Opinion
3:22-cv-00141-ART-CLB
08-15-2023
JASMINE PAUL SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. R. SAUCEDO, et. al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE1 [ECF No. 28]
This case involves a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Jasmine Paul Sanchez (“Sanchez”) against Defendants William Reubart(“Reubart”) and Ricardo Saucedo (“Saucedo”) (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 28, 30.) On June 22, 2023, the Court gave Sanchez notice of Defendants' motion pursuant to the requirements of Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998). (ECF No. 32.) Despite the Court sua sponte granting an extension of time, (ECF No. 34), Sanchez has failed to file an opposition to the motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 28), be granted.
This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Anne R. Traum, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and LR IB 1-4.
ECF No. 30 consists of Sanchez's medical records filed under seal.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sanchez is an inmate currently in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”) and is currently housed at the Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) On March 23, 2022, proceeding pro se, Sanchez filed an inmate civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (“Complaint”). (ECF No. 1-1.)
Sanchez's complaint alleges the following: On October 16, 2021, between 3:00 p.m. and 5:28 p.m., Saucedo assaulted and threatened Sanchez. (ECF No. 8 at 3). Saucedo told Sanchez that Reubart gave Saucedo permission to do as he pleased to Sanchez, including deny Sanchez food and assault Sanchez and that Saucedo would get away with it. (Id.) Saucedo beat-in Sanchez's face with a nightstick. (Id.) While beating Sanchez, Saucedo commented that Sanchez would not leave ESP alive, the only way Sanchez would leave ESP was in a body bag or a pine box, and that Saucedo was not the only prison official that Reubart gave permission to “fuck [Sanchez] off.” (Id.) Saucedo commented that the next time prison officials have to deal with Sanchez, they would make it look like a suicide. (Id.) Additionally, Saucedo told Sanchez that, if Sanchez tried to file a lawsuit, Sanchez would be dead before his lawsuit made it to the courts. (Id.) Saucedo then bent, pulled, and twisted Sanchez's arm “to make good on his threat.” (Id.) The Complaint was screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). (ECF No. 7.) Based on these allegations, the district court allowed Sanchez to proceed on an excessive force claim and an unsafe prison conditions claim against Defendants.
In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted declarations and authenticated evidence. This evidence is undisputed by Sanchez. Thus, the undisputed facts in this case are as follows. According to a declaration filed by Saucedo, as well as Sanchez's disciplinary history report, on October 16, 2021, Defendant Saucedo was working in Unit 2 of Ely State Prison. (ECF Nos. 28-4, 28-1.) Saucedo was conducting the dinner feeding. (Id.) As he approached cell 2B-3, he opened the food slot to give Sanchez his dinner. (Id.) Sanchez stuck his arm through the slot, thus, “capturing” the slot. Saucedo tried to reason with Sanchez to determine why he had captured the slot. (Id.) Sanchez then threw an unknown liquid on Saucedo, spit at him, and punched Saucedo in the stomach. (Id.) Saucedo pushed on the slot to trap Sanchez's arm and prevent further attacks. (Id.) Saucedo also pulled out his collapsible baton to protect himself, but did not strike Sanchez with the baton. (Id.) Saucedo never told Sanchez that he would be killed or that Warden Reubart had given him carte blanche to hurt Sanchez. (Id.)
Other officers arrived to assist. (ECF No. 28-6.) One responding officer, Madeline Pickens, filed a declaration in support of Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The declaration stated that she witnessed Sanchez spit at Saucedo, striking him in his upper extremity and then saw Sanchez punch Saucedo in the stomach. (Id.) She witnessed Saucedo pull out his collapsible baton and approach Sanchez, but Saucedo did not strike Sanchez with the baton, and could not strike Sanchez in the face, as his face was on the other side of a metal door. (Id.)
Once Sanchez backed away, medical personnel arrived at the scene and Sanchez was evaluated. (ECF No. 30 (sealed).) He had some slight swelling on his arm, but stated “he was fine.” (Id.) There were no marks or swelling on his head or face. (Id.) He was given some IBU for the swelling and pain. (Id.) Based on this incident, Sanchez was charged with battery. (ECF No. 28-3.) After a disciplinary hearing, he was found guilty of battery and placed in disciplinary segregation (Id.)
Defendant Reubart also submitted a declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment, which states that he never told Saucedo, or any other person, that they could injury or assault Sanchez, or any other inmate, without repercussions. (ECF No. 28-5.) Reubart did not authorize any person to “kill, injure or deny food to [Sanchez].” (Id.) Reubart has never made any such statement to Sanchez or threatened him in any way. (Id.)
According to Sanchez's Inmate Disciplinary History Report, Sanchez has a long disciplinary history based on throwing feces and urine and has had “propelling” charges and battery charges filed against him on several occasions. (ECF No. 28-1.)
On June 21, 2023, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment arguing there are no genuine issues of material fact and Sanchez cannot demonstrate that the Defendants violated his constitutionally protected rights, and alternatively, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 28.) Sanchez did not oppose the motion and has not disputed any of the facts as stated above.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The substantive law applicable to the claim determines which facts are material. Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Only disputes over facts that address the main legal question of the suit can preclude summary judgment, and factual disputes that are irrelevant are not material. Frlekin v. Apple, Inc., 979 F.3d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 2020). A dispute is “genuine” only where a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The parties subject to a motion for summary judgment must: (1) cite facts from the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, and declarations, and then (2) “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Documents submitted during summary judgment must be authenticated, and if only personal knowledge authenticates a document (i.e., even a review of the contents of the document would not prove that it is authentic), an affidavit attesting to its authenticity must be attached to the submitted document. Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Neheme, 632 F.3d 526, 532-33 (9th Cir. 2011). Conclusory statements, speculative opinions, pleading allegations, or other assertions uncorroborated by facts are insufficient to establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine dispute. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. “Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. However, if the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet their initial burden by demonstrating either: (1) there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or claims; or (2) submitting admissible evidence that establishes the record forecloses the possibility of a reasonable jury finding in favor of the nonmoving party. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2018); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). The court views all evidence and any inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). If the moving party does not meet its burden for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to provide evidentiary materials to oppose the motion, and the court will deny summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Where the moving party has met its burden, however, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact actually exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, (1986). The nonmoving must “go beyond the pleadings” to meet this burden. Pac. Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, the nonmoving party may not simply rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings; rather, they must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material in support of its contention that such a dispute exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11. This burden is “not a light one,” and requires the nonmoving party to “show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (quoting In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010)). The non-moving party “must come forth with evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor.” Pac. Gulf Shipping Co., 992 F.3d at 898 (quoting Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 387). Mere assertions and “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” will not defeat a properly supported and meritorious summary judgment motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
When a pro se litigant opposes summary judgment, his or her contentions in motions and pleadings may be considered as evidence to meet the non-party's burden to the extent: (1) contents of the document are based on personal knowledge, (2) they set forth facts that would be admissible into evidence, and (3) the litigant attested under penalty of perjury that they were true and correct. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004).
Upon the parties meeting their respective burdens for the motion for summary judgment, the court determines whether reasonable minds could differ when interpreting the record; the court does not weigh the evidence or determine its truth. Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). The court may consider evidence in the record not cited by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). Nevertheless, the court will view the cited records before it and will not mine the record for triable issues of fact. Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d at 386 (if a nonmoving party does not make nor provide support for a possible objection, the court will likewise not consider it).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment's proscription on cruel and unusual punishment forbids prison officials from inflicting “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ....” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Encompassed within the Eighth Amendment is a bar on the use of excessive force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 710 (1992). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a five-part balancing test to excessive force claims: (1) the extent of the inmate's injuries; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and amount of force; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by prison officials; and (5) any efforts that officials utilized to “‘temper the severity of a forceful response.'” Id. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 36-38 (2010); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).
The inmate must demonstrate that officials acted maliciously and sadistically to prevail. “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. As the Ninth Circuit has explained,
[t]he “malicious and sadistic” standard arose out of “the need to maintain or restore discipline” inside the prison. When a prison disturbance occurs, prison officials must make “decisions ‘in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.'” In these situations, prison officials are “accorded wide-ranging deference” and therefore, prisoners alleging excessive force must show that the force was applied “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 and Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). Thus, the Court must be careful when reviewing the factors to verify indicia of “such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as [is] tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Moreover, there is no need for a showing of serious injury as a result of the force, but the lack of such injury is relevant to the inquiry. See id. at 7-9; Martinez, 323 F.3d at 1184; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).
Excessive force cases “nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom,” and for this reason, the Ninth Circuit has “held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415-16 (9th Cir. 2003); Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing cases).
In the motion for summary judgment, Defendants contend reasonable force was used under the circumstances. (ECF No. 28.) Saucedo trapped Sanchez's arm with the food slot in response to Sanchez sticking his arm out, propelling a substance, spitting, and ultimately punching Saucedo. These facts were corroborated by several accounts of the same incident. Thus, Defendants contend that briefly trapping Sanchez's arm with the food slot cannot be considered unreasonable under the circumstances. (Id.)
As discussed above, the undisputed facts, uncontradicted by Sanchez, are as follows. On October 16, 2021, Defendant Saucedo was working in Unit 2 of Ely State Prison. (ECF Nos. 28-4, 28-1.) Saucedo was conducting the dinner feeding. (Id.) As he approached cell 2B-3, he opened the food slot to give Sanchez his dinner. (Id.) Sanchez stuck his arm through the slot, thus, “capturing” the slot. Saucedo tried to reason with Sanchez to determine why he had captured the slot. (Id.) Sanchez then threw an unknown liquid on Saucedo, spit at him, and punched Saucedo in the stomach. (Id.) Saucedo pushed on the slot to trap Sanchez's arm and prevent further attacks. (Id.) Saucedo also pulled out his collapsible baton to protect himself, but did not strike Sanchez with the baton. (Id.) Saucedo never told Sanchez that he would be killed or that Warden Reubart had given him carte blanche to hurt Sanchez. (Id.)
Other officers arrived to assist. (ECF No. 28-6.) One responding officer, Madeline Pickens, filed a declaration in support of Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The declaration stated that she witnessed Sanchez spit at Saucedo, striking him in his upper extremity and then saw Sanchez punch Saucedo in the stomach. (Id.) She witnessed Saucedo pull out his collapsible baton and approach Sanchez, but Saucedo did not strike Sanchez with the baton, and could not strike Sanchez in the face, as his face was on the other side of a metal door. (Id.)
Once Sanchez backed away, medical personnel arrived at the scene and Sanchez was evaluated. (ECF No. 30 (sealed).) He had some slight swelling on his arm, but stated “he was fine.” (Id.) There were no marks or swelling on his head or face. (Id.) He was given some IBUs for the swelling and pain. (Id.) Based on this incident, Sanchez was charged with battery. (ECF No. 28-3.) After a disciplinary hearing, he was found guilty of battery and given disciplinary segregation (Id.)
Here, based on the undisputed evidence, the majority of the Hudson factors objectively weigh against finding an Eighth Amendment violation. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. First, using force generally was necessary. Sanchez explicitly threatened Saucedo when he stuck his hand out of his food slot, propelled a substance, spit, and ultimately punched Saucedo.
Second, the amount of force used was proportional to the need. Saucedo used minimal force to hold Sanchez's arm down to prevent him from throwing further punches. There is no evidence that Saucedo used other, greater force to accomplish this. Thus, the force used was objectively minimal and proportional to the need to gain control of Sanchez's arm. Third, the injuries reported were minimal, if not de minimis. Sanchez suffered slight swelling on his arm but had no injuries to his head or face (despite what Sanchez alleged) and reported to medical that “he was fine.” Thus, both the force used, and Sanchez's injuries were insignificant here.
Next, the threat Saucedo reasonably perceived was significant. As discussed above, not only does Sanchez have a lengthy disciplinary history for “propelling” feces and urine and a lengthy disciplinary history for battery, Sanchez actually propelled a substance at Saucedo and battered him during this incident. Thus, when Sanchez struck Saucedo, a reasonable officer would have felt threatened. Finally, Saucedo made efforts to temper the severity of his use of force. However, officers are sometimes required to use force if an inmate refuses a valid order. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. Saucedo had already instructed Sanchez to keep himself clear of the food slot, and only resorted to trapping Sanchez's arm with the food slot after Sanchez had struck him.
Based on the evidence before the Court, all five of the relevant Hudson factors weigh in favor of finding that Saucedo did not use excessive force. There is no dispute as to the minimal amount of force used, the circumstances under which it was applied, and the minimal injuries to Sanchez as a result of the minimal force. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the merits of the excessive force claim. Sanchez does not, and cannot, show that Saucedo applied force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. To the contrary, Saucedo applied a minimal amount of force necessary in a good-faith effort to maintain order, and it was not done maliciously or sadistically to cause harm. Accordingly, the Court recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to the excessive force claim.
B. Unsafe Prison Conditions
The “treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). To establish violations of these duties, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to serious threats to the inmate's safety. Id. at 834. To demonstrate deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. Prison officials may not escape liability because they cannot, or did not, identify the specific source of the risk; the serious threat can be one to which all prisoners are exposed. Id. at 843. Further, a plaintiff “must also demonstrate that the defendants' actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries.” Lemire v. California, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
Sanchez's unsafe prison conditions claim is premised on allegations that Reubart created an excessive risk to Sanchez's safety by giving correctional officers, such as Saucedo, permission to assault Sanchez without any repercussions. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) As discussed above, Defendant Reubart submitted a declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment, which states that he never told Saucedo, or any other person, that they could injury or assault Sanchez, or any other inmate, without repercussions. (ECF No. 28-5.) Reubart did not authorize any person to “kill, injure or deny food to [Sanchez].” (Id.) Reubart has never made any such statement to Sanchez or threatened him in any way. (Id.) Defendant Saucedo also submitted a declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment, which states that he never told Sanchez that Reubart gave him permission to hurt Sanchez. (ECF No. 28-4.)
Based on the record before the Court, there is no evidence that Reubart created an excessive risk to Sanchez's safety. Aside from the bare assertions in Sanchez's complaint, there is no evidence to support his allegations. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (the opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations or mere assertions). Sanchez's conclusory statements and pleading allegations, which are uncorroborated by the evidence before the Court, are insufficient to establish the presence of a genuine dispute. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Accordingly, the Court recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted as to the unsafe prison conditions claim.
Because the Court recommends that the motion for summary judgment be granted in its entirety based on a finding that no constitutional violations occurred, it need not address the argument regarding qualified immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
For good cause appearing and for the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 28), be grant.
The parties are advised:
1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule IB 3-2 of the Local Rules of Practice, the parties may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days of receipt. These objections should be entitled “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation” and should be accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the District Court.
2. This Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.
V. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (ECF No. 28), be Granted.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of Court Enter judgment accordingly and close this case.