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Snyder v. Snyder

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Feb 9, 2012
B225428 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012)

Opinion

B225428

02-09-2012

SCOTT A. SNYDER, as Co-trustee, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THOMAS C. SNYDER, as Co-trustee, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

Mortensen Law, Daniel R. Mortensen and Jeffrey B. Furchtenicht; Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Daniel B. Herbert, Steven J. Renick, and David Wilson for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Pelosi & Ferguson, Paul A. Pelosi and Adam W. Ferguson for Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP119019)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Reva Goetz, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded with instructions.

Mortensen Law, Daniel R. Mortensen and Jeffrey B. Furchtenicht; Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Daniel B. Herbert, Steven J. Renick, and David Wilson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Pelosi & Ferguson, Paul A. Pelosi and Adam W. Ferguson for Defendant and Respondent.

Scott A. Snyder and Guy H. Snyder (appellants) appeal from an order denying the majority of requests in their petition for instructions concerning the internal affairs of a trust and for construction of the trust instrument. Appellants argue that the trial court's interpretation of the trust is incorrect and that the court erred in denying the bulk of their petition for instructions.

Based on a plain reading of the trust, we disagree with the trial court's answers to some of appellants' proposed instructions. Therefore, we reverse in part and remand with instructions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUD

Appellants and their brother, respondent Thomas C. Snyder (respondent) are settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries of the Snyder Family Trust. Starting in the 1950s, Harold W. Snyder (Harold), the father of appellants and respondent, and his father, Sidney Snyder, began to acquire commercial properties on the west side of Los Angeles.Harold and his father personally managed the properties for many years. They thought of the properties as family assets, to be held and managed by and for the benefit of successive generations. In 1979, Harold helped appellants and respondent form the Snyder Family Trust, which has been used by the family to manage its real estate holdings in Southern California. Harold and Scott were the original co-trustees.

We will refer to the Snyder family members individually by their first names for clarity and ease of reference.

Harold resigned as a co-trustee of the Snyder Family Trust in 1988, at which time Scott became the sole trustee. In 1997, at Harold's request, Scott, Guy, and Thomas revised the Snyder family trust structure so that all three would be co-equal co-trustees, with day to day management subcontracted to Dicott Corporation, a California corporation wholly owned and operated by Scott. The current version of the trust is the fourth amendment to and complete restatement of the Snyder Family Trust, executed by and between Scott, Thomas, and Guy, as trustors and co-trustees, in January 2005. Scott, Guy, and Thomas continue as co-trustees of the trust, and day to day management remains with Dicott Corporation. Harold retains a minority interest in the properties.

Beginning in 2008, respondent began expressing disagreement with certain proposals made by Scott. Respondent suggested that Scott may have mismanaged the trust and might be committing fraud against the trust. Respondent demanded that the trust engage a third party auditor to investigate his suspicions. Appellants agreed that the expense of a third party audit was unnecessary. Appellants invited respondent to conduct his own review of the trust's records. Respondent was unhappy with that decision, and his concerns about the trust financial management were heightened.

On August 12, 2009, respondent withdrew $20,000 in trust funds. The funds were paid as a retainer to attorney Peter Bajorek (Bajorek), whom respondent engaged to assist him in obtaining accounting information from appellants and to investigate whether any breaches of trust had occurred. Appellants objected, and demanded that the money be returned. Respondent refused, citing section 5.15 of the trust as his authority to act. Appellants then blocked respondent's access to most trust financial accounts.

On October 7, 2009, appellants filed a safe harbor petition pursuant to Probate Code section 21320, asking for a determination that the underlying petition for instructions was not a contest.

All further statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.

On December 8, 2009, respondent transferred an additional $60,000 of trust funds to attorney Bajorek's client trust account to ensure that he would be able to pay his legal expenses related to the litigation appellants were initiating.

On December 30, 2009, the trial court granted appellants' petition. The final order granting the petition was signed on February 16, 2010.

On January 12, 2010, appellants filed their petition for instructions under section 17200 et seq. The petition sought the following orders: (1) that the trust "does not permit or authorize any unilateral action by any individual co-Trustee or Trustor that is expressly disapproved by a majority of co-Trustees"; (2) that the trust does not permit the withdrawal of funds by any individual co-trustee or trustor over the express disagreement of a majority of the co-trustees; (3) that each co-trustee and trustor is bound to accept the express decisions of a majority of co-trustees, made in good faith and not in breach of trust; (4) that if any individual co-trustee and trustor disputes the express decisions of a majority of co-trustees, he may not act unilaterally in contravention of such decisions but must seek arbitration or court decision in accordance with the terms of the trust; (5) that respondent could properly be denied unilateral signature authority over the trust and trust-entity accounts; (6) that respondent be ordered to refund the amount of $80,000 in trust assets unilaterally appropriated by him, or that appellants be permitted to recover the $80,000 by offsets; (7) that appellants' decision to immediately discontinue the services of Bajorek as an agent of the trust be given effect; and (8) that nothing in the court's orders affect the right of respondent to seek reimbursement from the trust for reasonable expenses incurred in managing and conducting the trust's business, subject to presentation and documentation of such expenses and approval of a majority of co-trustees in good faith and in accordance with the terms of the trust.

On April 5, 2010, respondent filed a verified written objection to the petition.Appellants filed a reply to respondent's objection on March 30, 2010. On April 1, 2010, Harold filed a joinder to appellants' petition. Although there were eight specific requests prayed for in the petition for instructions, appellants pointed out that all the requests revolved around a single basic question:

Respondent indicates in his brief that his objection was filed and served sometime prior to this date, but that due to a clerical error it was not file-stamped until April 5, 2010.

"Are the terms of the Trust reasonably susceptible to [respondent's] proffered interpretation that each co-Trustee is entitled to act unilaterally with respect to the entirety of Trust assets, to the exclusion, and over the express disapproval, of a majority of his co-Trustees?"

The matter was heard on April 5, 2010 and taken under submission. On May 3, 2010, the trial court ruled on the petition. The court denied outright six of the requested orders, concluding that "[t]he trust permits unilateral action by an individual co-trustee (w/ the exceptions set forth in 5.15)." The court deferred a ruling on appellants' sixth proposed instruction, indicating that the question of whether the $80,000 unilaterally withdrawn from the trust must be returned would be put off pending the outcome of the petition for breach of trust filed by respondent. Appellants' eighth proposed instruction was approved as modified to read that "[n]othing in this court's orders and decisions affects the right of [respondent], or any other interested person under the trust, to seek reimbursement and/or indemnification from the trust for reasonable expenses incurred in managing and conducting the trust business."

On June 25, 2010, appellants filed their notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of review

Generally, the probate court has wide discretion to make any order or take any action necessary or proper to dispose of matters presented by a petition under section 17200. (Manson v. Shepherd (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1258-1259.) However, findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. (Ibid.)

The main question presented in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the trust permits each co-trustee to act unilaterally with respect to the trust assets despite a majority decision to the contrary. "The interpretation of a will or trust instrument presents a question of law unless interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or a conflict therein. [Citations.]" (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254.)

Respondent argues that we should use a substantial evidence standard of review. Respondent claims that the court considered conflicting evidence, in the form of declarations, offered by the parties regarding the purpose behind execution of the trust. Because this conflicting evidence was placed before the court, respondent argues, the court's order should be given "the deference to which all findings of fact are due." (Estate of Verdisson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136.) However, there is no indication that the trial court resorted to extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of the trust. In particular, no party argued that the trust was ambiguous or susceptible to more than one interpretation. Courts may utilize extrinsic evidence to aid in construing a will or trust if it first finds that the will is ambiguous. (Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318.) No such finding of ambiguity was made, therefore we assume that the trial court followed the mandate of section 21102 and relied exclusively upon "[t]he intention of the transferor as expressed in the instrument."

II. Principles of trust interpretation

The rules governing the construction and interpretation of trust instruments are set out in part 1 of division 11 of the Probate Code. The intention of the transferor, "as expressed in the instrument," controls our interpretation. (§ 21102.) The words of an instrument are to be given their ordinary and grammatical meaning. (§ 21122.)

The part generally applies to a will, trust, deed, and any other instrument. (§ 21101.)

Where there are provisions in a will or trust that appear to conflict, the different parts "are to be construed in relation to each other and so as, if possible, to form a consistent whole." (§ 21121.) Further, "[t]he words of an instrument are to receive an interpretation that will give every expression some effect, rather than one that will render any of the expressions inoperative." (§ 21120.)

Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the trust.

III. Section 5.15

Respondent cited section 5.15 of the trust as his authority to unilaterally withdraw funds. That section reads:

"Individual Trustors Acting As Trustees and Signatures. Except as otherwise set forth in this Section 5.15, any Trustor acting as a Trustee under this Trust shall have the full and exclusive power to operate the business and affairs of the Trust as if such Trustee was the individual and absolute owner thereof. Any Trustor acting as Trustee shall have the right to sign documents in the exercise of his or her powers under the Trust. Provided, however, the signatures of all Trustors acting as Trustees then serving shall be required on any (1) deed or other instrument conveying real property; (2) note and deed of trust or mortgage encumbering real property; (3) document to borrow or loan money; (4) agreement to invest in a limited partnership; and (5) any binding agreement for the purchase or sale of real property." (Original bolding.)

As set forth above, neither party has argued that section 5.15 is vague or ambiguous. Giving the words of this provision an ordinary meaning, it permits any one of the three trustors and co-trustees to operate the business and affairs of the trust as if he were the individual and absolute owner of the entire trust. This power is expressly limited only by the specific exceptions included within the section, which do not include a limitation on the withdrawal of money.

Section 5.7 of the trust expressly provides that "[f]unds may be withdrawn by check or other instrument signed by any Trustee . . . without inquiry of any kind . . . ."

The trial court correctly came to this conclusion, finding that "[t]he trust permits unilateral action by an individual co-trustee." However, section 5.15 does not address a trustee's authority to act unilaterally where, as here, the trustees have collectively considered the proposed unilateral action and a dispute has arisen among them. That situation is not governed by section 5.15, but by section 5.22.

IV. Section 5.22


Section 5.22 of the trust reads:

"Disputes. If more than one Trustee is acting at any time, and a difference arises among the Trustees which affects the Trust, the decision of a majority in number of the Trustees then acting shall control. If such difference cannot be resolved in such manner, the Trustees then acting may jointly select an independent person, or agree to submit the matter to arbitration to resolve such difference in accordance with the provisions of Section 16. The cost of such independent person or arbitration shall be borne by the Trust Estate."

Section 5.22 addresses the situation where more than one co-trustee is acting, and a disagreement has arisen. We interpret such collective action to include the act of collectively considering whether a proposed action -- i.e., engaging an outside auditor -- is in the best interest of the trust. Under these circumstances, when a dispute arises, section 5.22 dictates that the decision of the majority "shall control."

V. Interaction of sections 5.15 and 5.22

Having analyzed the plain language of sections 5.15 and 5.22, we turn back to the single basic question proposed by appellants:

"Are the terms of the Trust reasonably susceptible to [respondent's] proffered interpretation that each co-Trustee is entitled to act unilaterally with respect to the entirety of Trust assets, to the exclusion, and over the express disapproval, of a majority of his co-Trustees?"

We answer this question differently than the trial court. Based on the plain language of section 5.22, we find that where the co-trustees have acted together to consider a proposed action, and the majority has expressly disapproved such proposed action, a single co-trustee may not take unilateral action in contravention of that majority decision.

We agree with appellant's argument that any other interpretation of the trust instrument would render section 5.22 inoperative. If, following joint consideration of a proposed action -- such as the hiring of outside assistance in obtaining accounting information -- a co-trustee may unilaterally go forward with such action regardless of the majority decision, the mandatory language of section 5.22 is completely ineffectual. Under section 21120, the words of an instrument must "receive an interpretation that will give every expression some effect, rather than one that will render any of the expressions inoperative." Where the co-trustees act together to consider a proposal and a dispute arises, the majority decision must control. In order to make both sections 5.15 and section 5.22 effectual, a co-trustee's ability to act unilaterally must be restricted where such unilateral action has been considered and rejected by a majority.

Because we base our decision on the plain language of the trust, we decline to consider the parties' declarations concerning their intentions in signing the document. (Estate of Dodge, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 318.)

VI. Application of sections 5.15 and 5.22 under the undisputed facts of this case

Under the undisputed facts of this matter, respondent demanded that the trust engage a third party auditor to investigate his suspicions of financial wrongdoing. By making this demand, respondent sought the consideration and agreement of his co-trustees. In other words, respondent proposed that the co-trustees act together to alleviate his concerns regarding possible mismanagement and fraud. Appellants -- constituting the majority -- were not in agreement with respondent. Appellants felt that the expense of a third party audit was unnecessary. As the co-trustees collectively considered respondent's suggestion that the trust engage an outside auditor, a dispute arose.

The majority of co-trustees, along with Harold, decided that the services of an outside auditor were unnecessary and too expensive. That majority decision should have controlled that particular question. Nevertheless, respondent unilaterally withdrew $20,000 "to assist him in obtaining meaningful accounting information from Scott and to investigate whether Scott had been concealing breaches of trust." That withdrawal was not permissible under the plain language of section 5.22.

Respondent admits that the first $20,000 that he unilaterally withdrew was to pay an attorney "to assist him in obtaining meaningful accounting information from Scott and to investigate whether Scott had been concealing breaches of trust." As to this first withdrawal, the majority had already determined that such outside accounting and investigation was unnecessary. Thus, this first unilateral action was subject to section 5.22. As to the second withdrawal of $60,000, respondent claims that this action was "to ensure that he would be able to pay his legal expenses related to the litigation his brothers had initiat[ed] against him." Apparently respondent had not proposed this withdrawal of $60,000 to pay his legal fees to his co-trustees beforehand. Thus, this second withdrawal was, arguably, pure unilateral action not subject to section 5.22. This factual distinction was not raised or decided below, therefore we decline to address it further.

VII. Proposed instructions

Having determined that a co-trustee may not act unilaterally over the express disapproval of the majority of co-trustees, we now turn to the court's decisions as to each of appellants' eight proposed instructions.

1. "That the trust, including [section] 5.15 thereof, does not permit or authorize any unilateral action by any individual co-Trustee or Trustor that is expressly disapproved by a majority of co-Trustees."

The trial court denied this request, on the ground that each co-trustee is permitted to act unilaterally, as if he were the individual and absolute owner of the trust. We disagree. Where the co-trustees have acted together to consider taking certain action on behalf of the trust, and a dispute has arisen, section 5.22 dictates that the majority decision must control. Under these circumstances, an individual may not take unilateral action which has been expressly disapproved by majority decision.

2. "That [section] 5.7 of the Trust does not permit any withdrawal of Trust funds by any individual co-Trustee or Trustor over the express disapproval of a majority of co-Trustees, and any funds so withdrawn must be returned to the Trust on demand or alternatively, may be recovered by offset."

The trial court denied this request, holding that "[t]he trust permits unilateral withdrawal of trust funds by an individual co-trustee." However, the trial court addressed only part of this proposed instruction. As set forth above, where a specific withdrawal, for a specific purpose, is under consideration by more than one trustee, those trustees are acting together to determine whether such withdrawal is in the best interests of the trust. If a dispute arises, the majority decision controls. Under these circumstances, a single trustee may not withdraw funds in contravention of a majority decision disapproving such withdrawal.

3. "That each individual co-Trustee and Trustor is bound to accept, and not act in contravention of, the express decisions of a majority of co-Trustees, made in good faith and not in breach of Trust."

Again, the trial court denied this proposed instruction. The trial court held that "[t]he trust permits a decision to be made by a majority of co-trustees where there is a disagreement among the trustees." Appellants do not disagree with the trial court's conclusion, but argue that in light of this conclusion, the trial court's denial of this request is unfathomable.

Again, we disagree with the trial court's determination. This proposed instruction contemplates a situation where the co-trustees have acted together to consider whether a proposed action is in the best interests of the trust. If an individual co-trustee disagrees, section 5.22 comes into play, and each co-trustee is bound to accept the majority decision. Under the mandatory language of section 5.22, an individual co-trustee may not act unilaterally in contravention of the majority decision. Thus, this proposed instruction should have been approved.

4. "That if any individual co-Trustee and Trustor disputes the express decisions of a majority of co-Trustees, he may not act unilaterally in contravention of such decision but must seek arbitration or court decision in accordance with the terms of the Trust."

The trial court denied this request, holding that "[n]othing in this court's orders and decisions that affects the right of [respondent], or any other interested person under the trust to, seek reimbursement and/or indemnification from the trust for reasonable expenses incurred in managing and conducting the trust business." Appellants argue that this holding appears to be a typographical error, since the language exactly repeats the language of the trial court's ruling on appellants' request number eight. Appellants argue that there is no basis for denying this request in light of the court's recognition of the majority rule.

The trial court correctly recognized the majority rule in the event that two or more trustees are working together and a disagreement arises. However, this proposed instruction, as drafted, was properly denied. Section 5.22 uses permissive language. In the event that the majority decision does not resolve the differences among the trustees, the trustees "may jointly select an independent person, or agree to submit the matter to arbitration to resolve such difference . . . ." (Italics added.) Therefore appellants' request that the trial court instruct the trustees that they "must seek arbitration or court decision" would be in direct contravention of the trust. Therefore, this proposed instruction was properly denied.

5. "That [respondent] properly may be denied unilateral signature authority over Trust and Trust-entity accounts absent majority approval of co-Trustees, and the Petitioners' actions in furtherance of same be approved."

The trial court denied this proposed instruction without explanation. Appellants argue that they merely asked the trial court to confirm that the majority of trustees can act to ensure that their decisions are enforced. Appellants cite section 16013, which provides that "[i]f a trust has more than one trustee, each trustee has a duty . . . [t]o take reasonable steps to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust or to compel a co-trustee to redress a breach of trust." Appellants argue that respondent abused his right to make withdrawals by making withdrawals contrary to the express decision of a majority of the trustees, therefore in order to protect the trust, request number five should have been approved.

We disagree with appellants. Like the other two trustees, respondent has broad unilateral authority to operate the affairs of the trust. The trust provides no mechanism for denying such authority, nor have appellants cited a provision of the trust in support of this argument. Therefore, we find that this proposed instruction was properly denied.

6. "That [respondent] be ordered to refund the amount of $80,000 in Trust assets unilaterally appropriated by him, or in the alternative, that as co-Trustees acting jointly [appellants] be permitted to recover said $80,000 by offset against distributions to [respondent] in accordance with [section]18.15 of the Trust."

The trial court deferred ruling on this proposed instruction "pending the outcome of the Petition for Breach of Trust filed [by respondent] on January 12, 2010." However, appellants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. Appellants claim that whether or not respondent's accusations against his brothers are true has nothing to do with whether respondent should be obliged to comply with a decision made by the majority of the trustees relating to the respondent's actions.

To the extent that respondent's monetary withdrawals were in direct contravention of a majority decision regarding the need for outside assistance in obtaining audit information, such action was impermissible under section 5.22 and the money was improperly taken from the trust.

Section 18.15 of the trust permits offset in the event that a trustor or beneficiary owes money to the trust. Specifically, it states: "Whenever the Trust is to pay any sum to any Trustor or beneficiary, any amounts that Trustor or beneficiary owes the Trust may be deducted from that sum before payment." Therefore, we find that any amounts withdrawn in violation of a majority decision made pursuant to section 5.22 may be offset pursuant to this provision.

Respondent argues that this proposed instruction is moot, since appellants have already offset respondent's payments by $80,000. However, documentation of the offset is outside of the record before this court.

This proposed instruction should be modified in accordance with this finding, and granted as modified.

7. "That the [appellants'] express joint decision to immediately discontinue the services of Peter Bajorek as an agent of the Trust, and to require [respondent] to hire such attorney personally with his own funds, subject to reimbursement in accordance with the terms of the Trust, be given effect."

The trial court denied this requested instruction without explanation. Appellants argue that this was error. Appellants admit that section 5.13.1 of the trust permits the trustees to "employ . . . attorneys . . . to assist in administering the Trust." However, appellants point to section 5.13.3, which provides that "[t]he employment of any agent and the authorization of any person under this Section 5.13 may be terminated at any time upon majority vote of the Trustees." Appellants argue that this is exactly what happened here -- the majority of trustees sought to terminate Mr. Bajorek as an agent of the trust.

We find that the trial court properly denied this request. Appellants fail to provide a citation to the record indicating that Bajorek was hired as an agent of the trust. Instead, respondent unilaterally hired Bajorek, indicating that he transferred the majority of the funds out of the trust to "ensure that he can pay the legal expenses that he will incur as a result of the litigation initiated by [appellants]." Absent a specific indication that Bajorek was hired as an agent of the trust, there is no reason to discontinue such services to the trust.

In addition, as noted above, respondent and appellants appear to agree that this proposed instruction is moot due to the fact that appellants have already offset the $80,000 pursuant to section 18.15.
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8. "That nothing in this Court's order and declarations affect the right of [respondent], or any other interested person under the Trust, to seek reimbursement and/or indemnification from the Trust for reasonable expenses incurred in managing and conducting the Trust's business, subject to presentation and documentation of such expenses and approval of a majority of co-Trustees in good faith in accordance with the terms of the Trust."

The trial court approved this request as modified to read: "Nothing in this court's orders and decisions that affects the right of [respondent], or any other interested person under the trust, to seek reimbursement and/or indemnification from the trust for reasonable expenses incurred in managing and conducting the trust business." The trial court deleted appellants' language requiring that such reimbursement or indemnification be "subject to presentation and documentation of such expenses and approval of a majority of co-Trustees in good faith in accordance with the terms of the Trust."

Appellants argue that the modification effectively denied the request. What appellants sought was confirmation that the majority decisions of the trustees were controlling.

As set forth above, by the express terms of the trust, each trustee is permitted to act individually, subject to certain specific limitations set forth in section 5.15. In addition, pursuant to section 5.18, "[a]ll reasonable expenses incurred by the Trustees in managing and conducting the Trust's business, including (but not limited to) overhead, administrative and travel expenses, and professional, technical, administrative and other services, shall be reimbursed by the Trust." The mandatory language of section 5.18 requires that all reasonable expenses be reimbursed, without reference to presentation and majority approval.

Pursuant to section 5.22, majority decisions control only in the situation where more than one trustee is acting and a difference arises among the trustees. Thus, the trust is designed for each trustee to act independently, as absolute owner, with the majority vote only coming into play where trustees, acting together, do not agree. The majority rule set forth in section 5.22 applies only under these circumstances, and does not otherwise affect a trustee's right to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses.

Based on the plain language of the trust document, we find that the trial court properly modified the proposed instruction to eliminate the need for presentation and approval of expenses before a majority of co-Trustees.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed to the extent that it held that a trustee may act unilaterally in contravention of a majority decision under section 5.22. The trial court's ruling on appellant's proposed instructions is reversed in part and remanded for entry of an order which conforms with our decision. Each party shall bear its own costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

____________________________, Acting P. J.

DOI TODD

____________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST


Summaries of

Snyder v. Snyder

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Feb 9, 2012
B225428 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012)
Case details for

Snyder v. Snyder

Case Details

Full title:SCOTT A. SNYDER, as Co-trustee, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

Date published: Feb 9, 2012

Citations

B225428 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012)