Opinion
04 CIV. 8268 (DLC).
May 22, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
This Memorandum Opinion considers plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's February 14, 2006 Opinion (the "Opinion") granting summary judgment for defendants. The underlying action arises out of the City's sale of plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was incarcerated. In his complaint, Snype claims that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants violated his constitutional due process rights by misclassifying his vehicle as "abandoned" and failing to give him adequate notice of the auctioning of the vehicle. In his motion for reconsideration, plaintiff contends that the Opinion did not address his argument regarding misclassification.
The facts out of which this matter arises are set forth more fully in the Opinion, Snype v. New York City, No. 04 Civ. 8268 (DLC), 2006 WL 345861 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2006), familiarity with which is assumed.
A motion for reconsideration must set forth "the matters or controlling decisions" which a party "believes the court has overlooked." S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 6.3. In moving for reconsideration, the moving party "must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion." Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The moving party may not "advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the Court." Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Stroh Co., Inc., 265 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
The Opinion did not overlook Snype's argument regarding misclassification. Although the Opinion did not address it in detail, it explained that the issue of misclassification would not affect plaintiff's right to the money generated by the sale of the vehicle:
Under the governing statute, however, whether or not Snype abandoned his vehicle does not appear to determine his ultimate right to the proceeds of its sale at auction. . . . It appears . . . that Snype had a property interest in the proceeds from the sale of his vehicle for at least one year after the auction.Snype, 2006 WL 345861 at *3.
Furthermore, as explained in the Opinion, the existence of an adequate postdeprivation remedy defeats a federal claim based on allegations that a state official engaged in an unauthorized and intentional violation of a plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. Id. at *4. The tort laws of New York State provide such a remedy, id., and therefore Snype's argument that the City misclassified his vehicle as abandoned fails for this reason, as well.
Snype also argues for the first time that his substantive due process rights were violated by defendants' conduct. He citesVelez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005), for the proposition that "malicious and sadistic abuses of power" by government officials that "unquestionably shock the conscience" amount to substantive due process violations. Id. at 94 (citation omitted). This argument was not previously presented to the Court, and is therefore rejected. Nat'l Union, 265 F.3d at 115. In any event, misclassification of a vehicle as abandoned does not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.