Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. EC042493, Laura A. Matz, Judge.
Valentin Shustov, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Collins, Collins, Muir & Stewart, Brian K. Stewart, Nicole A. Davis-Tinkham, Douglas Fee and Christian E. Foy Nagy for Defendants and Respondents.
MALLANO, P.J.
The Housing Authority of the County of Los Angeles (Authority) leased public housing to Valentin Shustov based on his declaration that he had no income other than Social Security. When the Authority learned that Shustov was actually receiving income as an adjunct college professor, it evicted him. Shustov responded to his eviction by filing a pro se complaint against the Authority for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the Authority’s motion for summary judgment. Shustov filed a timely pro se appeal. We affirm.
FACTS
A.
In June 2004, Shustov signed a public housing lease agreement with the Authority for a one-bedroom unit in Foothill Villa, a senior public housing facility in La Crescenta. Shustov elected to pay income-based rent rather than a flat rental fee. Based on information submitted by Shustov, the Authority calculated and fixed his income-based rent for his public housing at $53 per month.
Paragraph 5.A. (1) of the lease agreement provided: “Once a year, or more frequently as requested by Management, Resident, who elects to pay income-based rent, must provide Management with a true and complete written verification of [his] income from all sources . . . which will be reviewed by Management to determine whether the rent being paid should be changed and/or if Resident is still eligible for continued occupancy in the Residence. Each review and redetermination of rent and occupancy in the Residence (‘Regular Review’) will be made in accordance with approved Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policies [‘ACOP’] and Schedule of Rents available in Management’s Office and incorporated herein by reference. . . .”
Paragraph 5.B. (1)(e) of the lease provided: “The monthly rent . . . will remain constant for the period between Regular Reviews, unless during such a period any of the following ‘Changes in Circumstances’ occur: . . . There is an additional source of income to [the Resident] . . . .”
Immediately below the end of Paragraph 5.B. (1)(e), the lease included this provision: “A TRUE AND COMPLETE STATEMENT OF ALL CHANGES DESCRIBED IN [Paragraph 5.B. (1)(e)] MUST BE REPORTED TO MANAGEMENT WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS OF THEIR OCCURRENCE AND ANY FAILURE BY RESIDENT TO DO SO OR ANY MISREPRESENTATION OF ANY SUCH CHANGE WILL BE A MATERIAL BREACH OF THE LEASE.” (Capitalization in original.)
B.
At the time he signed the lease agreement in June 2004, Shustov signed a “Personal Declaration” –– under penalty of perjury –– in which he represented to the Authority that he was not working, and that his only income came from Social Security.
In October 2004, Shustov signed another personal declaration under penalty of perjury, again representing to the Authority that his only income came from Social Security.
Shortly after Shustov signed his October 2004 declaration, California State University at Long Beach provided information to the Authority indicating that Shustov had been working part-time for the University since January 2004, and that he was being paid $916.80 per month for his services. Upon receiving this information, the Authority began the process of evicting Shustov from Foothill Villa. In December 2004, the Authority served a “sixty-day notice of non renewal” on Shustov.
C.
In March 2006, Shustov filed a pro se complaint against the Authority. In October 2006, Shustov, still pro se, filed a second amended complaint against the Authority alleging a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court sustained the Authority’s demurrer to Shustov’s causes of action for violations of the Code of Federal Regulations, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of the duty to maintain and repair premises, and breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Shustov’s opening brief on appeal does not challenge the trial court’s ruling on demurrer, and, for the remainder of this opinion, we ignore all of his claims save for his cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Broadly summarized, Shustov’s operative pleading alleged that the Authority had “instigat[ed] a malicious eviction campaign” against him based on his failure to report his income, that his failure to report his income had been “an innocent mistake on [his] part,” and that the Authority’s eviction amounted to a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, including (1) his public housing lease agreement, and (2) the ACOP which was incorporated into the lease agreement. Insofar as we are able to ascertain from the pleading, it appears that Shustov’s fundamental allegation against the Authority amounted to claiming its sole remedy for his failure to report income was to increase his rent, not to evict him.
In January 2007, the Authority filed a motion for summary judgment which, reduced to its essence, argued that it was undisputed that Shustov had failed to report income, and that his omission was a material breach of the parties’ lease justifying his eviction. In March 2007, Shustov filed a pro se opposition to the Authority’s motion. Shustov’s opposition was supported by a document entitled “Plaintiff’s Evidence in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment” (a number of documents collected together), along with his own personal declarations in which he stated in general terms that all of the material in his package of evidence was based on his personal knowledge. In its reply, the Authority filed objections to the bulk of Shustov’s evidence.
The Authority’s motion showed other breaches of the lease by Shustov, but we limit our focus to the income-reporting issue.
On April 6, 2007, the trial court sustained the Authority’s objections to Shustov’s evidence, and entered a minute order granting the Authority’s motion for summary judgment. On April 26, 2007, the trial court entered a formal order granting the Authority’s motion for summary judgment, and, on April 27, 2007, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Authority.
Shustov filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
Shustov’s first argument advances the contention that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court misinterpreted the lease. More specifically, Shustov contends the Authority could not evict him because the ACOP prescribed the following, exclusive, noneviction, remedies for his failure to report income: (1) the Authority could retroactively increase his rent to the date that his change in income became effective; (2) the Authority could recover any underpaid past rent; and (3) the Authority could require him to sign a repayment agreement. In other words, as Shustov puts it, Paragraph 5 of the lease, which authorized the Authority to evict him based on his misstated income, was “nil [sic] and void” from the outset because it was inconsistent with the ACOP, which controlled over the terms of the lease. We disagree.
Paragraph 1.D. of the lease provided: “Resident understands and agrees that Management enters into the Lease Agreement in reliance upon the truth of information provided in Resident’s initial application for housing and subsequent information provided for continued occupancy. The discovery that any such information is false or that information was misrepresented may result in termination of this Lease and/or retroactive rent charges . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 5 of the lease required Shustov to provide accurate information about his income and any changes in his income, and that any failure to do so, or any misrepresentation, was a material breach of the lease.
The unambiguous language of the lease controls the result in this case. The paragraphs cited above reserved to the Authority the discretion to evict a resident “and/or” to impose retroactive rent charges, and no terms may be implied in the lease to vary the lease’s plain language. (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 374.)
And the ACOP did not in any event state that retroactive rent was the exclusive remedy available to the Authority. The ACOP provisions cited in Shustov’s opening brief on appeal do not limit the Authority’s remedy to the collection of retroactive rent for a resident’s failure to report income.
Shustov cites chapter 11 of the ACOP. Chapter 11 sets forth the rules under which the Authority conducts annual recertifications of eligibility and rental rates for public housing. Chapter 11, section B. provides: “If there has been a misrepresentation or a material omission by the [resident] . . . there will be a retroactive increase in rent to the anniversary date.” This provision plainly means that, if there has been a misrepresentation or omission, then the resident is liable for the rent which should have been, but was not, charged. The provision does not say that retroactive rent is the exclusive remedy available to the Authority. In other words, the Authority may seek back rent and still evict a resident who fails to report income. Shustov does not acknowledge chapter 12 of the ACOP which sets forth the rules under which the Authority may terminate a resident’s lease.
For the record, the ACOP is available for public viewing at the Authority’s Web site, http://www.lacdc.org/cdcwebsite/uploadedFiles/HM/ACOP.pdf [as of 7/22/2008]. Chapter 12 generally provides that “[t]he [Authority] may terminate tenancy for a [resident] based on the resident’s action(s) or failure to act in accordance with . . . the terms of the Lease Agreement.” Chapter 12 more specifically provides: “The lease may be terminated at any time by the [Authority] . . . for serious or repeated violation of the terms of the lease, such as . . . [¶] Failure to provide timely and accurate statements of income at . . . Admission, Interim, Special or Annual Rent Recertifications.” (Ch. 12, § B.)
Shustov also cites ACOP chapter 11, section G., a provision which is similar to chapter 11, section B. Again, the provision does not state that the Authority’s exclusive remedy is the collection of retroactive increased rent.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Authority based on Shustov’s failure to report income.
II.
Shustov contends the Authority’s evidence was not sufficient to meet its burden on summary judgment. More specifically, Shustov argues the Authority’s evidence consisted of declarations which the trial court should have rejected because they contained perjury, a lack of trustworthiness, or were made in bad faith. We disagree.
Shustov’s argument includes nary a reference to any evidence in the record to support his allegations of malfeasance on the part of the Authority’s declarants, nor does he cite any legal authority in support of his claim. Given the absence of references to evidence in the record and relevant legal authority, Shustov simply has not met his burden of showing error on appeal. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119-1120; Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
DISPOSITION
The summary judgment entered on April 27, 2007, is affirmed.
We concur: ROTHSCHILD, J., NEIDORF, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.