Opinion
2:20-cv-01784-JAM-AC
09-10-2021
DIMITRIOS SIAFARIKAS, an individual, Plaintiff, v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company. Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On May 18, 2020, Dimitrios Siafarikas (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Defendant”) in the Sacramento County Superior Court. See Not. of Removal ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendant removed the case to federal court, invoking this Court's diversity jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 7. Alleging the 2017 Mercedes-Benz C300C he purchased in January 2020 had various defects, Plaintiff brings three claims against Defendant: (1) breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act; (2) breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act; and (3) fraudulent inducement - concealment. See generally Compl., Ex. B to Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1-3. The alleged defects include “air conditioning [with a] strong bad smell, strong fuel odor, acceleration issues, radio malfunction, inoperable window, and defective cargo net clip.” Id. ¶ 10. For these defects, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief, including punitive damages. Id. at 10.
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim and his punitive damages claim. See Mot. for J. on the Pleadings (“Mot.”), ECF No. 7. Plaintiff filed an opposition. See Opp'n, ECF No. 9. Defendant did not file a reply. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for August 10, 2021.
I. OPINION
A. Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of an order from the District Court for the Central District of California. See Def.' RFJN, ECF No. 8. A court may take judicial notice of matters of court records in another case. U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Defendant's request is granted. However, the Court takes judicial notice only of the existence of this document and declines to take judicial notice of its substance, including any disputed or irrelevant facts therein. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).
B. Legal Standard
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical' to Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of review' applies to motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamic C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, in deciding whether to dismiss a claim the court considers “whether the complaint's factual allegations, together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1054.
Additionally, the more stringent pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) apply to allegations of fraud. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” Id.
C. Analysis
Defendant's leading argument as to why Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim should be dismissed is that Plaintiff did not plead his fraudulent concealment claim with the requisite particularity under Rule 9(b). Mot. at 5-9. As Defendant summarizes: “Plaintiff's third cause of action consists of nothing more than conclusory statements parroting the legal elements of the claim, but not a single allegation is sufficient to meet their burden to plead facts with particularity.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff counters first that the sufficiency of his fraudulent concealment claim must be measured against the requirements of California law rather than Rule 9(b)'s pleading standard. See Opp'n at 2-3, 5-7. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that California law recognizes a distinction between fraudulent concealment claims and generic fraud claims, and less specificity in pleading is required for fraudulent concealment claims. Opp'n at 2. The Ninth Circuit, however, has clearly stated otherwise: “It is well-settled that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in federal court, irrespective of the source of the subject matter jurisdiction, and irrespective of whether the substantive law at issue is state or federal. While a federal court will examine state law to determine whether the elements of fraud have been pled sufficiently to state a cause of action, the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must be stated with particularity is a federally imposed rule.” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Under Kearns, Rule 9(b) clearly applies to Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim.
“Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud ‘be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct ... so they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.'” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124 (internal citations omitted). As explained below, Plaintiff's allegations in support of his fraudulent concealment claim fall well short of what is required under Rule 9(b). See Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 9-11, 36-38, 40-41; see also Opp'n at 3-4 (referring the Court to these paragraphs).
The elements for a fraudulent concealment claim are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.'” SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Cent. Pac. Bank, 207 Cal.App.4th 859, 864 (2012)(internal citations omitted). Reviewing the complaint, the Court finds no facts supporting any of these elements. See generally Compl. For example, Paragraph 36 states: “Prior to Plaintiff's purchase of the Subject Vehicle, Defendant was well-aware of the non-conformities and defects related to the air conditioning system. In particular, Defendant had knowledge that the air conditioning system contained a defect or defects which resulted in malodorous odors emanating from the air conditioning system. Despite this advance knowledge of which only defendant could know, Defendant still introduced the subject vehicle into the stream of commerce, which eventually led to Plaintiff purchasing the vehicle. Plaintiff had no way of knowing this information related to the air conditioning defect and [Defendant] and its authorized retailers and distributors of vehicles including the subject vehicle intentionally failed to disclose this information to Plaintiff.” This paragraph, which exemplifies the rest of the complaint, is conclusory, unsupported with facts, and plainly insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Because Plaintiff's complaint contains nothing but bare legal conclusions unsupported with facts, Plaintiff fails to state a fraudulent concealment claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim is dismissed. Because the Court dismisses on these grounds, the Court need not reach Defendant's additional argument that even if Plaintiff had met the heightened Rule 9(b) standard, his fraud claim is barred by the economic loss rule. See Mot. at 9-11.
Lastly, Defendant contends that if the Court dismisses Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim, it must also dismiss his punitive damages claim because the fraudulent concealment claim is the only cause of action that can support a request for punitive damages. Mot. at 11. That is, Plaintiff's remaining claims under the Song-Beverly Act do not permit recovery of punitive damages. Id. (citing to Troensegaard v. Silvercrest Industries, Inc., 175 Cal.App.3d 218, 228 (1985)). In opposition, Plaintiff does not address this argument. See Opp'n at 13-14. Significantly, at no point does he contend that his Song-Beverly claims can support such a request. Id. Accordingly, because the fraudulent concealment claim has been dismissed, Plaintiff's punitive damages claim must also be dismissed.
D. Leave to Amend
Courts dismissing claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) have discretion to permit amendment, and there is a strong presumption in favor of leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). “A district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff one final opportunity to rectify the deficiencies identified above and to file an amended complaint, if he so chooses.
II. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he shall file a First Amended Complaint within twenty days (20) of this order. Defendant's responsive pleading is due twenty days thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.