Opinion
No. 1 CA-JV 14-0175
11-25-2014
SANDRA M., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, K.M., Appellees.
COUNSEL The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix By Christopher Stavris Counsel for Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By JoAnn Falgout Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD22903
The Honorable Shellie F. Smith, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix
By Christopher Stavris
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By JoAnn Falgout
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge John C. Gemmill joined. NORRIS, Judge:
¶1 Sandra M. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her child, K.M. On appeal, she argues the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of her parental rights was in K.M.'s best interest because a strong bond existed between them. The juvenile court considered the bond between Sandra and K.M.; and it found termination to be in K.M.'s best interest in light of all the evidence:
In accordance with ARCAP 27, we have substituted the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") for ADES because the pertinent responsibilities of ADES have been transferred to DCS. Senate Bill 1001, § 157, 51st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (enacted).
With respect to best interests, I have considered what mother has stated. And, as I think everyone has acknowledged, including the case manager and the guardian ad litem, that mother and [K.M.] have a bond. . . .We hold the juvenile court's termination order was supported by reasonable evidence, as summarized below, and affirm. See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009) ("[W]e view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's decision, and we will affirm a termination order that is supported by reasonable evidence.") (citations omitted).
However, the Court does find that termination—that, notwithstanding, the Court finds that termination is in the child's best interests.
¶2 ADES presented credible evidence demonstrating K.M. would benefit from termination of Sandra's parental rights. See generally Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 8, 177 P.3d 327, 329 (App. 2008) ("To prove that the termination of parental rights would be in a child's best interests, ADES must present credible evidence demonstrating 'how the child would benefit from a [termination] or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.'") (quoting Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d 43, 50 (App. 2004)). ADES placed K.M. in care in November 2012 due to Sandra's substance abuse, lack of income, and failure to provide K.M. with stable housing. From then until the April 2014 termination hearing, Sandra did little to address these issues, and at the termination hearing, she agreed her participation in recommended services had "been dismal at . . . best." The ADES case manager assigned to Sandra's case testified she saw a glass of wine during a supervised visit in January 2014 and that Sandra appeared hung-over during a supervised visit in December 2013. The case manager also testified Sandra had not demonstrated that she could provide permanency and stability for her child. Since the beginning of the case Sandra had lived in four different residences, and at the time of the termination hearing she could not produce a lease in her name. Sandra had also failed to secure employment or a source of regular income.
¶3 Further, K.M.'s stepfather, and father to her siblings, had expressed an interest in adopting K.M., and ADES was in the process of obtaining a home study for the stepfather. See Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998) ("One factor the court may properly consider in favor of severance is the immediate availability of an adoptive placement."). The prospective adoption would reunite her with her siblings and afford her permanency and stability. In addition, the juvenile court found K.M. "would be adoptable [even] if [her stepfather] for some reason is not able to adopt her." See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352, 884 P.2d 234, 238 (App. 1994) ("[A]DES need not show that it has a specific adoption plan before terminating a parent's rights; [A]DES must show that the children are adoptable.").
¶4 On this record, reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that termination was in K.M.'s best interest. We therefore affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Sandra's parental rights to K.M.