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Silicon Valley Community Foundation v. Beltran

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Jul 11, 2008
No. A117816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2008)

Opinion


SILICON VALLEY COMMUNITY FOUNDATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CONNIE BELTRAN, Objector and Appellant. A117816 California Court of Appeal, First District, Fourth Division July 11, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 114747

RIVERA, J.

Plaintiff Silicon Valley Community Foundation (SVCF) appeals after the trial court ruled that certain checks from a decedent to Connie Beltran were valid transfers under Probate Code sections 21350 and 21351. Beltran has filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s findings that she drafted the checks and that they were “instrument[s].” Although we disagree with the trial court’s reasoning, we conclude it reached the correct result. Accordingly, we affirm.

All statutory references are to the Probate Code.

I. BACKGROUND

Beltran worked for Medical Care Professionals, a company that provided home health care workers. Through Medical Care Professionals, she began caring for Albert Cobb in 2003. At the time, he was 88 years old. At some point in 2003, she began working for him on Saturdays in addition to her weekday schedule, and on a few occasions she worked on Sundays. She also stayed overnight at his house on occasion, and usually had her school-aged daughter with her when she did so. Cobb paid her directly for her time on those occasions.

This summary of the facts is primarily taken from the trial testimony.

Beltran lived in Hayward with her husband and daughter, but her daughter went to school in San Mateo, the city where Cobb lived. At times it was more convenient for Beltran not to commute back and forth with her daughter.

Beltran described her relationship with Cobb as “family,” and said that he was lonely and enjoyed having the company of her and her daughter. He would ask her and her daughter to stay at his house and have dinner with him, and he enjoyed listening to Beltran’s daughter play the flute. He left Beltran his car in a trust. He told her he loved her. She, her husband, and her daughter had Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners with him in 2003 and 2004, and they took him out for his 90th birthday.

When Beltran went on vacation in 2003 and 2004, Cobb gave her $6,000 to help with expenses. At some point before summer 2005, Cobb gave Beltran a signed blank check, telling her that he wanted to leave something to her. She believed he told her that she could fill in any amount she wanted.

Cobb was hospitalized on July 24, 2005, and Beltran went to visit him the following day. She returned to the hospital twice on July 26. The first time she visited that day, Cobb signed at least one check that Beltran had prepared in order to pay a bill. He also told Beltran to write out a check to herself for $15,181. He told her the money was for her services, and to reimburse her for shopping she had done for medicines and groceries. The memo line of the check said, “Thank you.” The topic of the blank check arose, and Cobb told Beltran he wanted to give her a total of $200,000, plus $6,000 for her vacation. On her second visit to the hospital that day, Cobb told her to make out the check for $191,000. She filled out the check while she was in Cobb’s hospital room. She asked him what to write in the memo line, and he told her to write whatever she wanted. The memo line of the check said, “Thank you (Inheritance).”

There were some inconsistencies in the accounts Beltran gave of events at different times. In an October voicemail message to Cobb’s lawyer, John Golden, Beltran said that after Cobb had given her the smaller check, she left the hospital and then returned because she had recalled that Cobb had given her a blank check. She asked him if she should destroy the check, and he told her he wanted to give her more money for her daughter’s education. He wanted her to have a total of $200,000 (including the $15,000) as well as $6,000 for her vacation, so she prepared a check for $191,000. In her deposition, Beltran testified that she visited with Cobb in the hospital on July 26 from about 10:30 or 11:00 until 1:00 and that she was there when he was given lunch. During that visit, she asked Cobb if he wanted her to dispose of the blank check, and he told her he wanted to give her more money to help with her daughter’s education. She went home to retrieve the check, and brought it back to the hospital. SVCF questions whether Beltran in fact returned to the hospital for the second visit on July 26, contending her account of events that day is inconsistent with that of another witness, Ann Troken-Walter. For instance, Beltran testified in her deposition that she stayed with Cobb through lunch on July 26, but Troken-Walter also testified she was with him at lunchtime and did not see Beltran. At trial, Beltran expressed uncertainty about whether she was at the hospital for Cobb’s breakfast or for his lunch.

Cobb lapsed into a coma on July 28, and he died on July 31, 2005.

Two neighbors testified about Cobb and his affection for Beltran. Troken-Walter, a neighbor and friend of Cobb, testified that she visited Cobb every Sunday, the one day of the week that Beltran was not there. She said Cobb talked about Beltran’s daughter “[a]ll the time,” saying that she was a wonderful little girl and that he enjoyed being with her. He also talked about Beltran, speaking of how much he enjoyed her company. He considered her his “best buddy,” would “beam every time he talked about her,” and said he loved her. She also testified that he was generous to his friends and neighbors, buying a car for a neighbor, buying Beltran’s daughter a laptop computer, and paying for Beltran’s vacations. Troken-Walter said that on July 24, 2005, the day he went to the hospital, Cobb was bright and observant and showed no signs of mental deterioration. Troken-Walter left a telephone message for Beltran, who was returning from a trip to the Philippines on that date. Troken-Walter visited with Cobb in the hospital on July 25, 26, and 27, and found his mental state to be the same as usual, although their conversation was “one way” because he was sick and receiving oxygen. She described his normal mental state as bright, alert, focused, and sociable. On July 27, Cobb spoke with Troken-Walter about Beltran, talking of their routine and saying she was his best buddy.

Another neighbor, Bonnie Buss, testified that Beltran was “all [Cobb] talked about,” that Cobb praised Beltran, that he enjoyed having her daughter’s company, and that he told Buss he was buying a computer for Beltran’s daughter. Buss did not notice any deterioration in Cobb, and said he seemed sharp, alert, and awake. She knew that Cobb had given a car to another neighbor.

After Cobb died, SVCF, the residuary beneficiary of his trust, filed a petition for determination of ownership of property, contending the transfers effected by the checks were invalid under section 21350. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Beltran’s favor, finding that she had drafted the checks and that she was a care custodian for Cobb, but that she had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not a product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in her favor. SVCF appealed the judgment, and Beltran cross-appealed.

At the time, SVCF was known as Peninsula Community Foundation.

II. DISCUSSION

SVCF contends that the trial court properly found that Beltran drafted the checks and that under sections 21350 and 21351 the transfer is invalid. Section 21350, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “Except as provided in Section 21351, no provision, or provisions, of any instrument shall be valid to make any donative transfer to any of the following: [¶] (1) The person who drafted the instrument. [¶] . . . [¶] (4) Any person who has a fiduciary relationship with the transferor, including, but not limited to, a conservator or trustee, who transcribes the instrument or causes it to be transcribed. [¶] . . . [¶] (6) A care custodian of a dependent adult who is the transferor.” Section 21351 provides in pertinent part: “Section 21350 does not apply if any of the following conditions are met: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) The court determines, upon clear and convincing evidence, but not based solely upon the testimony of any person described in subdivision (a) of Section 21350, that the transfer was not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. . . . [¶] (e) Subdivision (d) shall apply only to the following instruments: [¶] (1) Any instrument other than one making a transfer to a person described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 21350.” To the extent our analysis requires us to interpret the meaning of sections 21350 and 21351, we review the matter de novo. (Estate of Odian (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 152, 162-163.)

Section 21351 contains other exceptions to the rule of section 21350, including an exception when transferor is related to, is a cohabitant with, or is the domestic partner of the person who drafted the instrument (§ 21351, subd. (a)), and an exception when the instrument is reviewed by an independent attorney who counsels the transferor, attempts to determine whether the transfer is the result of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence, and provides a certificate of independent review (§ 21351, subd. (b)). Beltran does not contend that any of the other exceptions are applicable.

SVCF argues that Beltran, as the drafter of the checks, was “a person described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 21350” (§ 21351, subd. (e)(1)), and was therefore precluded from receiving the transfer even if she showed by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not a product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. We agree that if Beltran was the drafter of an instrument—that is, if she was “a person described in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 21350”—the presumption of invalidity may not be overcome by evidence of lack of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. Indeed, Beltran concedes this point, contending instead that (1) the checks were not instruments for purposes of section 21350 and (2) she transcribed, rather than drafted, them.

As to her first point, Beltran contends section 21350 applies only to a probate instrument that makes a donative transfer, not to an inter vivos gift in the form of a check. Our Supreme Court has construed section 21350 more broadly. In Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 91-92, 94-95 (Rice), the court considered whether certain transfers, including inter vivos transfers of stock, were subject to section 21350. The court stated, “ ‘Instrument’ is broadly defined in section 45 as ‘a will, trust, deed, or other writing that designates a beneficiary or makes a donative transfer of property.’ ” (Rice, at p. 97, fn. 4.) Moreover, “[s]ection 21350 applies to all donative transfers by instrument, not only to wills and other testamentary transfers . . . .” (Id. at p. 98; see also Estate of Stephens (2002) 28 Cal.4th 665, 669-670, 677, fn. 6 [applicability of section 21350 to grant deed transferring title of property to joint tenancy of grantor and his daughter].) Under this rule, it appears that to the extent the checks were gifts, rather than reimbursement for Beltran’s expenses, they fall within the terms of section 21350.

Beltran points to the legislative history of section 21350, arguing it indicates that the Legislature intended the provision to apply only to documents transferring property at death and, therefore, the statements in Rice are mere dicta that we should not follow. We have reviewed the legislative history the parties have provided. While it appears that the primary purpose of the bill was to forbid attorneys from drafting wills that leave themselves substantial gifts, the legislative history also indicates the Legislature was aware that the statute as worded applied to all instruments, including trusts, deeds and other writings that make a donative transfer of property. In light of the broad language of the statute, and our Supreme Court’s interpretation of that language in Rice, we conclude the checks were instruments for purposes of section 21350.

Beltran also argues that the Probate Code requires gifts to be treated according to the general law of gifts, pointing out that section 5701 provides that, except as provided in the statutory scheme related primarily to revocation of gifts in view of impending death, “a gift in view of impending death is subject to the general law relating to gifts of personal property.” The relevance of this statute is unclear, and the reference does not change our conclusion that the checks were instruments for purposes of section 21350.

We next determine whether the trial court properly found Beltran drafted the checks or whether, as Beltran contends, she merely transcribed them. As we have explained, this issue is dispositive, because if Beltran drafted the checks, she cannot be a beneficiary under section 21350, whereas if she merely transcribed them, the presumption of invalidity may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of lack of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. (§ 21351, subds. (d) & (e)(1).) The trial court found that Beltran had produced such evidence, and SVCF does not challenge that finding.

In Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 807, 809 (Swetmann), the court considered whether a conservator who had procured for a decedent the company that produced a will, introduced the company representative to him, and as conservator paid for the services, but who had nothing to do with the contents of the will or its physical preparation, was a person who “caused the will to be transcribed” for purposes of section 21350, subdivision (a)(4); the court concluded that he was not. In addressing this issue, the court stated: “Because the Legislature has obviously drawn a distinction between drafting an instrument and transcribing it, we must construe ‘transcribing’ to mean something separate from the acts (typically performed by attorneys) of creating or composing the contents of the document. In our view, transcribing is the act that follows the composition of the document and reduces the creation to its final, written form.” (Swetmann, at p. 819.) Similarly, in Rice, our Supreme Court considered the meaning of transcribe, stating: “ ‘Transcribe’ is, in the present context at least, clear enough in meaning: ‘To make a copy of (something) in writing; to copy out from an original.’ (18 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 392; see also Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 2426 [‘1 a: to make a written copy of . . . [;] b: to make a copy of (dictated or recorded matter) in longhand or esp. on a typewriter’]; Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 1503 [‘To make a written or typed copy of (spoken material, esp. testimony)’].)” (Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 101.)

The evidence here shows that Beltran, at most, filled in the blanks of two checks. According to her testimony, she did so at Cobb’s direction. There were no independent witnesses to what happened in the hospital room. The trial court noted the inconsistencies in Beltran’s version of events and indicated that they undermined her credibility. Nevertheless, on all factual issues we are bound by the trial court’s findings if substantial evidence supports them. (See Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) And the trial court here found by clear and convincing evidence that Beltran did not defraud, menace, or pressure Cobb. Despite the inconsistencies highlighted by SVCF, the court accepted her testimony that Cobb intended to give her the money and directed her to fill out the checks for the amounts in question.

In its statement of decision, the trial court referred to inconsistencies noted in SVCF’s trial brief. The trial brief argued that Beltran had given inconsistent versions of events. In particular, the brief noted that in a voicemail to Cobb’s attorney, Beltran had stated that she returned to the hospital with the blank check because she had forgotten it earlier, and that in her declaration, she stated that Cobb had reminded her of the check before she left the hospital; that Beltran had given inconsistent versions of where she had kept the blank check and how many checks Cobb signed at the hospital; that Troken-Walter’s testimony about events at the hospital contradicted Beltran’s; and that although Beltran stated in her declaration that Cobb had given her the larger check for her daughter’s education, she used it to remodel her house and to help family members in the Philippines. SVCF points out other discrepancies noted at trial, among them that the smaller check was out of sequence with the other checks written around that time and that Beltran’s name on the larger check was written in a different color of ink from other information on the face of the check.

We cannot interpret the act of filling in the blank lines in a check with the date, payee, and amount as “drafting” for purposes of section 21350. The actions involve no independent judgment. They are not even remotely similar to “the acts (typically performed by attorneys) of creating or composing the contents of the document” (Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 819), but are instead far more like making “ ‘a written or typed copy of (spoken material . . .)’ ” (Rice, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 101). In reaching this conclusion, we are aware of the evidence that Cobb told Beltran she could write whatever she wanted on the memo line of the larger check, and that she wrote “Thank you” on the memo line of the smaller check and “Thank you, (Inheritance)” on the larger check. Those additions, however, did nothing to effectuate or alter the donative transfer, and do not persuade us that Beltran “drafted” the checks for purposes of section 21350, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.

We agree, however, that the trial court’s ultimate result was proper. At most, Beltran transcribed the check. The presumption of the invalidity of donative transfer to a fiduciary who transcribes a document or to a care custodian may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. (§§ 21350, subd. (a)(4), (6), 21351, subd. (d).) The trial court found that such a showing had been made here. SVCF does not challenge that finding, and the record contains substantial evidence to support it.

For purposes of this appeal, we need not consider whether Beltran was a fiduciary.

Accordingly, although our reasoning differs from that of the trial court, we conclude the court correctly entered judgment for Beltran.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.


Summaries of

Silicon Valley Community Foundation v. Beltran

California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division
Jul 11, 2008
No. A117816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2008)
Case details for

Silicon Valley Community Foundation v. Beltran

Case Details

Full title:SILICON VALLEY COMMUNITY FOUNDATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CONNIE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Fourth Division

Date published: Jul 11, 2008

Citations

No. A117816 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2008)