Opinion
No. C 01-0969 CR3 (PR) (Doc #18)
August 13, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, filed the instant pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that, while incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad ("SVSP"), SVSP Warden A. A. Lamarque and Correctional Administrator M. Monteiro violated his rights to due process and equal protection when, on May 10, 2000 and February 14, 2001, they intentionally segregated him without a disciplinary hearing because of his race and inability to disclose information.
Per order filed on May 22, 2001, the court found that plaintiffs allegations stated minimally cognizable claims for damages under § 1983 when liberally construed, and ordered the United States Marshal to serve defendants. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that there are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They also claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and defendants have filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
B. Claims and Analysis
Defendants contend that plaintiffs equal protection and due process claims are without merit because plaintiff was subjected to modified program lockdowns on the dates at issue solely in response to stabbing incidents involving white inmates. Defendants specifically argue that plaintiffs segregation was carried out pursuant to an emergency response plan reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and that a hearing was not required under such circumstances.
Defendants submit various declarations showing, and other parts of the record also show, the following: On the dates at issue, white inmates (including plaintiff) were placed on a modified program following stabbing incidents involving only white prisoners. Under the modified program, white inmates were isolated and monitored, and their movement was restricted pending further investigation. The modified program was reviewed every 24 hours and "non-involved inmates" were released back into the general population/program as the results of the incident investigation (including inmate interviews) unfolded.
Defendants further show that isolating and interviewing plaintiff and other white inmates was reasonably related to maintaining the safety and security of the institution, inmates and staff until the stabbing incidents could be thoroughly investigated. White inmates, like other racial groups in prison, may be involved in prison gangs which often conspire to attack other inmates. It is important to isolate them promptly if they could have been involved in a stabbing in order to obtain information from them and avoid destruction of evidence or schemes to agree on a false story or alibi. If, during the course of the investigation, it was found that black, Hispanic, Asian or Native American inmates had been involved, they too would have been isolated, monitored and interviewed.
1. Equal protection
"Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). Invidious racial discrimination such as racial segregation, which is unconstitutional outside prisons, is unconstitutional within prisons, save for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000).
A claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause requires a showing of discriminatory intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). In addition, the claim must be rejected if, as is the case here, the prison regulation or practice claimed to have infringed on an inmate's constitutional rights is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-25 (1990) (standard of review adopted in Turner applies in all circumstances in which needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights, including when the constitutional right claimed to have been infringed is fundamental or a suspect class is involved).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs equal protection claim because plaintiff has not "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Plaintiffs conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent and general second-guessing of defendants' emergency response plan will not do. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). That defendants may have approached the situation in a manner less objectionable to plaintiff and other white inmates in no way means that defendants violated plaintiffs equal protection rights. The Supreme Court made clear 30 years ago that racial segregation is unconstitutional within prisons, save for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 321. Here, the undisputed facts in the record make clear that plaintiffs temporary segregation and questioning were carried out for the necessities of prison security and discipline. Defendants are entitled to judgment on this claim as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Defendants also are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2001) (qualified immunity proper if plaintiff fails to show violation of constitutional right or that constitutional right was not clearly established at time of incident).
2. Due process
It is well-established that there is no due process right to a hearing before a prisoner is placed on lockdown during a prison state of emergency. See Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal prisoner); Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1980) (California state prisoner). This is especially true where, as here, plaintiff was subjected to two separate modified programs less severe than a total cell lockdown, and which together lasted no more than a few "weeks." Cf. id. at 600-03 (upholding single lockdown which lasted 5 months).
California's prison regulations do not compel otherwise. Cf Hayward, 629 F.2d at 602 (finding that former state regulations authorizing lockdowns do not create a protected liberty interest entitling prisoner to a hearing before a lockdown may be imposed or continued).
Plaintiffs general second-guessing of defendants' emergency response plan again is insufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no evidence in the record that the modified programs at issue were anything but legitimate responses to prison states of emergency. See id. And even if plaintiffs treatment was meted out as punishment rather than as a response to a prison state of emergency, plaintiff has not established that the nature and duration of the deprivations of which he complains amounted to "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). See. e.g., Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931, 932 (9th Cir. 1995) (despite prior case law determining disciplinary regulations created liberty interest, under Sandin no liberty interest when inmate placed in disciplinary segregation for less than 30 days). Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs due process claim as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
Defendants also are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56.
Plaintiff claims for the first time in his opposition papers that the restrictions on outside exercise he was subjected to under the modified programs violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs claim is untimely at this point the proceeding and, in any event, is without merit. See. e.g., Hayward, 629 F.2d at 603 (temporary restriction on outdoor exercise in response to prison state of emergency did not violate 8th Amendment).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (doc #18)is GRANTED.The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the file. SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issued have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, judgment is entered in favor of defendants.