Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000583-MR
06-21-2013
CLARENCE SCISNEY AND FORREST SCISNEY APPELLANTS v. VIVIAN SNORTON; JAMES SCISNEY; LEE RORER; MARGARET TRAMILL; FRANK SCISNEY; AND HAROLD SCISNEY APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Wm. Clint Prow Providence, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Keith Cartwright Madisonville, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES C. BRANTLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-00941
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; TAYLOR AND VANMETER, JUDGES. ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE: The sole issue on appeal is whether the Hopkins Circuit Court erred when it granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment. The circuit court found that the Final Settlement disposing of the estate of Clara Scisney need not be supported by vouchers and, as a result, the Hopkins District Court committed no error when it accepted the Final Settlement. Albeit on different grounds, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedure
The following facts are not in dispute.
The decedent, Clara Scisney, died on July 31, 2009. She was survived by eight children. Two of those children, appellees Vivian Snorton and James Scisney, were appointed Co-Administrators of the Estate of Clara Scisney.
On December 8, 2009, Vivian and James tendered to the district court a Final Settlement disposing of Clara's estate. The Final Settlement identified all assets received and disbursements made; no documentation supporting the disbursements was attached to or submitted with the Final Settlement.
According to the Final Settlement, after settling all debts and appeasing all creditors, Clara's eight children shared equally in the remainder of her estate. By order entered July 27, 2010, the district court approved the Final Settlement and closed Clara's estate. The children received, and cashed, their disbursement checks.
Appellants Clarence Scisney and Forrest Scisney, also children of Clara, were displeased with the Final Settlement. Consequently, they moved to alter, amend, or vacate the district court's July 27, 2010 order under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05. In support of their motion, the appellants claimed the district court accepted the Final Settlement in error because they did not receive adequate notice of the proposed settlement, and no waivers or vouchers accompanied the settlement. The district court denied the motion.
The remaining four children, Lee Rorer, Margaret Tramill, Frank Scisney, and Harold Scisney, were satisfied with the Final Settlement and raised no objection. They are Appellees to this appeal.
The appellants then filed a Petition for Settlement of Estate in the Hopkins Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 395.617(2). On November 10, 2011, the appellants moved for summary judgment. One ground they argued, and which is repeated as the sole argument on appeal before this Court, is that the co-administrators of Clara's estate failed to include an itemized statement of receipts and distributions, supported by vouchers, as required by KRS 395.610. For this and other reasons, the appellants asked the circuit court to set aside the Final Settlement. The appellees opposed the motion and filed a competing motion for summary judgment. By order entered February 23, 2012, the circuit court rejected the appellants' arguments, denied their summary judgment motion, but granted the appellees' summary judgment motion. The circuit court found the Final Settlement to be a "periodic or final settlement" governed by KRS 395.610 through KRS 395.630 (as opposed to a "proposed periodic or final settlement" pursuant to KRS 395.617, or an "informal settlement" pursuant to KRS 395.605), but concluded KRS 395.610 did not apply because the two-year period after the co-administrators' appointment had not yet expired. This appeal ensued.
II. Standard of Review
"The standard of review on appeal of summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Ky. 2012). Our review is de novo. Id.
III. Analysis
The appellants assert the district court erred when it accepted the Final Settlement tendered by the appellees and, in turn, the circuit court erred when it refused to set aside the Final Settlement, because the disbursements listed therein were not supported by vouchers. The appellants maintain that KRS 395.610 requires that a formal final settlement include an itemization of all receipts and disbursements supported by vouchers. It is undisputed that the appellees filed no documentation or vouchers to support the Final Settlement.
There is a very practical reason for the circuit court's refusal to set aside the Final Settlement. In its order so declining, the circuit court noted the critical - and undisputed - fact that during the hearing on the CR 59.05 motion before the district court the appellants, as stated by the circuit court, "indicated that they had no objections to the disbursements that were made." They did not take issue with that factual statement when the circuit court expressed it, nor did they contest the appellees' characterization of that statement before this Court as undisputed. The appellants' admission suggests they simply fault the district court for accepting a final settlement that did not meet their understanding of the requirements of KRS 395.610(1), despite conceding no injury resulted therefrom. They are on record as being satisfied with the disbursements.
We note that the record in Estate of Clara G. Scisney, Hopkins District Court, (No. 09-P-00261), shows proofs of claim (and notices of satisfaction of those claims) for most, if not all, creditors listed on the settlement. Several of the other expenditures in the settlement are fees paid to fiduciaries based on statutory calculations of which the courts would have been mindful. While these are not substitutes for "vouchers," they no doubt factored into the parties' and the courts' satisfaction with the settlement.
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The appellants' own expression of satisfaction with the disbursements undermines any argument that they were faulty, improper, or fraudulent. It would be wasteful of judicial and other resources to compel compliance with a statute, the failure of which resulted in no injury in the first instance. See generally Knox v. Atterberry, 33 Ky. 580 (1835) ("This court will not reverse a case for a mere irregularity from which no injury has resulted."); Tackett v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 630 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Ky. App. 1982) ("[I]t would be a futile gesture to remand [this case] to the lower court for correction of the procedural problem.").
"It is a maxim that the law does not require a man to do a vain and fruitless thing[.]" Bolen v. Jenkins, 167 Ky. 295, 180 S.W. 351, 352 (1915). To require the circuit court to order the district court to re-open Clara's estate, and to require the appellees to submit vouchers supporting disbursements with which the appellants take no issue, would be a vain and fruitless act. We decline to so rule.
IV. Conclusion
The Hopkins Circuit Court's February 23, 2012 Order is affirmed.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Wm. Clint Prow
Providence, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: J. Keith Cartwright
Madisonville, Kentucky