Opinion
Civil No. 99-CV-74096-DT.
February 23, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. Introduction
The Court has before it Plaintiff Rita Shaffmaster's pro se civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has paid the filing fee for this action. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at the Huron Valley Center in Ypsilanti, Michigan. She is suing Defendant Brenda Murphy, a registered nurse who works at that facility, in her individual and official capacities.
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was denied proper medical treatment because she experienced a two-day delay in the receipt of pain medication for an earache in April, 1999. Plaintiff states that she reported her earache to Defendant Murphy on April 20, 2999, but Defendant refused to call a physician to obtain a Motrin pain relief medication prescription at that time. Another nurse provided Plaintiff with Tylenol pain relief medication that evening. Plaintiff was eventually given the Motrin on April 22, 1999. Plaintiff states that she suffered excruciating pain due to the delay in proper treatment and seeks monetary damages of $1,500 per day, plus court costs. Having reviewed Plaintiff's complaint, the Court now dismisses it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides for the dismissal of prisoner complaints against governmental entities and officials. It states in pertinent part:
(a) The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint —
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
III. Discussion
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he or she was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1988). Despite the liberal pleading standard accorded pro se plaintiff's, the Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison authorities maybe sued for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners where such indifference constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must establish that the medical needs were serious and that the defendant prison official acted with deliberate indifference to those serious medical needs. Id. Deliberate indifference may be established by showing a delay in medical treatment. Id.; Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1992). To establish a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment, however, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant prison official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A delay in medical care does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment unless there has been deliberate indifference which results in substantial harm. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Harrington v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1226-27 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (Cohn, J.) (six-week delay in treatment of foot malady was insufficient to state Eighth Amendment claim absent evidence that delay caused serious harm).
Assuming that Plaintiff's medical needs were serious, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to those needs. Plaintiff states that she was examined by Defendant Murphy for her earache complaint and was told that a prescription for Motrin pain relief medication would have to be ordered by the physician. Although Plaintiff asserts that Defendant refused to make the call, she received Motrin two days later. Moreover, Plaintiff received Tylenol pain relief medication on the evening she reported her earache. Plaintiff alleges no long-term ill-effects in not receiving Motrin sooner than provided. Thus, Plaintiff's claim is for, at most, a de minimis injury not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992).
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff claims medical malpractice or asserts that Defendant Murphy was negligent in responding to her medical needs, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. It is well-settled that claims of negligence concerning a prisoner's medical treatment, i.e. medical malpractice, are not cognizable in a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An "injury caused by negligence does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutionally-protected interest" and a claim that officials have engaged in negligent conduct does not state a claim under § 1983. Collins v. City of Harker Hgts., 503 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1992); Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov't. of Nashville Davidson Co., Tenn., 34 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1994). Moreover, any allegation that Defendant was grossly negligent in attending to Plaintiff's medical needs also fails to state a claim under § 1983. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that "gross negligence is not actionable under § 1983 because it is not arbitrary in the constitutional sense." Lewellen, 34 F.3d at 351. Plaintiff's complaint, which reflects a disagreement with the type and timeliness of the medical treatment she received in prison, fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
ARTHUR J. TARNOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: FEB 23 2000