Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-CV-01891
06-08-2023
VANN L. BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. K. KAUFFMAN, et al., Defendants.
BRANN, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a motion for preliminary injunction filed by pro se-prisoner Plaintiff Vann L. Bailey (“Bailey”). (Doc. 225). While Bailey is presently incarcerated at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institute at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), Bailey was incarcerated at the State Correction Institute at Huntingdon (“SCI-Huntingdon”) at all times relevant to this suit. (Doc. 1; Doc. 225). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction be DENIED. (Doc. 225).
I. Background and Procedural History
On January 8, 2021, pro se-prisoner Plaintiffs Vann L. Bailey, Jason Cisne.Angel Irizarry, Alexis Maldanado, and Miguel Molina (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon; Jill Spyker, Deputy Superintendent for Decentralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; Scott Walters, former Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services at SCI-Huntingdon; G. Ralston, Unit Manager of certain housing units (B and C Blocks) at SCI-Huntingdon; John E. Wetzel, Secretary of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Tabb Bickell, Executive Deputy Secretary for Institutional Operations for the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); and Erin Brown, Director of the Office of Population Management (“OPM”) of the DOC (collectively, “Defendants”) for constitutional violations caused by the deterioration of the SCI-Huntingdon facility and by employee misconduct. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed an amended complaint on March 21, 2021, and a motion to certify the class and appoint class counsel on March 29, 2021. (Doc. 35; Doc. 43; Doc. 44). On September 28, 2021, the District Court adopted the undersigned's report and recommendation to deny Plaintiffs' motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel. (Doc. 67; Doc. 84). On October 1, 2021, the undersigned granted counsel for Plaintiffs' unopposed motion to withdraw as counsel. (Doc. 86; Doc. 88).
On February 16, 2022, Cisne filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, informing the Court that matters between Defendants and Cisne have been adjusted, compromised, and settled. (Doc. 169). Therefore, the Court dismissed Cisne's action with prejudice as to Defendants on February 24, 2022. (Doc. 177).
On October 19, 2021, the undersigned granted Plaintiffs leave to file individual amended complaints. (Doc. 91; Doc. 100). Bailey filed a complaint on November 16, 2021. (Doc. 106). Defendants filed the motion to dismiss Bailey's complaint on November 30, 2021. (Doc. 118). On January 28, 2022, Bailey filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 153). On July 25, 2022, the undersigned recommended that that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted, the state law negligence claims against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice, and the remaining claims be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 202). The Court adopted the undersigned's recommendation on August 30, 2022, and granted Bailey leave to file a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 213). On December 1, 2022, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to open a new civil action for Bailey. (Doc. 223). Having failed to file a fourth amended complaint, the undersigned issued an Order on January 10, 2023, directing Bailey to show cause as to why he failed to file a fourth amended complaint. (Doc. 224).
On January 30, 2023, Bailey filed a motion for preliminary injunction, alleging that he could not timely file a fourth amended complaint because new Defendant Sgt. Butter is withholding his legal materials. (Doc. 225). As of the date of this Memorandum, Bailey had not filed a fourth amended complaint. On May 9, 2023, the undersigned issued an Order directing Defendants to respond to Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction. (Doc. 228). On May 23, 2023, Defendants filed brief in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 229).
II. Standard of Review
A. Preliminary Injunction Standard
Four factors govern a district court's decision in considering a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest. Grill v. Aversa, 908 F.Supp.2d 573, 591 (M.D. Pa. 2012); Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1373 (3d Cir. 1994); SI HandlingSystems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001). A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kerschner v. Mazurkewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of prisoner motion for preliminary injunction seeking greater access to legal materials).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Such relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). As a threshold matter, it is a movant's burden to show that the “preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Therefore, “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937). In order to satisfy this standard, the party moving for a preliminary injunction must carry its burden of demonstrating both: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) the existence of irreparable injury from the alleged misconduct. Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989).
To establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits, a movant must produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause of action. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1980). The district court must examine the legal principles controlling the claim and the potential defenses available to the opposing party. See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2000). A mere possibility that the claim might be defeated does not preclude a finding of probable success if the evidence clearly satisfies the essential prerequisites of the cause of action. Highmark, 276 F.3d at 173.
Next, “[a] preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis in original). A preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). “[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable-not merely serious or substantial,' and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it.'” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for injunctive relief is in danger of suffering irreparable harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued. If the record does not support a finding of both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, then a preliminary injunction cannot be granted. Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1123 (3d Cir. 1987); see Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1987)).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are further instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity ... in tailoring any preliminary relief.
§ 3626(a)(2).
A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, it is well-settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, where the requested preliminary injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief, the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582.
III. Discussion
Bailey alleges that Sgt. Butter, the property sergeant of SCI-Huntingdon, is withholding a box of his legal materials since his transfer to SCI-Forest. (Doc. 225, ¶ 12). Specifically, Bailey contends that Sgt. Butter is doing so in retaliation for filing the instant lawsuit, and are thereby denying him access to the courts. (Doc. 225, ¶¶ 9, 16). Thus, Bailey requests an Order directing Sgt. Butter to produce the box of legal materials. (Doc. 225, at 1). In addition, Bailey requests that the Court direct Sgt. Butter to pay for all shipping of his legal materials from SCI-Huntingdon and an award of $10,000 for pain and suffering. (Doc. 225, ¶ 17).
In opposition, Defendants assert Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction should be denied because Bailey has not demonstrated he is likely to be successful on the merits of his claims and Bailey has not established a relationship between the preliminary injunction motion and the conduct asserted in his third amended complaint, i.e., his long-term confinement under allegedly inhumane conditions at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 229, at 7-8). Further, Defendants argue that Bailey fails to show an actual concrete injury or adverse action by Defendants, and offer nothing more than conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive. (Doc. 229, at 9). As observed previously, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, one that should be ordered only in limited cases upon a compelling showing. See Am. Tel. &Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at 1426-27. That showing has not been made in this case.
At the onset, the undersigned finds that the motion for preliminary injunction is impermissible and inappropriate since Bailey seeks relief that is not requested or at all related to the remaining claims in this case. In addition, Bailey seek to enjoin an individual who is not a party to the instant lawsuit. This is not permissible and runs afoul of the “general rule that a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to th case before it.” Pew v. Harris, No. 3:12-CV-1984, 2016 WL 4487901, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-1984, 2016 WL 4449639 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2016) (citations omitted). “[I]njunctive relief is not an appropriate means by which to raise and litigate new claims, either against a named defendant or a third party.” Sides v. Wetzel, No. 2:20-CV-1168, 2021 WL 1566415, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-1168, 2021 WL 1216534 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2021). Moreover, there must be “a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that because plaintiff's motion raised issues entirely different from those presented in his complaint, his allegations could not provide the basis for a preliminary injunction); see also Braithwaite v. Phelps, 602 Fed.Appx. 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2015); Ball v. Famiglio, 396 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010).
In the third amended complaint, Bailey first alleged an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for housing him in “dangerous, harmful, and inhumane conditions” at SCI-Huntingdon. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 77-78). At Count Two, Bailey alleged an Eighth Amendment claim against all Defendants for housing him at SCI-Huntingdon with an inadequate ventilation system and exposing him to asbestos, black mold, and contaminated water. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 80-81). At Count Three, Bailey asserted a state law negligence claim against Defendants Wetzel and Kauffman for allowing SCI-Huntingdon to physically deteriorate and become uninhabitable. (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 83-86). Bailey further averred that Defendant Wetzel instructed OPM to continue to transfer inmates to SCI-Huntingdon, despite its deteriorated condition. (Doc. 106, ¶ 84). Conversely, in the motion for preliminary injunction, Bailey asserts that Sgt. Butter, a third party, is retaliating against him and disrupting his access to the courts. (Doc. 225). Bailey may not raise and litigate these new claims in a motion for preliminary injunction.
Furthermore, to the extent that this injunction may affect his current confinement at SCI-Forest, a prison located in the Western District of Pennsylvania, Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction ignores basic venue principles, which strongly suggest that any disputes with state officials in the Western District of Pennsylvania should be heard in that district. See Pew, 2016 WL 4487901, at *5.
A. Success on the Merits
With respect to the issue of Bailey's ultimate likelihood of success on the merits of this case, the undersigned previously found that the complaint fails to allege personal involvement and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 202). Therefore, Bailey has not shown a likelihood to succeed on the merits. Failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “necessarily precludes a finding that [the p]laintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, which is required before a court may grant preliminary injunctive relief.” See Woodson v. Colajezzi, No. 12-973, 2012 WL 4932022, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2012); see also Allah v. Beasely, No. 3:18-CV-2047, 2019 WL 4511693, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2019).
Nor can Bailey demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his newly-asserted First Amendment retaliation and access to the courts, as he alleges that Sgt. Butter is withholding his excess legal materials and refusing to send them to SCI-Forest, Bailey's current institution. (Doc. 225). An access to court claims claim requires some proof of an actual, concrete injury, in the form of direct prejudice to the plaintiff in the pursuit of some legal claim. See, e.g., Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997); Easley v. Tritt, No. 1:17-CV-930, 2019 WL 1497054, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-930, 2019 WL 1493172 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2019). A retaliation claim requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff took some action itself protected by the constitution; (2) the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from persisting in his conduct; and (3) there was a casual connection between the plaintiff's protected conduct and the adverse action. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). With respect to the obligation to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered action that “was sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his rights.” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, Bailey has not shown that he has suffered any actual and concrete harm. He alleges that Sgt. Butter is refusing to send his second box of legal materials to SCI-Forest, but has not demonstrated how he has been harmed by this action. Quite the contrary, since Bailey filed this motion for preliminary injunction, on January 30, 2023, he filed a request for a copy of the docket sheet on February 16, 2023, which was mailed to Bailey at SCI-Forest. (Doc. 227); see Stilton v. Albino, No. 10-CV-757, 2010 WL 4916103, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (dismissing an access-to-courts claim where the plaintiff “[did] not articulate how the alleged denial of access to his legal documents hindered his efforts to either pursue this claim or other court actions”). Thus, Bailey has not shown any actual, concrete injury arising from Sgt. Butter's actions. Additionally, Bailey fails to show an adverse action or any retaliatory animus on the part of Defendants or Sgt. Butter. There is no record evidence that Bailey was ever disciplined in any way, shape, or form when it came to the issue of his missing paperwork, and Bailey's request that Sgt. Butter be ordered to cease retaliation is merely speculative. See Dawson v. Frias, No. 09-CV-6050, 2010 WL 1379894, at *3 (D.N.J. March 30, 2010) (“speculation as to what might or might not happen in the future” cannot serve as a basis for a valid claim).
Accordingly, Bailey has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.
B. Irreparable Harm
In addition, without diminishing Bailey's complaints, the undersigned finds that Bailey has not shown immediate irreparable harm justifying a preliminary injunction. See e.g., Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 346 Fed.Appx. 749 (3d Cir. 2009) (denying inmate request for injunction for failure to demonstrate irreparable harm); Rush v. Correctional Medical Services,Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 142 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). As noted above, a preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., 409 F.2d at 618. When considering this benchmark standard for a preliminary injunction, it is clear that: “Irreparable injury is established by showing that plaintiff will suffer harm that ‘cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial.” Messner v. Bunner, No. 07-CV-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2009) (quoting Instant Air Freight Co., 882 F.2d at 801 (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”)). In this context, the word irreparable has a specific meaning and connotes “that which cannot be repaired, retrieved, put down again, [or] atoned for ....” Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). To satisfy the exacting standard of a preliminary injunction, the injury or threat of injury must be both “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, (1941); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947). Thus, an injunction will not issue “simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury ....” Acierno, 40 F.3d at 655 (citation omitted). Where an inmate-plaintiff is alleging that damages may be an adequate remedy, a preliminary injunction is often not appropriate since the inmate has not shown that he faces immediate, irreparable harm. Rivera, 346 Fed.Appx. at 750; Rush, 287 Fed.Appx. at 142.
Although Bailey detailed examples of the alleged conditions at SCI-Huntingdon, Bailey does not assert allegations of harm that are “actual and imminent.” See Angstadt, 182 F.Supp.2d at 437. Bailey has failed to demonstrate that he are likely to suffer immediate irreparable injury regarding Sgt. Butter retaliating against him and interfering with his access to the courts. Rather, Bailey avers that DOC policy does not require permission to have excess legal materials and, therefore, they are withholding it in retaliation for his filing the present lawsuit. (Doc. 225, ¶ 9). There is no suggestion in the record of any retribution - past, present, threatened, or otherwise. Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[I]njunctions will not be issued merely to allay the fears and apprehensions or to soothe the anxieties of the parties. Nor will an injunction be issued to restrain one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do.”).
Therefore, Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction does not satisfy the requirement for a showing of irreparable harm.
C. Harm to Non-Moving Party and Public Interest
Finally, Bailey does not discuss harm to the nonmoving party or the public interest in his motion, despite bearing the burden of persuasion on all factors the court considers when deciding a request for injunctive relief. (Doc. 225); see U.S. v. Bell, 238 F.Supp.2d 696, 699 (M.D. Pa. 2003). A prisoner's request for some form of mandatory, proactive injunctive relief in the prison context must “be viewed with great caution” because of the “intractable problems of prison administration.” Milhouse, 721 Fed.Appx. at 111 (quoting Goff, 60 F.3d at 520). Given the Supreme Court's instruction that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment,” injunctive relief at this stage would not be in the public interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). Defendants' interest and the public's interest in penological order could be adversely affected if the Court began dictating the day-to-day operations of the DoC and prison staff. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626; see also Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (“[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.”). Therefore, consideration of “whether granting preliminary relief will result in an even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and . . . whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,” also weighs heavily against Bailey in this case. Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1373.
In sum, an assessment of the factors that govern the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief weighs against Bailey. See Easley v. Wetzel, No. 1:21-CV-00063, 2021 WL 1200214, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2021). Bailey failed to carry his burden on every factor because he failed to assert facts showing his likelihood of success on the merits, the presence of immediate, irreparable harm resulting from a denial of the relief, the interests of the opposing parties, and the public's interest. See Grill, 908 F.Supp.2d at 591. In addition, the relief sought in this motion is not available to Bailey at this time because the requested injunctive relief involves persons who are not before this Court. See Sides, 2021 WL 1566415, at *2. Accordingly, it is recommended that Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction be denied. (Doc. 225).
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Bailey's motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 225) be DENIED. In addition, it is recommended that Bailey be DIRECTED to file a fourth amended complaint in accordance with the Court's Orders.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated June 8, 2023. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.