Opinion
C.A. No. S10C-08-007.
Submitted: February 2, 2011.
Decided: April 15, 2011.
On Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Her Claim for Veterinary Costs: DENIED.
H. Clay Davis, III, Esquire, Henry Clay Davis III, P.A., Georgetown, Delaware.
Miranda D. Clifton, Esquire, Law Office of Cynthia G. Beam, Newark, Delaware.
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to her claim for Veterinary Costs. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is denied.
Facts and Procedural Background
On August 7, 2008, Hilary M. Sisk ("Plaintiff") alleges Tashera M. Johnson ("Defendant") negligently caused Defendant's vehicle to collide with Plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff's dog, Mr. Weiner, was riding in the front passenger seat and suffered injuries as result of the accident. Consequently, Plaintiff incurred, and expects to continue to incur, veterinary expenses. In the pending motion, Plaintiff argues she is entitled as a matter of law to compensation for these expenses, currently totaling $5,539.15, if they are proved at trial.
Discussion Standard of Review
Summary judgment is only appropriate where, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact. Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of material issues of fact. Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, the non-moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If, after discovery, the non-moving party cannot make a sufficient showing of the existence of an essential element of his or her case, summary judgment must be granted. "A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." If, however, material issues of fact exist, or if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the law to the facts before it, summary judgment is inappropriate.Merits
Plaintiff contends she is entitled to the entire amount of veterinary expenses she has incurred. In support of her position, Plaintiff argues the public policy behind Delaware's animal cruelty statute supports total reimbursement of these expenses. Defendant counters that this Court is bound by a Superior Court decision that held animals are chattel and, thus, any damages sought for injury thereto cannot exceed the animal's market value. Defendant asserts that the public policy behind the animal cruelty statute is to punish intentional cruelty to animals and is not disturbed by limiting damages for an animal's injury resulting from a negligent act.In Naples v. Miller, Judge Ableman reasoned:
While the Court is mindful that dogs are often beloved family members, and that many owners will spend inordinate sums of money to keep their pets healthy, the law in Delaware has not advanced to the point where it has carved out a personal injury action for injured dogs. . . . If a change in the law is to occur, it is up to the Legislature, not the Courts, to decide that a dog named Fido, a cat named Boots, a hamster named Harry, or a fish called Wanda can have some new species of personal injury action brought on their behalf. For now, however, [the injured dog] is personal property under the law, and the maximum value [the plaintiff] can recover is no greater than [the dog's] market value. . . .
Judge Ableman's decision was upheld on appeal by the Delaware Supreme Court.
Naples v. Miller, 2009 WL 1163504, at * 3 (Del. Super.), aff'd, 2010 WL 1440463 (Del.), 992 A.2d 1237 (Del. 2010) (TABLE).
2010 WL 1440463 (Del.), 992 A.2d 1237 (Del. 2010) (TABLE).
Plaintiff argues the Naples reasoning is flawed in light of the criminal code, which was not considered in the decision. Plaintiff asserts that animals are living things and not chattel and that Plaintiff was obligated to provide the veterinary care to Mr. Weiner to avoid prosecution for animal cruelty. Because a general principle of tort law is that a wrongdoer is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong, Plaintiff argues, she is entitled to compensation for all of the veterinary costs. Section 1325 of Title 11 provides, in relevant part:
For the purpose of this section, the following words and phrases shall include, but not be limited to the meanings respectively ascribed to them as follows:
. . .
(6) "Cruelty to animals" includes mistreatment of any animal or neglect of any animal under the care and control of the neglector, whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused. By way of example, this includes: Unjustifiable beating of an animal; overworking an animal; tormenting an animal; abandonment of an animal; failure to feed properly or give proper shelter or veterinary care to an animal.
. . .
(11) "Proper veterinary care" includes providing each animal with veterinary care sufficient to prevent unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering by the animal.
Section 1325 establishes that cruelty to animals is a class A misdemeanor and establishes penalties for violations of the section.
Plaintiff essentially argues that she would have been subject to criminal prosecution if she had not spent $5,539.15 for veterinary care of Mr. Weiner. However, comparing a criminal prosecution to a negligence action is akin to comparing apples and oranges. The public policies implicated by the different areas of the law do not necessarily overlap. I agree with Defendant that the public policy served by the prohibition of cruelty to animals is not disturbed by the issue raised in this case. Moreover, there is no evidence, much less undisputed fact, that any of the expenses incurred were necessary to provide proper veterinary care to Mr. Weiner.
I find the analysis contained in Naples to be directly on point; its holding controls the outcome of this case. After careful consideration of the implications of her ruling, Judge Ableman concluded animals are personal property under the law of Delaware and, therefore, the maximum value Plaintiff may recover in a personal injury action is the animal's market value. There is, simply put, a point at which the animal is "totaled" under Delaware law. Of course, as Judge Ableman also noted, an extraordinary number of animal owners would pay far beyond their pet's market value for their pet's care out of love. But, as it stands, Delaware law does not require a negligent tortfeasor to pay for any expenses above and beyond the market value of the injured animal. Plaintiff's argument is without merit.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to her claim for Veterinary Costs is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.