Opinion
D059756 Super. Ct. No. J518063
01-11-2012
In re L.E., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.A., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed.
R.A. appeals orders declaring her son L.E. a dependent child of the juvenile court and removing him from her custody. She contends substantial evidence did not support the court's orders; and, even assuming it was proper to find L.E. to be a dependent of the court, the court erred by removing him from her custody and by ordering their visitation be supervised. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2011, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) petitioned on behalf of 13-year-old L.E. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c), alleging R.A. had slapped and punched him, causing him to have scratches and a black eye; he had been expelled from school and had an emotional disability disorder that included emotional disturbance; and R.A. was unable to provide him with appropriate care.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On March 6, at R.A.'s request, police had taken L.E. to Polinsky Children's Center (Polinsky). R.A. said L.E. had kicked her, snapped her with a towel, pulled her hair and thrown her to the ground. R.A. told the Agency social worker she believed she needed help with him. L.E. said R.A. had stabbed him with her keys, hit him with a shoe and called him "fat boy." He said he was not in school because he had been expelled for threatening a teacher's aide.
On March 8, L.E. ran away from Polinsky and called R.A. She picked him up and immediately called the Agency. On March 10, the court ordered him detained with R.A. on the condition she enroll him in school and not use corporal punishment. That same day, L.E. and a friend were arrested for being on school grounds in possession of two BB guns. L.E. was detained in juvenile hall and then moved to the Mi Casa group home, where he was rude and disruptive. He said he wanted to return to R.A.'s care. The Agency recommended that because R.A. could not control L.E., he needed to be in an intensive group home environment with strict rules and consequences.
The social worker reported L.E. said he wanted to go home and would run away if he were placed in a group home. The social worker, L.E.'s probation officer, and his juvenile delinquency attorney recommended the court proceed with a juvenile delinquency case and the family receive voluntary services, but the social worker provided a juvenile dependency case plan in the event the court determined to proceed with juvenile dependency proceedings. The case plan required L.E. to have counseling and anger management treatment in a group home and participate in educational services through his Individual Education Plan. The plan required R.A. to attend parenting education and therapy.
At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings on May 12 and May 16, the social worker stated the Agency was requesting the court make true findings on the petition. The social worker reported L.E.'s behavior had improved after he was placed at the New Alternatives detention center. R.A. testified the reports of the March 6 incidents were exaggerated, and she had cooperated in the past with L.E.'s school to provide necessary services to help him.
The court found the allegations of the petition as amended to be true, declared L.E. a dependent child of the juvenile court, removed his custody from R.A., and ordered the Agency to provide services, place L.E. in a licensed group home and provide L.E. and R.A. with unsupervised visitation on group home grounds and supervised visitation elsewhere. The court gave the Agency discretion, with concurrence of minor's counsel, to return L.E. to R.A.'s custody with appropriate services.
The section 300, subdivision (c), allegation was amended to state L.E. had been suspended rather than expelled from school, and to include that he was arrested for trespassing on school grounds and for possessing two BB guns.
DISCUSSION
I
R.A. contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. She argues at the time of the dispositional hearing there was no evidence L.E. was suffering or at substantial risk of suffering serious harm or abuse, and she had provided appropriate care and had worked with L.E.'s school to provide services for him. She further contends, assuming the court properly declared him a dependent child, it nevertheless erred by removing him from her custody.
A reviewing court must uphold a juvenile court's findings and orders if they are supported by substantial evidence. (In re Amos L. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1036- 1037.) " ' "The rule is clear that the power of the appellate courts begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact." [Citation.]' " (In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1227.) "[W]e must indulge in all reasonable inferences to support the findings of the juvenile court [citation], and we must also '. . . view the record in the light most favorable to the orders of the juvenile court.' " (In re Luwanna S. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 112, 114.) The appellant bears the burden to show the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
The purpose of dependency law is to:
"provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused . . . [or] neglected . . . and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm." (§ 300.2.)
A dependency petition is brought to benefit the child, not to punish the parents. (In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 593, 599.)
Section 300, subdivision (a), provides a child is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the child has suffered or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by the parent. Section 300, subdivision (c), provides the child is subject to the court's jurisdiction if the child is suffering or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others.
Section 360, subdivision (d), states if the court finds the child is a person described by section 300 it may order and adjudge the child to be a dependent child of the court. Section 361, subdivision (c), provides a dependent child may not be taken from a parent's physical custody unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child would be at substantial risk if returned home and there are no reasonable means to protect the child without removal from parental custody.
Substantial evidence supports the true finding under section 300, subdivision (a), that L.E. had suffered physical injuries when on March 6, 2011, R.A. subjected him to excessive discipline and physical abuse by hitting him with a shoe, and slapping and punching him, causing him to have a black eye and scratches on his face and neck.
Substantial evidence also supports the true finding under section 300, subdivision (c), that L.E. had an emotional disability disorder including emotional disturbance and R.A. had been unable to provide necessary mental health treatment and appropriate care. L.E. had had numerous incidents of untoward aggression towards others and had been suspended from school. R.A. had been keeping him at home because she disagreed with the school's recommendation of having him attend a special school. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c).
Substantial evidence also supports the court's orders declaring L.E. a dependent of the court and removing him from R.A.'s custody. R.A. and L.E. engaged in mutual combat, which caused him injuries, and she had been unable to provide mental health treatment and appropriate care for his emotional disturbance. With placement in a group home, mental health treatment and enrollment in a school setting suitable for his needs, L.E.'s mental health issues could improve. Services for R.A. also could make it possible for them to develop a healthier, more nurturing relationship.
R.A.'s suggestion the court should have ordered informal services and supervision by the Agency is not persuasive. R.A. tended to deny and minimize L.E.'s problems. After he was suspended from school because of his aggressive and disruptive behavior, she kept him at home and out of school instead of enrolling him in the alternative school the school district authorities had recommended. After he ran away from Polinsky and returned to her home, she left him unsupervised, and he and another youth walked to his former school, where he was arrested for trespassing on school property and being in the possession of BB guns. By declaring him a dependent child of the court and removing him from parental custody, the court made it possible for L.E. to be placed in an intensive group setting where he could receive needed treatment. Substantial evidence supports the court's dispositional findings by clear and convincing evidence.
We note that at the six-month review hearing on November 9, 2011, the court found returning L.E. to R.A.'s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to him. The court continued his custody with the Agency and placement in a licensed group home. At a contested modification hearing on November 7, the court had given the social worker discretion to begin a 60-day trial visit for L.E. and R.A. to begin within two weeks, with the conditions that L.E. and R.A. remain engaged in services, L.E. stay enrolled in school full time, the school notify the social worker if L.E. runs away, misses school or is suspended because of his behavior or if there is a fight, and the social worker make at least three unannounced visits.
II
R.A. asserts the court erred by ordering her visitation with L.E. be supervised when they are outside of the grounds of his group home.
Orders regarding visitation may be reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Emmanuel R. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465.) " 'The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
The court did not abuse its discretion by ordering visitation outside of the grounds of L.E.'s group home be supervised. L.E. had a history of aggressively acting out and R.A. tended to minimize or deny his behavior. The court reasonably ordered that their visitation outside of the group home setting be supervised.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
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MCDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
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MCCONNELL, P. J.
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NARES, J.