Opinion
Case No. 2:20-cv-1168
03-08-2021
ANTHONY SIDES, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZEL, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
Plaintiff, Anthony Sides, is a state prisoner who is currently housed at SCI Forest. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny his Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 15) ("First Motion for Preliminary Injunction") and his Motion Requesting Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 61) ("Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction").
II. Report
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in the civil action in which he brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 8, 2020, the Court granted his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and his Complaint (ECF No. 11) was deemed filed and entered on the docket. At the time, Plaintiff was housed at SCI Pine Grove. In his Complaint, and now in his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43) (which is his operative pleading), he raises claims related to the alleged deficient mental health services available to him at SCI Pine Grove and his placement in its Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU"). Plaintiff names as defendants: John Wetzel, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (the "DOC"); Lee Estock, SCI Pine Grove's Superintendent; Zachary Kennedy, a psychologist at SCI Pine Grove; and numerous other individuals who work at SCI Pine Grove.
Plaintiff filed the First Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 15) in September 2020, at around the same time that he filed the Complaint. In it, he seeks preliminary injunctive relief in the form of an order directing that Defendants remove him from SCI Pine Grove's RHU and either transfer him to another DOC facility or hire an on-site psychiatrist at SCI Pine Grove and institute appropriate mental health treatment there. (See also ECF No. 28.) In October 2020, and before service of the Complaint had been effectuated, counsel for Defendant Estock entered her appearance and filed a brief in opposition to the First Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 23). The Court scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing for February 10, 2021.
At times Plaintiff used the term "solitary confinement" to describe his confinement. It appears he uses that term to describe his confinement in SCI Pine Grove's RHU.
On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43). He alleges, as he did in his original complaint, that SCI Pine Grove is not designed to house inmates with mental health disabilities, and that its mental health services are either nonexistent or are so deficient that he is being denied mental health treatment. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17, 45-46, 53.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Kennedy fabricates his "Mental Health/Intellectual Disabilities Consultation for Disciplinary Disposition" forms, also known as "1-C's," so that he is placed in SCI Pine Grove's RHU instead of transferred to another DOC facility where he could receive mental health treatment. (Id., ¶¶ 20-25.) He asserts that his continued placement in SCI Pine Grove's RHU exacerbates his mental health issues and that on more than one occasion he was placed in a psychiatric observation cell due to his suicidal and homicidal ideations. (Id., ¶¶ 26, 47-51.) Plaintiff claims that one or more of the Defendants violated: the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act; the Eighth Amendment; his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by arbitrarily placing him in SCI Pine Grove's RHU; and his right to privacy. (Id., ¶¶ 54-66.) He seeks damages, declaratory relief, and, in relevant part, an injunction ordering that Defendants transfer him to another state correctional institution that has mental health programming and services. (Id., at 33-35, ¶¶ A-I.) Defendants' answer to the amended complaint is due on March 16, 2021.
On January 29, 2021 the Court held a pre-hearing teleconference in preparation for the February 10, 2021 preliminary injunction hearing. Plaintiff stated during the conference that he had been notified that he was going to be transferred to another state correctional institution. (See ECF No. 51; ECF No. 61, ¶ 1.) Thereafter, the Court continued the preliminary injunction hearing.
On February 22, 2021 Plaintiff notified the Court that he was recently transferred to SCI Forest. (ECF Nos. 57, 58.) On March 2, 2021 he filed an "Addendum" (ECF No. 62) to the First Motion for Preliminary Injunction within which he contends that his transfer did not necessarily moot that motion.
Plaintiff also requests that the Court hold a telephonic status conference and appoint him counsel. Those requests will be addressed in a separate order.
Plaintiff also filed the Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction on March 2, 2021. (ECF No. 62.) In it he asserts that upon his arrival at SCI Forest he was met by a group of 10-15 guards, strapped in a restraint chair for no reason, and then placed in an unsanitary "hard" cell with a cement bed and sink. (Id., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff further asserts that he was denied toiletry items, showers, pen and paper and yard time, and that his legal files for this case and other cases have been confiscated. (Id.) In contrast, he states that when he left SCI Pine Grove he was on Administrative Custody status and "had commissary, hygiene item[s], extra phone privileges, etc." (Id., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff contends that he now is being subject to retaliation and he seeks injunctive relief related to his alleged mistreatment at SCI Forest. Specifically, he requests that the Court order officials at SCI Forest to preserve video footage of the alleged incidents that have recently occurred there; return his legal files; "cease all retaliatory actions and provide [him] all rights and privileges that are provided to inmates of his same status i.e. (DC-Adm 802 Administrative Custody);" and allow him to use the law library once a week. (Id., ¶¶ 6-8.)
II. Discussion
It is well established that temporary or preliminary injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy" and "should be granted only in limited circumstances." Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). In evaluating a movant's request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, courts employ the familiar four-factor balancing test. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176-79 (3d Cir. 2017). That test requires that the movant demonstrate a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and that it is more likely than not that he will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of immediate injunctive relief. Id. The remaining two factors are the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and the public interest. Id. If the movant meets his burden with respect to the first two factors, which are the "most critical[,]" "a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief." Id. at 179.
Importantly, the above-cited factors are relevant only if the movant's request for immediate injunctive relief is being sought for its proper purpose, which is to maintain the status quo to avoid the likelihood of irreparable injury before a decision on the merits of the complaint can be rendered. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). By contrast, injunctive relief is not an appropriate means by which to raise and litigate new claims, either against a named defendant or a third party. Moreover, there must be "a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that because plaintiff's motion raised issues entirely different from those presented in his complaint, his allegations could not provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); see also Braithwaite v. Phelps, 602 F. App'x 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2015); Ball v. Famiglio, 396 F. App'x 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff has been transferred from SCI Pine Grove and, therefore, he is no longer subjected to its alleged inadequate mental health services. Accordingly, the Court should deny the First Motion for Preliminary Injunction because it is moot. See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248-50 (3d Cir. 2003) (when an inmate is transferred from the facility complained of, injunctive claims are generally mooted) (citing Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiff argues that his transfer did not moot the First Motion for Preliminary Injunction and in support cites Shoatz v. Wetzel, No. 2:13-cv-657, 2016 WL 595337 (W.D. Pa. 2016) and Johnson v. Wetzel, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 722 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Those cases are distinguishable. In them the plaintiff had been in solitary confinement for decades (22 years in Shoatz's case and 36 years in Johnson's). The court's decision in Shoatz was on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and not related to a request for preliminary injunctive relief. It held that although the plaintiff had been transferred and released to the general population, his claim for prospective relief against Secretary Wetzel were not moot because it accepted plaintiff's argument that "the DOC's underlying conduct and/or policies remain at issue[.]" Shoatz, No. 2:13-cv-657, 2016 WL 595337 at * 13. In Johnson, which was a decision on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, the court implicitly found that his recent transfer did not moot his motion because it assumed that he "remained subject to nearly identical conditions" at his new correctional institution and the DOC had expressed its intent to retain him on the Restrict Release List indefinitely. 209 F. Supp.3d at 774 n.3.
In this case, Plaintiff's claims are specific to SCI Pine Grove and its alleged deficient mental health services and his alleged arbitrary placement in its RHU. Since Plaintiff is no longer at SCI Pine Grove and there is nothing indicating that he will be returned there, he can demonstrate neither likelihood of success on the merits of his claim for prospective injunctive relief nor irreparable injury from the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Therefore, the First Motion for Preliminary Injunctive relief is moot.
As for Plaintiff's Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction, it improperly seeks immediate injunctive relief on impermissible and inappropriate bases. Plaintiff asserts that unidentified individuals are retaliating against him. As explained above, however, he cannot raise and litigate new claims in a motion for preliminary injunction. Also, the relief Plaintiff seeks in the Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction is premised upon alleged incidents that recently occurred at SCI Forest and which are not related to the claims raised in the Amended Complaint. The Court cannot direct prison officials at SCI Forest who are not defendants in this action to provide Plaintiff with access to the law library, preserve video recordings, or alter his custody status. If Plaintiff wants to challenge his conditions of confinement at SCI Forest he must pursue such claims in a separate civil action. He is reminded that under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), he must first fully exhaust all available administrative remedies before pursuing a civil rights complaint concerning prison conditions.
Finally, if in fact Plaintiff has not yet had access to his legal files, it may be because he was recently transferred to SCI Forest. In the event that he does not receive access to those files in the near future, he should file a separate notice with the Court and that issue will be addressed at that time.
III. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff's First Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 15) and his Second Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 61).
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: March 8, 2021
/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge