Opinion
No. 1D21-2661
10-12-2022
SIMS CRANE & EQUIPMENT CO., and Bridgefield Employers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Alejandro PRECIADO, Appellee.
H. George Kagan, Gulf Stream, and Robert B. Griffis, Maitland, for Appellants. Bill McCabe, Longwood, and Brian P. Vassallo, West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
H. George Kagan, Gulf Stream, and Robert B. Griffis, Maitland, for Appellants.
Bill McCabe, Longwood, and Brian P. Vassallo, West Palm Beach, for Appellee.
M.K. Thomas, J. In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) vacating an arbitration determination that Alejandro Preciado (Claimant) was not entitled to benefits. Because the JCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse.
Facts
Claimant filed a Petition for Benefits (PFB) with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims, requesting medical and indemnity benefits pursuant to chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2020). The E/C responded that the JCC had no jurisdiction over the PFB because the parties were bound by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), compelling resolution of the claims by arbitration. Claimant then voluntarily dismissed the PFB and filed a request for arbitration as required by the CBA. Following the arbitration hearing, a determination was entered denying all benefits. Four days later, Claimant filed a motion to modify or for rehearing with the arbitrator which was also denied.
Next, Claimant filed with DOAH a motion requesting the JCC to vacate the arbitration determination citing sections 682.13 and 440.1926, Florida Statutes (2020). The E/C responded that the JCC lacked jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award but may have "jurisdiction to determine the lack of jurisdiction." Ultimately, the JCC determined that section 440.1926 conferred upon him subject matter jurisdiction over the motion. He vacated the arbitration determination and ordered rehearing before the same arbitrator "subject to the arbitrator's willingness and availability." This is the E/C's timely appeal.
Analysis
"Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed by this Court de novo ." Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips , 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013). Regarding jurisdiction, an appellate court may raise subject matter jurisdiction concerns sua sponte even where neither party raises the issue. Escambia Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Warren , 337 So. 3d 496, 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (citing Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. , 719 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ); 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Thus, "[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice the defect and enter an appropriate order." Polk Cnty. v. Sofka, 702 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1997) (quoting W. 132 Feet v. City of Orlando , 80 Fla. 233, 86 So. 197, 198–99 (1920) ). "[T]he parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists." Id . (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. , 630 So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994) ).
Here, no PFB was pending before the JCC when Claimant filed the motion to vacate. Although Claimant initially filed a PFB, he voluntarily dismissed it and proceeded to arbitration as required by the CBA. "[T]his court has previously held that the Courts of Compensation Claims are not courts of general jurisdiction, and therefore do not have "general" jurisdiction over any subject matter beyond that specifically conferred by statute." Avalon Ctr. v. Hardaway , 967 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sitko , 496 So. 2d 920, 921-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) ("We begin our analysis with the premise that workers' compensation is purely a creature of statute. All rights and liabilities under the system are created by chapter 440, Florida Statutes, as is the deputy's power to hear and determine issues in a workers' compensation case.")).
Dismissal of PFBs divests the JCC of jurisdiction. See Souza v. Truly Nolen, Inc. , 199 So. 3d 531, 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (citing Cova v. Ostfeld , 994 So. 2d 1162, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ("When all claims asserted through a petition for benefits are dismissed, the JCC loses jurisdiction to address those claims. ‘Such dismissal divests a JCC of jurisdiction to take any further action in the case.’ " (quoting Perez v. Winn–Dixie, 639 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) )). The loss of jurisdiction occurs even when the dismissal of the PFB is without prejudice. See Perez , 639 So. 2d at 112. "The effect [of a voluntary dismissal] is to remove completely from the court's consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of ‘jurisdiction.’ " Souza , 199 So. 3d at 532–33 (quoting Randle-E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta , 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1978) ); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Rippy , 67 So. 3d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding JCC lacked jurisdiction to address E/C's motion for termination of benefits based on fraud because there was no pending PFB); Wojick v. State, Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 75 So. 3d 362, 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding that in the absence of a pending petition for benefits, JCC lacked jurisdiction to compel claimant's attendance at a functional capacity evaluation); Polston v. Hurricane Island Outward Bound , 920 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that in the absence of a pending petition, the JCC had no jurisdiction to entertain the E/C's motion to determine if the claimant had committed fraud).
Chapter 440 recognizes limited exceptions in which a JCC has jurisdiction over certain matters in the absence of a PFB. See Vazquez v. Romero , 179 So. 3d 402, 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (providing list of cases in which a JCC had jurisdiction in the absence of a PFB). Most of the exceptions generally involve discovery requests or disputes. See Id. Additionally, although section 440.33(1), Florida Statutes, confers upon a JCC certain powers in the absence of a PFB, the statute is void of language encompassing consideration of a motion to vacate an arbitration award.
This Court has previously addressed a JCC's jurisdictional boundaries. See Hamm ex rel. Hamm v. PMI Emp. Leasing , 134 So. 3d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (the JCC lacked jurisdiction to address death benefit entitlement on the E/C's motion where no individual had filed a claim requesting the payment of such benefits); Rippy , 67 So. 3d at 1123 (holding jurisdiction of JCC is invoked with filing of PFB and the E/C has no statutory right to file PFB); Polston , 920 So. 2d at 767 ; Simpson v. Am. Custom Interiors , 911 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (holding JCC lacked jurisdiction to rule on misrepresentation defense as he lacked jurisdiction of the underlying medical claim for failure of the claimant to exhaust managed care grievance procedures); Furtick v. William Shults Contractor , 664 So. 2d 288, 290–91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting that the claimant had no legal interest in the dispute between the health care provider and E/C, and ruled that PFBs which involve claims or matters within the scope of the utilization review process are beyond the JCC's jurisdiction); Terners of Miami Corp. v. Freshwater , 599 So. 2d 674, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that the JCC lacked jurisdiction over the disputed amount the claimant's physician alleged was due from the E/C); Carswell v. Broderick Const. , 583 So. 2d 803, 803–04 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (affirming dismissal by the JCC, holding that the JCC lacked jurisdiction over the determination of unjustified treatment, hospitalization, or office visits and excessive charges for medical care).
We have further detailed jurisdictional boundaries in Furtick v. William Shults Contractor , 664 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding this court noted that the claimant had no legal interest in the dispute between the health care provider and E/C, and ruled that petitions for benefits which involve claims or matters within the scope of the utilization review process are beyond the jurisdiction of the Judges of Compensation Claims), Terners , 599 So.2d 674 (holding that the JCC lacked jurisdiction over the disputed amount the claimant's physician claimed was due from the E/C), and Carswell v. Broderick Constr. , 583 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that the JCC lacked jurisdiction over the determination of unjustified treatment, hospitalization or office visits and excessive charges for medical care). See also , Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Rippy , 67 So. 3d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (holding jurisdiction of JCC is involved with filing of PFB and employer/carrier has no statutory right to file PFB); Hamm ex rel. Hamm v. PMI Emp. Leasing , 134 So. 3d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (the JCC here lacked jurisdiction to address death benefit entitlement on the E/C's motion where no individual had filed a claim requesting the payment of such benefits); Polston v. Hurricane Island Outward Bound , 920 So. 2d 766, 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ; Simpson v. Am. Custom Interiors , 911 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (JCC lacked jurisdiction to rule on misrepresentation defense as he lacked jurisdiction of the underlying medical claim for failure of the claimant to exhaust managed care grievance procedures).
In the absence of a pending PFB or supporting statute, the JCC was without jurisdiction to consider the motion. Here, the JCC erroneously relied on section 440.1926 as bestowing upon him authority to consider the motion and vacate the arbitration determination. He reasoned:
10. Nevertheless, the question of subject matter jurisdiction is answered in Florida Statute § 440.1926, which provides, "Arbitrations agreed to pursuant to this section shall be governed by chapter 682...the term ‘court’ shall mean a judge of compensation claims." Accordingly, Chapter 400 does confer jurisdiction upon the JCC as the court of competent jurisdiction, as referenced in § 682.13.
11. I conclude that § 440.1926 expressly confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the JCC to act as the "court" in accordance with § 682.13 — the determination of vacating an arbitration award.
In reaching this conclusion, the JCC read section 440.211, Florida Statutes, in pari materia with section 440.1926. But the doctrine of in pari materia does not apply here, because "[w]hen the language of the statute is clear ..., there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction;" in fact, judicial construction of unambiguous statutory language "would be an abrogation of legislative power." McLaughlin v. State , 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Holly v. Auld , 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ). And, sections 440.211, 440.1926, and 682.13, are clear.
Section 440.211 recognizes the controlling effect of CBAs in workers’ compensation proceedings when the claimant and employer have entered a CBA as part of an employment contract. In the controlling CBA, Claimant and the E/C agreed that the provisions of chapter 682, Florida Statutes, would govern the arbitration. Section 682.014 instructs that vacation of an award is governed by section 682.13. Section 682.13(1)(c) restricts the authority to review arbitration orders to only "the court," which is defined by section 682.011(3) as "a court of competent jurisdiction in this state." JCCs are not "courts" because, unlike Article V courts, they have no inherent authority beyond that granted by statute. See generally Amends. to the Fla. Rules of Workers’ Comp. Proc. , 891 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Fla. 2004) ("The Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims (OJCC) is not a court of this State because it is neither the supreme court, a district court of appeal, a circuit court, nor a county court."); Jones v. Chiles , 638 So. 2d 48, 51–52 (Fla. 1994) ("We find that compensation claims judges are executive branch officials, not judicial branch officials.").
Conversely, section 440.1926, enacted almost a decade after section 440.211, creates a separate and distinct statutory avenue by which parties may, in the absence of a CBA, seek approval of the JCC to alternatively resolve workers’ compensation issues via arbitration. Specifically, under section 440.1926, "the employer, carrier, and employee may mutually agree to seek consent from a judge of compensation claims to enter into binding claim arbitration in lieu of any other remedy provided for in this chapter to resolve all issues in dispute regarding an injury." Granted, section 440.1926 details that arbitration agreed to under this section shall be governed by chapter 682, the Revised Florida Arbitration Code. But unlike section 440.211, section 440.1926 provides that "notwithstanding any provision in Chapter 682, the term ‘court’ shall mean a judge of compensation claims" and "an arbitration award in accordance with this section is enforceable in the same manner and with the same powers as any final compensation order." (Emphasis added.) Thus, section 440.1926 expressly expands, in its text, the definition of "court" in chapter 682 to include JCCs for the purpose of enforcement. Logically, in the absence of the contractual significance of a CBA, section 440.1926 provides "ground rules" for this statutorily created alternative dispute resolution process.
Sections 440.211 and 440.1926 are separate and distinct provisions setting forth two avenues of dispute resolution—one mandatory per pre-employment or pre-accident contractual agreement of the parties and one optional, formed post-employment and post-accident and subject to the consent of the JCC. The plain language of section 440.1926 recognizes that a PFB would be before the JCC providing jurisdiction to approve the request for dispute resolution under 440.1926 and ultimately enforce the arbitration award in the "same manner and with the same powers as any final compensation order." The provision allows binding claim arbitration of "all issues in dispute regarding an injury." The expansion of the definition of "court" under sections 682.011 and 682.13 to include the JCC applies only to alternate dispute resolution under section 440.1926. As such, the JCC improperly conflated the provisions of sections 440.211 and 440.1926.
Here, Claimant filed a PFB and then voluntarily dismissed it, conceding a CBA controlled and compelled arbitration. He requested and was provided an arbitration hearing. Being dissatisfied with the arbitration award's denial of benefits, he filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award with the JCC, an inappropriate forum which lacked jurisdiction, instead of seeking relief through "the courts" as defined by section 682.13 (courts of competent jurisdiction).
[ Section 440.211 ] manifests a clear intention to curtail or displace the jurisdiction of the Division of Workers' Compensation and its judges of compensation claims, when collective bargaining agreements meet the statutory criteria. Absent such pro tanto contractions of the reach of chapter 440's procedural provisions, the Workers' Compensation Law applies in every detail, § 440.03, Fla. Stat. (1995), collective bargaining agreements notwithstanding. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985) (Federal labor law
"does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law.").
Gassner v. Bechtel Const. , 702 So. 2d 548, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
Conclusion
Accordingly, because the JCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address the motion to vacate the arbitration award, the order on appeal is reversed.
REVERSED .
B.L. Thomas and Makar, JJ., concur.