Opinion
1:23-CV-00092-SPB-RAL
05-23-2024
JHEN SCUTELLA, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, MIKEY HOLMAN, DEPUTY BRYANT, AND COUNSELOR MARTIN, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
ECF NO. 30
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 30) be GRANTED.
IL Report
A. Introduction and Procedural History
Plaintiff Jhen Scutella initiated this pro se civil rights action against the Erie County Prison (“ECP”), Deputy Wardens Holman and Bryant, and Counselor Martin during his pretrial detention ECP. See ECF No. 8. The Complaint asserts violations of Scutella's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania tort law based on ECP's COVID-19 quarantine and grievance policies and procedures and the conditions of Scutella's confinement. See id. at 5-7. Scutella seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
It appears from Scutella's court filings that he has been at liberty since January 2024. See ECF Nos. 25, 27, 32, 37.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 30. Defendants have also filed a brief in support of their motion. ECF No. 31. Scutella has responded with a brief in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 38.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally consider[s] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am.,36\ F.3d217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice, and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly!Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Burtch v. Milberg Factors. Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Scutella is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).
C. Material Facts
The Court accepts as true the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 2023, the Erie County Department of Probation detained Scutella for three pending misdemeanors. Prison officials placed Scutella on B-Pod for the next eight days and only allowed him to leave his cell for fifteen minutes a day to either place a phone call or take a shower because of “the quarantine policy.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 10. At one point, all inmates on B-Pod had to take a COVID-19 test, which indicated that an employee had transmitted the virus.
Eight days later, Scutella was moved to F-Pod-a “maximum unit. . . that houses” inmates charged only with “violent crimes.” Id. ¶ 11. When Scutella asked why he had been moved to this housing pod, he learned that Defendant Dep. Warden Holman “ha[d] labeled [him] a high society risk” and directed that he “be placed in an observation tank” in “the front of the unit” in retaliation for “a prior lawsuit.” Id. Scutella asked to be moved to another cell pod numerous times because he was “only a pretrial detainee . . . facing misdemeanor charges,” but he was never moved. Id. ¶ 14.
At the time of his Complaint, “a code ha[d] been called to [F-Pod] or others” “almost daily.” Id. ¶ 12. When these codes were called, inmates' movements were often restricted until at least the next day. Sometimes, the movement restrictions lasted days, during which time Scutella did not shower or exercise.
On March 3, 2023, an “inmate or two were diagnosed with [COVID]-19,” and instead of “quarantin[ing] those specific inmates or mov[ing] them to the quarantine block, they locked the entire block down with the same” quarantine policy Scutella experienced on B-Pod. Id. ¶ 13. Sometimes, inmates would be on lock down for several days because of the Corrections Officers' shift changes.
Scutella also claims that he “requested grievances through the kiosk” on March 5, 14, 15, and 17, 2023, but the grievances were not “readily available.” Id. ¶ 8. “[A]lmost every time [he] requested a grievance,” he ended up in an Informal Resolution Conference (“IRC”) with Defendant Dep. Warden Bryant and several other prison officials as “an intimidation tactic and screening process to circumvent [his] civil liberties.” Id. ¶¶ 15, 8. On March 20 or 21, Scutella received a grievance response “stat[ing] that [his] grievance [wa]s being denied or refused because it was handled in an [IRC],” and “if he ke[pt] asking for it that it w[ould] be considered harassment and [he] w[ould] be held accountable for trying to exercise [his] right to redress the government (1st Amendment).” Id. ¶ 16. Though Scutella dyes not know for certain, he thinks this response was from Holman instead of Defendant Counselor Martin. He “did not respond after that” out of “fear of more retaliation.” Id.
Scutella contends that Defendants' conduct has “placed a burden on [his] physical wellbeing” and debilitated his mental health. Id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up). He avers that he is “in constant fear of retaliation from the jail.” Id. ¶ 17. He adds that “they keep attempting to restrict [his] commissary . . . because of [his] diabetic state,” but he is “insulin resistant,” not diabetic. Id.
D. Analysis
Scutella claims that Defendants' “retaliate[ed] for freedom of speech/right to grieve the government for redress,” and Holman retaliated against him for his prior lawsuits, in violation of his First Amendment rights; his conditions of confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment; and Holman is punishing him for his prior lawsuits in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. ECF No. 8, at 5. Scutella also generally asserts a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
In support of their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue: (1) ECP is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability; (2) the facts alleged fail to demonstrate the personal involvement of any Defendant in Scutella's alleged constitutional injuries; (3) Scutella does not have a constitutional right to a particular housing setting or to file a grievance; (4) the Complaint fails allege facts sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference to Scutella's health or safety; (5) the facts alleged are insufficient to state a Monell claim against Erie County; (6) Scutella fails to plead the requisite elements of an IIED claim; and (7) Scutella's requested relief is improper. ECF No. 31 at 7, 6, 8. The undersigned will address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Erie County Prison is not an entity amenable to suit.
Scutella cannot assert a cause of action against ECP for violating his constitutional rights or for IIED. First, a prison “is not a ‘person' and therefore, cannot be held liable for constitutional violations through § 1983.” Scutella v. Erie Cnty. Prison, 2020 WL 4904587, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2020). See also Barnes v. Erie Cty. Prison Admin., 2020 WL 4450297, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2020) (citing Lenhart v. Pennsylvania, 528 Fed.Appx. 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2013)) (concluding that district court properly dismissed claims against county prison because even though “[a] local governmental agency may be a ‘person' for purposes of § 1983 liability[, the county prison] is not a person capable of being sued within the meaning of § 1983”) (internal citations omitted). ECP thus lacks the capacity to be sued for the alleged violations of Scutella's constitutional rights. Second, “a prison cannot form the necessary intent to engage in” an intentional violation of Scutella's state rights. Jones v. Erie Cnty. Prison, 2022 WL 3236939, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3228113 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2022) (“[Plaintiffs] state law claim is subject to dismissal because a prison cannot form the necessary intent to engage in a battery.”). As such, Scutella cannot assert a viable IIED claim against ECP. Accordingly, all claims asserted against ECP should be dismissed with prejudice and ECP should be terminated as a party defendant. See, e.g., Bros. v. Lawrence Cnty. Prison Bd., 2008 WL 146828, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2008) (citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F.Supp.2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (moving to strike improper party defendant)).
2. The Complaint fails to state Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.
Scutella takes issue with the conditions of his pre-trial detention when he was housed in B-Pod, F-Bod, and an observation cell. Defendants argue that the facts alleged are insufficient to demonstrate a violation of Scutella's Fourteenth Amendment rights or the personal involvement of the individual Defendants in any unconstitutional conduct. The Court agrees.
When “pretrial detainees challenge their conditions of confinement,” the Court must consider whether there has been “a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). “[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979). “[A] particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.” Andrews v. Harper, 576 F.Supp.3d 305, 312 (W.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999)).
A court typically evaluates a prisoner's conditions of his confinement claims under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997)). But the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees' challenges to the conditions of their confinement. See id.
Additionally, in a Section 1983 action, “a plaintiff must show that each and every defendant was ‘personally] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation). These principles apply to supervisory officials such as Dep. Wardens Holman and Bryant. See, e.g, Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice, or custom which directly caused the constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
i. ECP's COVID-19 policies and procedures do not did not impose unconstitutional conditions of pretrial detention.
Scutella alleges that ECP's COVID-19 protocols subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that “[ECP] has used the Covid-19 Protocol Policy/Custom or Procedures to limit complete inmate movement.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 18. According to the Complaint, when an inmate was diagnosed with COVID-19, ECP would “lock[] the entire block down” instead of only quarantining the sick individual. Id. During these quarantine lockdowns, individuals could only leave their cell for fifteen or twenty minutes a day-the pleadings allege both-and could not shower, exercise, use the phone, or contact staff. Scutella contends that he was subjected to the quarantine lockdown for the first eight days of his confinement and “almost daily” thereafter. ECF No. 8, ¶ 18.
These allegations fail to support a violation of Scutella's constitutional rights as a result of ECP's COVID-19 quarantine policy or that any Defendant was personally involved in creating or implementing this policy. Courts have consistently denied claims by inmates where corrections facilities have implemented policies to mitigate the effects posed by the Coronavirus and, in doing so, they have recognized the legitimate penological purposes of such policies. See e.g., Engelund v. Doll, 2020 WL 1974389, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2020) (“it cannot be said that Respondents have been deliberately indifferent to Petitioners' health, safety, or medical needs” because, “[a]lthough COVID-19 presents a serious medical issue, as detailed above, the facilities have taken significant steps to curb the introduction or spread of COVID-19 and to contain and treat those infected with the virus”); Allen v. Wetzel, 2021 WL 2254997, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 2021) (DOC policies mitigating spread of COVID-19 sufficient to prevent deliberate indifference claim where Plaintiff contracted COVID-19 but did not experience any serious symptoms); id. (listing cases). A review of the policies complained of in the Complaint “suggests that [ECP] officials . . . have not acted unreasonably with respect to the threat posed by COVID-19 and instead have instituted measures to safeguard the entire inmate population, including [Scutella].” Bevins v. Kauffman, 2021 WL 322168, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021). Scutella has alleged no facts to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on ECP's COVID-19 quarantine policy.
Even if this CO VID-19 policy precipitated unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Complaint does not indicate that any individual Defendant was personally involved in creating or implementing the quarantine protocol. Scutella does not attribute any conduct whatsoever to Martin. As for Bryant and Holman, Scutella bases their liability strictly upon their supervisory positions. See, e.g., ECF No. 38-1, at 4 (ECP's “lockdown procedure could not have been initiated without some type of chain of command . . . obviously medical would have been informed of symptoms and then as or if the virus spread, medical would have had to contact the administration specifically [D]eputy [W]arden Bryant or [D]eputy [W]arden Holman, who would then order or initiate the lockdown [COVID] procedure.”). But ‘“mere hypothesis' that an official is personally involved in complained-of conduct ‘simply because of his [supervisory position]' is an insufficient basis for finding Section 1983 liability.” Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354. Equally insufficient are generalized allegations that “a supervisory state actor is ‘in charge of or ‘responsible for' an office or facility.” Carroll v. Delaware Cnty. of Pennsylvania, 2023 WL 2868020, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2023) (citing Saisi v. Murray, 822 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354)) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,' and that liability stemmed merely from defendants' ‘belief that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.' However, a director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].”')). Nor does the Complaint indicate that ECP's facially neutral policies caused Bryant, Holman, Martin, or any other ECP employee to violate Scutella's constitutional or state rights. Thus, Scutella's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on the conditions of his detention associated with ECP's quarantine policies and procedures should be dismissed.
ii. The Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Holman for labeling Scutella “as a high security risk.”
Scutella also appears to assert a due process claim against Holman for characterizing him “as a high security risk in retaliation of former lawsuits, without a hearing or establishing] the reason for doing so.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 20. Scutella contends that this status “has its punitive nature, shorter visits, less move time and restricted movement,” and so “this was done solely for its punitive nature.” Id. He adds that he “completed 30 days without infraction and still has not been moved out of' the “observation cell.” Id.
The allegations do not support a due process claim based on Scutella's security classification or housing placement. Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Scutella and drawing all inferences in his favor, he appears to argue that Holman identified him as a “high security risk” and placed him in an observation cell as punishment for his previous lawsuits, and that his movements were unduly restricted because of this classification and cell placement. However, the Complaint is devoid of facts to support that Holman's characterization was incorrect or improperly motivated. It is also far from clear what the actual conditions of Scutella's confinement were and whether Holman imposed any such condition as punishment. Holman's “express intent to punish” Scutella therefore cannot be inferred from the pleading. And the Complaint's threadbare allegations of Scutella's confinement on F-Pod and in an observation cell do not indicate that his conditions “amounted to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt,” either. Young v. Kubrin, 2022 WL 16637729, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2022) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1983 based on Scutella's security designation or cell location.
Scutella has also failed to allege facts to support any other plausible violation of his due process rights. To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “(1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.'” Disco v. Thompson, 2020 WL 3980655, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2020) (quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 291 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mulholland v. Government Cty. Of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 2059745 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2020). “Protected liberty or property interests generally arise either from the Due Process Clause or from state-created statutory entitlement.” Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). Scutella does not have a property right or liberty interest in any prison placement or to any particular housing assignment. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, Ml U.S. 214, 225 (1976); Montanye v. Haynes, Ml U.S. 236, 242 (1976). The Complaint also fails to allege facts to support that his pretrial detention was “imposed contrary to the mandates of procedural due process,” Postie v. Adams, 2022 WL 1126052, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2022) (quoting United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 969598 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2022), or that any Defendant unlawfully confiscated his property, see Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)) (Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendants confiscated his property and that he was not afforded a post-deprivation administrative remedy). Accordingly, Scutella's Fourteenth Amendment due process claims should be dismissed.
3. The facts are insufficient to state a claim for relief under the First Amendment.
Scutella contends that “the prison and staff are intentionally not giving [him] grievances” in violation of his First Amendment rights. But “a prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure.” Rivera v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 346 Fed.Appx. 749, 751 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted). See also Jackson v. Gordon, 145 Fed.Appx. 774, 777 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Further, “the state creation of [a grievance] procedure does not create any federal constitutional rights.” Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (alteration added), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998). While a prison official's failure to provide an inmate with a grievance form may excuse the individual's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it does not support a First Amendment claim. See Reavis v. Poska, 2010 WL 2511379, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 7, 2010) (citing Rivera, 346 Fed.Appx. 749). Scutella's First Amendment claim based on the denial of a grievance form must therefore be dismissed.
Scutella also appears to claim that ECP's grievance procedure is preventing him from properly exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and therefore violating his First Amendment right to seek redress from the government. See ECF No. 8, ¶ 18. To prevail on an access to courts claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) “that they suffered an ‘actual injury' in that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous' or ‘arguable' underlying claim”; and (2) that they have “no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. at 205-06 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). Here, Scutella has failed to plausibly plead that Defendants' conduct has prevented him from pursuing a nonfrivolous or meritorious claim, given that he is currently litigating the claim at issue. Moreover, Scutella cannot assert a constitutional claim based solely on how Defendants responded to his grievances because their participation in the grievance process, without more, does not support personal liability. See, e.g., Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“If a grievance official's only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official.”). Accordingly, Scutella's First Amendment access to courts claims also should be dismissed.
Finally, Scutella contends that Defendants retaliated against him for exercising his right to grieve and for filing previous lawsuits. To state a retaliation claim, Scutella must plausibly allege facts to support that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) officials took an adverse action against him; and (3) “a causal link” exists “between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.” Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). The filing of a grievance or lawsuit is generally considered protected activity for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 4573364, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011) (“voicing complaints and/or filing grievances are constitutionally protected activities.”). But the Complaint provides no other details related to the retaliation claim. For example, the allegations do not detail when the grievances or lawsuit were filed, who they were filed against, the specific contents of the grievance(s), etc. As such, Scutella's retaliation claim is merely a legal conclusion and so should be dismissed as well.
4. The Complaint fails to state a Monell claim against Erie County.
Defendants opine that Scutella may be attempting to assert a § 1983 claim against Erie County for ECP's policies and procedures. “[T]he touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body,” or a non-govemment entity performing a state function, such as Erie County, “is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.” Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). As a threshold matter, the insufficiency of Scutella's allegations to state a claim against the individual Defendants preclude a claim that a policy, practice, or custom caused an individual Defendant's constitutional violation. Absent a plausible claim that an individual committed a constitutional violation, a plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1983 against the municipality or other governmental body that employed the individual. See e.g., Stankowski v. Farley, 251 Fed.Appx. 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2007) (Because Plaintiff could not allege that “the nurses' practice of not distributing bandages until the patient sees a doctor” violated the Eighth Amendment, he could not show that the nurses' employer “adopted any policy, custom or practice that caused any constitutional violations”). Scutella's claim against Erie County based on Monell liability fails as a matter of law.
5. The facts alleged are insufficient to state an IIED claim against any individual Defendant.
To state and sustain a claim for IIED, Scutella must allege and show that defendants conduct was “(1) extreme and outrageous (2) intentional or reckless, and (3) caused severe emotional distress.” Shumate v. Twin Tier Hosp., LLC, 655 F.Supp.2d 521, 541 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Livingston v. Borough of Edgewood, 2008 WL 5101478 at *6 (W.D. Pa.2008) (citing Hargraves v. City of Philadelphia, 2007 WL 1276937 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2007)).Pennsylvania courts have defined “extreme and outrageous conduct” as conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Id. (quoting Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (citing Buczekv. First Nat'l Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa. Super. 551, 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)). Scutella does not support his IIED claim with a single allegation and nothing approaching “extreme and outrageous conduct” appears in the Complaint. He therefore fails to state an IIED claim against any Defendant as a matter of law.
This Court previously explained that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly recognized a cause of action for IIED. Taylor, 754 A.2d at 652. The court has, however, cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 “as setting forth the minimum elements necessary to sustain ... [an IIED] action.” Id. (citing Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc., 515 Pa. 183, 527 A.2d 988, 991 (1987), and Hoyv. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998)) (indicating that if the court were to recognize a cause of action for IIED “ ‘[t]he conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society' ”) (quoting Buczek v. First Nat'l Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987).Wilson v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 807 F.Supp.2d 291,301 (W.D. Pa. 2011).
6. Scutella's demand for injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief must be stricken.
Lastly, Defendants challenge Scutella's request for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. For injunctive relief, Scutella “asks the Court to grant an injunction to stop the E.C.P. from further violating the rights of [Scutella] and any other inmates by subjecting them to not being able to exercise, shower, or contact their families and at least afford inmates an hour out of the cell a day.” ECF No. 8, ¶ 21. Since initiating this action, Scutella has informed the Court that he is no longer detained at ECP. See ECF No. 37, ¶¶ 1,2. See also ECF Nos. 25, 27, 32 (notices of Scutella's change of address). This fact renders moot his request for injunctive relief regarding his own confinement at ECP. Additionally, as a pro se plaintiff, Scutella may not seek redress for the harms allegedly suffered by other inmates because he may not “represent another party pro se.” Itiowe v. Trentonian, 620 Fed.Appx. 65, 68 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll, of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991)). He therefore cannot request injunctive relief on behalf of the current individuals incarcerated at ECP. Accordingly, if any claim in this action survives dismissal Scutella's request for injunctive relief should nevertheless be stricken with prejudice.
Defendants are correct that “[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past conduct” and is not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.” ECF No. 31, at 12 (quoting Corliss v. O'Brien, 200 Fed.Appx. 80, 84 (3d. Cir. 2006); Blakeney v. Marisco, 340 Fed.Appx. 778 (3d Cir. 2009)). Scutella's request that the Court issue “an order declaring that the defendants have acted in violation of the Pa. and U.S. Constitution” contravenes this direction. ECF No. 8, ¶ 22. As such, Scutella's specific request for declaratory relief must also be stricken with prejudice.
Finally, Defendants also correctly contend that Scutella's demand for $250,000 in compensatory damages must be stricken from his Complaint based on Local Rule 8 of the Local Rules of the Western District of Pennsylvania. Local Rule 8 states that “[n]o party shall set forth in a pleading originally filed with this Court a specific dollar amount of unliquidated damages” except in certain circumstances which do not apply in the instant case. See LCvR 8. Scutella's demand for a specific amount of unliquidated damages must therefore be stricken as well. See, e.g., Massey v. Holman, 2019 WL 3997845, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3997280 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2019) (citing Ramsier v. Allegheny County, 2016 WL 890603, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2016) (invoking Local Rule 8 to strike plaintiffs demand for unliquidated damages)).
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
In this case, it would be futile to allow Scutella to amend his constitutional and state law claims against ECP, his First Amendment access to courts claim and claim arising from the denial of grievances, his Fourth Amendment due process claim, his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, and his IIED claim. These claims should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. Although it appears unlikely, Scutella may be able to amend his
Complaint to cure the deficiencies of his conditions of confinement claim. As such, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave for Scutella to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of the Court's adoption of this recommendation. If Scutella fails to file an amended complaint within this time, this remaining claim and this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint be GRANTED. It is further recommended that the claims against ECP, the First Amendment access to courts claim and claim arising from the denial of grievances, the Fourth Amendment due process claim, and IIED claim be dismissed with prejudice; the request for injunctive, declaratory, and demand for sum certain relief be stricken with prejudice; and the remaining Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave for Scutella to file an amended complaint within fourteen days of the Court's adoption of this recommendation. If Scutella fails to file an amended complaint within this time, this remaining claim and this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).