Opinion
D083094
04-18-2024
In re Bl.F. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. Ad.F., Defendant and Appellant. SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County Nos. NJ520438A, NJ520438B, Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BUCHANAN, ACTING P. J.
Ad.F. (Mother) appeals from Welfare and Institutions Codesection 366.26 orders terminating her parental rights to her sons, Bl.F. and Ad.R. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that she had not proved the beneficial parent-child relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied to preclude the termination of her parental rights and selection of adoption as the children's permanent plan. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the orders.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For a more detailed factual and procedural discussion, refer to In re Bl.F. (Apr. 18, 2024, D082610 [nonpub. opn.]) (Bl.F. I), in which we affirmed orders previously issued in the children's juvenile dependency proceedings.
In June 2020, Bl.F., then two years old, and Ad.R., then 10 months old, were living with Mother in her car. Mother left the children with a caregiver without provisions for their care and support and failed to return at the appointed time. The following day, the caregiver took the children to the maternal grandmother, who was unable to care for them. The maternal grandmother was concerned that Mother was using methamphetamine and leaving the children with caregivers who were not well known to her or the family. Thereafter, the Agency was contacted and attempted to create a safety plan for the children with Mother and the maternal grandmother. Mother was uncooperative, became hysterical, and was arrested by police on an outstanding warrant.
Jo.R., the children's father (Father), was imprisoned in another state at that time and was not in contact with Mother or the children. Father is not a party to this appeal.
In late June, the Agency filed dependency petitions alleging that the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). At the detention hearing, the court found that the Agency had made prima facie showings on its petitions, detained the children out of the home, and ordered supervised visits for Mother with the children.
At the November contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the petitions, placed the children in a licensed resource home, and ordered reunification services and supervised visitation for Mother.
In its six-month review hearing report, the Agency stated that Mother remained homeless and had only sporadically visited with the children. She had not participated in reunification services and was not in regular contact with the Agency. The Agency could not locate Father.
In June 2021, at the contested six-month review hearing, the court terminated Mother's reunification services, placed the children in a licensed resource home, and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
In its section 366.26 report, the Agency stated that in August it had located and contacted Father in another state. He wanted custody of the children. In September, the children were moved to the home of Do.B. and Jo.B. (De Facto Parents). The Agency recommended that the court continue the section 366.26 hearing for 120 days.
At that time, De Facto Parents were a resource family. In February 2023, they were designated as the children's de facto parents.
In September and October, Father filed a section 388 petition and amended section 388 petition, requesting that the court vacate its dispositional orders and instead order reunification services for him and/or placement of the children with him. The court granted Father's section 388 petition, found placement of the children with Father would be detrimental to them, ordered reunification services for Father, vacated the section 366.26 hearing, and set an 18-month review hearing.
In its 18-month review hearing report, the Agency stated that Mother's whereabouts were unknown. Father had not participated in reunification services or visitation. De Facto Parents wanted to adopt the children. The Agency recommended that the court terminate Father's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On June 3, 2022, at the contested 18-month review hearing, the court terminated Father's reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In its new section 366.26 permanency planning report and addendum reports, the Agency stated that De Facto Parents filed a request for prospective adoptive parent status and de facto parent status. From September 2022 through January 2023, Mother had six in-person visits with the children. An Agency social worker observed five of the visits. During an October 2022 visit, when Mother was outside walking a dog, the social worker asked Bl.F. if he recognized Mother. He answered: "Doggy. The lady." At the end of a November 2022 visit, Ad.R. pulled away from Mother when she tried to kiss him. Bl.F. told Mother that he loved her. On the way home, Bl.F. asked for Mother and both children stated they wanted to have more visits with Mother. In December 2022, Mother had another child and admitted she had used methamphetamine and attempted suicide while pregnant.
The social worker stated that the children had a positive attachment to De Facto Parents who consistently met the children's needs. The children were affectionate toward, and liked living with, De Facto Parents. The children referred to them as "mom" and "dad." Also, De Facto Parents both rated themselves at a 10 out of 10 in their commitment levels to the children. De Facto Parents wanted to adopt the children.
In February 2023, the Agency received a referral regarding Mother's new child, alleging that Mother had stopped attending services and possibly relapsed. From February through May 2023, an Agency social worker was unsuccessful in reaching Mother.
On February 15, the court designated De Facto Parents as the two older children's de facto parents.
On April 4, counsel for the children filed a section 388 petition, requesting an order placing the children with maternal relatives, Ro.F. and Jo.F. The court found that Ro.F. and Jo.F. had made a prima facie showing in support of their petition's allegations and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
On May 17, De Facto Parents filed a section 388 petition, requesting an order specifically placing the children with them. At a pretrial status hearing, the court found that De Facto Parents had made a prima facie showing in support of their petition's allegations and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
In May, counsel for the children filed a statement of Bl.F.'s wishes. Bl.F. stated that he wanted to live with the maternal grandmother and loved Do.B., Ro.F., and Jo.F.
In June, Mother contacted the Agency and stated she had completed a 30-day substance abuse treatment program and was doing well. The Agency social worker approved two virtual visits per week between Mother and the children. During a virtual visit in June, the social worker observed that Bl.F. screamed for most of the visit and the children fought over the phone and one another. During another virtual visit that month, the social worker observed that Ad.R. spoke lovingly toward Mother and called her "mom." Mother was appropriate and loving toward the children.
The Agency recommended that the court order a permanent plan of adoption for the children, grant the children's section 388 petition, and deny De Facto Parents' section 388 petition.
During an extended trip to visit maternal relatives in South Carolina, the children visited Mother and extended family in Florida.
In early August, a contested evidentiary hearing was held on both section 388 petitions. The court found that the best interests of the children were to remain placed with De Facto Parents and not to be moved to a placement with Ro.F. and Jo.F., citing the children's needs for permanency and stability. On August 10, the court issued orders granting De Facto Parents' section 388 petition and denying the children's section 388 petition. The children, Mother, and Relatives each filed notices of appeal challenging the orders. On April 18, 2024, we affirmed the August 10 orders. (Bl.F. I.)
In its October addendum report, the Agency stated that during an October virtual visit, Mother was at work, briefly greeted the children, and then had the maternal uncle continue the call with them. After that visit, one of the De Facto Parents reported that the children started screaming and Ad.R. urinated in a laundry basket. Mother did not attend the next scheduled virtual visit.
The Agency believed that the children were generally and specifically adoptable. It concluded that Mother had not maintained regular and consistent visitation with the children, having begun regular contact with them only in recent months. It opined that the relationship between Mother and the children was not positive or substantial. In particular, it noted that the children referred to Mother by her first name and did not ask for her between visits. Her absence from the children throughout their dependency cases did not negatively affect them. It believed that the children would not suffer detriment if parental rights were terminated. The Agency opined that the benefits to the children of adoption, which included permanence, stability, and safety, outweighed the benefits of continuing their relationship with Mother.
On October 23, 2023, the court held a contested section 366.26 hearing. The court received in evidence the Agency's original section 366.26 report and all addendum reports, as well as a report and an addendum from the children's court-appointed special advocate (CASA). Mother testified in support of her assertion that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied to preclude adoption from being selected as the children's permanent plan. She testified that she had spoken with the children 14 times in phone visits during the past six months. She had an in-person visit with them when they came to Florida and they seemed happy. The children referred to her as "mom" and by her first name. During phone visits, the children were distracted and appeared on and off the screen.
The court also received in evidence the children's stipulated testimony that they both wanted to live with De Facto Parents, but wanted continued contact with Mother and the maternal family.
The Agency social worker testified that the children had weekly video visits with Mother. She believed that adoption was in the children's best interests. De Facto Parents had indicated that they were willing to maintain the children's contact with Mother and the maternal relatives after adoption.
After hearing arguments of counsel and considering the evidence, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated and that adoption was in their best interests. The court further found that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights and selected adoption as the children's permanent plan. Mother filed a notice of appeal challenging the orders.
DISCUSSION
Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding that she had not carried her burden to prove that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied to preclude the termination of her parental rights and selection of adoption as the children's permanent plan. In particular, she argues: (1) the court applied an incorrect standard in determining whether she had proved the first prong (i.e., "regular visitation and contact" with the children) of the three-prong test for the exception; (2) the court's findings that she had not proved the first two prongs were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the court abused its discretion by finding she had not proved the third prong that the children would suffer detriment from the termination of parental rights.
A
"If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a parent's custody within statutory time limits, the court must set a hearing under section 366.26." (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.).) "[W]hen the court orders the section 366.26 hearing, reunification services have been terminated, and the assumption is that the problems that led to the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved." (Ibid.) The purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is to determine and implement the appropriate permanent plan for a dependent child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) The juvenile court can choose among three permanent plans: adoption, legal guardianship, and long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) When a child is adoptable, adoption is the preferred permanent plan unless there are countervailing circumstances or adoption is not in the child's best interests. (In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535, 546; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 574 (Autumn H.).)
At a section 366.26 hearing, it is the parent's burden to show an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529, 534; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.) One exception is when the juvenile court finds "a compelling reason" for determining that termination of parental rights would be "detrimental" to the child because the "parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The California Supreme Court has clarified that the "compelling reason" language does not impose on the parent any burden beyond the requirement to show termination of the beneficial relationship would be "detrimental" to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 635.)
Caden C. stated that under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a parent has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, three prongs: (1) "regular visitation and contact with the child;" (2) "the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent-the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship;" and (3) "terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home." (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Specifically, in making the determination of whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies, the juvenile court "balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Because interaction between a child and his or her parent will generally confer some incidental benefit to the child, the parent must prove the child will benefit to such a degree as to overcome the preference for adoption. (Ibid.) The beneficial parent-child relationship exception is not established simply by a showing of a parent's frequent and loving contact and relationship with their child. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529.) Some of the factors the juvenile court should consider when determining whether the parent-child relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child; (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody; (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child; and (4) the child's particular needs. (Caden C., at p. 632; Autumn H., at p. 576.)
On appeal, we apply a hybrid standard in reviewing a juvenile court's determination whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-641; In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issues of maintenance of regular contact and visitation and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship, and apply the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination of that relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., at pp. 639-641; In re J.C., at pp. 530531.) Under the substantial evidence standard of review, we consider the evidence, and make all reasonable inferences therefrom, favorably to support the court's order and disregard contrary evidence as not accepted by the court as having sufficient veracity or persuasiveness. (Caden C., at p. 640; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298 .) Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason, and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (Caden C., at p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.).)
B
At the contested section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court admitted in evidence the Agency's reports, the CASA's reports, and the children's stipulated testimony and heard testimony from Mother and the Agency social worker. After hearing arguments of counsel, the court found that Mother had not proved that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied to preclude termination of her parental rights. Regarding the first prong requirement for "regular visitation and contact" under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the court stated that Mother's "contact with her children has been really all over the map." Although Mother was granted liberal visitation in July 2020, she began missing visits in September, three months later. The court noted that Mother had visited the children "only five times in the four months preceding the [six-month] review [hearing]." Although Mother visited the children twice per week during February and March 2021, she had not visited them from April 2021 through September 2022, which the court noted was "a period of [17] months these children did not have any contact with her whatsoever." The court found that Mother's presence in the children's lives "has been fleeting, in and out, inconsistent. She will be consistent from some period of time and then disappear for a lengthy period of time." In September 2022, although Mother resumed having supervised visits with the children, she visited them only six times during the following five months and then "disappeared again for a period of five months." Although the Agency's reports did not support it, the court accepted Mother's testimony that she had spoken on the phone with the children 14 times during the six-month period prior to the section 366.26 hearing. However, even during that period, she often called them only once per week, despite being permitted twice per week calls. During the previous six months, the only in-person visitation Mother had with the children was over two days in July, when they were left in Florida by the persons authorized to have them in contravention of the court's order. Therefore, under the first prong, the court found that "Mother ha[d] not visited consistently" with the children. The court stated: "[M]other has not had consistent visitation with the boys by any measure. They have been dependents of the court for over three years now, and for much of that time [M]other has been completely absent and her whereabouts unknown."
The court stated that even "[a]ssuming arguendo that the first element is met," it would still need to assess whether the children would benefit from a continuing relationship with Mother. Under that second prong of the test, the court noted that it could consider factors, such as the children's ages, the portions of their lives spent in Mother's custody, the positive or negative effect of the interactions between Mother and the children, and the children's particular needs. Considering the evidence admitted at the hearing, the court noted that the children were removed from Mother's care when Bl.F. was two years old and Ad.R. was 10 months old and at the time of the hearing they were six years old and four years old. The court found that the children had "spent the vast majority of their lives out of [Mother's] care." Regarding the nature of their interactions with Mother, the court noted that it had been "a superficial kind of relationship." The court noted that Mother's visits with the children "were not high-quality bonding opportunities between her and the children," noting that she had testified the children were "highly distracted" and "not focused" during her calls. According to her testimony, the children's faces were oftentimes turned away from the screen and she could not tell if they were happy or excited to see her during phone or virtual visits during the past six months. On the rare occasions that they had inperson visits, the children seemed excited to see Mother, but did not have a hard time separating from her and thereafter did not ask about her or state that they missed her. Therefore, under the second prong, the court found that "[b]y all measures, whatever benefit there may be to them in continuing this inconsistent relationship with [Mother], . . . it would not be harmful for the children to sever this relationship" and choose a permanent plan of adoption for them.
Finally, regarding the third prong of the test, the court found that "[w]hatever harm would come to the boys from severing their relationship with [Mother], the benefit of adoption outweighs that harm that would be caused to them ...." The court noted that in the care of De Facto Parents, the children had "seen stability for the first time in their lives, and they are finally receiving the care that they need, especially given the special needs that [Bl.F.] has." The court stated that it "most certainly and unequivocally finds that any harm [from severing the children's relationship with Mother] would be far outweighed by the benefit of having [De Facto Parents] as [the children's] adoptive parents and to give them the consistency that they so desperately deserve and need and want." Accordingly, the court found that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply to preclude termination of her parental rights and selection of adoption as the children's permanent plan.
C
First prong. Mother argues that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard in determining whether she had proved the first prong of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. She notes that section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) required her to show only "regular visitation and contact" with the children, but that the court implicitly required her to prove she had "consistent" visitation with the children, which she argues was a higher burden on proof. However, Mother does not cite any case or other authority in support of her argument. Instead, she apparently relies solely on the language of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which requires "regular visitation and contact," and not "consistent" visitation.
As the Agency notes, the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the distinction that Mother attempts to make. In Caden C., the court stated: "The first element-regular visitation and contact-is straightforward. The question is just whether 'parents visit consistently,' taking into account 'the extent permitted by court orders.' [Citation.]" (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212.) Therefore, Caden C. concluded, in effect, that "regular" visitation was equivalent to "consistent" visitation for purposes of the first prong of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception. Based on Caden C., we conclude that Mother's argument that the juvenile court erred by determining that her visitation with the children was not "consistent," as opposed to not "regular," is a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not apply an incorrect standard, much less a higher burden of proof, by finding that Mother's visitation with the children was not "consistent," as opposed to not "regular," within the meaning of the first prong of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception.
Mother also argues that substantial evidence does not support the court's finding under the first prong that she had not proved that she had "consistent" (or "regular") visitation and contact with the children. As discussed above, in applying the substantial evidence standard of review, we consider the evidence, and make all reasonable inferences therefrom, favorably to support the court's order and disregard contrary evidence as not accepted by the court as having sufficient veracity or persuasiveness. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 297-298.) Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the court's finding that Mother had not carried her burden to prove that she had maintained consistent or regular visitation and contact with the children. Although Mother was allowed two visits per week during the reunification period beginning in July 2020, she began missing visits with the children in September 2020. Importantly, as the court noted, Mother did not visit or contact the children from April 2021 until September 2022, which was an extended period of 17 months. Then, after reestablishing contact with the Agency, Mother had six in-person visits with the children from September 2022 through January 2023, but then again had no contact with the Agency or the children until June 2023. In June 2023, the Agency authorized Mother to have two virtual visits per week, but she again did not avail herself of all of those permitted visits. In addition to the Agency's reports that described Mother's visits during the three-year period of the children's dependency cases, the Agency opined that under the first prong Mother had failed to maintain regular and consistent visitation with the children. We conclude that the above evidence provides substantial evidence to support the court's finding on the first prong that Mother had not carried her burden to prove that she had maintained regular visitation and contact with the children within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)'s beneficial parent-child relationship exception.
Mother argues that she satisfied the first prong because she had been in regular contact with the children in the months preceding the contested section 366.26 hearing. However, by citing only evidence and inferences in support of her position, she misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review. On appeal, we uphold the juvenile court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence and do not reweigh the evidence or its inferences. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 (Dakota H.).) We may not reverse the court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if there is other evidence that could have supported a contrary finding. (Ibid.) Therefore, Mother has not shown that substantial evidence does not support the court's finding that she had not proved the first prong of the exception.
In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, cited by Mother, is factually and procedurally inapposite to this case and therefore does not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. In particular, in that case the appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the mother had maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, despite being late to a visit and cancelling other visits. (Id. at pp. 619, 622.) Here, in contrast, the court found that Mother had not maintained regular visitation and contact with the children and, as discussed above, we have concluded substantial evidence supports that finding.
Second prong. Mother also argues that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding on the second prong that she had not proved the children would suffer detriment from the loss of their relationship with her if her parental rights were terminated. Because we concluded above that substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Mother had not proved the first prong of regular visitation and contact, that finding, by itself, supports its ultimate finding that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception did not apply to preclude the termination of her parental rights. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Accordingly, we need not address her argument regarding the second prong.
We nevertheless elect to decide the issue and conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding on the second prong that Mother had not proved that the loss of the children's relationship with her would be detrimental to them. Alternatively stated, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Mother had not proved that the children had a substantial, positive emotional attachment to her. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) An emotional attachment exists where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate. (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) That attachment results from the parent's attention to the child's needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) A positive attachment may also result from the stability, a sense of security, and nurturing that a parent may provide the child. (In re B.D., at p. 1230.)
Here, although there is evidence showing that Mother loved the children and they loved her and enjoyed their visits with her, there is strong evidence showing that the children did not have a substantial, positive emotional attachment to Mother. When they were removed from Mother's care in June 2020, Bl.F. was two years old and Ad.R. was 10 months old. By the time of the contested section 366.26 hearing, the children had been out of Mother's care for over three years. Mother's reunification services were terminated at the six-month hearing and she never progressed beyond supervised visitation. In September 2022, after being absent from the children's lives for 17 months, Bl.F. did not recognize Mother at first and Ad.R. pulled away from her when she attempted to show him affection. Based on that and other evidence, the court could reasonably infer that Mother's inconsistent visitation and absence from the children's lives for extended periods negatively impacted the children's ability to develop a substantial, positive emotional attachment to her. Also, as Mother testified, the children were distracted and often went on and off the screen during their virtual visitations. In its most recent addendum report, the Agency questioned whether Mother's relationship with the children was positive or substantial and concluded they would not suffer any detriment if parental rights were terminated. It noted that the children did not ask for her between visits. We conclude that the above evidence constitutes substantial evidence in support of the court's finding that Mother had not proved that the children had a substantial, positive emotional attachment to her, such that the severance of that attachment or relationship would cause great harm to the children. To the extent Mother cites evidence or inferences that would have supported a contrary finding, she again misapplies the substantial evidence standard of review. (Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.)
Third prong. Mother finally argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding on the third prong that she had not proved that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the children even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Because we concluded above that substantial evidence supports the court's findings that Mother had not proved the first and second prongs of the three-prong test, those findings, by themselves, support the court's ultimate finding that the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception did not apply to preclude the termination of her parental rights. (Caden C., at p. 636.) Accordingly, we need not address her argument regarding the third prong.
Nevertheless, we conclude that Mother has not carried her burden on appeal to show that the court abused its discretion by finding that she had not proved the third prong, i.e., that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the children even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home. In its most recent addendum report, the Agency opined that the benefits to the children of adoption, which included permanence, stability, and safety, outweighed any detriment they would suffer from the loss of their relationship with Mother if her parental rights were terminated. Because the children had thrived in their stable placement with De Facto Parents who met their all of their needs (including Bl.F.'s special needs), we conclude that the court could reasonably infer they would likewise thrive and benefit from an adoptive placement and that the benefits to them of adoption outweighed any benefit to them of continuing their relationship with Mother.
To the extent Mother cites evidence or inferences that would have supported a contrary finding, she again misapplies the standard of review. Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason, and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.) Likewise, none of the cases cited by Mother are factually or procedurally apposite to this case and therefore do not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. (See, e.g., In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 77-78 [juvenile court abused its discretion by applying wrong standard; children also indisputably had substantial and positive attachment to mother such that termination of that attachment would cause children great harm]; In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 299-300 [juvenile court erred by applying wrong standard that required parent to show child had "primary attachment" to parent].)
Accordingly, we conclude that Mother has not carried her burden on appeal to show that the court's finding on the third prong was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) Because Mother has not shown any error as to any of the three prongs, we conclude the court properly ruled that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did not apply to preclude the termination of her parental rights and selection of adoption as the children's permanent plan.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: CASTILLO, J., RUBIN, J.