Opinion
NO. 01-19-00158-CV
04-28-2020
BHASKARA SHETTY, Appellant v. ARCONIC INC., Appellee
On Appeal from the 113th District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2017-85782
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Bhaskara Shetty appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Arconic Inc. on Shetty's claims of race, national origin, and age discrimination and retaliation brought under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. We affirm.
Background
Shetty worked for Arconic as a maintenance manager from June 2014 until he was laid off on March 31, 2017. Arconic subsequently provided Shetty with a "Letter of Agreement and General Release" that stated that Shetty would receive ten weeks' total severance benefits, a subsidized benefit extension, and three months of outplacement assistance. Shetty executed the agreement on April 4, 2017.
The agreement provided that, in consideration for the severance and transition benefits received, Shetty waived and released "any and all claims . . . or any right to any monetary recovery or any other personal relief, whether known or unknown, in law or in equity, by contract, tort, law of trust or pursuant to federal, state or local statute, regulation, ordinance or common law . . . arising out of or relating in any way to [Shetty's] employment relationship" with Arconic. It further stated that "[t]his waiver, release, and discharge includes any claim or right . . . based upon or arising under any federal, state or local fair employment practices or equal employment opportunity laws, including, but not limited to . . . the Texas Labor Code (specifically including . . . Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code)."
On November 2, 2017, Shetty filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging discrimination based upon race, national origin, and age, and retaliation. On November 3, 2017, the EEOC issued a dismissal of notice and right-to-sue letter determining that, based on its investigation, it was unable to conclude that the information obtained established violations of the employment discrimination statutes.
On December 28, 2017, Shetty, proceeding pro se, filed suit against Arconic alleging claims of race, national origin, and age discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. On February 19, 2018, Arconic filed its original answer and affirmative defenses. On June 19, 2018, Shetty, then represented by counsel, filed his first amended petition alleging discrimination pursuant to Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
On November 9, 2018, Arconic filed a traditional motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of each of Shetty's claims asserted under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code on the ground that Shetty executed a valid and enforceable release of those claims. On December 4, 2018, Shetty filed his summary judgment response. On December 10, 2018, Arconic filed a reply.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted Arconic's summary judgment motion on December 19, 2018. Shetty timely filed his pro se notice of appeal.
Briefing Waiver
Although we liberally construe pro se briefs, we nonetheless require pro se litigants to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (stating "pro se litigants are not exempt from the rules of procedure"); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978). On appeal, a pro se appellant must properly present his case. Strange v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing. TEX. R. APP. P. 38. These rules require an appellant, among other things, to state concisely his complaint, provide succinct and clear argument for why his complaint has merit in fact and in law, and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made along with appropriate record references. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (h), and (i). We are not responsible for identifying possible trial court error, see Canton-Carter v. Baylor College of Medicine, 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.), searching the record for facts that may be favorable to a party's position, see Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 283-84 (Tex. 1994), or doing the legal research that might support a party's contentions, see Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Were we to do so, we would be abandoning our role as judges and become an advocate for that party. See Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.).
Shetty's brief fails to identify any issue for our review or otherwise point out any error allegedly committed by the trial court in granting summary judgment to Arconic on Shetty's claims. See Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 896 (stating that brief fails if court must speculate or guess about what contentions are being made). Although Shetty's brief includes a recitation of the facts he believes are relevant on appeal, it includes no record references or citation to any legal authority whatsoever. In re Estate of Taylor, 305 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (stating failure to cite legal authority or to provide substantive analysis of the issues presented results in waiver of complaint). Further, Shetty has provided no argument as to why his complaint has merit but instead makes a single conclusory statement that Arconic discriminated against him based on his race, national origin, and age, and that it retaliated against him. See Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845 ("An appellate court has no duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error."); see also Borisov v. Keels, No. 01-15-00522-CV, 2016 WL 3022603, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 26, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Having failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, Shetty has waived any error on appeal. See Fredonia State Bank, 881 S.W.2d at 284 (discussing "longstanding rule" that point may be waived due to inadequate briefing).
Shetty's brief also fails to include (1) the identity of parties and counsel; (2) a table of contents; (3) an index of authorities; (4) a statement of the case; (5) a summary of the arguments; (6) a certificate of service; or (7) an appendix containing a copy of the trial court's judgment from which relief is sought. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a), (b), (c), (d), (g), (h), (j), (k).
However, even absent briefing waiver, Shetty could not prevail on his challenge to the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Arconic for the reason discussed below.
Valid and Enforceable Release
Arconic moved for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of release. It argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Shetty executed a valid and enforceable release of each of his claims asserted under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). When reviewing a summary judgment motion, we must (1) take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and (2) indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)).
In a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the trial court should grant judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997); EWB-I, LLC v. PlazAmericas Mall Tex., LLC, 527 S.W.3d 447, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
B. Analysis
A release is an agreement or contract in which one party agrees that a duty or obligation owed by the other party is discharged immediately on the occurrence of a condition. Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 844 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 955 S.W.2d 120, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff'd, 20 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2000). "In general, a release surrenders legal rights or obligations between the parties to an agreement." Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). "[I]t is well settled that a settlement agreement or release, which is valid on its face and has not been set aside, is a complete bar to a later action on the matters contained therein." Baker v. Fed. Express Corp., 224 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (quoting DeLuca v. Munzel, 673 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). To prove release, Arconic had to conclusively establish that Shetty signed the release and accepted the benefits offered. See Brown v. Cain Chem., Inc., 837 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
The record reflects that Shetty signed the agreement on April 4, 2017. The agreement states that, in consideration for the severance and transition benefits received, Shetty waived and released "any and all claims . . . or any right to any monetary recovery or any other personal relief, whether known or unknown, in law or in equity, by contract, tort, law of trust or pursuant to federal, state or local statute, regulation, ordinance or common law . . . arising out of or relating in any way to [Shetty's] employment relationship" with Arconic. It further stated that "[t]his waiver, release, and discharge includes any claim or right . . . based upon or arising under any federal, state or local fair employment practices or equal employment opportunity laws, including, but not limited to . . . the Texas Labor Code (specifically including . . . Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code)." To its motion, Arconic attached the affidavit of Sonya Wilson, its senior human resources manager, attesting that Shetty retained all of his severance and transition benefits provided to him under the release.
Arconic conclusively established the existence of a valid and enforceable release as a matter of law. See id. at 245. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Arconic on Shetty's employment discrimination claims brought under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Accordingly, we overrule Shetty's issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Kelly, Goodman.