Opinion
No. CV02 0283059-S
January 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #118
This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 2, 2001, between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff filed a two-count amended complaint on October 6, 2003. Count one alleges a claim of negligence and count two, one of recklessness and violation of General Statutes § 14-222. The plaintiff claims double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.
Section 14-222 states:
Reckless driving. (a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or upon any school property recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway, road, school property or parking area, the intersection of streets and the weather conditions. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway, road or parking area for ten cars or more at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person other than the operator of such motor vehicle, or the operation, downgrade, upon any highway, of any motor vehicle with a commercial registration with the clutch or gears disengaged, or the operation knowingly of a motor vehicle with defective mechanism, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway, road or parking area for ten cars or more at a rate of speed greater than eighty-five miles per hour shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.
Section 14-295, which was in effect at the time of this cause of action, states: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
On October 31, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to strike the second count of the amended complaint and that portion of the prayer for relief seeking double and treble damages. In compliance with Practice Book § 10-42, the parties have filed memoranda of law.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The motion is "properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). "The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 366, 819 A.2d 822 (2003).
The defendant moves to strike count two on the grounds that it "fails to state a cause of action, because it is not plead[ed] in accordance with . . . § 14-295 and the facts are insufficient to support a common law claim of recklessness." In his memorandum of law, the defendant argues that since recklessness is more than negligence, the plaintiff has failed to allege the type of reckless conduct necessary to support a common-law or statutory claim of recklessness. The defendant further argues that notwithstanding the violation of a statute "specified by § 14-295 . . . [the plaintiff] fails to indicate that such violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's alleged injuries."
In count two of the amended complaint dated October 1, 2003, the plaintiff incorporates the factual allegations set forth in the negligence count and adds the following: "The aforesaid accident and resulting injuries, losses and damages were caused by the reckless disregard of the defendant, . . . in that he operated his motor vehicle in a parking area for ten or more cars on property of Taylor Rental, 620 North Colony Road, Wallingford, Connecticut and a public highway, North Colony Road, Wallingford, Connecticut in such a manner as to recklessly attempt to perpendicularly pass in front of plaintiff's vehicle while she was stopped in a southerly line of traffic at a traffic light in order to turn his automobile into the northerly traffic lane and thus acted recklessly having regard to the width, traffic and use of such road and parking area in violation of Section 14-222 of the Connecticut General Statutes."
"There is a split of authority in the Superior Court on the issue of the specificity needed to assert a claim of recklessness under General Statutes § 14-295. One line of cases holds that under [§ 14-295], a plaintiff must plead the specific facts that would constitute recklessness at common law . . . The second line of cases holds that a plaintiff need only allege that the defendant violated an enumerated statute deliberately or with reckless disregard and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone v. Neff, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 03 0069653 (August 20, 2003, Foley, J.).
"With respect to the first line of cases, although [t]here is a wide difference between negligence and a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a complaint should employ language explicit enough to clearly inform the court and opposing counsel that reckless misconduct is [being] relied on . . . [A] brief reference to recklessness, contained within a count which otherwise is clearly limited to ordinary negligence is [not] sufficient to raise a claim of reckless and wanton misconduct. Simply using the word `reckless' or `recklessness' is not enough." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kostiuk v. Queally, 159 Conn. 91, 94, 267 A.2d 452 (1970).
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged in count two that her injury was caused by the reckless disregard of the defendant in the manner he operated his vehicle and, specifically, in the manner in which he attempted to pass her vehicle. Construing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations in the second count are sufficient to sustain a claim of common-law recklessness.
With respect to the second line of cases, in count two, the plaintiff alleges that at the time of the accident, the defendant violated a statute enumerated in § 14-295, specifically § 14-222; she further alleges, as required by § 14-295, that her injuries, losses and damages were caused by such violation. Likewise, those allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to strike.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.
BY THE COURT
TANZER, JUDGE