Opinion
D076515
02-20-2020
In re P.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.J., Defendant and Appellant.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. EJ4373) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed. William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A.J. (Mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her request pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to set aside the court's previous jurisdiction findings and declining to require that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) pay for her to travel from another state for visitation.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Mother lives in Indiana but gave birth to P.B. while visiting San Diego. P.B.'s cord blood tested positive for methamphetamines and he was removed from Mother's care. Mother did not participate in the dependency proceedings at the outset of the case. She made an initial appearance approximately three months after the jurisdiction and disposition hearing and filed her section 388 petition soon thereafter. In the petition, Mother asserted that she had not received adequate notice of the proceedings or a meaningful opportunity to participate and asked the court to set aside its previous findings regarding jurisdiction. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition and denied the request.
The juvenile court then ordered reunification services for Mother. Mother requested that the court order that the Agency provide funding for her or P.B. to travel between Indiana and San Diego for visitation. The juvenile court denied that request, as well.
We affirm the juvenile court's orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother lives in Indiana. She met P.B.'s father (Father) while he was visiting family in Indiana. Father lived in San Diego but spent time with Mother in Indiana "on and off" over the course of the next year.
Father is not a party to this appeal. His involvement is discussed only to the extent it is relevant to Mother's appeal.
Mother accompanied Father to San Diego, where Father intended to address an outstanding warrant. While in San Diego, in March 2019, Mother went into labor unexpectedly and gave birth to P.B. P.B.'s cord blood tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine and Mother tested positive for amphetamines and THC. She admitted having used methamphetamine approximately four days earlier. She said she had a prescription for Adderall, an amphetamine, and that she had used methamphetamine when she ran out of the Adderall.
The hospital made a referral to the Agency and two Agency social workers interviewed Mother in the hospital a couple of days later. The social workers began by explaining why the Agency was involved. Mother showed them a prescription bottle of Adderall with her name on it but admitted that she had not told the prescribing doctor that she was pregnant, and also admitted to using methamphetamine. She said she began using methamphetamine a year earlier while going through a divorce and that she had continued to use it to cope with stress. She had participated in a treatment program four years prior and said that she would be willing to participate in outpatient treatment but did not feel that she needed inpatient treatment.
Mother told the Agency that she had not received any formal prenatal care, and that she thought the baby was not due until May. She said that she and Father were staying at a Super 8 Hotel in El Cajon (the El Cajon hotel). She indicated that she had two older children from her previous marriage who were residing with their father in Indiana, and that she and the older children's father had a parenting agreement whereby the children lived with the father for a couple of months and then with her for a couple of months.
Father confirmed that Mother had accompanied him to San Diego to help him with an outstanding warrant. He said that he was currently on parole for an arrest in 2008 but denied any other criminal history. He denied using any kind of controlled substances and denied having any prior knowledge of Mother's use of methamphetamine, but did not seem concerned that P.B. had tested positive for methamphetamines. The social worker asked Father to drug test and he agreed to do so but then failed to arrive at the testing facility on time. He did submit a drug test the following day.
The Agency spoke with Father's parole officer who said that Father was in violation of his parole for evading supervision, and that there were warrants for his arrest in both San Diego and Indiana. The parole officer told the social worker that Father had violated parole in February 2017 by using cocaine and in July 2017 by using methamphetamine.
The Agency also spoke with the paternal grandmother. She said that she had lived in San Diego for the past 35 years but that she had recently moved to Virginia. However, she had friends and family in San Diego and could stay in town if doing so would allow her to take care of P.B.
On March 21, 2019, Mother filled out a medical consent form for P.B. She listed an address in Fishers, Indiana (the Fishers address) as her address on the form.
The Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on P.B.'s behalf the following day. The Agency listed the address of the El Cajon hotel on the petition as the address for both Mother and Father, and sent copies of the petition to them at that address. The Agency also contacted Mother and Father via telephone that same day and informed them of the date and time of the detention hearing. An Agency social worker spoke with Father on the phone just before the hearing on March 25, 2019. Father said that he and Mother were on their way to court. The social worker reminded Father what floor the juvenile court was on. Neither parent appeared at the hearing.
After noting that Father was currently an alleged Father and that Mother had only recently come to California from Indiana, the juvenile court took temporary emergency jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). (See Fam. Code, § 3424.) The court found that notice had been given as required by law and that the Agency had made a prima facie showing on the petition. The court ordered that P.B. be detained and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing for April 16, 2019. The court directed the clerk to serve the parents with a copy of the petition. The clerk sent copies to both parents via certified mail at the El Cajon hotel address.
The Agency made several attempts to contact both Mother and Father over the next two weeks. Mother did not answer or return the Agency's calls. Father did not answer the first several calls, but the Agency social worker was able to speak with him on April 2, 2019. He indicated that he had seen Mother the day before but said that he did not know her current whereabouts. He agreed to meet with the social worker the following day.
The social worker reviewed the petition allegations with Father at the in-person meeting and he again stated that he was not aware of Mother using any drugs. He said that he did not know where Mother was but added that he did not believe that she had returned to Indiana. He said that he had told Mother that she could not stay with him because, "I didn't know if you guys were going to show up," but also said that part of the reason for their trip had been to see whether Mother could live in San Diego. The social worker asked why they had not attended the detention hearing and Father responded, "It was a miscommunication, I didn't know when it was supposed to be."
The Agency discovered that Father's recent drug test was positive for methamphetamine and spoke with Father about it on April 8. He said that he hadn't taken any drugs and suggested that Mother had put something in his drink. The social worker asked when he had last seen Mother and he said he had seen her at the mall the day before. Father stated, "I call her sometimes and she answers but sometimes she doesn't." The social worker ended the call by informing Father that there was a Child and Family Team meeting scheduled for April 10, 2019. Father indicated that he would attend the meeting, but he failed to do so.
On April 9, 2019, the Agency social worker left Mother a voice message on her cell phone notifying her of the April 16 jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The social worker provided the address of the courthouse and informed Mother that she was entitled to a court appointed attorney.
On April 10, 2019, an Agency social worker called several additional phone numbers previously associated with Mother and, on April 12, the social worker sent letters to several addresses associated with Mother via certified mail, including both the El Cajon hotel address and the Fishers address. The social worker sent form number 04-212 Notification to Parents Letter, which includes a copy of the petition, information about the next hearing, and a notice that the parents have a right to have an appointed lawyer.
The Agency also identified and sent letters to approximately 30 of Mother's and Father's relatives, notifying them of the proceedings and inquiring as to whether they were interested in seeking placement of P.B. The paternal grandmother continued to express interest in caring for P.B. but indicated that she had moved back to Virginia.
An Agency social worker was able to speak with Mother via telephone on April 12, 2019. The social worker told Mother that the Agency had been trying to reach her. Mother responded, "I obviously know that." Mother told the social worker that Mother was still in San Diego but that she had to go back to Indiana and was considering placing P.B. for adoption. She explained that she was not expecting P.B. to be born in San Diego, that her support network was in Indiana, and that it would be "hard" to travel to San Diego on a regular basis to see P.B. The social worker informed Mother that the next court hearing was on April 16 and requested that Mother come into the office for an in-person meeting. Mother agreed to meet the social worker at the Agency's offices on April 15 but did not show up for the meeting.
Neither parent appeared at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The juvenile court indicated that it had reached out to the court in Indiana regarding jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and that the Indiana court had declined to take jurisdiction. The juvenile court therefore took general jurisdiction over the case and sustained the petition. The court found that the Agency had used due diligence to locate Mother but that Mother's whereabouts were unknown, and ordered that reunification services be bypassed for Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1).
On May 28, 2019, P.B.'s caregiver reported that Mother had recently called for the first time and that Mother had called and texted several times thereafter. On June 14, Mother left a voicemail for the Agency social worker; the social worker was able to speak with Mother the following week. Mother told the social worker that she had moved back to Indiana but said that she wanted legal counsel and wanted to participate in reunification services. She also indicated that she would agree to placement of P.B. with the paternal grandmother in Virginia.
Around the same time, Father sent the Agency a letter indicating that he was in jail in Ohio for a probation violation but that he would be returning to San Diego very soon. The Agency social worker attempted to call Mother again on July 11, 2019. Father answered Mother's phone. He indicated that he had been released from custody but remained on probation and was trying to get both the Ohio probation and the San Diego probation cases transferred to Indiana. He said that he was not permitted to leave the state of Indiana, but also wanted counsel and wanted to participate in reunification services and future court hearings.
Mother and Father made their first appearances at a special hearing on July 25, 2019. The juvenile court appointed counsel for each of them. On August 16, Mother filed a request to change court orders pursuant to section 388. She asserted that the juvenile court had found that notice had been given as required by law at the April 16 jurisdiction hearing, but that the notice was insufficient because it was not sent to the Fishers address, which she indicated was her correct mailing address. Mother asked the court to set aside the jurisdictional findings and to afford her a meaningful opportunity to participate in the jurisdictional hearing.
The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The court admitted the Agency's reports in evidence, together with a declaration of due diligence and service logs filled out by the Agency social workers. Mother did not testify or call any witness, and none of the parties submitted any additional evidence. After hearing argument from the parties, the court denied Mother's request. The court acknowledged that it had not complied with the letter of law insofar as it had not sent the petition to Mother's last known address, presumably the Fishers address, but concluded that Mother was not prejudiced because she had actual notice of the proceedings.
The court proceeded to order reunification services for Mother, as well as liberal supervised visitation for both parents. Mother's counsel pointed out that Mother was living in Indiana and that P.B. remained in San Diego, and asserted that the Agency should be responsible for ensuring in-person visitation. The Agency objected to financing Mother's visits and argued that it was Mother's choice to move back to Indiana. Mother's counsel responded that Mother lived in Indiana and had custody of two other children there. The court stated that it did not think that the Agency should be obligated to finance the visitation and denied Mother's request.
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Mother's Section 388 Petition
A. Relevant Legal Principles
A parent whose child is involved in a juvenile dependency matter is entitled to notice that is reasonably calculated to apprise the parent of the proceedings and to allow the parent a meaningful opportunity to participate. (In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583, 590 (D.R.); In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188 (Justice P.).) The absence of adequate notice is a due process violation that renders the juvenile court's jurisdiction defective. (Justice P., supra, at p. 188; Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 483 (Ansley).)
Whenever the Agency files a juvenile dependency petition, section 290.1 requires that the social worker provide a copy of the petition and notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing to a number of individuals, including any mother "whose whereabouts are known or become known prior to the initial petition hearing." (§ 290.1, subds. (a)(1), (d)(1)-(3).) Section 290.2 requires the clerk of the court to provide similar notice to any mother "whose address is known or becomes known prior to the initial petition hearing." (§ 290.2, subds. (a)(1), (d)(1)-(3).) After the initial hearing on the petition, section 291 requires the clerk of the court to serve certain interested parties, including the mother, with notice that includes, among other items: the date, time and place of the next hearing; the nature of the hearing; a copy of the petition; and advisements that the court may proceed without them if they fail to appear and that they are entitled to counsel, even if they cannot afford it. (§ 291, subd. (d)(1)-(5).)
If a parent's whereabouts are unknown, the Agency must act with due diligence to locate the parent. (Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 188.) Due diligence requires a thorough, systematic investigation and an inquiry conducted in good faith. (Ibid.) There is no due process violation as long as the Agency exercises good faith and due diligence to provide notice to the parent. (Ibid.)
A parent may assert that an order or judgment is void based on inadequate notice at any point in the proceeding by filing a request to change, modify, or vacate a previous order pursuant to section 388. (Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 487-488; D.R., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 590 ["A section 388 petition is the correct method for raising a 'due process challenge based on lack of notice' "].) A parent who files such a petition bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence indicating inadequate notice, and that the proposed change is in the child's best interests. (See § 388; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47 [petitioner bears the burden of showing changed circumstances or new evidence and that the proposed change is in the child's best interests]; Ansley, supra, at pp. 486-487 [characterizing allegations of inadequate notice as new evidence in accordance with section 388].)
The juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case in deciding whether to grant or deny a section 388 petition. (Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) We review the juvenile court's decision for an abuse of discretion. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) However, we review any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence, and review the legal question of whether a party received adequate notice de novo. (See, In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102 [" 'When applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, "the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious." ' "]; In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183 [adequacy of notice is a legal question reviewed de novo].)
B. Analysis
Mother argues that her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court proceeded with the April 16, 2019 jurisdiction and disposition hearing without providing her adequate notice, and that the juvenile court erred by denying her request to set aside the jurisdictional findings. We disagree. The record before the juvenile court at the section 388 hearing was sufficient to establish that the Agency exercised due diligence to locate Mother and that Mother had actual notice of the hearing.
Agency social workers visited Mother in the hospital shortly after P.B. was born and explained why the Agency was involved. At that time, Mother told the social workers that she was from Indiana, and that she and Father were currently staying at the El Cajon hotel. When the Agency filed the juvenile dependency petition on P.B.'s behalf just a few days later, it included the address of the El Cajon hotel—the only local San Diego address that it had for either parent. The Agency also provided both Mother and Father with notice of the date and time of the detention hearing over the phone that same day. (See § 290.1, subd. (e) [notice of the petition and initial hearing may be oral].)
Mother argues that the detention report simply notes that notice was given and, therefore, the juvenile court was not aware of the contents of the notice at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, but the court's knowledge at that time is irrelevant; the relevant inquiry is whether Mother and Father actually received adequate notice.
An Agency social worker also called Father on the day of the detention hearing. Father told the social worker that he and Mother were on their way to court, indicating that they both knew about the hearing. However, neither parent appeared at the hearing. Father later told the social worker that he and Mother did not appear because they did not know when the hearing was. However, that statement was not credible because it was inconsistent with Father's previous statements indicating that he and Mother were on their way to court shortly before the hearing. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 [trial court has discretion to weigh credibility].)
In Mother's and Father's absence, the court detained P.B. and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing for April 16. The court ordered the clerk to serve the parents with a copy of the petition. The clerk sent copies to both parents via certified mail at the El Cajon hotel address listed on the petition and in the Agency's report. (See §§ 290.2; 291.) There is no evidence that Mother received that notice; her precise whereabouts at the time were unknown. However, the El Cajon hotel address was the last known address for Mother in San Diego, and, as far as the Agency knew, she was still in San Diego. (See §§ 290.2, subd. (a)(1) [notice required for any mother "whose address is known"]; 291.)
The Agency subsequently exercised due diligence to locate Mother and to provide her with notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. (See In re J.H., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 182.) The Agency called Mother numerous times at a phone number that others verified she was still using, asked Father about her whereabouts, ran database searches, made calls to several additional telephone numbers that were identified in those searches as associated with Mother, and sent letters to a number of additional addresses, including the Fishers address.
As a result of those efforts, the Agency was ultimately able to provide Mother with actual notice of the April 16 hearing. First, the social worker left Mother a voicemail on April 9 in which she notified Mother about the jurisdiction hearing on April 16. Mother argues there is no proof that she received this message but there is ample evidence that Mother both made and received calls using the same number that the Agency was using at around the same time. Indeed, when the social worker told Mother, on April 12, that the Agency had been trying to reach her, she responded, "I obviously know that."
More significantly, the parties also stipulated that, if called, an Agency social worker would testify that she spoke with Mother via telephone on April 12, 2019, and told her directly that the next court hearing was on April 16. Mother had the opportunity, and the burden, to present evidence at the section 388 hearing disputing the existence or contents of these calls, but she did not. (See § 388; In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47; Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487.)
Further, the Agency also provided Mother with written notice, sent to the Fishers address. Specifically, on April 12, 2019, the Agency sent a form letter, which included a copy of the petition and all of the required information, to Mother at the Fishers address. (See In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 386-387 [letters correctly addressed and properly mailed presumed received].) Mother contends that there is no record of the contents of the letter, but the August 8, 2019 addendum report that was admitted in evidence at the section 388 hearing contains a blank copy of the form letter that the Agency maintains it sent. Again, Mother had the opportunity, and burden, to cross-examine the social worker or to present additional evidence challenging these various forms of notice at the hearing on her section 388 petition, but she failed to do so. (See § 388; In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47; Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487.)
Mother argues that the Agency did not exercise due diligence because it continued to use the El Cajon hotel address to correspond with Mother and did not inform the court of the Fishers address, despite Mother having listed the Fishers address on the consent form in March. However, as noted, the Agency had no reason to believe that Mother was residing at the Fishers address at any point prior to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, or that she would receive notices sent to the Fishers address. To the contrary, in fact, both Mother and Father continually indicated that Mother was still in San Diego but refused to disclose her exact whereabouts. As a result, the Agency reported, and the juvenile court found, that Mother's whereabouts were unknown. In any event, the Agency did send notice to Mother at the Fishers address prior to the April 16 hearing.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the findings that the Agency exercised due diligence to locate Mother and that the Agency provided actual notice to Mother of the April 16 jurisdiction and disposition hearing. We therefore conclude that Mother's due process notification rights were not violated. (See Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 188 ["there is no due process violation when there has been a good faith attempt to provide notice to a parent who is transient and whose whereabouts are unknown for the majority of the proceedings"]; § 290.2 [requiring written notice to "persons whose address is known"]; cf. In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689 [reversal appropriate where agency did not make any efforts to locate or notify mother]; In re Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598-599 [reversal required where agency ignored information regarding parents' current location].)
Further, we agree with the juvenile court that Mother was not prejudiced as a result of any failure by the Agency or the court to comply precisely with the statutory notice requirements. (See In re J.P. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 789, 797-801 [applying a harmless error standard to a section 388 request to set aside prior orders in a dependency proceeding].) Mother argues that the Agency's and court's failure to provide adequate notice was prejudicial because it precluded her from participating in the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. However, Mother fails to acknowledge that the Agency notified her of the hearing via telephone and sent written notice to the Fishers address—the same address at which she maintains the court did not send notice. She offers no explanation as to why she did not appear at the hearing despite that notice. Mother focuses on the arguments that she could have made if she had attended the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, but there is no reason to believe that she did not know about the hearing or that she would have appeared if the Agency or court had simply sent additional notices to the Fishers address.
Even if we were to conclude that Mother did not receive adequate notice, which we do not, she failed to establish that a change in orders would be in P.B.'s best interests. (See § 388; In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p, 47; Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 486-487.) In her section 388 petition, Mother argued that the jurisdictional findings were void for lack of due process notice and extrinsic fraud, in accordance with Ansley, but she did not provide any argument regarding P.B.'s best interests.
At the hearing on her petition, Mother asserted that setting aside the jurisdiction and disposition orders would be in P.B.'s best interests because it would afford Mother a full and fair opportunity to reunify and would also afford P.B. the opportunity to create a relationship with Mother's other children, his siblings. However, it is unlikely that the outcome would have been any different if the juvenile court had set aside the prior orders. The court almost surely would have found jurisdiction again, given that P.B. was born with methamphetamine in his system and Mother admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant. Further, although the court originally bypassed reunification services for Mother, the court later reversed its previous decision and ordered the Agency to provide her with services. Revisiting the juvenile court's prior jurisdiction and disposition orders would have only delayed the proceedings further, and would not provide P.B. with any further opportunity than he already had to build a relationship with Mother or with Mother's other children.
On appeal, Mother asserts that a dependent child's best interests are always promoted when a jurisdictional finding made without a parent being afforded an opportunity to participate is set aside. (See Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 490-491.) However, Mother's argument in her section 388 petition was that notice of the hearing was inadequate. As we have concluded, Mother had actual notice and an opportunity to participate in the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Further, as noted, revisiting the prior jurisdiction and disposition orders would have served only to delay the proceedings, and it is well accepted that it is not in a child's best interests to inject unnecessary delay into dependency proceedings, particularly when, as here, the child is an infant. (See In re. J.P., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 799-800; In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.)
Mother also suggests, for the first time on appeal, that she could have argued that Indiana was the more appropriate venue, pursuant to the UCCJEA, at the April 16 hearing. Mother has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. (See In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138.) Further, Mother had notice of both the detention hearing and the jurisdiction and disposition hearing and, therefore, was provided the opportunity to participate in both discussions regarding the juvenile court's jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
Even if there were some basis for jurisdiction in Indiana under the UCJEAA, the Indiana court had already declined to exercise jurisdiction. (See Fam. Code, §§ 3427, 3428 [California may assume jurisdiction if another state with jurisdiction declines to exercise jurisdiction].) Further, while Mother claims that she and Father lived in Indiana before P.B. was born, Father said that he was raised in San Diego and had been going to Indiana "on and off" during the year before P.B.'s birth. --------
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err by denying Mother's section 388 petition.
II. Mother's Request That the Agency Finance Visitation
Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by refusing to grant her request that the Agency finance her out-of-state visitation with P.B.
Visitation is an essential component of any reunification plan, and should occur as frequently as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972; § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for the juvenile court to order the Agency to provide financial assistance to a parent who lacks the financial means to travel to and from visitation. (In re L.M. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 645, 650 (L.M.); § 362 [authorizing reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of a dependent child]; see also In re Samuel G. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 502, 513 [upholding court order directing county agency to pay travel costs of dependent child's educational representative].)
When considering a request that the Agency provide financial assistance to facilitate visitation, the juvenile court may consider, but is not limited to, the following factors: "the parent's financial circumstances and ability to pay the necessary travel costs (considering the parent's income, assets, expenses, and other support obligations); the methods of transportation available and their respective costs; the nature and stage of the minor's case plan and whether family reunification is contemplated; the parent's conduct and participation in other aspects of any reunification plan ordered; the frequency of visits ordered and the degree to which the minor is likely to benefit from face-to-face visits; and the availability and adequacy of other forms of parent-child contact (such as telephone calls, letters and e-mail)." (L.M., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 651.)
In L.M., the appellate court concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order the Agency to finance visitation costs; the father did not present any evidence of his income or the cost of travel and it was not clear that he would actually utilize the funds to visit the child given that his contact with the Agency up to that point had been inconsistent. (L.M., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.)
Similarly, here, Mother did not provide any evidence regarding her financial circumstances or her ability to pay the necessary travel costs. Further, Mother had only sporadic telephone contact with P.B.'s caregiver and did not visit him at all during the period that she remained in San Diego. It is thus unclear whether Mother would visit P.B. even if the Agency did arrange travel. When the Agency suggested that Mother could have avoided the need for travel by staying in San Diego, Mother's counsel responded that she had custody of her two other children in Indiana. However, Mother did not present any evidence confirming that she in fact had custody of her other children, she had already spent several months away from the other children, and the record suggests that there may have been a restraining order restricting her contact with them.
We agree that visitation is an essential element to any reunification plan and have some concerns about the juvenile court in San Diego taking jurisdiction over a child whose parent lives out of state without providing reasonable and realistic means for visitation. While we cannot conclude on the record before us that the juvenile court abused its discretion in this case by denying Mother's request since Mother presented no evidence of her financial situation or the cost of travel, Mother might be entitled to such relief if she were able to present additional evidence supporting her request. (L.M., supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 652 [concluding the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying a similar request but suggesting that the father could bring a new motion with additional supporting evidence].)
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. IRION, J.