Summary
holding that the petitioner had not shown that his mental illness rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights during the relevant time period
Summary of this case from United States v. HowardOpinion
No. C 03-1165 SI (pr)
August 13, 2003
JUDGMENT
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed because it was not filed by the statute of limitations deadline.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL INTRODUCTION
Lance James Shafer, a California prisoner at the Mule Creek State Prison, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1999 conviction in the Humboldt County Superior Court. This matter is now before the court for consideration of respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The court finds that the petition was not filed by the deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and therefore dismisses the petition as untimely.
BACKGROUND
Shafer alleges in his petition that he was convicted in Humboldt County Superior Court of numerous sex offenses against a child and was sentenced on November 24, 1999 to 19 years, four months, "followed by 17 indeterminate terms to life" in prison. He appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on April 11, 2001. Shafer did not file any state habeas petition or other state collateral attack on the conviction.
Shafer's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was signed on February 27, 2003 and was stamped "filed" on March 3, 2003 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. It was later transferred to this court. The actual date on which Shafer gave the petition to prison officials for mailing is unknown because he did not provide a proof of service and the postmarked envelope in which the petition was sent is not in the court file.
DISCUSSION
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which became law on April 24, 1996, imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The starting date of the limitations period here is the ordinary one: the date on which the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Shafer's petition for review was denied on April 11, 2001 and his conviction became final 90 days later on July 10, 2001, when the time for him to seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Absent any tolling, the federal petition had to be filed by July 10, 2002, to be timely. The federal petition was not deemed filed until at least February 27, 2003, more than seven months after the deadline. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities formailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold,536 U.S.214, 122 S.Ct. 2134 (2002).
The court will assume for purposes of this order that the petition was given to officials for mailing on the date it was signed.
Having determined that the presumptive deadline for filing was July 10, 2002, the next step is to determine whether the limitations period should be statutorily tolled. The one-year statute of limitations period will be tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Shafer receives no statutory tolling because he did not file any petition for writ of habeas corpus or collateral review in state court.
The final step is to determine whether equitable tolling applies. Equitable tolling of the limitation period is available upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances beyond a petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the petition. See, e.g., Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should only be granted if extraordinary circumstances beyond prisoner's control make it impossible for him to file petition on time), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). Shafer argues that he should receive equitable tolling for mental illness and for limited access to the law library.
These arguments were made in an attachment to the habeas petition. Shafer did not file an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Mental incompetency may equitably toll the AEDPA's limitation period because mental incompetency is an extraordinary circumstance beyond a prisoner's control. See Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541. But a showing of mental illness alone will not toll the limitation period. Under federal common law, mental illness tolls a limitation period only if "the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them." Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 937 (1996). Most mental illnesses are treatable, and with proper treatment many, if not most, sufferers are capable of managing their own affairs. See id. at 192. In order to overcome the limitation barrier, Shafer must show that mental illness rendered him incapable of filing a habeas petition before the limitation period expired. See id.; accord Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp.2d 160, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (prisoner must show that medical/mental problems rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights during relevant time period).
Shafer has not established that he was mentally incompetent or was prevented from managing his legal affairs for a sufficient length of time to aid his untimely petition. First, Shafer has not provided evidence that he was incompetent during the relevant time period. The fact that he twice attempted suicide (on October 24, 2001 and again on January 25, 2002) does not necessarily mean that he was mentally incompetent for purposes of attending to his legal affairs. Shafer also failed to show mental incompetency based on his stay in the Department of Mental Health facility at Vacaville for about four months during which time he took thorazine. Being in a mental health facility does not necessarily mean that he was mentally incompetent for purposes of attending to his legal affairs. And the fact that Shafer took thorazine to treat his mental illness also does not justify equitable tolling because he has not shown that the consumption of this medicine made him mentally incompetent so that he was unable to file his petition on time. Shafer has not approached the substantial showing of mental illness made by the petitioner in Kelly; there, the petitioner's serious mental problems were documented in a report listing extensive behavioral manifestations of the petitioner's mental illnesses and psychiatrist's conclusion that the severity of the petitioner's mental disorder precluded his capacity to appreciate his current legal position and make rational choices with respect to court proceedings. See Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541. By contrast to the detailed showing of how the mental illness affected the petitioner inKelly, Shafer has not provided persuasive evidence that he had a mental illness that rendered him incompetent and unable to attend to his legal affairs.
Second, even assuming arguendo that Shafer's suicide attempts, crisis bed stays, and incarceration at the Department of Mental Health facility in Vacaville were times during which he was incompetent and not able to work on his habeas petition, the time period are not long enough to solve his statute of limitations problem. The cumulative time of the mental health events was less than five months, and Shafer missed the deadline by seven months. In other words, even if the limitations period was tolled for the 15-day and one-week stay in the crisis bed and the four months in the Vacaville facility, the petition was still more than two months late.
Even if Shafer suffered from, and was treated for, mental illness — even if it continues today — he has not shown that the mental illness rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights during the relevant time period. Shafer has not set forth any evidence, such as medical records or affidavits signed by physicians who have examined or treated him in prison, which would support a finding that he was actually prevented him from filing a petition on time due to his mental illness. The court will not accept Shafer's implicit invitation for the court to stereotype all mentally ill — especially those who take medication to treat their mental illness — as inherently and endlessly incompetent. Shafer simply has not shown that he had a mental illness that made him unable to file his federal habeas petition by the deadline.
Shafer also argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because his access to the law library was limited during an unstated time period. This excuse is unavailing because he admits he had some restricted access to the law library and he does not provide any particulars about the duration of the limitations on his law library use, how those limitations were extraordinary and how they were the proximate cause of his inability to timely file his petition.
Shafer's federal petition was deemed filed on February 27, 2003, over seven months after the deadline for filing. The petition must be dismissed because it was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket #6.) The petition is dismissed because it was not timely filed. The clerk shall close the file.IT IS SO ORDERED.