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SAPP v. PURETHANE

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 28, 2003
662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)

Opinion

No. 2-900 / 02-0205

Filed February 28, 2003

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Patrick R. Grady, Judge.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his review-reopening request for additional workers' compensation weekly benefits. AFFIRMED.

Thomas M. Wertz of Wertz Law Firm, P.C, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Matthew G. Novak of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Mark S. Soldat, Algona, for amicus curiae, Iowa Trial Lawyers Association.

Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.


John Sapp appeals the denial of his petition to reopen a workers' compensation settlement agreement made with his former employer, Purethane, Inc. We affirm.

Background Facts and Proceedings . In 1995 John Sapp and Purethane, Inc. entered into an Agreement for Settlement, wherein the parties stipulated Sapp's occupational asthma was causally related to his employment with Purethane and had resulted in a thirty-percent permanent partial disability. At that time Sapp was gainfully employed by the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC). The pre-settlement vocational assessment noted Sapp was being treated for depression, but there was no indication the depression was causally linked to his asthma or interfering with his ability to work.

In 1996 Sapp's depression worsened, to the point of hospitalization. At that time he began to treat with a psychiatrist, Dr. James Brown. It was Dr. Brown who ultimately opined Sapp's depression was precipitated by his asthma. In 1997, concerned he might be fired for excessive absenteeism, Sapp voluntarily separated from his employment with UIHC. He has been unemployed since that time.

In 1998 Sapp sought review-reopening of the settlement agreement, arguing his depressive condition had markedly worsened and resulted in a loss of employability. The deputy workers' compensation commissioner denied reopening, finding the changes in Sapp's condition were "events that should have been contemplated by the parties." However, he did order Purethane to pay medical expenses related to Sapp's depression, finding the depression was causally related to Sapp's work injury.

On appeal, the agency affirmed the deputy's decision. It found Sapp had voluntarily quit his employment with UIHC and that any changes in Sapp's ability to maintain employment, including his depressive symptoms, were contemplated at the time of the 1995 settlement. It also found Sapp could not "meet his burden by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the worsening of his depression was caused by the occupational asthma, or other events related to his work injury." The district court affirmed the agency. Although critical of the agency's application of a "contemplation" standard, the court noted the crucial question was whether the worsening of Sapp's depression or his loss of employment were attributable to the occupational asthma. It found substantial evidence supported the agency finding that Sapp had not shown a causal connection between his injury and the worsening of his depression or his depression and loss of employment.

Scope of Review. Our review is limited to correcting errors at law. Aluminum Co. of America v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Iowa 2001). The agency action will be reversed if it is legally erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2001). The action will be upheld if the entirety of the record is sufficient to allow a reasonable, neutral, and detached person to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Id. at § 17A.19(10)(f).

Causal Connection . The focus of Sapp's argument, and that of the amicus curiae brief from the Iowa Trial Lawyers Association, is the proper interpretation of Iowa Code section 86.14 (1997), and whether that section requires a claimant to demonstrate conditions leading to the impairment or decreased earning capacity were not contemplated at the time of the original settlement. While some of our case law may be construed to require such a finding, we need not reach the question. Sapp's appeal faces a more fundamental problem.

Even assuming contemplation at time of settlement is irrelevant in a review-reopening proceeding, Sapp was still required to establish that, subsequent to the settlement, he suffered an impairment and/or lessened earning capacity that was proximately caused by his initial injury. E.N.T. Assoc. v. Collentine, 525 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1994). Sapp does not allege any injury-related factor other than his depression. As the parties agree Sapp's depression first occurred at the time of, or prior to, the 1995 settlement, the mere existence of his depression cannot be a "subsequent" impairment. Accordingly, Sapp was required to show his occupational asthma was a substantial contributing factor to his worsened depression, which in turn substantially contributed to his loss of employability. See Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1980).

Contrary to Sapp's assertion, proximate cause was not indisputably settled by the deputy's decision. The deputy ruled only that Sapp's depression was caused by his occupational asthma and therefore the treatment of his depression was a medical expense that must be paid by the employer. See Iowa Code § 85.27. The deputy's decision was silent as to whether the subsequent impairment — the change in his mental status — was also causally related to his initial injury. The agency appeal decision answered this open question, specifically ruling causation was not shown. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence in the record supports the agency's finding.

Sapp contends his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Brown, provided uncontroverted medical testimony that Sapp's worsened mental condition was proximately caused by his occupational asthma. He argues the agency clearly erred in arbitrarily rejecting this testimony. See Poula v. Siouxland Wall Ceiling, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Upon a review of the record, we conclude this was not the case.

Dr. Brown did opine the onset of Sapp's depression was precipitated by the occupational asthma, and the majority of the evidence indicates this was the case. It is also clear Sapp's depression worsened after the 1995 settlement. However, Dr. Brown never specifically opined the worsening of the depression was causally related to the asthma. Rather, he indicated his belief that Sapp's continued cycle of depressions was directly related to lifestyle changes Sapp underwent after the asthma diagnosis. This distinction is significant for a number of reasons.

According to Dr. Brown, once depression has manifested, the patient will be prone to recurrent major depressive episodes. He further stated depression can occur spontaneously or be triggered by external stressors. Consequently, the proper focus is on any evidence that indicated Sapp's acute episodes, or other changes in condition since 1995, were triggered by stressors associated with his asthma.

In reviewing the medical evidence and testimony, it is clear there were a number of significant post-settlement stressors, other than those related to his asthma, that had an impact on Sapp's mental state and the maintenance of his employment. Although Dr. Brown did view Sapp's asthma as a "chronic stressor," he was unaware Sapp's condition had improved dramatically since the 1995 settlement. He was unaware of not only the degree of Sapp's physical improvement, but also that Sapp had been reporting physical symptoms out of proportion to his physical condition and that Sapp's pulmonary specialist questioned what percentage of these symptoms were psychological as opposed to true physical exacerbations.

At the time he sought review — reopening in 1998, Sapp's pulmonary function tests were "consistently supernormal."

While there was evidence in the record that could support a finding in Sapp's favor as to causation, there was also evidence indicating a contrary result. On review, the question is not whether the evidence supports a finding different from the agency's, but whether the evidence supports the finding the agency actually made. See 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Iowa 1995) ("[a]n agency's decision does not lack substantial evidence because inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the same evidence"). The agency, not the court, weighs the evidence, and we are obliged to broadly and liberally apply those findings to uphold rather than defeat the agency's decision. Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1981). Under such a standard, we must conclude substantial evidence supports the agency's finding as to causation. Accordingly, we need not address whether contemplation is a necessary element of proof in a review-reopening proceeding.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

SAPP v. PURETHANE

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 28, 2003
662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)
Case details for

SAPP v. PURETHANE

Case Details

Full title:JOHN SAPP, Appellant, v. PURETHANE, INC. and HERITAGE MUTUAL INSURANCE…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Feb 28, 2003

Citations

662 N.W.2d 374 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003)