Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BD373416, Frederick C. Shaller and Gail Feuer, Judges. Affirmed.
Lilavati Sharma, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Marguerite M. Buckley and Marguerite M. Buckley for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Nachshin & Weston, Joseph Langlois; Law Offices of Marjorie G. Fuller and Marjorie G. Fuller for Defendant and Respondent.
KRIEGLER, J.
Appellant Lilavati Sharma appeals from a postjudgment order entered on May 16, 2007, directing the clerk of the court to execute and enter satisfaction of judgment in this proceeding for dissolution of marriage. Sharma contends: 1) she is entitled to interest, and therefore, the judgment has not been satisfied; 2) she is entitled to interest on temporary support that was paid late, as well as unpaid temporary support and interest; 3) the May 16, 2007 order conflicts with an order entered on May 2, 2007; 4) she was denied due process when the trial court heard the matter on May 2, 2007, without notice or service of process; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her oral request on June 13, 2007, for funds to retain an attorney; and 6) the trial court deprived her of due process by failing to consider evidence submitted in support of a motion for reconsideration. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that Sharma was served with notice of the proceedings and the judgment has been satisfied in full. There is no conflict in the court’s orders and Sharma’s contentions concerning subsequent proceedings are not properly before this court. Therefore, we affirm.
Sharma’s motion to augment the record filed on February 19, 2008, is granted.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2003, Sharma and respondent A. Michael Pardue entered into a settlement agreement concerning the dissolution of their marriage and spousal support. On July 21, 2003, Pardue mailed a check in the amount of $60,800 to Sharma, which was the full amount of the support payment required under the settlement agreement. Judgment was entered in the case on August 27, 2003. Sharma elected not to cash the check out of concern that negotiating the check would prejudice her right to appeal. In 2004, the trial court ordered Pardue to cancel the check and issue another check to Sharma for the same amount. On September 6, 2004, Pardue reissued the check to Sharma. She did not cash the check.
In October 2006, Sharma asked Pardue to issue the check for a third time. On November 2, 2006, Sharma filed an abstract of judgment stating that Pardue owed a support judgment of $60,800, plus interest of 10 percent annually from the date of entry of the judgment. Pardue placed a stop-order on the prior checks and issued a third check to Sharma on November 6, 2006. On November 28, 2006, Pardue received notice of the abstract of support judgment recorded against his properties in three states. On January 31, 2007, process server Edward Melzi signed a proof of personal service stating that he personally served a letter of demand and acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment to Sharma at her home in Studio City. Sharma refused to sign a satisfaction of judgment. Sharma also has not paid two sanction orders totaling $7,000, on which interest of $1,970 had accrued.
On March 14, 2007, Pardue filed an application requesting that the trial court: 1) determine no spousal support arrearages or interest was owed to Sharma, but that arrearages of $8,970 were owed to Pardue based on the prior court orders; 2) order Sharma to sign the satisfaction of judgment in the court’s presence, or alternatively, direct the court clerk to enter satisfaction of judgment; 3) award attorney fees and costs of $4,900 and sanctions of $5,000 against Sharma; 4) issue a writ of execution for the enforcement and collection of the arrearages of $8,970; and 5) order Sharma to identify her holdings in financial institutions in open court, or alternatively, order her to submit to a debtor’s examination. Pardue submitted his own declaration and the declaration of his attorney in support of the application, as well as the abstract of support judgment, copies of checks written to Sharma, and other documentation. No responsive documents were filed by the due date.
On April 23, 2007, Pardue submitted a supplemental declaration from Melzi. Melzi declared that he knew Sharma from several previous services that he had completed. The first time that he served her, he was parking his car and saw a woman walk from a car parked in the driveway of Sharma’s house to the front door of the house. The woman was approximately 5’4” and 65 years old, thin, with black hair. He approached her and asked, “Lilavati Sharma-Pardue?” To which she replied, “Yes, who are you?” He identified himself and presented her with the legal documents. He served her on two other occasions and her demeanor was identical. Melzi attempted to serve Sharma with the application for an order directing satisfaction of judgment at her home on March 16, 2007, at 7:45 p.m. and 9:20 p.m., without success. On March 17, 2007, he returned at 8:30 a.m. He knocked on the front door. The blinds on the kitchen window next to the door opened. Sharma appeared and asked what he needed. He told her that he had service for Lilavati Sharma-Pardue. She stated that Lilavati Sharma-Pardue was her mother, who was not at home. Melzi told her that he knew her, advised her that he was serving her with legal documents, and put the papers by the front door. She knocked on the glass and yelled at him to take the papers back and go away.
A hearing was held on May 2, 2007. Sharma did not appear. Melzi testified about the service of the application. He stated that the woman that he talked to through the window at Sharma’s house was in her late sixties, looked good, with dark hair. He confirmed that it was the same person he had served previously at the house. The trial court found that Melzi used due diligence to serve Sharma, she had actual notice, and although the documents were not put in her hand, the service of the documents was adequate. That day, the trial court entered an order directing the court clerk to enter the satisfaction of judgment, ordering Sharma to pay $5,000 to Pardue for attorney fees, costs, and a fine, determining that no spousal support arrearages or interest was owed to Sharma under the terms of the judgment, determining that Sharma owed Pardue arrearages of $8,970, and granting the request for a writ of execution for the enforcement and collection of the arrearages of $8,970. The trial court denied the request for sanctions but found it was an additional ground for payment of the sum for fees and costs, and denied without prejudice the motion to compel discovery of financial information.
On May 14, 2007, Sharma filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the trial court vacate the orders made on May 2, 2007, on the ground that she was not served with either the demand letter or the application. On May 16, 2007, the trial court entered an order simply directing the court clerk to execute and enter the satisfaction of judgment. The court clerk signed and filed the acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment on May 17, 2007. On May 31, 2007, Pardue opposed Sharma’s motion for reconsideration and filed motions to strike portions of Sharma’s declarations and exhibits.
At a hearing on June 13, 2007, Melzi testified again about service of the application. He identified Sharma in court as the individual with whom he had spoken and served with the application. The trial court treated the motion for reconsideration as a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court took the motion and Sharma’s request for funds to hire an attorney under submission. Later that day, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration as untimely and statutorily defective. The trial court sustained Pardue’s evidentiary objections and struck related exhibits. On the merits, the trial court found Sharma’s assertion that she was not served and had been in Chicago was not credible. In addition, Melzi’s personal identification of the person served on the date of service of the prior motion was credible and forceful evidence that service was made as stated in the proof of service.
Sharma wrote a letter to the court and the trial court ordered her not to file any further papers unless related to a properly noticed hearing. On July 13, 2007, Sharma filed a notice of appeal from the May 16, 2007 order directing the court clerk to execute and enter satisfaction of judgment.
DISCUSSION
Service of Process
A. Standard of Review
Service of process must comply with the statutory procedures to establish personal jurisdiction. (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.) “Lack of personal jurisdiction renders a judgment (or default) void, and the default may be directly challenged at any time.” (Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)
“[W]hen the facts giving rise to jurisdiction are conflicting, the trial court’s factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 794.) “ ‘ “So far as it has passed on the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses, [the trial court’s] implied findings are conclusive. . . .” [Citations.] When an issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on appeal is that those affidavits favoring the contention of the prevailing party establish not only the facts stated therein but also all facts which reasonably may be inferred therefrom, and where there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated, a determination of the controverted facts by the trial court will not be disturbed.’ [Citations.]” (Kulko v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 514, 519, fn. 1.)
“[W]e review independently the trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts. [Citation.] When the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is purely a legal question that we review de novo. [Citation.]” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 794.)
B. Substantial Evidence of Service
Sharma contends that she was not personally served with the application for entry of satisfaction of judgment. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Sharma was properly served with notice of the application for satisfaction of judgment.
Personal service was effected in this case through substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.10, which provides in relevant part: “A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery.”
The proof of service is valid on its face. The process server supplied a declaration and testified in court that he personally served Sharma, whom he was able to identify based on prior services. Sharma’s refusal to open the door to receive process cannot defeat service. “‘Personal service usually contemplates actual delivery. But the person on whom service is sought may not, by merely declining to take the document offered, deny the personal service on the ground of lack of delivery, where under the circumstances it would be obvious to a reasonable person that a personal service was being attempted. In such a case the service may be made by merely depositing the process in some appropriate place where it would be most likely to come to the attention of the person being served.’ [Citation.]” (Crescendo Corp. v. Shelted, Inc. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 209, 212.) The trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Satisfaction of Judgment
A. Standard of Review
We examine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual findings that Pardue tendered performance to Sharma, and whether a tender of performance and a refusal of that tender, or some other circumstance, caused interest to cease to accrue on the judgment. (In re Marriage of Green (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1322.)
B. No Interest Accrued on the Judgment
Sharma contends that the judgment has not been satisfied, because interest accrued that remains to be paid. We conclude the trial court’s finding that no interest accrued on the judgment is supported by substantial evidence.
Code of Civil Procedure section 685.030, subdivision (d), provides in pertinent part that interest ceases to accrue on the date that the judgment is satisfied in full. The date that a money judgment is satisfied in full is the earliest of: “(1) The date satisfaction is actually received by the judgment creditor. [¶] (2) The date satisfaction is tendered to the judgment creditor or deposited in court for the judgment creditor. [¶] (3) The date of any other performance that has the effect of satisfaction.”
“[W]ith respect to tender, ‘it is a debtor’s responsibility to make an unambiguous tender of the entire amount due or else suffer the consequence that the tender is of no effect.’ [Citation.]” (Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 439.)
In this case, Pardue tendered the full amount of the settlement to Sharma two weeks after the parties settled the case and prior to the entry of judgment. His tender of performance caused interest to cease to accrue on the judgment. Sharma’s decision not to cash the check could not cause interest to begin accruing again.
C. Temporary Support
Sharma contends Pardue failed to pay temporary support, interest on unpaid temporary support, and interest on late support payments. However, the trial court’s finding that the judgment was satisfied is supported by substantial evidence. The judgment required payment of $60,800. There is no evidence the judgment included temporary support that remains unpaid. In fact, Sharma’s abstract of judgment states that Pardue owes $60,800, plus interest. Pardue proved that he paid Sharma $60,800 and she was not entitled to interest. Therefore, the trial court properly found that the judgment had been satisfied.
No Conflict Between Orders
Sharma contends the trial court’s May 2, 2007 order conflicts with the May 16, 2007 order. This is incorrect. Both orders direct the court clerk to enter satisfaction of judgment. The May 16, 2007 order additionally directs the court clerk to execute the satisfaction of judgment. Both orders accurately reflect the trial court’s rulings on May 2, 2007.
Appealability of the June 13, 2007 Order
The trial court found Sharma’s motion for reconsideration was untimely and failed to meet statutory requirements. However, the trial court treated the motion for reconsideration as a motion to vacate under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, which the trial court denied on June 13, 2007. Sharma did not identify the June 13, 2007 order in her notice of appeal.
Generally, an order denying a motion for reconsideration or a motion to vacate is not separately appealable because the assertions of error can be reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself. (Morton v. Wagner (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 968-969; Scognamillo v. Herrick (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1146.) However, Sharma has not challenged the trial court’s determination that her motion failed to meet the statutory requirements for a motion for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.
An order denying a motion to vacate a judgment on the ground that it is void for lack of jurisdiction is an appealable order (In re Marriage of Brockman (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1040-1041), as was the denial of Sharma’s request for funds for attorney fees (cf. Morton v. Wagner, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 968-969 [order denying motion for reconsideration was not separately appealable, but order designating appellant a vexatious litigant was appealable]).
Sharma contends that she was deprived of due process, because the trial court disregarded evidence submitted with the motion showing lack of service of process. In addition, Sharma contends the trial court should have ruled on an oral request for funds for an attorney prior to denying the motion. In this context, the June 13, 2007 order was an appealable order and Sharma failed to identify it in her notice of appeal. Therefore, her contentions concerning the June 13, 2007 order are not properly before this court.
DISPOSITION
The May 16, 2007 order is affirmed. Respondent A. Michael Pardue is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., MOSK, J.