Summary
finding case manager entitled to prosecutorial immunity where claims stemmed entirely from case manager’s function as a legal advocate, i.e., assisting in prosecution and constructing a case for the prosecution
Summary of this case from State ex rel. W.Va. Attorney-Gen. v. BallardOpinion
No. 2:19-CV-167
2021-01-19
Tracy D. L. C. SMITH and Candace A. Smith, Plaintiffs, v. Chris HATCHER, Andrea Browning, Georgia Department of Human Services, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Randy Austin, Stephanie Shuman, and Glynn County, Georgia, Defendants.
James A. Yancey, Jr., James a. Yancey, PC, Brunswick, GA, for Plaintiffs. Richard K. Strickland, Steven G. Blackerby, & Watkins, LLP, Brunswick, GA, for Defendants Chris Hatcher, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Stephanie Shuman, Georgia Glynn County. Patrick T. O'Connor, Stuart Fallin Sumner, Oliver Maner, LLP, Savannah, GA, for Defendant Randy Austin.
James A. Yancey, Jr., James a. Yancey, PC, Brunswick, GA, for Plaintiffs.
Richard K. Strickland, Steven G. Blackerby, & Watkins, LLP, Brunswick, GA, for Defendants Chris Hatcher, E. Neal Jump, Michael Heath, Stephanie Shuman, Georgia Glynn County.
Patrick T. O'Connor, Stuart Fallin Sumner, Oliver Maner, LLP, Savannah, GA, for Defendant Randy Austin.
ORDER
LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Andrea Browning and the Georgia Department of Human Services (collectively, "Defendants"). Dkt. No. 53. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED .
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an alleged contractual agreement to assume legal custody of a minor child between Plaintiffs Tracy D. L. C. Smith and Candace A. Smith ("Plaintiffs") and the parents of the child. Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 8. Plaintiffs took physical custody of the child but never obtained legal guardianship over the child. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. Soon thereafter, the minor child's mother indicated to Chris Hatcher, an officer of the Glynn County Police Department, that she had attempted to regain custody of the child but that Plaintiffs refused to bring the child back or tell the mother where the child was located. Id. ¶ 22. Consequently, these allegations led to the arrest of Plaintiffs on two separate occasions based on grand jury indictments and bench warrants for interstate interference with custody issued by the Glynn County Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 31-34, 50-52. Both indictments were subsequently dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 42, 90. Plaintiffs contend they were wrongly arrested and that the indictments and subsequent prosecutions against them were illegally and unconstitutionally initiated and pursued. Id. ¶¶ 26, 92. Plaintiffs filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations arising from the arrests and ensuing prosecutions in the Glynn County Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 102, 128, 136, 144, 152. Plaintiffs also bring state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 132, 140, 148, 156, 169.
Defendants Andrea Browning ("Browning") and the Georgia Department of Human Services (the "DHS") are two of seven named defendants. Plaintiffs assert claims against Chris Hatcher, a Glynn County Police Department Sergeant; Andrea Browning, a Department of Family and Children Services ("DFCS") case manager; the DHS; E. Neal Jump, Glynn County Sheriff; Michael Heath, a Glynn County jail administrator; Randy Austin, a Glynn County detention captain; and Stephanie Shuman, a Glynn County detention lieutenant. Id. at 1-2. In response, Defendants Browning and DHS filed the present Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 53.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege the following conduct by Defendants resulted in violations of certain protections guaranteed to them by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and constituted false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law:
DEFENDANT BROWNING[ ] assisted DEFENDANT HATCHER and Assistant District Attorney BARNHILL [a nonparty] in the first prosecution of [Plaintiffs] which included going to Idaho to take physical custody of [the minor child].
Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 47.
DEFENDANT BROWNING continued to construct a case for the prosecution of [Plaintiffs].
Id. ¶ 48.
[Despite] her knowledge of the dismissal of the previous indictment for its failure to allege a violation of the law ..., DEFENDANT BROWNING, as the prosecutor, initiated and sustained a second prosecution of [Plaintiffs] for the same conduct alleged in the first indictment.
Id. ¶ 49.
DEFENDANT GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES is liable ... for its respective failures to property [sic] train its personnel and ... for condoning the policy and practices of its employees ... in the reckless institution of criminal actions against innocent parties such as [Plaintiffs].
Id. ¶ 169-70.
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 53. Defendant Browning contends that she should be dismissed because she is afforded prosecutorial immunity for the federal claims asserted against her. Dkt. No. 53-1 at 6. Further, Defendant Browning maintains that the state law tort claims also fail because only a state entity may be sued under the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA"). Id. Defendant DHS contends it should be dismissed because it has Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the federal and state claims asserted against it. Id. It also maintains that it is shielded from the state law claims pursuant to the express language of the GTCA. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
This Court may dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint is plausible on its face when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
It is important to note that while the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are to be considered true at the motion to dismiss stage, the same does not apply to legal conclusions set forth in the complaint. Sinaltrainal v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Lastly, the Court notes that exhibits attached to pleadings become part of a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). The Court can consider public records when deciding a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment. Universal Express, Inc. v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 177 F. App'x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) ("A district court may take judicial notice of certain facts without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Public records are among the permissible facts that a district court may consider.").
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant Browning
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Browning violated Plaintiffs' legal and constitutional rights under both federal and state law. Dkt. No. 44 at 2.
A. Federal Law Claims
First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Browning committed false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, and malicious prosecution, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 127-154. However, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest , and malicious prosecution under federal law.
Counts Ten through Eighteen are brought against "All Defendants," including Defendant Browning and Defendant DHS. Id. ¶¶ 127-165.
The Court has previously held that federal law does not recognize the distinct cause of action for malicious arrest under § 1983. Jaudon v. Sasser for Estate of Sasser, No. 2:17-CV-118, 2020 WL 261226, at *10 n.11 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 2020) (citations omitted). Rather, such claims are construed as or equated with claims for false arrest. Id.
1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment
An unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment can give rise to a viable constitutional tort cognizable under section 1983. However, not every unlawful arrest or imprisonment by a public officer violates a constitutional right. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Section 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment "consist[ ] of detention without legal process. " Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). As such, when detention is pursuant to a form of legal process, such as a warrant, a cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment is improper. Washington v. St. Lawrence, No. CV4:12-062, 2012 WL 2792319, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 19, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV4:12-062, 2012 WL 2792317 (S.D. Ga. July 9, 2012). Instead, "unlawful detention forms part of the damages for the ‘entirely distinct’ tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ; see also, Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing the distinction between malicious prosecution and false arrest claims).
Plaintiffs concede that they were arrested pursuant to bench warrants issued after grand jury indictments. Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 31-33, 50-52. Because Plaintiffs were arrested pursuant to legal process, i.e., two bench warrants, they have stated no facts supporting a false imprisonment or false arrest claim against Defendant Browning.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Accordingly, only Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim remains to permit relief in this context. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) ("[U]nlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, [malicious prosecution] permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process."); Carter v. Gore, 557 F. App'x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Given that [plaintiff] was arrested pursuant to a warrant, the district court properly concluded that [plaintiff]'s only available claim against [the defendant] under § 1983 was for malicious prosecution."). Nonetheless, Defendant Browning's prosecutorial immunity precludes Plaintiffs' section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
Even if the facts alleged supported false arrest and false imprisonment claims, those claims would also be barred by prosecutorial immunity as discussed below. See e.g., Houston v. Heap, No. CV4:19-144, 2020 WL 3473654, at *1 (S.D. Ga. June 25, 2020) (barring a section 1983 false imprisonment claim under absolute immunity).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Browning "violated [Plaintiffs'] rights protected under the Fourth Amendment with her initiation and continuation of the prosecution of them that led directly to [their] illegal and unconstitutional indictment, arrest[,] and incarceration." Dkt. No. 44 ¶ 102. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Browning "instituted and maintained the proceedings against [Plaintiffs] with malice, personal spite, and ill will." Id. ¶ 153. Defendant Browning moves to dismiss because she is afforded prosecutorial immunity for the federal claims asserted against her. Dkt. No. 53-1 at 6. Plaintiffs filed a response brief but offered no legal or factual opposition to the prosecutorial immunity argument. Dkt. No. 56 at 2.
This claim, found in Count Two of the complaint, is brought specifically against Defendant Browning and is in addition to count sixteen (misidentified as count 14), which alleges malicious prosecution against "all defendants". Compare Dkt. No. 44 at 22 with id. at 36. However, both claims set forth allegations of malicious prosecution and will be construed together for purposes of clarity.
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity is whether the allegations at hand stem from the prosecutor's function as a legal advocate. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) ("Acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in h[er] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."); see also Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). Further, prosecutorial immunity is not limited solely to prosecutors in title. Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009). As the Supreme Court explained in Buckley, a "functional approach" is necessary to determine whether absolute immunity is warranted. 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606. Courts must look to "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606 ). The official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Here, Defendant Browning is not a prosecutor in title, but Plaintiffs' claims stem entirely from Defendant Browning's function as a legal advocate. Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that Defendant Browning "assisted ... in the first prosecution" and "continued to construct a case for the prosecution. " Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 47, 48 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Browning, "as the prosecutor , initiated and sustained a second prosecution of [Plaintiffs]." Id. ¶ 49 (emphasis added). These alleged actions by Defendant Browning are the type of decisions that fall within the everyday activities of a prosecutor. See e.g., Neville v. Classic Gardens, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 2001) ("[A] prosecutor's decision whether or not to prosecute[ ] ‘lies at the heart of the prosecutorial function.’ " (quoting Altman v. Kelly, 28 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1998) )).
Further, although Plaintiffs sue Browning in her individual capacity as a case manager for the Glynn County DFCS, Browning's alleged role was functionally identical to that of a prosecutor. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Browning's unlawful conduct consisted of her initiation and continuation of the prosecution against them. Id. ¶ 102. Additionally, the second indictment against Plaintiffs—attached to Plaintiffs' complaint as exhibit I—was signed by Defendant Browning as the "Prosecutor." Dkt. No. 44-8 at 2. Consequently, Defendant Browning performed the same functions that a prosecutor in title would have performed in the judicial proceedings at issue. Because Defendant Browning performed functions analogous to those of a prosecutor, she is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to those acts. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) ("[A]gency officials performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor should be able to claim absolute immunity with respect to such acts.").
Finally, in support of their federal causes of action, Plaintiffs contend that "neither probable cause nor reasonable and articulable suspicion existed for the indictment," and that Defendant Browning "instituted and maintained the proceedings against [Plaintiff] with malice, personal spite, and ill will." Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 103, 153.
However, prosecutorial immunity extends to litigation-related activities without regard to the motives of a prosecutor. "[T]he absolute immunity doctrine has evolved such that even wrongful or malicious acts by prosecutors are allowed to go unredressed in order to prevent a flood of claims against the remainder of prosecutors performing their duties properly." Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2009). As such, Defendant Browning retains prosecutorial immunity despite Plaintiffs' allegation that she proceeded with malice, personal spite, and ill will. Jackson v. Capraun, 534 F. App'x 854, 859 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[A prosecutor] is entitled to absolute immunity for initiating the prosecution even if [s]he did it with malicious intent."). Such immunity also extends to the claim that Defendant Browning prosecuted Plaintiffs without the requisite probable cause. Holt v. Crist, 233 F. App'x 900, 903 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Immunity extends to charging a defendant without probable cause ...."); Ramey v. Georgia, No. 4:10-CV-06CDL, 2010 WL 786806, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2010) (holding that prosecutorial immunity extends "to Plaintiff's claims that the District Attorney prosecuted Plaintiff without probable cause"). Indeed, "having absolute immunity in civil damages actions would be of little consequence if it could only be asserted when the prosecutor correctly complied with every legal obligation, in which case there would be no claim." Hart, 587 F.3d at 1298.
Plaintiffs' allegations make it clear that Defendant Browning acted as a government advocate in initiating and assisting in the prosecution against them. Since Defendant Browning's alleged acts fall within the scope of her prosecutorial function, Plaintiffs' federal claims are deflected by the shield of absolute immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims against Defendant Browning are DISMISSED .
B. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs also assert various state law claims against Defendant Browning. Defendant Browning contends that these claims are barred by the Georgia Tort Claims Act. Dkt. No. 53-1 at 16; O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20. The GTCA "constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a state officer or employee." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a). Pursuant to the GTCA, "[a] state officer or employee who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment is not subject to lawsuit or liability therefor." Id. This immunity applies even when the officer is accused of committing unauthorized torts that are intentional or malicious. See Ridley v. Johns, 274 Ga. 241, 552 S.E.2d 853, 854 (2001) ("Since there is no exemption in the statute for acts motivated by malice or an intent to injure, the presence of such motivation has no effect on the immunity granted by the statute.").
Counts Ten through Eighteen, which are brought against "All Defendants," include the state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 127-165.
The Georgia Department of Human Services "includes the county departments of family and children services and the agents, agencies, officers, and employees designated by the commissioner of human services." O.C.G.A. § 49-4-2(1) ; see also Dep't of Human Servs. v. Duncan, 351 Ga.App. 332, 831 S.E.2d 4, 10 (2019), cert. denied (Mar. 13, 2020) ("[T]he [defendants] were acting on behalf of the DHS ... as a result, they were ‘state officers or employees’ under the Tort Claims Act.").
Guided by these principles, the Court turns to the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs have filed their complaint against Defendant Browning in her individual capacity as a case manager. However, the Complaint alleges that Browning acted unlawfully by constructing, initiating, and sustaining prosecution against Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 44 at 10-11. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' complaint explicitly states that "[a]t all times relevant to this Complaint ... DEFENDANT BROWNING worked as a case manager for the Glynn County [DFCS]." Id. ¶ 7. Since the only alleged interaction between Plaintiffs and Defendant Browning occurred during her prosecution of Plaintiffs, the facts as alleged demonstrate that Defendant Browning was acting within the scope of her employment as a case manager when the alleged misconduct occurred. Cf. O.C.G.A. § 50–21–25(a) (a state officer or employee does not enjoy immunity "if it is proved that the officer's or employee's conduct was not within the scope of his or her official duties or employment" (emphasis added)). Because the GTCA shields Defendant Browning from being sued individually for the state law claims alleged against her, these claims must be DISMISSED . See Timmons v. Martin, No. 6:17-CV-116, 2020 WL 5580172, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2020) (dismissing state law claims because defendants were acting within the scope of their official duties), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:17-CV-116, 2020 WL 5578688 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2020).
The GTCA applies to actions against state employees in their official and individual capacities; merely styling a suit against a public officer as one brought against her personally does not deprive her of any immunity to which she might otherwise be entitled to under the GTCA. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(a) ; Stephens v. Coan, 349 Ga.App. 147, 825 S.E.2d 525 (2019).
The term "scope of employment" under the GTCA has been broadly construed. See Ridley, 552 S.E.2d at 855 (finding supervisor's harassment of female employee occurred during the performance of the supervisor's official duties, thus he was entitled to official immunity); Davis v. Standifer, 275 Ga.App. 769, 621 S.E.2d 852, 855 (2005) (finding sexual assault by a police officer that occurred during a traffic stop of plaintiff's vehicle was within the scope of the police officer's official duties). The "scope of employment" test is a "straightforward" one that considers whether the defendant's conduct was performed in "the regular duties of their employment, during their regular hours of employment, at their regular site of employment." Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 746 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2013).
Because Defendant Browning is immune from suit, Plaintiffs' only potential avenue of recourse under state law would be against the DHS as the state governmental entity that employed Browning. See Riddle v. Ashe, 269 Ga. 65, 495 S.E.2d 287 (1998) ("While a state actor is immune from suit if acting within the scope of his or her official duties, the GTCA does allow recourse against the state for the same conduct, if certain conditions have been satisfied."). The GTCA instructs tort claimants to "name as a party defendant only the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting and shall not name the state officer or employee individually." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b) (emphasis added). In other words, if a state officer or employee is sued for a tort committed while acting within the scope of his or her official duties or employment, "the state government entity for which the state officer or employee was acting must be substituted as the party defendant." Id.
II. Defendant DHS
Along with the claims that require substituting the DHS for Defendant Browning, Plaintiffs also allege various state law and federal constitutional claims against DHS itself. Defendants contend that the state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment bars any claims brought directly against DHS and any substituted claims that could be brought. Dkt. No. 53-1 at 14. Thus, the Court must consider the extent of the State's sovereign immunity, together with any modification of that immunity under the GTCA.
Counts Ten through Eighteen are brought against "[a]ll Defendants," including Defendant DHS. Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 127-165. Plaintiffs assert generally that Georgia DHS is liable for its respective failures to properly train its personnel and for condoning the policy and practice of committing "the reckless institution of criminal actions against innocent parties," such as Plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 44 ¶¶ 169-170.
A. State Law Claims
"The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution bars federal courts from entertaining suits against states." Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits individuals from bringing suit against a state in federal court unless the state either consents to suit or waives its immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to any other entity properly described as "an arm of the State." Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) ; see also Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 713 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1983). In determining whether a defendant is an "arm of the State" for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, federal courts must examine the state law which creates and defines the particular entity. Brown v. East Central Health Dist., 752 F.2d 615, 617 (11th Cir. 1985). In doing so, the DHS and its respective DFCS offices have consistently been held to be "arms of the State" for purposes of immunity. See Powell v. Dep't of Human Res. of State of Ga., 918 F. Supp. 1575, 1578 (S.D. Ga. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Powell v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1997) ; see also Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 707 F. Supp. 1318, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (determining that the county DFCS offices are "state rather than county entities for the purposes of eleventh amendment immunity"). As such, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to the DHS unless Plaintiffs demonstrate that the State has consented to suit or waived such immunity in federal court.
A state may expressly consent to being sued by statute. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449, 20 S.Ct. 919, 44 L.Ed. 1140 (1900). But consent is not lightly inferred; the extent of a state's consent or waiver is strictly limited to its terms regarding persons, courts, and procedure. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944).
Although the State of Georgia has waived its sovereign immunity to a limited extent—via the GTCA—with respect to actions brought in state courts, it has not waived its immunity with respect to actions brought in federal court. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23(b) ("The [S]tate waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the manner provided in [the GTCA] and only with respect to actions brought in the courts of the State of Georgia. " (emphasis added)); id. ("The [State of Georgia] does not waive any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the United States."). Indeed, the GTCA provides that "[a]ll tort actions against the [S]tate under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the tort ... occurred." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28. Additionally, the Georgia Constitution makes clear that "[n]o waiver of sovereign immunity under [the GTCA] shall be construed as a waiver of any immunity provided to the [S]tate or its departments, agencies, officers, or employees by the United States Constitution." Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, ¶ IX (f). As such, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution still provides the State and its agencies immunity from suits brought in federal courts. Alyshah v. Georgia, 230 F. App'x 949, 950 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Although the State of Georgia has given its consent to being sued in contract or tort actions in its own state courts, a state's consent to suit in state court does not constitute a waiver of immunity in federal court.").
Consequently, the State of Georgia has not consented to the tort actions brought by Plaintiffs in federal court; nor has the State waived its sovereign immunity provided by the United States Constitution. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 307, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990) ("[A] State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be sued."). Thus, Plaintiffs' state law claims brought directly against DHS are barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity and these claims must be DISMISSED . Further, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to substitute DHS for Defendant Browning, the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims, and they must also be DISMISSED .
Even if Plaintiffs' state law claims were brought against DHS in the proper state court forum, the claims would still be barred by the GTCA. The GTCA waives sovereign immunity in some cases, however, specific exceptions to the waiver exist and are applicable even in the proper state court forum. For example, under subsection four, the state shall have no liability for losses resulting from "prosecutorial action or inaction." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(4). As previously discussed, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Browning and DHS arise from prosecutorial action. Therefore, sovereign immunity would still apply even if the state claims were brought in a state court forum. See Dep't of Human Res. v. Money, 222 Ga.App. 149, 473 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Ga. App. 1996) (dismissing a claim for emotional distress because "[prosecutorial] action taken by the DHS ... clearly falls within [the GTCA] exceptions."). Further, the GTCA also provides that the state shall have no liability for losses resulting from "false imprisonment, false arrest, [and] malicious prosecution." O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7). Thus, this exception provides further grounds upon which the GTCA would bar the specified claims if brought in a state court forum. Cf. Dept. of Human Resources v. Hutchinson, 217 Ga.App. 70, 456 S.E.2d 642 (1995) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity requires that the conditions and limitations of the statute that waives immunity be strictly followed."). Nor can Plaintiffs circumvent these exceptions by alleging that DHS was negligent in its training and supervision of other named Defendants. See Davis, 621 S.E.2d at 857. The focus of the GTCA is on the underlying conduct that is allegedly unlawful, not on the government's failure to exercise oversight. See Hutchinson, 456 S.E.2d at 644 ("The focus of the exceptions to liability in OCGA § 50–21–24(7) is not on the government action taken, but upon the act that produces the loss.").
B. Federal Claims
Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars section 1983 claims made against DHS. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ... of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that "neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Consequently, section 1983 does not constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) ; Robinson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Congress, in passing § 1983, did not intend to override the immunity guaranteed to the states by the Eleventh Amendment."). Because the State has neither waived its immunity nor consented to suit, Plaintiffs' federal claims against DHS are also barred and must be DISMISSED .
C. Plaintiffs' Felder Doctrine Argument
Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court's decision in Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), defeats the immunity provided by the GTCA. Dkt. No. 56 at 4. In Felder, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute improperly interfered with a federal section 1983 cause of action being pursued in state court. 487 U.S. at 151, 108 S.Ct. 2302. The Court noted that "where state courts entertain a federally created cause of action, ‘the federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.’ " Id. at 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (quoting Brown v. Western R. Co. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949) ). Here, Plaintiffs argue that the GTCA "categorically denies federal liability for acts committed by state actors" and "frustrates the unique purpose of Section 1983." Id. at 3-4.
However, the Felder doctrine is not applicable in this context because Felder concerned the rights of state court litigants pursuing federal claims; here, Plaintiffs seek redress in federal court. Similarly, the defenses asserted under the GTCA pertain to state law claims made in federal court. Dkt. No. 58 at 1. If anything, Felder supports the application of the GTCA to the state law claims at issue. 487 U.S. at 151, 108 S.Ct. 2302 ("[F]ederal courts are constitutionally obligated to apply state law to state claims.").
Moreover, the GTCA does not interfere with Plaintiffs' ability to seek redress for their federal claims in a federal court. The GTCA waives sovereign immunity only with respect to state actions brought in the state courts of Georgia. Plaintiffs' federal claims against Defendants fail for reasons entirely independent of the GTCA. As previously discussed, Defendant Browning is entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the federal claims asserted against her, and Congress did not abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity in passing section 1983. See Robinson, 966 F.2d at 640. Consequently, Plaintiffs' federal claims here are not defeated by "forms of local practice" as Plaintiffs suggest, but rather by the protections extended via the federal constitution to the state and its officials. Therefore, Felder is not applicable in this context.
"Although, by its terms, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state in federal court by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has extended its protections to apply in such cases." Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1303.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 53, is GRANTED in its entirety. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Andrea Browning and the Georgia Department of Human Services are DISMISSED .
SO ORDERED , this 19th day of January, 2021.