Opinion
No. 53252-9-I
Filed: November 22, 2004 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County. Docket No: 02-2-07119-6. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 09/22/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Kenneth L Cowsert.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Fredric Sanai, Co Courthouse, 535 NE 5th St Rm 106, Mcminnville, OR 97128-4523.
William Richard II Sullivan, Marsh Mundorf Pratt ET AL, 16504 9th Ave SE Ste 203, Mill Creek, WA 98012-6388.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Cory David Rein, Attorney at Law, 3232 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA 98201-4317.
In an action for damages where the amount pleaded is $10,000 or less, the `prevailing party' shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.250. In this action for replevin and conversion, the plaintiff submitted a pleading stating that the approximate value of the property in question was $9,500. But she did not limit her claim for relief to the fair market value of the property; she also sought damages for loss of use. And the plaintiff consistently maintained that RCW 4.84.250 was inapplicable. Under these circumstances, the defendant was not on notice that this was a claim for less than $10,000, and was not entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party under RCW 4.84.250. We affirm the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees. The remaining issues raised in this appeal are moot.
FACTS
Following the acrimonious breakup of their marriage, Viveca and Sassan Sanai and their children have been involved in numerous disputes, many of which have led to legal battles. This case involves Viveca and her adult daughter, Astrid Sanai. Astrid left numerous personal items in her mother's home. When the relationship between the two broke down, Astrid sued her mother. Her complaint sought replevin of her personal property and/or money damages for conversion thereof.
Astrid filed her complaint on May 21, 2002. On the same day, she filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiff Should Not Be Put in Immediate Possession of Personal Property and a supporting declaration pursuant to RCW 7.64.020. In the declaration, Astrid stated that the `approximate value (total) of the property is $9,500.'
On June 9, 2002, Viveca packed up much of Astrid's property and left it on the curb, and Astrid had movers pick up the property and move it to a storage facility. On October 5, 2002, Viveca allowed Astrid to come into her home and search for her property, and Astrid recovered all her property left in the home that she found. Astrid maintained that she was still missing items and claimed that her mother had knowingly disposed of or destroyed these remaining items.
Prior to trial, Astrid apparently offered to dismiss the claims against her mother. In response, Viveca's attorney (who is also her son and Astrid's brother) stated that Viveca would `settle' the case if Astrid were to pay Viveca's attorney fees, which allegedly exceeded $20,000. Astrid did not move to dismiss her suit.
Viveca then moved for summary judgment. In response, Astrid conceded that `the replevin action is probably moot' because Viveca denied having possession of the remaining property Astrid claimed was missing. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the matter proceeded to trial in May 2003.
During trial, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, Viveca moved to dismiss the replevin claim. Astrid consented to the dismissal.
The trial continued on the conversion action. On cross-examination, Viveca testified that she had a few Christmas tree ornaments belonging to Astrid. Viveca claimed that she had found the ornaments shortly before Christmas, had told Astrid that she found them, and had asked Astrid to come and get the ornaments. The ornaments were entered as an exhibit.
Following the trial, the trial court entered a written decision. The court found that Astrid had failed to meet her burden of proof on the conversion claim and that said claim should be dismissed.
In addition to preparing proposed findings, conclusions, and a proposed judgment, Viveca also filed a motion seeking fees pursuant to RCW 4.84.250. Astrid opposed the motion for fees and filed a motion to reinstate her replevin claim. This motion centered on the Christmas tree ornaments produced at trial.
The trial court allowed Astrid to reinstate her replevin claim and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. As to the conversion claim, the court concluded that Astrid had failed to meet her burden of proof. But the court concluded that Astrid had met her burden of proof as to the replevin claim and that Viveca had wrongfully detained property belonging to Astrid (the Christmas tree ornaments) from December 2002 until trial. The court's judgment indicated that Astrid's `claim for replevin against Defendant Viveca Sanai is granted, and Plaintiff is the prevailing party on the replevin claim.' The court declined to award fees or costs to either party.
Viveca's motion for reconsideration was denied. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
The gravamen of this appeal is Viveca's contention that she was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to RCW 4.84.250 and that the trial court erred in denying her request for fees. RCW 4.84.250 provides: Notwithstanding any other provisions of chapter 4.84 RCW and RCW 12.20.060, in any action for damages where the amount pleaded by the prevailing party as hereinafter defined, exclusive of costs, is seven thousand five hundred dollars or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party as a part of the costs of the action a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorneys' fees. After July 1, 1985, the maximum amount of the pleading under this section shall be ten thousand dollars.
The purpose of this statute is to encourage out-of-court settlements and penalize parties who unjustifiably bring or resist small claims. Beckmann v. Spokane Transit Auth., 107 Wn.2d 785, 788, 733 P. 2d 960 (1987). Astrid maintains that RCW 4.84.250 does not apply in this case because her claim was not limited to $10,000 or less. Astrid's complaint did not specify a dollar figure. But the failure to plead an exact amount of damages in a complaint will not bar an award of attorney fees where the opposing party has actual or constructive knowledge that the amount of the claim was $10,000 or less. Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 789-90; Schmerer v. Darcy, 80 Wn. App. 499, 509-10, 910 P.2d 498 (1996).
As Viveca points out, Astrid's Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiff Should Not Be Put in Immediate Possession of Personal Property and Supporting Declaration, filed concurrently with her complaint, stated that the `approximate value (total) of the property is $9,500.' Placing an approximate value on the property implies that the actual value may be somewhat higher or lower. Further, Astrid did not limit her relief sought to the return of the property or the value thereof. She also sought damages for loss of use. And she did not place a dollar figure on the loss of use of her property. The value of the lost use of the property could easily exceed $500. Moreover, Astrid consistently maintained that RCW 4.84.250 was inapplicable in this case. Under these circumstances, we do not agree that Astrid put Viveca on notice that her claim was limited to $10,000 or less. RCW 4.84.250 is therefore inapplicable, and Viveca is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
At trial, Astrid testified that the value of her property was $10,445. We agree with Viveca that Astrid's valuation during trial is irrelevant to a determination of whether RCW 4.84.250 applies. The purpose of RCW 4.84.250 is to prevent trials and encourage settlements. For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that "anything occurring during trial has no effect on the applicability of [RCW 4.84.250]." Beckmann, 107 Wn.2d at 791 (party's request during closing argument for damages exceeding statutory maximum did not affect applicability of RCW 4.84.250).
In light of our resolution of this matter, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Viveca's motion for summary judgment or in allowing Astrid to reinstate her previously dismissed replevin claim. Astrid was not granted any affirmative relief on the replevin claim (aside from recovering her Christmas tree ornaments), and Viveca has not claimed any ownership interest in the ornaments. Any consideration of Viveca's remaining contentions would therefore be purely academic. The issues are moot, and we need not consider them.
Affirmed.
COLEMAN, SCHINDLER and ELLINGTON, JJ.