Opinion
CASE NO. 20-61845-CIV-SINGHAL
2022-05-18
Jamie SENKO, Plaintiff, v. Corey J. JACKSON, individually, Daniella Moreno, individually, and The City of Miami Beach, a municipal corporation, Defendants.
David Alan Frankel, Law Offices of David A. Frankel, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff. Bradley Francis Zappala, Robert L. Switkes, Switkes & Zappala, P.A., Miami Beach, FL, for Defendants Corey J. Jackson, Daniella Moreno. Henry Joseph Hunnefeld, City Attorney's Office of Miami Beach, Miami, FL, Robert F. Rosenwald, Jr., City of Miami Beach City Attorney's Office, Miami Beach, FL, for Defendant The City of Miami Beach. Jennifer Lynn Warren, North Miami, FL, for Defendant City of North Miami.
David Alan Frankel, Law Offices of David A. Frankel, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.
Bradley Francis Zappala, Robert L. Switkes, Switkes & Zappala, P.A., Miami Beach, FL, for Defendants Corey J. Jackson, Daniella Moreno.
Henry Joseph Hunnefeld, City Attorney's Office of Miami Beach, Miami, FL, Robert F. Rosenwald, Jr., City of Miami Beach City Attorney's Office, Miami Beach, FL, for Defendant The City of Miami Beach.
Jennifer Lynn Warren, North Miami, FL, for Defendant City of North Miami.
ORDER
RAAG SINGHAL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DE [55]). Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (DE [55-1]) was filed in conjunction with the instant motion (DE [55]). Plaintiff filed his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response") (DE [62]) and his Statement of Material Facts Challenging Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment ("Statement of Facts") (DE [63]). Defendants have responded to Plaintiff's additional facts in their Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts ("Reply Statement of Facts") (DE [72]) and Reply in Support of their Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (DE [73]). The parties have also filed video evidence in support of their positions. Accordingly, the matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cut to its core, this case arises out of a sad encounter between Plaintiff Jamie Senko ("Plaintiff") and Miami Beach Police Department ("MBPD") Officers during the early morning hours of December 10, 2019. At approximately 5:15 a.m., in Miami Beach, Florida, Plaintiff fell asleep while at the wheel of his running vehicle, with the gear in drive and his foot resting on the brake. Virtually every relevant fact was captured on video as recorded by body cameras worn by the MBPD Officers who were present at the scene of the subject incident.
This Court will refer to Defendants’ Notice of Conventionally Filing Certain Video Exhibits (DE [60]) as Defendants’ Video Exhibits (DE [60]) and Plaintiff's Notice of Conventional Filing in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (DE [74]) as Plaintiff's Video Exhibits (DE [74]).
Eventually, as will be fleshed out more fully below, the parties realized this case never had to happen. But the issue before the Court today is whether on the record presented, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds they are.
On September 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a seven-count Complaint (DE [1]) alleging excessive force against Defendant Corey J. Jackson ("Defendant Jackson") (Count I) and Defendant Daniella Moreno ("Defendant Moreno") (Count II); false imprisonment against Defendant Jackson (Count III) and Defendant Moreno (Count IV); state tort battery against Defendant Jackson (Count V) and Defendant Moreno (Count VI); and respondeat superior liability against Defendant City of Miami Beach (the "City") (Count VII). The City filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Complaint (the "City's Answer") (DE [12]) on October 8, 2020, wherein the City asserted thirteen affirmative defenses. Defendants Jackson and Moreno jointly filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff's Complaint ("Answer") (DE [13]) on October 13, 2020, wherein they asserted thirty-one affirmative defenses.
In support of the instant motion (DE [55]), Defendants conventionally filed a thumb-drive containing the following video recordings: Video 1, the Unredacted Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Melissa Rosa ("Defendants’ Video Ex. C"); Video 2, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Daniella Moreno ("Defendants’ Video Ex. D"); Video 3, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Corey Jackson ("Defendants’ Video Ex. E"); Video 7, the Unredacted Body-Warn Camera Footage of Sergeant Wilson Romero ("Defendants’ Video Ex. G"); and Video 11, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Sergeant Wilson Romero ("Defendants’ Video Ex. H"). See (Defendants’ Video Exhibits (DE [60]), filed Oct. 4, 2021).
For ease of reference, this Court will make citations to the Defendants’ Video Exhibits (DE [60]) as follows: (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:hh:mm).
In support of his opposition to summary judgment (DE [62]), Plaintiff conventionally filed a thumb-drive containing the following video recordings: Video 1, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Melissa Rosa ("Plaintiff's Video Ex. 1"); Video 2, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Daniella Moreno ("Plaintiff's Video Ex. 2"); Video 3, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Officer Corey Jackson ("Plaintiff's Video Ex. 3"); Video 7, Body-Warn Camera Footage of Sergeant Wilson Romero ("Plaintiff's Video Ex. 7"). See (Plaintiff's Video Exhibits (DE [74]), filed Oct. 21, 2021).
For ease of reference, this Court will make citations to the Plaintiff's Video Exhibits (DE [74]) as follows: (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:hh:mm).
In their Reply Statement of Facts (DE [72]), Defendants request this Court strike or disregard those portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (DE [63]) which violate Local Rule 56.1. Nonetheless, Defendants addressed Plaintiff's additional statements beginning on paragraph 32 through 62 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (DE [63]). Beginning on paragraph 32 through 62 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (DE [63]), Plaintiff seemingly disputes Defendants’ facts, however, he cites no record evidence refuting them. Likewise, with the exception of Paragraphs 8, 16, 51, 53, 56–59 thereof, the Statement of Disputed Material Facts (DE [63]) does not provide evidentiary citations supporting Plaintiff's position as required by Local Rule 56.1(b)(2)(C). See (Pl.’s Resp. (DE [63]) at ¶¶ 8, 16, 51, 53, 56–59); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B) ; S. D. Fla. L. R. 56.1(a)(2), (c); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("If a party fails to properly ... address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion ...."). The Court will not expend valuable judicial resources searching for resolution of such purported factual disputes. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 56.1(a)(2) ("An opponent's Statement of Material Facts shall clearly challenge any purportedly material fact asserted by the movant that the opponent contends is genuinely in dispute. ") (emphasis added).
II. BACKGROUND FACTS
On December 10, 2019, at approximately 5:15 a.m., MBPD Officer Melissa Rosa ("Officer Rosa") was on duty and driving her patrol vehicle when she observed a Toyota Camry (the "Camry") stopped in the proper lane of travel at the intersection of 10th Street and Alton Road. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶¶ 1–2); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶¶ 1–2) ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 1 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); see also (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:00); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 1 at 0:00:00). Officer Rosa had parked her patrol vehicle behind the Camry with her emergency lights, headlights, and overhead takedown lights illuminating the Camry. Id. at ¶ 3; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 3 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 3 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); see also (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:00); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 1 at 0:00:00). The Camry's engine was running, it's brake lights and headlights were on. Id. at ¶ 4; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 4 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 4 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); see also (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:00); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 1 at 0:00:00).
Plaintiff disputes, without citation, that the Offense Incident Report ("OIR") written by Officer Rosa indicates that she observed the Plaintiff's vehicle at 4:44 a.m., not 5:15 a.m. See (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 2) ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 2 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts.").
Officer Rosa exited her vehicle and approached the driver's side door of the Camry and observed Plaintiff seemingly asleep in the driver's seat with his head leaning against the driver's window. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 5); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 5 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 5 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:00–0:00:07) (showing the driver's side window was fogged up with condensation and there was no movement within the vehicle). Officer Rosa assumed Plaintiff's foot was on the brake because the Camry's brake lights were on. Id. at ¶ 6; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 6 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 6 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:00–0:02:08); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 1 at 0:02:08). Officer Rosa then radioed her observation of the Camry over police radio, calling in a description of the vehicle and the plate number, and requesting a "15", which is a request for backup to assist her on the stop. Id. at ¶ 7; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 7 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 7 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:12–0:00:47).
While Officer Rosa waited for backup beside her patrol vehicle, she honked the horn of her patrol vehicle six times, but Plaintiff did not react at all. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 8); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:00:47–0:01:48). A few minutes after Officer Rosa's request for backup, MBPD Officer Daniella Moreno ("Officer Moreno") arrived at the scene and asked Officer Rosa: "You ready?" before beginning their approach of the Camry. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:01:49–0:02:13); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:08); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:08). As Officers Rosa and Moreno were preparing to approach the Camry, MBPD Officer Corey Jackson ("Officer Jackson") arrived at the scene in response to Officer Rosa's request for backup. Id. at ¶ 10; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 10 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 10 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:22); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:14–0:00:20). Officer Moreno clicked on her flashlight and approached the driver side of the Camry while Officer Rosa reapproached the Camry from the passenger side. Id. at ¶ 9; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 9 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 9 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:01:49–0:02:13); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:08); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:08). Next, Officer Rosa verbally asks Officer Moreno: "is he okay?"; as she wipes condensation from the passenger side window. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:13–0:02:19); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 1 at 0:02:13–0:02:19). Officer Moreno then exclaims: "Oh, he works here! He works here, hold on," while flashing the light through the driver's side window. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:15–0:00:21); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:15:21).
Officer Rosa opened the passenger door while Officer Moreno opened the driver door. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶¶ 12–13); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 12 ("There is no dispute of material fact as to paragraph 12 of the Defendants’ Statement of Facts."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:19–0:02:22); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:22–0:00:24). When Officer Moreno opened the driver's side door, she found Plaintiff slightly slumped over, as though leaning against the window. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:22–0:00:26); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:22–0:00:26). Officers Rosa and Moreno were able to open both front doors, all the way open, before Plaintiff reacted. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:27); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:27). Officer Moreno began to instruct Officer Rosa to put the car in park when Plaintiff placed his left hand on the steering wheel. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:28); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:28). Plaintiff appeared startled and disoriented. Id. at ¶ 13; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 13) (reframing of facts without citation); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:22–0:02:25); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:26–0:00:30); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:26–0:00:30).
Officer Jackson exited his patrol vehicle, approached the Camry, and observed the Camry was in gear because the brake lights were on. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 14); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:22); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:16–0:00:24); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:16–0:00:24). Officer Jackson approached the Camry first on the passenger side towards Officer Rosa then quickly moved to the driver's side of the Camry next to Officer Moreno. (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:20–0:00:30); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:20–0:00:30). While looking at Officer Moreno, Plaintiff placed his left hand on the steering wheel of the Camry as the officers instructed him to stop. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 14); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:22–0:02:27) ("No, no, no, stop the car," Officer Moreno. "Hey, hey, hey, stop the car," Officer Rosa); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:27–0:00:30) (same); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:30–0:00:31) (same); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:27–0:00:30) (same); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:30–0:00:31) (same).
As Officers Rosa and Moreno were attempting to secure the Camry, the Camry began to slowly roll forward. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶¶ 14–15); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:24–0:02:28); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:29–0:00:32); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:31–0:00:34); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:29–0:00:32); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:31–0:00:34). Plaintiff did not comply with the MBPD officers’ instruction; as a result, Officer Jackson physically moved past Officer Moreno, reached into the Camry, and put the Camry's transmission into park. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶¶ 16–17); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:27–0:02:28); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:29–0:00:32); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:31–0:00:34); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:29–0:00:32); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:31–0:00:34). Officer Jackson then grabbed Plaintiff's left hand from the Camry's steering wheel while repeatedly issuing loud verbal commands for Plaintiff to get out of the Camry. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 19); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:29–0:02:33); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:34–0:00:47); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:34–0:00:47).
Plaintiff did not comply with the MBPD officers’ requests, despite being asked over thirty times. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:22–0:03:01) (shouting different iterations of: "Get out the car!" "Out, out, out the car!" "Get out of the car, man!" "Get out of the fucking car, bro!"); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:27–0:01:05) (same); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:35–0:01:05) (same); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:27–0:01:05); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:35–0:01:05). Officer Jackson attempted to pull Plaintiff from the Camry by his left arm but was unsuccessful as Plaintiff was seemingly confused but physically non-compliant, shifting away from the MBPD officers and flailing his arms. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 23); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 23) (undisputed); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:30–0:02:47); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:33–0:00:44); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:00:41–0:00:47); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:33–0:00:44); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:41–0:00:47). Officer Moreno attempted to assist Officer Jackson by reaching for Plaintiff's right arm while the MBPD officers at the scene kept repeating their instructions for Plaintiff to get out of the Camry. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:45–0:00:50); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:45–0:00:50). With the Camry still running—though the transmission was in park due to Officer Jackson's actions—Officer Jackson grabbed Plaintiff by the ankles and pulled Plaintiff from the driver's seat and away from the Camry. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶¶ 21–22); see (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:02:57–0:03:03); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:00:58–0:01:05); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:01:00–0:01:06); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:00:58–0:01:05); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:01:00–0:01:06).
Once Plaintiff had been removed from the vehicle, Officer Moreno, Officer Jackson, and MBPD Officer Leon Azicri ("Officer Azicri") rolled Plaintiff onto his stomach and handcuffed him with his hands behind his back. Id. at ¶ 24; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 24 ("There is no dispute as the facts as described in paragraph 24."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:03:03–0:03:21); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:01:09–0:01:26) ("Turn your ass around," instructed Officer Moreno.); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:01:09–0:01:26) (same). Officer Jackson approached the Camry for a visual inspection of the driver's side, audibly stating: "He's gotta be high." (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:01:20–0:02:06); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:01:20–0:02:06). While Plaintiff was handcuffed on the ground, Officer Rosa conducted a pat-down search on his person while asking: "What the hell is wrong with you, man? What are you on?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:03:22–0:03:59). "What do you mean," Plaintiff mumbled. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:01:30); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:01:30) (same). While conducting the search of his person, Officer Moreno warned Plaintiff not to move, at which point, Plaintiff spoke audibly for the first time: "I'm not trying to cause a problem." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:00–0:04:09); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:01:50–0:02:15); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:01:50–0:02:15). The MBPD officers then moved Plaintiff into a seated position on the ground while they conducted an investigation of the scene. Id. ; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 24 ("There is no dispute as the facts as described in paragraph 24."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:10–0:04:30).
While handcuffed on the ground, Plaintiff was evaluated and questioned by the MBPD officers in an effort to determine how he came to be disoriented and passed out behind the wheel of the running Camry in the middle of the street. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 25); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 25 ("There is no dispute as the facts as described in paragraph 25."); (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:10–0:02:27). Officer Moreno asked: "Jamie, you work at Whole Foods," Plaintiff nodded in response. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:27–0:04:30); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:02:30–0:02:37); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:02:32–0:02:40); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:30–0:02:37); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:32–0:02:40). Officer Moreno then asked: "Where were you coming from tonight?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:35–0:04:36); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:02:38); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:02:41–0:02:42); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:38); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:41–0:02:42). "I was coming from my house," Plaintiff responded. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:37–0:04:38); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:02:40–0:02:41); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:02:42–0:02:44); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:40–0:02:41); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:42–0:02:44). "I don't understand what happened," Plaintiff continued. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:04:38–0:04:40); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:02:41–0:02:43); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:02:44–0:02:46); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:41–0:02:43); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:02:44–0:02:46).
Officer Moreno then began searching the driver side of the Camry as Plaintiff was taken and placed in the back of Officer Rosa's patrol vehicle. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:05:11–0:06:04); (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:03:14–0:03:42); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:14–0:03:42). Officer Jackson stated to Officer Moreno: "They tried to take off with me in the car!" (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:03:41–0:03:43); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:03:43–0:03:45); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:41–0:03:43); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:43–0:03:45). Officers Jackson and Moreno discuss whether Plaintiff is under the influence or whether he fell asleep. (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:03:44–0:03:58); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:03:46–0:03:59); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:44–0:03:58); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:46–0:03:59). The MBPD officers then express confusion over Plaintiff's inaction and non-compliance during the stop. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:11–0:06:18) (Def.’s Video Ex. D at 0:03:58–0:04:30) (responding to Officer Jackson: "That's the only thing that concerns me is that why did he act like that?"); (Def.’s Video Ex. E at 0:04:00–0:04:23) (asking rhetorically: "Why did he act like that?"); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:03:58–0:04:30) (same); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 2 at 0:04:00–0:04:23).
Officer Rosa then entered her patrol vehicle, wherein a conversation with Plaintiff began. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:30). "What is wrong with you? Tell me the truth," Officer Rosa asked. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:51–0:06:53). Plaintiff almost unintelligibly mumbles: "What?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:54). "What are you on? Did you take a pill? Are you tired? What's going on with you?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:54–0:06:57). "No, I'm just tired. I was pulling up," the rest of Plaintiff's statement is inaudible. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:06:58–0:07:00). "You didn't pull up, you've been there for the past five minutes." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:00–0:07:03). Plaintiff responded: "Well, ‘cause when I first pulled up there was a truck sitting out there, I waited for him to reverse in." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:04–0:07:10). "So, why when we told you to get out, why didn't you get out?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:11–0:07:13). Plaintiff's exact response is inaudible, but Plaintiff states he was going to take a nap and passed out. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:14–0:07:22). Officer Rosa asked Plaintiff again: "I'm asking you, why didn't you get out when we told you to?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:23–0:07:25). Plaintiff responds: "Because I honestly didn't hear you guys until you pulled me out and threw me on the ground." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:26–0:07:28). "We told you like five times," Officer Rosa responded, though the video evidence indicates the request was made almost thirty times by the MBPD officers present at the scene. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:07:29).
The MBPD officers then discuss what to do with the Camry; that Plaintiff works at the Whole Foods; leaving the Camry in the parking lot; and Plaintiff lives in Pompano Beach. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:08:30–0:09:25). The MBPD officers then discuss Plaintiff's action during the stop, what measures should be taken, and whether Plaintiff was under the influence or just tired from the drive from Pompano Beach. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:09:26–0:10:14).
Officer Jackson then approached the back passenger window of Officer Rosa's patrol vehicle where Plaintiff was being held. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:10:15). Officer Jackson asked Plaintiff if he had anything to drink, to which Plaintiff responded: "no, sir." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:10:21–0:07:25). Plaintiff then explained: "I was trying to pull in here to take a nap before work, I got here kind of early, and the truck was out here." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:10:29–0:10:34). "Ok, so question," Officer Jackson continued, "when I opened the door and tried to talk to you, why were you trying to drive off with me in the car?" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:10:34–0:10:42). Officer Jackson was surprised by Plaintiff's response that he fell asleep at the wheel, with the transmission in drive, his foot on the brakes, while waiting for a truck to back in. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:10:43–0:11:23). Plaintiff then explained: "I ain't gunna lie [unintelligible]. I don't remember having an interaction with you. I just remember like waking up and I had the cops in my face and I was on the ground." (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:11:23–0:11:35). "You slapped my hand and everything," Officer Jackson responded. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:11:38–0:11:39).
MBPD Sergeant Wilson Romero ("Sergeant Romero"), the patrol supervisor, also questioned and evaluated Plaintiff while he was in the patrol vehicle, Plaintiff complained he felt dizzy and his head was spinning. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶¶ 25–26 ("There is no dispute as [to] the facts as described in paragraph 25."); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:00:00–0:01:26). "Hey, brother. What's going on, man? How are you? Hey, you alright man, what's going on?" (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:00:00–0:00:12). Plaintiff advised Sergeant Romero he was really tired, taking anti-depressants, had worked a long shift at the Whole Foods Market, and had not slept the previous evening. Id. at ¶ 26; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) disputed); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:00:00–0:01:30); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:00:12–0:01:30); (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:00:59–0:01:05) (responding to Sergeant Romero's question: "Nah, I'm on anti-depressants.") Plaintiff explained that he must have dozed off while waiting for the truck to move. (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:00:39–0:00:45). Sergeant Romero asked Plaintiff if anything hurt, to which Plaintiff responded his back hurt from being on his feet too long after working twelve hours. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:01:30–0:01:50); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:01:31–0:01:50).
The store manager from Whole Foods where Plaintiff worked arrived at the scene, advised the MBPD officers Plaintiff was tired from working really long hours, and told Plaintiff it would be fine if he did not come in to work later that morning. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:02:46–0:03:06); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:02:46–0:03:06). Following questions from Sergeant Romero, the store manager advised him that Plaintiff worked for her, that Plaintiff worked the late shift the night before until closing and was scheduled to work again at five the next morning, less than five hours later. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:03:27–0:03:47); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:03:27–0:03:47). The store manager advised he was covering for two teams. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:03:50–0:03:54); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:03:50–0:03:54). Sergeant Romero asked if Plaintiff has ever acted in this manner, if Plaintiff has ever appeared intoxicated. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:04:25–0:04:36) ("He appears to be intoxicated, the way he's speaking and ..."); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:04:25–0:04:36) (same). She responded he has worked shifts back-to-back opening and closing before without issues. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:04:24–0:05:10); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:04:24–0:05:10). Sergeant Romero asked if Plaintiff has ever required medical attention, to which the store manager responded she has never seen him dizzy or appear intoxicated and advised Sergeant Romero that Plaintiff was a Team Leader, a Department Manager. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:05:11–0:05:55); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:05:11–0:05:55).
Miami Beach Fire Department was called to evaluate Plaintiff. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:20:00). As Plaintiff was getting out of the back of the patrol vehicle, he exclaimed: "Oh, shit!" (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:30). "What happened," Officer Rosa asked. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:31–0:26:32). "My knee dislocated," Plaintiff responded. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:33). "What do you mean? How does that happen," Officer Rosa asked. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:34). Plaintiff explained he got hurt playing football and his left knee pops out if it gets in the wrong direction. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:35–0:26:41). "All right, they're going to pop it back in," Officer Rosa explained referring to Miami Beach Fire Department, which had arrived at the scene. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:41–0:26:43).
Officer Rosa removed the handcuffs for Plaintiff to be evaluated by the Miami Beach Fire Department. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:26:58–0:27:31). Plaintiff explained his football injury to the first responders and Sergeant Romero, provided personal information, and had his blood pressure and vitals checked. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:27:32–0:30:50); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:06:45–0:07:00). In the meantime, Officer Rosa returns to her patrol vehicle, continues the investigation from her patrol vehicle, and states: "This could have been so simple," before signing off. (Def.’s Video Ex. C at 0:33:12–0:33:15).
After being evaluated by Miami Beach Fire Department, Plaintiff appeared alert, declined being taken to the hospital, stated he had to be at work in an hour, and was embarrassed. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 30); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 30) (claiming there is no evidence to support Defendants’ statement "other than the report of Sergeant Romero, which is of questionable credibility"); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:14:22–0:15:00) ("BP is a little high, he could have passed out ... asymptomatic."); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:14:22–0:15:00) (same). Sergeant Romero asked Plaintiff if this had ever happened to him before. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:15:12–0:15:16); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:15:12–0:15:16). Plaintiff responded that he had not passed out for five years, since high school, when he had a herniated disk in his back. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:15:17–0:15:27). At this point, Sergeant Romero jokingly stated: "So you're all messed up, your back is herniated, your knee is dislocated, and you feel dizzy." (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:15:27–0:15:35). Plaintiff chuckled. (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:15:31); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:15:31).
During this conversation with Sergeant Romero, Plaintiff stated the last thing he remembered before being pulled from his vehicle and placed in handcuffs is stopping his vehicle in the street to wait for a truck to move. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 28); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 28) ("There is no dispute as described in paragraph 28."); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:15:50–0:16:39); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:15:50–0:16:39). Without being prompted, Plaintiff admitted to Sergeant Romero he regularly smoked marijuana to calm himself down and had in fact smoked marijuana that evening but could not remember if he had consumed any alcohol that evening. (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 27); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:16:41–0:17:06); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:16:41–0:17:06).
Later a first responder advised Sergeant Romero that she treated the scratch on his back and his left elbow, which appeared to have an old wound that appeared agitated. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:00:00–0:00:45). Sergeant Romero advised Plaintiff he was the supervisor and asked Plaintiff what he remembered. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:00:46–0:00:50). Plaintiff did not remember. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:51:30–0:01:31). Sergeant Romero asked Plaintiff if anything hurt, to which Plaintiff responded: "No. No sir, nothing." Id. at ¶ 29; (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 29 (claiming he told Sergeant Romero he had back pain, without citation); (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:01:31–0:01:35) (but consistent with Plaintiff's earlier discussion with Sergeant Romero where the Sergeant joked with Plaintiff). Sergeant Romero pointed out the small wound on Plaintiff's left elbow and the scratch on his back. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:01:36–0:01:41). Plaintiff responded: "Until you pointed it out, I didn't even feel it." (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:01:42–0:01:45). Plaintiff answered questions regarding his contact information. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:01:46–0:03:14). During this conversation, Plaintiff claimed he came to as he hit the ground, the officers told him to turn around, and he was handcuffed. (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:03:15–0:03:39); (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:04:46–0:04:09). Sergeant Romero asked if Plaintiff needed anything from him, Plaintiff responded "no, sir," Plaintiff then apologized: "I'm sorry." (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:04:11–0:04:20).
Miami Beach Fire Department personnel advised the MBPD officers on scene that Plaintiff was most likely experiencing medical issues due to high blood pressure and sleep deprivation. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 30); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 30) (same); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:11:11–0:11:54); (Def.’s Video Ex. G at 0:12:09–0:12:32). Following the medical evaluation, the MBPD officers made the decision to release Plaintiff from custody. See (Def. Stat. (DE [55-1]) at ¶ 30); (Pl. Stat. (DE [63]) at ¶ 30) (same).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment "is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656–57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ); see also Alabama v. North Carolina , 560 U.S. 330, 344, 130 S.Ct. 2295, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the nonmoving party in light of his burden of proof. Harrison v. Culliver , 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). And a fact is "material" if, "under the applicable substantive law, it might affect the outcome of the case." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co. , 357 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). "[W]here the material facts are undisputed and do not support a reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant, summary judgment may properly be granted as a matter of law." DA Realty Holdings, LLC v. Tenn. Land Consultants , 631 Fed. Appx. 817, 820 (11th Cir. 2015).
The 2010 Amendment to Rule 56(a) substituted the phrase "genuine dispute" for the former " ‘genuine issue’ of any material fact."
The Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. SEC v. Monterosso , 756 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party must offer more than a mere scintilla of evidence for its position; indeed, the nonmoving party must make a showing sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably find on its behalf." Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ. , 780 F.3d 1039, 1050 (11th Cir. 2015). "[T]his, however, does not mean that we are constrained to accept all the nonmovant's factual characterizations and legal arguments." Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp. , 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir. 1994). IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to all counts asserted in Plaintiff's Complaint. Officer Jackson and Officer Moreno contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claims because any force used against Plaintiff was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established law. As to Plaintiff's claims arising under Florida law, Officers Jackson and Moreno assert they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's battery claims because any force used against Plaintiff was reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and as to Plaintiff's false imprisonment claims because any arrest or detention of Plaintiff was supported by probable cause. Further, the officers assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims based on the sovereign immunity afforded to them under Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a), because there is no evidence that they acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Finally, the City asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claim for Respondeat Superior liability.
Plaintiff opposes the instant motion (DE [55]), arguing the officers’ conduct was unreasonable in light of Plaintiff's condition: asleep with his foot on the brake of the running Camry. Plaintiff insists he did not refuse to comply; instead, he was not able to comply with the officers’ requests. As such, Plaintiff argues probable cause did not exist so Plaintiff's arrest was illegal and constitutes false imprisonment. Plaintiff insists Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims because if the arrest of Plaintiff is deemed unlawful by this Court, then the force used by the officers was gratuitous, unnecessary, and unreasonable under the circumstances. Finally, Plaintiff argues the City is not entitled to summary judgment because Florida law permits plaintiffs to recover against a municipality for the tortious acts of its employees based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
A. Excessive Force (Counts I and II)
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ; Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). "An official asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity must initially establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority." Skop v. City of Atlanta , 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Once an officer has shown that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Vinyard v. Wilson , 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) ); see Brown v. City of Huntsville , 608 F.3d 724, 734 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2010). When a claim of qualified immunity is asserted, a court must first answer the following question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ).
Plaintiff does not dispute that Officers Jackson and Moreno were performing a discretionary function in the course and scope of official duties. See Hill v. DeKalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr. , 40 F.3d 1176, 1185 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A government official acts within his or her discretionary authority if objective circumstances compel the conclusion that challenged actions occurred in the performance of the official's duties and within the scope of this authority."). Once an officer has shown that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Vinyard v. Wilson , 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee , 284 F.3d at 1194 ); see Brown , 608 F.3d at 734 & n.14.
The Fourth Amendment's freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest. Lee , 284 F.3d at 1197. In excessive force cases, whether a plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated is governed by the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. Hadley v. Gutierrez , 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008). Under that standard, a court judges the officer's use of force "on a case-by-case basis from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Brown , 608 F.3d at 738 (quotation marks omitted).
Whether an officer has used excessive force depends on "the facts and circumstances of each particular case," including a non-exhaustive list of factors, such as (1) "the severity of the crime at issue"; (2) "whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others"; and (3) "whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "Not every push or shove" violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled specifically that a police officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he uses gratuitous force against a suspect who is secure, not resisting, and not a safety threat to the officer or other officers. See, e.g. , Hadley , 526 F.3d at 1330 (holding officer used excessive force when, in a single blow, he punched suspect who was handcuffed and was not struggling or resisting); Lee , 284 F.3d at 1199 (holding that an officer's use of force after the plaintiff was "arrested, handcuffed, and completely secure, and after any danger to the arresting officer as well as any risk of flight had passed" was excessive). Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit has held that it may be reasonable for an officer to use force against a suspect who is resisting and not subdued. See, e.g., Mobley v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep't , 783 F.3d 1347, 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding officers’ use of force in striking, kicking, and tasing suspect was not excessive where the suspect, though pinned on the ground, was "refusing to surrender his hands to be cuffed"); Crosby v. Monroe Cnty. , 394 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding officer's use of force was not excessive where suspect, though lying face down on the ground, "was able to wrestle his hand loose and push [the officer's] foot away").
Here, carefully viewing the evidence and each video in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that at the time of the incident, (1) Plaintiff was not secured; (2) Plaintiff was not complying; (3) Plaintiff was moving, resisting, and otherwise posing a threat to Officers Rosa, Moreno, and Jackson; and (4) Officers Jackson and Moreno had need to use force to remove Plaintiff from the moving vehicle. The Graham factors do not weigh in Plaintiff's favor.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was verbally unintelligible and physically non-compliant throughout the incident, and therefore a reasonable officer in Officer Jackson's or Officer Moreno's position could believe Plaintiff was a safety threat. This Court finds the video evidence supports this position. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues the officers created the exigent circumstance leading to Plaintiff's attention. Plaintiff claims Officer Jackson's actions were not "heroic"; he merely reached into a car that began to roll, without any resistance from Plaintiff, and put the Camry in park. (Resp. (DE [62]) at 3). However, Plaintiff's contention that there were no other vehicles or any pedestrians near the Camry, is directly contradicted by his argument that the officers, specifically Officer Rosa, neglected the possibility that Plaintiff was having a medical emergency. Id. This argument in effect admits Plaintiff posed a danger to himself and others. In any event, the video evidence of the incident, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, reveals the officers had no choice but to forcibly remove Plaintiff from the Camry and secure him with handcuffs. Accordingly, this Court finds the officers’ conduct did not violate a federal constitutional right.
B. False Imprisonment (Counts III and IV)
"[U]nder Florida law, false arrest and false imprisonment are different labels for the same cause of action." Rankin v. Evans , 133 F.3d 1425, 1430 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998). "False arrest and false imprisonment are closely related, but false imprisonment is a broader common law tort; false arrest is only one of several methods of committing false imprisonment." Mathis v. Coats , 24 So. 3d 1284, 1289 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010). "Indeed, a person improperly detained pursuant to a lawful arrest may have the right to bring an action for false imprisonment." Id. "[W]hen an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen a court [may] conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A claim for false imprisonment under § 1983 accrues "when either the seizure ends or the plaintiff is held pursuant to legal process." Williams v. Aguirre , 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020).
" ‘False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of a person against his will, the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff and deprivation of his liberty.’ " Archer v. City of Winter Haven , 846 Fed. Appx. 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Johnson v. Weiner , 155 Fla. 169, 171 (Fla. 1944)). "To state a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must establish: ‘1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a person 2) against that person's will 3) without legal authority or ‘color of authority’ ... 4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances." Id. (citations omitted). "In a false imprisonment action, the plaintiff is required only to ‘establish imprisonment contrary to his will and the unlawfulness of the detention.’ " Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. , 437 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
"The existence of probable cause constitutes an affirmative defense to the claims of false arrest and imprisonment under Florida law." Rankin v. Evans , 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir. 1998) ; see also (Ans. (DE [13]) at 8, 10). "In determining whether probable cause existed, we consider whether the officer's actions were ‘objectively reasonable’ based on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ " Williams v. City of Homestead , 206 Fed. Appx. 886, 888 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Rankin , 133 F.3d at 1435 ). To establish probable cause, a defendant must show "the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge" were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to believe the suspect was guilty of committing a crime. Holland v. City of Auburn , 657 Fed. Appx. 899, 903 (11th Cir. 2016). "The probable cause standard is objective, requiring only ‘that an arrest be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.’ " Id. (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs , 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992)). Under federal and state law, "the validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest." Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002). "[I]f there is a valid charge for which a person could have been arrested , probable cause exists." Daniel v. Village of Royal Palm Beach , 889 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (emphasis added). "[S]o long as probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for any offense, the arrest and detention are valid even if probable cause was lacking as to some offenses, or even all announced charges." Whittington v. Town of Surfside , 490 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Lee , 284 F.3d at 1196 ).
Even though Plaintiff was ultimately not charged, Defendants argue probable cause existed "to detain and arrest Plaintiff for multiple criminal offenses at the time of his encounter with the Defendant Officers, including but not limited to: (1) Failure to Obey a Lawful Order of a Police Officer in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.072(3) ; (2) Resisting an officer without violence in violation of Fla. Stat. § 843.02 ; and (3) driving under the influence in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.193(1)(a)." (Mot. (DE [55]) at 12). This Court agrees.
Section 316.072(3), Florida Statutes makes it a misdemeanor "for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer." And Florida law authorizes arrest for knowingly obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties, including by refusing to obey a police officer's lawful command. See Fla. Stat. § 843.02. In addition to failing to comply with Officers Rosa and Moreno's orders to stop the car, Plaintiff then refused to exit his vehicle despite almost thirty loud, clear, verbal orders to do so. Finally, it is not undisputed whether Plaintiff was under the influence at the time of the incident as Plaintiff admitted to Sergeant Romero that he had smoked marijuana earlier in the evening. Accordingly, there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff admitted he could not remember if he had any alcohol that evening. On this basis, and based upon his behavior and admissions, there existed probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance to the extent that his or her normal facilities are impaired, in violation of section 316.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
See (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:16:41-0:16:54); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:16:41-0:16:54).
Plaintiff argues the Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving under the influence at any time during the incident. Plaintiff claims the officers did not smell alcohol, though this is controverted by the video evidence of Sergeant Romero's bodycam footage, Plaintiff did not have slurred speech pursuant to the EMT's report, and the officers could not competently perform a roadside DUI investigation to confirm. Plaintiff critiques the officers’ competence in conducting the roadside DUI investigation, refers to Officer Rosa's insistence the roadside DUI investigation be conducted correctly, and infers the MBPD officers’ discussion regarding the roadside DUI investigation indicated the MBPD officers just wanted to charge Plaintiff with a crime. This Court does not agree with Plaintiff's reframing of facts regarding Plaintiff's demeanor at the time of the stop. While Plaintiff's speech and demeanor was much improved by the time he was evaluated by the Miami Beach Fire Department, nearly twenty minutes had passed from the initial stop, removal from the Camry, and detention. At that point, Plaintiff was admittedly more alert and responsive. However, in the few minutes Officers Rosa, Moreno, and Jackson had to evaluate the scene, assess the risks, and determine the proper course of action, Plaintiff was, admittedly, non-responsive and non-compliant.
See (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:00:46-0:00:58); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:00:46-0:00:58).
See (Def.’s Video Ex. H at 0:15:53-0:16:57); see also (Pl.’s Video Ex. 7 at 0:15:53-0:16:57).
The undisputed facts borne by the video evidence in this case conclusively establish that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff here. The video evidence shows the Camry was stopped, not parked, in the middle of the road in the proper travel lane. Plaintiff was unresponsive to Officer Rosa's initial approach, the patrol vehicle's flashing lights, and the honking of the patrol vehicle's horn. When Officers Rosa and Moreno approached the vehicle, Plaintiff did not comply with their loud and clear orders to stop the Camry. Once Officer Jackson intervened to put the Camry's transmission in park, Plaintiff again failed to comply to numerous, loud, verbal orders to get out of the Camry. Instead of complying with any of the MBPD officers’ repeated instructions, the video evidence shows Plaintiff struggled with the officers, resisted their attempts to remove him from the Camry, and did not give any indication he would comply with their orders.
Probable cause is an affirmative defense to a claim of false imprisonment. As a result, Plaintiff cannot show that his detention was "unlawful" or that the MBPD officers conducted it "without legal authority." Harder v. Edwards , 174 So. 3d 524, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim fails as a matter of law.
C. State Tort Battery (Counts V and VI)
Under Florida law, force used by a police officer during an arrest is transformed into a battery only where the force used was clearly excessive. See Davis v. Williams , 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Miami v. Sanders , 672 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) ). And to determine whether the force used was excessive, Florida courts analyze whether the amount of force used was reasonable under the circumstances. Sanders , 672 So. 2d at 47. In light of the conclusion above, that the officers did not use excessive force in securing Plaintiff, this Court concludes Plaintiff's state law battery claims against Officers Jackson and Moreno likewise fail.
D. Respondeat Superior Liability (Count VII)
In Monell v. Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Municipalities instead can only be held liable under section 1983 for the execution of a governmental policy or custom. See Laster v. City of Tampa Police Dep't. , 575 Fed. Appx. 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2014). "A plaintiff ... has two methods by which to establish a county's policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the county shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county." Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga. , 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In Count VII, Plaintiff alleges, in the alternative, that "the acts and omissions of the Defendants Jackson and/or Moreno were not committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, and therefore the City is liable for those acts and omissions which resulted in grievous physical and emotional harm to the Plaintiff on December 10, 2019." (Compl. (DE [1]) ¶ 56). Plaintiff argues the City is not entitled to summary judgment because a jury could reasonably find the officers were negligent in not checking on Plaintiff's well-being before opening the doors of the Camry and startling him; in incompetently using force and arresting Plaintiff; and as a result, Plaintiff would be entitled to seek redress from the officers’ employer pursuant to respondeat superior liability. The City argues Plaintiff has not plead any allegations regarding a policy or custom of the City that would suffice to proceed on a section 1983 claim against the City. This Court agrees.
Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim against the City, the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Furthermore, probable cause existed at the time of the arrest to bar such claims. Accordingly, this claim fails as a matter of law.
V. CONCLUSION
At the time of this incident, Plaintiff Jamie Senko was twenty-nine years old and a father of a seven-year-old boy. This Court finds Plaintiff to be a responsible, hard-working young man, willing to forgo sleep, despite working until close, to arrive to work as scheduled less than five hours later. This Court, however, cannot find the MBPD officers acted unreasonably under the circumstances. An officer is not meant to be clairvoyant when approaching the scene of an incident; instead, an officer is tasked with making split-second decisions to ensure the safety of the public and fellow officers. Here, the Court carefully reviewed each video. This would be the exact evidence offered at trial and argued at the directed verdict stage. Counsel for each side have very ably represented their clients, but liability here is a factor of Plaintiff's employment conditions rather than Defendants’ conduct.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (DE [55]) is GRANTED . In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, judgment for DEFENDANTS COREY J. JACKSON, DANIELLA MORENO, and THE CITY OF MIAMI BEACH will be entered separately. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT any pending motions. Furthermore, all deadlines are TERMINATED , and all hearings are CANCELLED .
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 18th day of May 2022.