Opinion
No. C-01-2355MMC
October 14, 2003
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Michael Sims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his California state court convictions on three counts of robbery with sentence enhancements for two prior felony convictions. Respondent James Rowland has filed an answer. Sims has not filed a traverse. For the reasons set forth below, Sims' petition is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 24, 1997, after a two-day jury trial in the Superior Court for the County of Contra Costa, Sims was convicted of one count of first degree robbery and two counts of second degree robbery. (See Petition ("Pet."), Ex. A, CT 202-07.) The facts of those crimes are not relevant to the instant habeas petition.'
On June 20, 1997, the state trial court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sims had been convicted of two prior serious felonies, on June 10, 1982 and November 13, 1992, respectively. (See id., CT 243.) Sims was sentenced to an aggregate term of 63 years to life, which included sentence enhancements as a result of the two prior serious felonies, pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 667(a) and 1170.12(c). (See id., CT 0243-0245.)
Section 667(a) provides that "any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively."
Under § 1170.12(c), any person convicted of a serious felony who has previously been convicted of two or more serious felonies shall receive a minimum sentence of three times the term of punishment for the current conviction. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(c).
On December 17, 1999, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Sims' convictions. The California Supreme Court denied review on March 22, 2000. Sims timely filed his federal habeas petition on June 19, 2001.
DISCUSSION
Sims argues that the trial court violated his right to due process under the federal Constitution in two ways. First, Sims contends that after the jury posed questions to the court, during deliberations, about Sims' access to information contained in their juror questionnaires, the trial court erred by failing "to inquire whether the fears expressed by the jurors disqualified one or more of them from continuing on the case due to loss of impartiality." (Pet. at 4.) Second, Sims argues that the evidence was inadequate to establish under California law the "qualifying character" of one of his two prior convictions for burglary because the proof did not establish that Sims committed a burglary of an inhabited dwelling house.
A. Standard of Review
This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may not grant a petition on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in a state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Price v. Vincent, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (2003). A federal court errs by reviewing a habeas claimde novo, rather than through the lens of § 2254(d). See id.
In determining whether the state court's decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits. LaJoie v. Thompson. 201 F.3d 1166, 1172 n. 9 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the highest court to address the merits of Sims' claims is the California Court of Appeal. See Pet., Ex. H.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a decision by a state court is "contrary to' our clearly established law if it 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases' or if it 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.'" Price, 123 S.Ct. at 1853 (quotingWilliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (200O)). "Clearly established" law refers to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United State Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). The state court need not cite the relevant United States Supreme Court cases or even be aware of them, as long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
In determining whether a state court engaged in an "unreasonable application" of federal law, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state-court decision applied a Supreme Court case incorrectly."Price, 123 S.Ct. at 1853 (citations omitted). "Rather, it is the habeas applicant's burden to show that the state court applied that case to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner."Id. (citations omitted). "Objectively unreasonable" is not the same as "clear error," as "[t]he gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness." Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175.
In determining whether the state court engaged in an unreasonable determination of the facts, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." id. The Ninth Circuit has held that the standard for "unreasonable determination of the facts" in § 2254(d)(2) is equivalent to the standard for unreasonable application of clearly established law in § 2254(d)(1). See Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has clarified that an "objective unreasonableness" standard applies in determining whether there was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. See Price, 123 S.Ct. at 1853;Lockyer, 123 S.Ct. at 1175. Consequently, the Court applies the same "objective unreasonableness" standard in deciding whether the state court engaged in an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Even if the state court committed a constitutional violation, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993); see also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001) (citingBrecht). The Brecht standard applies "uniformly in all federal habeas corpus cases under § 2254." Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). "[F]ederal district courts always should apply the Brecht standard . . . regardless of what, if any, type of harmless error review was conducted by the state courts." Id.
Constitutional errors are of two types: trial error and structural error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991). Structural error is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process-itself."Id. at 310. Where a criminal proceeding is undermined by a structural error, the "criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence," and the defendant's conviction must be reversed. Id. Trial error, on the other hand, is error occurring "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless." Id. at 307-08.
B. Legal Claims
1. Inquiry into potential juror bias
Sims argues that the trial judge violated his right to due process by failing to inquire whether the fears expressed by the jurors during their deliberations disqualified one or more of them from continuing on the case due to loss of impartiality. Near the end of the deliberations, the jurors sent two notes to the judge expressing fear that Sims may have obtained identifying information about them from his review of the jury questionnaire. The first note was sent on April 23, 1997, the day before the jury reached a verdict. That note read:
Discussion about the forms we filled out before jury selection. There's considerable alarm among jurors about Mr. Simms [sic] being allowed to review our forms. We thought we were under the protection of anonymity. The jurors viewed he was talking [sic] notes while reviewing the forms.
(Pet. Ex. B, Augmented Clerk's Transcript ("ACT") at 19.) The following day, the trial-judge responded with the following written response:
In response to your most recent request, please be advised that none of the parties ever had your addresses or telephone numbers or other identifying information. At the conclusion of the trial, the court will make the following order:
"It is hereby ordered that the court's record of personal juror identifying information, including names, addresses and telephone numbers, is sealed until further order of this court.
"In the event that any petition for access to the sealed information is set for hearing by the court, the affected juror, or jurors, will be given written notice of the time and place of the hearing. At the hearing, any affected former juror may appear in person, in writing, by telephone or by counsel, and request that the hearing be closed so as to protect juror anonymity, and may protest the release of the confidential information. Whether this confidential information, or any part of it, will be disclosed to the petitioner, and if so, under what terms, conditions or circumstances, are matters within the court's discretion."
You will also recall that at the commencement of the jury selection process I
informed you that the court reporter's transcript relating to that portion of the trial is ordered to be sealed and not made available to any party or person, unless good cause is shown as above set forth.
Likewise, the copies of the juror's questionnaire that the district attorney and the defense attorney had during the jury selection process, was ordered by the court to be returned to the court and those copies have been shredded and destroyed.
I hope that this is a satisfactory answer to your inquiry. If it is not, please send me a further communication.
(Id. at 24.) The trial court's response was approved as to form and content by counsel for the prosecution and the defense. (See id.)
Almost immediately, at 9:05 a.m. on April 24, the jury sent the judge a second note, which stated:
We the jury in this case, request the following:
A copy of the questionnaire that the defense attorney/defendant did get to see — even a blank form. Were our names, places of employment blocked out? (There is still concern about whether our names employers were on the form.)
(Id. at 15.) The court responded by sending the jury a blank questionnaire form. (See id-at 16-18.) This response was also approved as to form and content by counsel for the prosecution and the defense. (See id. at 18.) Shortly thereafter, at 10:05 a.m., the jury informed the court that it had reached a verdict. (See id. at 1.)
Sims contends that "[u]nder these circumstances, the trial court was obligated, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, to inquire whether the fears expressed by the jurors disqualified one or more of them from continuing on the case due to loss of impartiality." The Court of Appeal rejected this claim. (Pet., Ex. H at 9.) The court noted that a trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine facts alleged as juror misconduct whenever the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, and that the same is true whenever a court is put on notice of a juror's potential inability to perform his or her duty. (See id. at 9 (citingPeople v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 153, 230 (1997) and People v. Burgener, 41 Cal.3d 505, 519 (1986)). The Court of Appeal found that it did not need to decide whether the facts were sufficient to put the trial judge on notice of either situation, because even if the trial court erred, Sims could not show prejudice. (See id.) The court found Sims' theory that the jurors' fear of him might have encouraged jurors to convict him was weak, and opined that:
[a] much stronger hypothesis is that, if fear influenced the jurors at all, it was in the direction of acquittal. This was surely not lost on defense counsel when he twice endorsed the judge's proposed responses. . . .
(Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).) The court also noted that nothing in the record indicated that fear had any effect on the jurors' verdict, but that if it did, Sims "has recourse to [a] writ of habeas corpus upon a proper showing from behind the record." (id.) In support of his habeas petition, Sims has not submitted any additional evidence to indicate that the jury's verdict may have been affected by fear.
As Sims correctly notes, "[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). However, "due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation[.]" Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has held that Smith does not stand for the proposition that "any time evidence of juror bias comes to light, due process requires the trial court to question the jurors alleged to have bias." Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). "Rather, in determining whether a hearing must be held, the court must consider the content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source." Id. Typically, these factors relate to allegations of juror misconduct. Here, there are no such allegations. Nevertheless, the Court will assume the situation presented here called for some consideration of the need to conduct an inquiry as to juror bias.
Sims has submitted no evidence as to how the district court determined that a written response to the jury was adequate to both address the jurors' concerns and protect Sims' constitutional rights. Although there is no transcript of any discussion between the court and counsel about how to respond to the jurors' questions, presumably such a discussion did take place, since counsel approved the form and content of the judge's written responses, and the record contains several drafts thereof. (See ACT 20-28). Sims has not presented any evidence that the trial judge failed to adequately consider whether the jurors' ability to deliberate impartially was likely to be affected by their concerns.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial judge erred by not questioning the jurors as to whether fear of Sims affected their deliberations, Sims cannot show that the error prejudiced him. Even if the trial court committed a constitutional error, habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."Brecht 507 U.S. at 638. As the Court of Appeal has already noted, it is likely that any jurors who were afraid of Sims would have voted for acquittal to avoid upsetting him. This conclusion was not objectively unreasonable. Sims has not pointed to any evidence that any juror's fear of him had any prejudicial effect on his/her verdict or ability to decide the case solely on the evidence.
Accordingly, Sims has not demonstrated that the trial court's response to the jury's inquiries violated Sims' constitutional right to due process.
2. Prior Conviction
Sims argues that the trial judge also deprived him of due process by finding that his June 10, 1982 burglary conviction qualified as a serious felony under California Penal Code § 667(a) and §§ 1170.12(b) and (c). Sims contends that the evidence of such conviction was inadequate, because, under California law, to qualify as a serious felony the burglary must be of an "inhabited dwelling" (see former Cal. Pen. Code § 1192.7(c)(18)), and the only evidence submitted was Sims' guilty plea to a charge of burglary of "the dwelling house of Phyllis Davis."
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that, as a matter of California law, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the conviction was a "serious felony" for-purposes of the sentence enhancements in §§ 667(a) and 1170.12. (Pet. Ex. H at 11-14.) Sims does not even argue that this conclusion violated federal law. Instead, he contends that the Court of Appeal's decision conflicts with another decision of that court in In re Andrew l., 230 Cal.App.3d 572 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has held that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions"Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). As a result, this Court must accept the Court of Appeal's conclusion that Sims' June 10, 1982 conviction was a "serious felony" under California law. See Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 118-19 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to decide habeas claim that assault with a deadly weapon did not qualify as a serious felony under California sentence enhancement law because issue was a question of state sentencing law for which federal habeas relief was unavailable).
Moreover, even if the Court of Appeal had erred in its interpretation of state law, "[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own sentencing-laws does not justify federal habeas relief." Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Sims cannot make a plausible argument that it was fundamentally unfair for the state court to conclude that the phrase "dwelling house of Phyllis Davis" meant the "inhabited dwelling house of Phyllis Davis." There being no showing of fundamental unfairness, the state court's alleged misapplication of state law provides no basis for habeas relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Sims' petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGEMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED Sims' petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.