Opinion
H037077
01-26-2012
In re K.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.N., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD20557)
J.N., mother of the child at issue here, appeals from a juvenile court dispositional order removing the child from mother's physical custody, continuing the child in a foster home, and ordering reunification services for mother. Mother contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings and orders, and that the court abused its discretion in declaring the child a dependent child, instead of ordering informal services without adjudicating the child a dependent. We find no error and will, therefore, affirm the court's dispositional order.
BACKGROUND
The Department of Family and Children's Services (the Department) filed a petition as to the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) on March 25, 2011, and a first amended petition on March 28, 2011. The amended petition alleged that the child, who was about three and one-half years old, "has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness" by 1) "the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment," and/or 2) "the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's . . . mental illness." The child was placed in protective custody on March 25, 2011, pursuant to a protective custody warrant. The father's identity was unknown.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The social worker's jurisdiction/disposition report and addendums recommended that the section 300 petition be sustained, that the child remain in out-of-home care, and that mother receive reunification services. The combined hearing was held on June 20, 2011. The juvenile court admitted into evidence the initial hearing report and the jurisdiction/disposition report and addendums. The evidence presented in the reports and addendums was as follows.
Before the child was born in 2007, mother was repeatedly hospitalized for mental health issues. In 2002, mother was hospitalized for 21 days and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In late 2003, she was hospitalized for eight days and diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia. In 2004, mother was hospitalized for at least 17 days and diagnosed with major depression with psychotic features. She was then transferred to a mental health rehabilitation center where she remained for several months. During this time, a one-year conservatorship was established after mother was apparently found to be gravely disabled. Between 2004 and 2006, mother received inpatient treatment and later outpatient mental health services. She was also hospitalized for nine days beginning in late May 2006, and subsequently hospitalized for an additional 10 days in June 2006. Her diagnoses between 2004 and 2006 included schizophrenia paranoid type, "[p]sychosis, not other[wise] specified, versus [s]chizophrenia, undifferentiated type," and "[s]chizo-[a]ffective [d]isorder." Between 2002 and 2006, mother was prescribed a variety of medications, including Abilify.
In late March 2005, mother had moved into a maternal uncle's home. In September 2005, she began taking classes at Evergreen Community College. The uncle raised concerns about mother to her health care provider in August and December 2005. In April 2006, the uncle requested that mother move out, but she remained even after the uncle later moved out. She was arrested for trespassing in May 2006, convicted, and placed on probation.
Mother was raped and the child was born in 2007. Mother has stated that she does not have any information about the father.
Since the child was born in 2007, there have been five child abuse and neglect referrals: two substantiated reports of general neglect and three unfounded or inclusive reports of general neglect. The first report, which was substantiated, occurred a few days after the child was born. Mother was not aware she was pregnant until she actually gave birth to the child. She later called 911 when she saw that the child's fingers were blue. Mother did not purchase any baby items for the child, was renting a room where no children were allowed to live, was unemployed and living off her savings, and was estranged from her family. The child was placed in protective custody and the family was offered voluntary family maintenance services for approximately four months. The social worker purchased a crib and mattress for the child and the child was returned to mother. Mother was offered parent education and mental health counseling but she failed to follow through. She stated that she wanted to wait until the child was older. "The family stabilized and the case was closed."
The four subsequent reports of general neglect occurred in 2010, and only the last report was substantiated. During an investigation of a report in April 2010, the social worker found that mother and child were staying at a homeless shelter. Mother "was not cooperating with taking the child to the doctor, but she finally did." The child was found to be healthy. Another report of general neglect in June was inconclusive. Mother and child stayed in the lobby of the Campbell Police Department after mother failed to find space at a homeless shelter. A social worker took them to InnVision, but mother left the shelter the same day. A few days later, a report was made that mother and child were attempting to stay at a hotel. Mother had been evicted from housing in Santa Clara but kept returning. The police gave mother a voucher for a few days of housing, and she did not leave the hotel lobby after the voucher was used up. Mother eventually left voluntarily. Her whereabouts thereafter were unknown. Another report of general neglect was made in September. The police arranged for a three-night hotel stay for mother and child. The social worker transported mother and child to a community center to request an extension of the hotel stay. The social worker lost contact with mother after she checked out of the hotel.
The most recent report of general neglect was made on October 14, 2010. About 12:30 a.m., an officer from the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety found mother and child sleeping in a sleeping bag in the carport of an apartment building. The officer reported that the Department of Public Safety had had "several prior contacts" with mother involving the "same circumstances" and that she had been offered an opportunity to receive services from the county. According to the officer's report, the apartment manager who reported the incident stated that mother continuously slept with the child in the carport. This exposed the child to the "harsh elements, such as the cold weather, insects, rats, vehicle traffic[,] etc." Based on the officer's observations, the officer believed mother had continuously exposed the child to danger. The officer placed the child in protective custody.
A social worker investigated the case and "assessed . . . mother to be meeting [the child's] needs." According to the social worker, the child was "healthy and well taken care of, except for some scabies." The social worker reported that due to mother's homelessness, "she was not able to locate a safe residence for her family." During an interview by the social worker, mother stated that she knew that no car drove into the spot where she and the child slept. At an interview a few months later, mother stated that they were in the carport because the laundry room was closed, that it was not late when the officer arrived, and that they were still awake.
On October 14, 2010, mother signed an informal supervision agreement and agreed to voluntarily place the child in a foster home. According to the agreement, the reasons for intervention by the Department included the family's unsafe living conditions and mother's unaddressed mental health. Mother agreed to participate in parent education, a mental health assessment, and mental health counseling. She also agreed to locate and maintain a safe living arrangement for the child and herself.
For several months thereafter, mother did not participate in the agreed-upon services. Although she stated that she wanted to find a stable residence before completing the services, she repeatedly declined housing assistance and did not have a reasonable plan for housing. For example, in November 2010, mother did not want to stay at InnVision because she believed they used cleaning products with unsafe chemicals and she felt uncomfortable leaving the child at the child care center. When mother was offered emergency shelter on January 28, 2011, she told a social worker that she did not like to live in a shelter or InnVision because her child had cried all night there. She "further stated that [the child] cried 'because [the child] was hypnotized by people from the second world.' " In February 2011, mother indicated to a social worker that she would be allowed to move into an apartment in a week. She claimed that she could not get into the apartment immediately " 'because they have visitors from Arizona,' " and referred to the fact that she saw a car with an Arizona license plate in the carport. Mother acknowledged that she had no money but assured the social worker that she would be able to stay rent free for three months. It does not appear from the record that mother ever moved into the apartment.
Mother also declined a bus pass for March 2011, although it took her more than two hours to walk each way to visit the child. She missed five visits with the child between March 3 and 21, 2011, and the social worker was unable to contact her for two weeks.
On March 25, 2011, the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b) as to the child, who was approximately three and one-half years old, and the child was placed in protective custody pursuant to a protective custody warrant. That same day, during an interview with the social worker, mother indicated that she did not know about her diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and stated that she did not have any mental health problem. She indicated that she missed visits with the child in early March because it was raining hard and on another occasion, she went the wrong way and did not arrive in time. Mother had been buying food with food stamps and gift certificates provided by the social worker during the prior holiday season. She continued to sleep in the laundry room of an apartment building and did not have a realistic plan to locate housing. For example, one of her plans for housing was to talk to the manager of the apartment building where she stayed, but she had not actually talked to him for six months. Similarly, she planned to talk to a friend, but she had not talked to the friend in six months and did not think her friend would allow her to stay without the child. As to why she did not participate in the agreed-upon services, mother stated: " 'I have my own right. I have to do what is good for [the child]. I want to live somewhere by ourselves. I don't want to live with others because they have the keys to the lock and they can go inside the room. That is why I do not accept the services.' "
The foster mother reported to the social worker that the child was eating, compared to six months before when the child only wanted to drink milk. The foster mother was concerned about the child's "sexual acting out behaviors." She indicated that when she asks the child to stop, the child complies. The social worker observed that the child spoke in sentences of two to three words. The child was healthy and active, and "knows how to listen and can normally be redirected."
In mid-April 2011, a few weeks after the juvenile dependency petition was filed, the social worker observed that the child is "healthy, good-mannered, and smart," and "is bonded" to mother. Further, mother had "demonstrated that she deeply cares for" the child. According to the social worker, mother attempted to keep the child clean when they were homeless and mother "provides good care of food and clothing" for the child. After the child was placed in foster care, mother was "very appropriate with [the child] during visitation." The social worker reported, however, that mother, at some point, "return[ed] two SSI benefit check[s] of $10,000 for [herself] and $3,000 for [the child] and [withdrew] her SSI benefit in 2009 because she does not want to be labeled as disabled."
The social worker spoke to the maternal uncle, who was unaware of the child. The maternal uncle and his wife offered to rent a room for mother so that she might obtain custody of the child, but mother declined. She stated that she did not need any help and that she did not want to talk to them.
On May 17, 2011, mother told the social worker that "she has been the same, living on the street and going to InnVision during the day to get food and use their facility and services."
On May 19, 2011, mother reported that "she does not have any mental health concerns and that the people that worked with her made things up and had their own agenda. She reported that the doctor did that for business." Mother indicated that she had previously accepted services "because her eyesight was weak and she wanted the financial support." Mother wanted the child returned to her care and reported that "she will go in the shelter" with the child. She did not want to look for a job in order to have money to rent a place.
On May 31, 2011, mother reported that she continued to be homeless and that she was waiting for a space at the shelter.
Mother eventually completed a parent orientation class in May 2011, and between May and mid-June 2011 she was continuing to participate in parenting classes. Mother had also been visiting the child "on a consistent basis."
In June 2011, the social worker reported that the child "is a very young and active [child] who requires constant attention and care." Further, "[t]here is no doubt that [mother] loves [the child] and wants what is best for" the child. However, the social worker believed that mother could not provide the child with the constant attention and care that the child needed without mental health treatment for herself. According to the social worker, mother's mental health prevented her from making good choices that were in the child's best interests. Mother "has had periods where she stabilize[d] her mental health with treatment and medication and safely cared for herself. [She] can do the same for herself and [the child] by participating in [a] mental health evaluation and treatment." The social worker recommended that mother receive family reunification services "to support her in stabilizing her mental health."
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, counsel for mother argued that the petition's allegations pertained to mother's mental health prior to the child's birth in 2007. Counsel contended that after the child's birth, mother had not presented any mental health problems, and the child was healthy and well-adjusted. Further, mother "used her good judgment" and voluntarily allowed the Department to take the child in October 2010, so that the child could be in a warm place while she looked for housing. Currently, mother was attending appointments and classes and otherwise "doing what she needs to do in order to regain custody." Counsel argued that mother's homelessness was not a basis for jurisdiction, and that mother was currently on a wait list at InnVision. Counsel indicated that the petition should be dismissed, and that mother was willing to enter into another supervision agreement with the Department so that the child could stay with the child's current foster parent until mother found housing.
Counsel for the child argued that mother was in "serious denial of her mental health past" and that there was a significant risk of harm to the child. Counsel contended that mother's mental health affected her willingness to cooperate and accept help from the Department and observed that mother failed to comply with several aspects of the informal supervision agreement even after five months had passed.
Counsel for the Department argued that the child was at risk because mother consistently failed to acknowledge her mental health issues and failed to accept referrals for housing assistance. According to counsel, the "mental health concerns in this case are very serious" in view of the diagnoses that mother had received, including paranoid schizophrenia, and the several hospitalizations. Counsel argued that "[t]hese are very serious diagnoses that don't go away." Counsel explained that if mother participated in a psychological evaluation and counseling, it would assist the Department in "helping her meet her mental health needs and that would be a great platform for her to reunify with [the child]." Counsel stated that the Department had already "done everything it possibly can to provide reasonable efforts to help" mother, and requested that the petition be sustained.
The juvenile court observed that a three-year-old child is "vulnerable and unable to communicate any information to determine the degree of the risk, and for [the child's] own safety to even be able to ask for help." The court stated that mother had been offered services on multiple occasions and "has been unwilling or unable to appreciate the seriousness of her mental health illness and how that places [the child] at risk." The court also referred to the "risks that being homeless has posed for [the child]." The court indicated that, by mother's failure to provide a home where the child "can safely have some boundaries, some parameters, it is very likely that mother could fall asleep and [the child] can wander off when they are staying in an open environment, like a carport, and serious harm can come to [the child]." The court did not believe that mother "appreciate[d] the risk in having [the child] with her and sleeping here and there without any stable housing." With respect to mother's mental health, the court believed that mother had been diagnosed with a very serious and chronic illness, that it had gone untreated, and that mother was unable to appreciate the degree of her illness. As a result, mother had been unable to make those decisions necessary to keep the child safe. The court expressed no doubt that mother loved the child, but indicated that jurisdiction over the child was necessary to ensure the child's safety "and so that [mother] can receive the services that she needs."
The court ultimately found the allegations in the petition true and adjudged the child to be a dependent child of the court. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that the welfare of the child required that the child be removed from mother's custody. The court ordered that the child's placement in a foster home continue, and that mother receive reunification services. Mother's service plan was to include a parenting class; a psychological evaluation; a program of counseling or psychotherapy that addresses issues of trauma, depression, and mental health concerns that affected the mother and the family; and supervised visitation a minimum of two times per week for two hours.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Parties' Contentions
Mother contends that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings under section 300, subdivision (b) that the child was at risk of serious physical harm or illness by mother's failure to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by mother's inability to provide the child care due to mental illness. Among other things, mother contends that the evidence showed that, when the child was removed from her, the child was generally healthy and well taken care of; she "acknowledge[ed]" the risks to the child caused by homelessness; and she "responded immediately to the offer of voluntary care for her [child] to deal with homelessness." She further contends that "any future risk posed by [her] mental health . . . was highly speculative."
The Department contends that substantial evidence warranted taking jurisdiction over the child under section 300, subdivision (b). "[M]other's homelessness was directly attributable to her mental illness and her inability to make safe choices for herself and [the child]."
Analysis
"A petition to commence proceedings in the juvenile court to declare a child . . . a dependent child of the court" must contain "[t]he code section and the subdivision under which the proceedings are instituted." (§ 332, subd. (c).) It must also contain a "concise statement of facts, separately stated, to support the conclusion that the child upon whose behalf the petition is being brought is a person within the definition of each of the sections and subdivisions under which the proceedings are being instituted." (§ 332, subd. (f).) "At the jurisdictional hearing, the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is a person described by Section 300. Any legally admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence." (§ 355, subd. (a).) Generally, hearsay evidence in the social worker's report "is admissible and constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based . . . ." (Id., subd. (b); see id., subds. (c) & (d); In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568, 577.) "After hearing the evidence, the court shall make a finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or not the minor is a person described by Section 300 and the specific subdivisions of Section 300 under which the petition is sustained." (§ 356.)
A child may be declared a dependent child under section 300, subdivision (b) if "[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, . . . by the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's . . . mental illness . . . ." The Department has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the circumstances are such that the child has been or will be harmed due to the parent's failure or inability to provide for the child. (See In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) There must be evidence of "three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) 'serious physical harm or illness' to the minor, or a 'substantial risk' of such harm or illness." (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 (Rocco M.); accord, In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829 (David M.).)
"[T]he purpose of section 300, subdivision (b) is to protect the child from a substantial risk of future serious physical harm and that risk is determined as of the time of the jurisdictional hearing." (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1397 (Savannah M.); accord, In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803.) "While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm." (Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) Jurisdiction thus may be unwarranted where the facts alleged in the petition represent an isolated instance of past parental neglect not likely to recur. (Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1398; David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 831.)
On appeal, we review the jurisdiction findings under the substantial evidence standard. We examine the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, to support the juvenile court's findings. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649 (Kristin H.); In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.) We indulge every inference and resolve all conflicts in favor of the court's decision. (Kristin H., supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1649.) Each allegation need not independently support jurisdiction. The court can take jurisdiction on evidence of a "pattern of behavior" resulting in a substantial risk of harm to the child. (Id. at p. 1650.)
As we stated above, the Department had the burden of showing specifically how the child has been or will be harmed. " 'Without the history of abuse and neglect, it is nearly impossible to determine whether [the minor is] at risk of suffering from the same abuse and neglect.' [Citation.]" (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136; see also David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Further, " 'harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness of a parent. [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) The risk of harm must result from the parent's mental illness. (Ibid.) In addition, a child may not be found to be a dependent child under section 300 "solely due to the lack of an emergency shelter for the family." (§ 300, subd. (b).)
In this case, the Department alleged in the amended petition, and carried its burden of proving, that there was a substantial risk the child would suffer serious physical harm or illness 1) by the failure of mother to provide the child with adequate shelter, and 2) by the failure of mother to provide regular care for the child due to mother's mental illness.
The record reflects that since the child's birth in 2007, mother had difficulty locating and maintaining suitable housing for the child. In October 2010, the child was taken into protective custody after mother and child were found sleeping at night in a carport. The responding officer reported that there had been "several prior contacts" with mother involving the "same circumstances." As the juvenile court explained, in view of the child's age, the circumstances posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the child, who could wander off in an open environment while mother was sleeping. Even after the child was placed in a foster home, mother continued to have difficulty in locating and maintaining suitable housing for the child. She never had a reasonable plan for housing, and she previously refused even emergency housing assistance. It was not until about a month before the June 2011 jurisdiction/disposition hearing that mother indicated that she would go into a shelter with the child. However, in view of mother's history of refusing support or assistance with housing, the many reasons she previously offered for declining even emergency housing assistance, and her ongoing failure to present a reasonable plan for obtaining suitable housing, it would have been reasonable for the court to question mother's commitment to staying at InnVision with the child, or otherwise locating and maintaining suitable housing for the child. Therefore, based on mother's lengthy history of failing to provide adequate shelter for the child, her questionable current commitment to providing adequate shelter, and the substantial risk posed to the child, we determine that ample evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdiction finding. (§ 300, subd. (b).)
There was also substantial evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction based on the risk posed to the child by mother's failure to provide regular care due to her mental illness. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Mother had a documented history of serious mental illness in the years leading up to the child's birth, and her diagnoses included paranoid schizophrenia. Although the record does not reflect that mother received treatment for a mental illness following the birth of her child in 2007, the record reflects that she still suffered from some form of mental illness. As recently as late January 2011, less than six months before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother refused emergency housing in a shelter or InnVision, stating that her child had previously cried there " 'because [the child] was hypnotized by people from the second world.' " Further, in February 2011, in attempting to explain why she could not immediately live in an apartment, mother simply stated that there were visitors from Arizona at the apartment and referred to the fact that she saw a car in the carport with an Arizona license plate. These comments, along with the nature and extent of mother's documented history of mental illness, give rise to a reasonable inference that mother continued to suffer from some form of mental illness. Further, the comments evidencing mental illness were directly related to mother's refusal or inability to locate and maintain adequate shelter, which was the issue that created the risk of harm to the child. It was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that the risk posed to the child from the lack of regular care, and specifically the lack of adequate shelter, due to mother's illness was a continuing risk, given mother's continued denial of any mental health issue, and her ongoing refusal to undergo a mental health evaluation and to participate in any necessary treatment.
In the proceedings below and in this court, mother relies on In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377 (Janet T.), to support her argument that there is insufficient evidence to support jurisdiction by the juvenile court. We find Janet T. distinguishable. In that case, the mother and children lived in several shelters, and the mother had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. A petition was filed under section 300, and the allegations that were sustained under section 300, subdivision (b) included the failure to "supervise or protect the child" adequately and the inability to "provide regular care" due to the parent's mental illness. The facts alleged in the petition to support this allegation pertained to the mother's failure to ensure the children attended school and the mother's " 'mental and emotional problems.' " (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 387.) The juvenile court ultimately sustained the petition.
On appeal, the appellate court determined that the mother's facial challenge to the petition had merit, concluding that the sustained allegations of the petition did not support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b). The appellate court explained that there were "no facts alleged or suggested by the supporting documentary evidence to indicate mother's failure to ensure the children's regular school attendance subjected the children to physical injury or illness, serious or otherwise." (Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) Similarly, the petition did not contain any facts "to suggest how mother's mental health problems created a 'substantial risk' her children would suffer 'serious physical injury or illness.' " (Ibid.) The appellate court further concluded that 1) any supporting evidence bearing on physical injury to the children pertained to conditions that did not exist at the time of the hearing on the petition, 2) there was no claim in the petition that these events "were the result of, or were caused by," the mother's mental and emotional problems, and 3) there were insufficient facts alleged "to support the conclusion the children were currently at a substantial risk of serious physical injury or illness because of mother's mental and emotional problems." (Id. at p. 390.)
In the present case, mother on appeal raises a substantial evidence challenge to the jurisdictional findings and does not assert a facial challenge to the allegations in the petition. As we have explained, there is substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional finding in view of mother's lengthy history of failing to provide, and her questionable current commitment to providing, adequate shelter for the child, and the substantial risk posed to the child by that failure, where mother was sleeping in an open environment with a very young and active child. Moreover, there was ample evidence that the failure to provide regular care to the child, and specifically adequate shelter, was due to mother's mental illness, and the risk of harm was continuing in view of mother's continued denial of any mental health issue along with her ongoing refusal to participate in a mental health evaluation or treatment. Accordingly, we determine that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b).
Adjudicating the Child a Dependent Child
Mother next contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it declared the child a dependent child, instead of ordering informal services without adjudicating the child a dependent. The Department responds that the court's order was not an abuse of discretion.
After the juvenile court determines that it has jurisdiction over a child, and "[a]fter receiving and considering evidence on the appropriate disposition, the juvenile court may (1) order a legal guardian be appointed for the child (§ 360, subd. (a)); (2) order informal services without adjudicating the child a dependent (id., subd. (b)); or (3) adjudge the child a dependent of the juvenile court (id., subd. (d))." (In re G.W. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1436 (G.W.); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(a).)
Section 360, subdivision (b) states: "If the court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may, without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and the child's parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with Section 301." Section 360, subdivision (d) states: "If the court finds that the child is a person described by Section 300, it may order and adjudge the child to be a dependent child of the court."
" 'The overarching goal of dependency proceedings is to safeguard the welfare of California's children. [Citation.]' " (G.W., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435.) "The court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child's interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this discretion. [Citations.] We cannot reverse the court's determination in this regard absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]" (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.)
We determine that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the child a dependent instead of ordering informal services without such an adjudication. The Department had previously entered into an informal supervision agreement with mother in October 2010, and for several months thereafter mother failed to participate in the agreed-upon services. It was not until May 2011, approximately one month before the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, that mother began participating in parenting classes. At that point, however, mother continued to deny that she had in the past or currently had any mental health issues. At the subsequent jurisdiction/disposition hearing, mother's counsel acknowledged that mother had mental health problems in the past, but argued that there was "nothing current or recent" showing that the child had been affected by mother's "mental health situation," and nothing to show that mother was currently suffering from anything that would place the child at risk if the child was returned to her care. However, given mother's poor level of participation in agreed-upon services and her otherwise minimal progress under the informal supervision agreement in the months leading up to the hearing, her failure to participate in any mental health related services, her continued denial of any mental health issues despite the effect on her child's care and the risk posed to the child, and her failure to recognize the risk to her young child from inadequate shelter, it was eminently reasonable and not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to adjudicate the child a dependent child of the court, rather than ordering informal services without adjudicating the child a dependent.
DISPOSITION
The disposition order of June 20, 2011 is affirmed.
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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
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RUSHING, P.J.
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PREMO, J.