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Sayers v. Sayers

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
Aug 28, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

Opinion

No. 35653-8-II.

August 28, 2007.


Barbara Sayers appeals the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing her claim against her parents, Wesley and Jean Sayers, for breaching their duty of care to her as a social guest and licensee while she recuperated from knee surgery at her parents' home. She argues that reasonable minds could differ about whether her parents breached their duty of care by repositioning the bed she used to brace herself while getting up from an office chair in her parents' bedroom. We affirm.

Since all the parties to this action share the same last name, we will refer to the plaintiff by first name only, intending no disrespect.

Washington courts define a licensee as '"a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent" (including social guests). Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wn.2d 658, 667, 724 P.2d 991 (1986) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 (1965)).

FACTS

In March 2002, Barbara Sayers had knee revision surgery performed on her right knee. After the surgery, she stayed at her parents' house as a guest. During her month-long recovery period, Barbara slept in her parents' bedroom and worked at a computer located on a desk near the bed. At the time of the incident at issue, she was not limited to a wheelchair and used a walker or a cane for support. She would often sit in a wheeled office chair working at the bedroom desk and, when she needed to stand, she would push the chair back against the bed for additional support. Her mother was aware that Barbara followed this routine while her leg was healing.

The day before the incident, Barbara attended a physical therapy appointment and was able to ascend and descend stairs unassisted. On the day of the incident, while Barbara was out of the room, Barbara's mother prepared for the housekeeper's visit by moving Barbara's bed away from the wall, leaving a plainly visible space of several inches between the wall and the bed. Later that afternoon, Barbara attempted to brace herself against the bed and the bed moved, apparently because of the shift in the bed's position, causing her to fall while trying to get up from the office chair. Barbara had performed this series of steps a "100 times before," and the bed had not moved and she had not fallen. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 72. Barbara's fall reopened the surgical wound on her knee. As a result, Barbara suffered an infection, two additional knee revision surgeries, a rod insertion, and, ultimately, amputation of her leg.

Barbara asserts in her brief that the bed was only moved a couple of inches, but the photos in the record do not support this assertion. In fact, Barbara's complaint states that the bed was 12 inches away from the wall, and the interrogatory responses do not address distance at all. All other facts in the record remain undisputed.

Barbara subsequently sued her parents for damages resulting from her fall, alleging that her parents' negligence in moving the bed proximately caused her to fall. Her parents successfully moved for summary judgment of dismissal, arguing that: (1) the placement of the bed was not a dangerous condition and, (2) if it was a dangerous condition, it was "equally obvious to any person entering or occupying the room." CP at 18. Barbara appeals.

ANALYSIS

Barbara contends that reasonable minds could differ about whether her parents breached their duty of care by moving the bed and setting in motion the chain of events that caused the injuries.

When reviewing an order of summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). We must consider "all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson, 98 Wn.2d at 437. After the moving party has submitted adequate affidavits, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to provide specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986). "A party seeking to avoid summary judgment cannot simply rest on the allegations of his pleadings, he must affirmatively present the factual evidence upon which her relies." Macky v. Graham, 99 Wn.2d 572, 576, 663 P.2d 490 (1983). We will grant summary judgment only if reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion from all the evidence in the record. Wilson, 98 Wn.2d at 437.

Actionable negligence comprises four elements: "(1) the existence of a duty owed to the complaining party; (2) a breach thereof; (3) a resulting injury; and (4) a proximate cause between the claimed breach and resulting injury." Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wn.2d 226, 228, 677 P.2d 166 (1984). "Foreseeability determines the extent and scope of duty." Knott v. Liberty Jewelry § Loan, Inc., 50 Wn. App 267, 271, 748 P.2d 661 (1988). "When the defendant in a negligence action moves for summary judgment challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of its case." Bird v. Walton, 69 Wn. App. 366, 368, 848 P.2d 1298 (1993). The threshold determination of whether the defendants owed a duty to the complaining party is a question of law. Pedroza, 101 Wn.2d at 228.

The common law classification of persons entering on real property (i.e., invitee, licensee or trespasser), determines the owner or possessor's duty of care. Younce v. Ferguson, 106 Wn.2d 658, 666-67, 724 P.2d 991 (1986). Where, as here, the facts surrounding the complaining party's entry on the property are not contested, the determination of the entrant's legal status is a question of law. Here, the parties do not dispute Barbara's status as a licensee on her parents' property, since she was there at their invitation while recovering from knee surgery. We agree that Barbara was a social guest and, thus, a licensee.

Washington has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 342 (1965) as the standard of care owed to licensees. Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wn.2d 685, 689, 538 P.2d 517 (1975). The Restatement provides:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,

(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and

(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and

(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk involved.

Restatement § 342. If the licensees are adults, the fact that the condition is obvious is usually sufficient to apprise them, as fully as the possessor, of the full extent of the risk involved in it. Restatement § 342, cmt. b.

In determining whether a dangerous condition exists, we consider whether the condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee. See Fredrickson v. Bertolino's Tacoma, Inc., 131 Wn. App. 183, 190, 127 P.3d 5 (2005), review denied, 157 Wn.2d 1026 (2006). But the mere fact that an injury occurred is insufficient to prove that a dangerous condition existed. Brant v. Market Basket Stores, Inc., 72 Wn.2d 446, 448, 433 P.2d 863 (1967). We agree with the trial court that even viewing the facts favorably to Barbara, the evidence is insufficient to show that moving the bed a few inches from the wall created an unreasonably dangerous condition. Barbara's parents had no reason to expect that repositioning the bed would cause her to fall and suffer serious injury. Although her injury is unfortunate, it is insufficient as a matter of law to show that the placement of the bed presented an unreasonable risk of harm.

Our Supreme Court has held that a landowner has no duty to warn licensees about open and apparent dangers from natural (or artificial) conditions. Tincani, 124 Wn.2d at 134; see also Restatement § 342, illus. e. Similarly, we find no precedent for concluding that a duty to warn flows from the normal and visible placement or movement of furniture in the homeowner's own home.

Therefore, we conclude, that on the record before us, no dangerous condition existed. The record fails to show any defects or dangers in the bedroom or the furniture; rather, the only evidence points to a clean, uncluttered bedroom that was in no way dangerous or unusual. On this record, reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion — there was no danger resulting from the furniture arrangement. Accordingly, Barbara's parents had no duty to warn Barbara of a nonexistent danger.

Furthermore, even assuming that a dangerous condition existed, we conclude that Barbara was in the best position to notice it and evaluate the danger. There is no dispute that Barbara's knee injury did not affect her vision or her ability to note the placement of furniture in the bedroom. While being questioned about the incident, Barbara stated that on the day of the incident she arrived home, went into the bedroom, and commented to her mother, "[O]h, my gosh. There's so much more room on the floor." CP at 71. This comment indicates that at some point she was aware of a readily apparent change in the room's arrangement. Thus, even if a danger existed, it would have been obvious to Barbara. Therefore, we hold that (1) no duty to warn existed and (2) reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion on the undisputed facts.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

ARMSTRONG, J. PENOYAR, J., concur.


Summaries of

Sayers v. Sayers

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two
Aug 28, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
Case details for

Sayers v. Sayers

Case Details

Full title:BARBARA SAYERS, Appellant, v. WESLEY N. SAYERS ET AL., Respondents

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two

Date published: Aug 28, 2007

Citations

140 Wn. App. 1021 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
140 Wash. App. 1021