Nos. 13-03-671-CR, 13-03-672-CR
Opinion delivered and filed July 1, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices YAñEZ, RODRIGUEZ, and GARZA.
RODRIGUEZ, Justice.
After pleading guilty to four counts of indecency with a child pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant, Jeffrey Sexton, was placed on deferred adjudication, community supervision. Upon learning that appellant had violated the conditions set by the trial court, the State moved to revoke his community supervision and to adjudicate guilt. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the State's motion to revoke. The trial court found that appellant violated several conditions of his community supervision and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively for a total of twenty-eight years. At appellant's revocation hearing, the trial court also heard the State's new indictment against appellant, failure to register as a sex offender.See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.10 (Vernon Supp. 2004). Without the benefit of a plea bargain, appellant pleaded guilty to the new charge and was sentenced to four years imprisonment to run concurrently with the four seven-year sentences. Appellant appeals from both proceedings. The cases have been consolidated for purposes of appeal. By two issues, appellant challenges the legality of the punishment imposed. He contends that the trial court erred in: (1) commenting that it could not consider the full range of punishment for a defendant convicted of fondling a child; and (2) changing its oral, pronounced sentence and stacking appellant's four sentences after learning that the applicable statute precluded the court from imposing the sentence it originally announced. The trial court has certified that these cases are "not . . . plea-bargain case[s], and the defendant has the right of appeal." See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(a)(2). We affirm.
One of the allegations in the State's motion to revoke was that appellant had failed to register as a sex offender.
I. FACTS
As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex.R.App.P. 47.4. II. FAILURE TO CONSIDER ENTIRE RANGE OF PUNISHMENT
By his first issue, appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it commented that it could not consider the full range of punishment for a defendant convicted of fondling a child. Appellant argues that "it is clear from the reporter's record that the trial court was not willing to consider the full range of punishment." However, appellant fails to identify where in the record the court's alleged comment was made. Furthermore, we have reviewed the record and have failed to find any such comment or inference by the trial court. "In accordance with rule 38.1(h) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will only consider contentions that are supported by clear and concise arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Horner v. State, 129 S.W.3d 210, 219 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h)). We find that this argument is inadequately briefed, and therefore will not consider it on appeal. Appellant's first issue is overruled. III. CHANGE IN SENTENCING
By his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it changed its oral, pronounced sentence and stacked appellant's four sentences upon learning that the applicable statute did not allow the court to impose the sentence originally announced. However, "[t]here has never been anything in Texas law that has prevented any court with jurisdiction over a criminal case from noticing and correcting an illegal sentence." Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 806 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). "A sentence that is outside the maximum or minimum range of punishment is unauthorized by law and therefore illegal." Id. The trial court's initial pronouncement exceeded the statutory maximum and hence was an illegal sentence. The State immediately pointed out to the trial court that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum. The trial court then amended the sentence to comply with the statute. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a trial court has the authority to notice and correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 805. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by correcting the sentence upon determining that it exceeded the statutory maximum. Appellant's second issue is overruled. IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.