Opinion
2017-817400
06-14-2018
STEPHANIE A. ADAMS, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiff TIMOTHY A. BALL, ESQ., Robert E. Quinn, Esq., of counsel, Attorney for Defendant City of Buffalo BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD, ESQ., New York, Melissa H. Thore, Esq., of counsel, Attorney for Defendant New York State, Department of Transportation
STEPHANIE A. ADAMS, ESQ., Attorney for Plaintiff
TIMOTHY A. BALL, ESQ., Robert E. Quinn, Esq., of counsel, Attorney for Defendant City of Buffalo
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD, ESQ., New York, Melissa H. Thore, Esq., of counsel, Attorney for Defendant New York State, Department of Transportation
Emilio Colaiacovo, J.
Facts and Procedural History
Before the Court is an action brought by Plaintiff seeking judgment of "his right to ride his bicycle on any section of the 198 where bicycles cannot be barred by law, including the Park Section." See Complaint at ¶ 5. New York State Route 198, an urban principal arterial expressway, is often referred to as the Scajaquada Expressway (hereinafter "198"). The 198 links Interstate 190 Highway and New York Route 33.
New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a prohibits bicycle riding on state expressways or highways. The purpose behind the law is to deter the physical harm high volume motorist activity would pose to bicyclists.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiff commenced this action against the City of Buffalo, the State of New York, and the Department of Transportation seeking permission to ride his bicycle on the 198. Observing signage on the 198 that prohibits bicycling, Plaintiff brought this action because he fears that " if he rides his bicycle on any section of the 198, including the Park Section, he will be subject to ticketing and/or arrest." See Complaint at ¶ 3. (Emphasis added). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff has been ticketed, arrested, or subject to any other action as a result of riding his bicycle on the 198.
The Plaintiff maintains that the City retains the right to regulate any "arterial highway" passing through the city, enabling it to permit bicycling notwithstanding State law to the contrary. Plaintiff points to the 2007 Final Environmental Impact Study (hereinafter "FEIS") to demonstrate his right to bring this challenge to the current practice. Both Defendants argue that the State is the proper owner of the 198 and, as a result, the Department of Transportation has the power and authority to prohibit the use of bicycles on the 198.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Inasmuch as the Plaintiff seeks judgment as a matter of law, "declaratory judgment is the proper remedy only for determining the legal relations to parties to a justiciable controversy." Phelan v. Buffalo , 54 AD2d 262 (4th Dept. 1976) ; See CPLR § 3001 . However, one is not entitled to declaratory judgment absent "concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions." United Public Workers v. Mitchell , 330 U.S. 75 (1947) ; Maryland Cas. Co., v. Pacific Co. , 312 U.S. 270 (1941) ; Winkler v. Spinnato , 134 AD2d 66 (2d Dept. 1987). Said differently, "Courts are not empowered to give advisory opinions, but must deal with particular instances when they arise." Matter of Christopher v. City of Buffalo , 88 AD2d 777 (4th Dept. 1982). "A declaratory judgment may not be granted if it will only result in an advisory opinion." Combustion Eng'g v. Travelers Indem. Co ., 75 AD2d 777 (1st Dept. 1980), affd 53 NY2d 875 (1981). An actual dispute is required and the judgment a Plaintiff seeks may not be simply disguised as a manner in which to receive permission to engage in a certain activity. This is precisely what Plaintiff wants the Court to do here.
The Court agrees with both Defendants that Plaintiff has no standing to bring the current action. Before the Court addresses a substantive legal issue, it must be assured that there is a legal issue that has resulted in an actual harm or injury to the Plaintiff. Matter of ADM, LLC v. Village of Macedon , 101 AD3d 1717 (4th Dept. 2012) ; Niagara County v. Power Authority of the State of New York , 82 AD3d 1597 (4th Dept. 2011). Plaintiff here simply wishes to accomplish at the bench that which should be addressed in another forum, namely the legislature. This, respectfully, is not the role of the Court. The Judiciary is not the proper branch of government to address this issue, absent a manifestation of a discernible harm, which this record does not contain. See generally Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Daniels , 158 AD3d 82 (1st Dept. 2017) ; Rudder v. Pataki , 93 NY2d 273 (1999).
Here, Plaintiff's complaint states simply that "in fear of imminent harm, to wit, fear or citation or arrest," he wishes this Court to declare his right to bicycle on the 198. See Complaint , ¶ 5. This is insufficient to demonstrate an actual harm. Had he been ticketed or cited, that would perhaps satisfy the applicable threshold applicable for a declaratory judgment action. However, because of the failure to plead with particularity an injury or harm, he fails to have standing to seek the relief he requests. As such, the motion to dismiss the action must be GRANTED in its entirety.
Notwithstanding, even if the Plaintiff could establish standing to seek judgment as he does here, the application fails on its merits. First, it is quite clear that in this special proceeding, Plaintiff seeks to challenge a decision or action of the government, more specifically, the prohibition of bicycles on the 198. Plaintiff points to signs and government policies that prohibit such acts. He seeks relief that is commonly found in Article 78 challenges. Article 78 of the CPLR is the main procedural vehicle to review and challenge government action in the State of New York. However, a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner. Matter of Silvestri v. Hubert , 106 AD3d 924 (2nd Dept. 2013). The time to commence this action has long since passed. As the Attorney General correctly notes, the time for asserting a claim "cannot be extended through the simple expedient of denominating the action as one for declaratory relief." Wechsler v. State, 284 AD2d 707 (3rd Dept. 2001) ; New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194 (1994) . The 198 has been a state expressway since 1963 and the policy to prohibit bicycling on the 198 is just as old. As such, even if Plaintiff had standing, the current action is barred by the statute of limitations that apply to Article 78 challenges.
Lastly, it is well within the authority of municipalities to promulgate laws and ordinances that are designed to protect the public from harm. Bicycling on an expressway with heavy motor vehicle traffic would likely pose harm to a bicyclist, not to mention motorists in close proximity. Such laws therefore have a rational basis and are, on their face, valid. Highway safety regulations, such as the restriction at issue here, enjoy a strong presumption of validity. Ruiz v. Commissioner of Dept. of Transp. of City of NY, 679 F. Supp . 341 (SD NY 1988) ; Kaehny v. Lynn, 172 Misc 2d 295 (Sup. Crt. New York County, 1997) . As such, the Plaintiff's contention that he is being deprived of his right to bicycle on the 198 is unavailing and without merit.
In sum, the Defendants' motion must be granted in its entirety as the Plaintiff lacks standing to commence this action. However, if this Court addressed the merits, which it need not do in light of the procedural deficiencies addressed herein, they would likely fail as well. Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby DISMISSED.