Opinion
No. CV05-4007155S
June 9, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This action arises from a motor vehicle accident on Interstate 84 in Hartford, Connecticut on August 14, 2003. The alleged tortfeasor, Joseph Rabis, Jr., died on November 23, 2004. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant administratrix of the estate of Joseph Rabis, Jr. and Petroleum Services, Inc. which allegedly owned the vehicle driven by Rabis at the time of the accident.
The defendant estate moves to strike the second count of the complaint which is brought pursuant to § 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes on the grounds that an action for punitive damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 is barred by the three exceptions to the survival statute.
Relative to the issues presented here, § 52-599 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides that a cause of action against a person shall not abate but shall survive that person's death and may be brought against his or her executor or administrator except in cases where (1) the purpose or object of the proceeding is rendered useless by the person's death, (2) where the defense of the civil action depends upon the person's continued existence, or (3) where the civil action is based upon a penal statute. For purposes of this discussion, the court addresses these issues in reverse order.
Sec. 52-599. Survival of cause of action. Continuation by or against executor or administrator.
(a) A cause or right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any person, but shall survive in favor of or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person.
(b) A civil action or proceeding shall not abate by reason of the death of any party thereto, but may be continued by or against the executor or administrator of the decedent. If a party plaintiff dies, his executor or administrator may enter within six months of the plaintiff's death or at any time prior to the action commencing trial and prosecute the action in the same manner as his testator or intestate might have done if he had lived. If a party defendant dies, the plaintiff, within one year after receiving written notification of the defendant's death, may apply to the court in which the action is pending for an order to substitute the decedent's executor or administrator in the place of the decedent, and, upon due service and return of the order, the action may proceed.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply: (1) To any cause or right of action or to any civil action or proceeding the purpose or object of which is defeated or rendered useless by the death of any party thereto, (2) to any civil action or proceeding whose prosecution or defense depends upon the continued existence of the persons who are plaintiffs or defendants, or (3) to any civil action upon a penal statute.
The estate maintains that § 14-295 is a penal statute. The plaintiff argues that § 14-295 is not a penal statute.
Sec. 14-295. Double or treble damages for personal injury or property damage resulting from certain traffic violations.
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle.
In State v. Pompei, 52 Conn.App. 303, 306-07, 726 A.2d 644 (1999), our Appellate Court, citing Plumb v. Griffin, 74 Conn. 132, 134, 50 A.1 (1901), stated: "Penal statutes, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense against the State . . . The words `penal' and `penalty,' in their strict and primary sense, denote a punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State for a crime or offense against its laws." In Mobil Oil Corporation v. Killian, 30 Conn.Sup. 87, 99, 301 A.2d 562 (1973), the court, also citing Plumb v. Griffin, supra, stated:
The classic definition of a penal statute is one imposing punishment for an offense against the state; "and the expression `penal statutes,' does not ordinarily include statutes which give a private action against a wrong-doer . . . Thus a statute which required a wrongdoer cutting trees on another's land without his permission to pay the injured party $2 for every tree of one foot in diameter and, for trees of greater dimension, three times their value besides the $2 was not a penal statute because the increased damages were not intended as punishment for an offense."
The estate's reliance on the Connecticut Supreme Court in Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941), is misplaced. The issue before the Tedesco court was whether a liability insurer is obligated to pay punitive damages on behalf of its insured. The court stated that the predecessor statute to § 14-295 (§ 1642) "in so far as it permitted an individual to recover damages, was remedial, but that, while not strictly penal, it was so far of that nature that it should be construed with reasonable strictness." Id., 536. In strictly construing the statute, the Tedesco court held that a liability insurer is not obligated to pay damages that were not compensatory in nature. The holding of the Tedesco court does not change the definition of "penal." Section 14-295 of the Connecticut General Statutes contains no provision for a punishment or penalty imposed by the state for a crime against the state. Furthermore, the court imposes the penalty in cases where penal statutes are violated. Section 14-295 provides that a determination of whether or not to impose double or treble damages is made by the trier of fact. Under the definitions used by the Connecticut Supreme Court, it is not a penal statute.
Regarding the second issue, the estate's position that the defense to the plaintiff's § 14-295 claim requires the continued existence of Rabis is untenable. Responding to virtually the same argument in Welcome v. Ouellette-McGregor, No. CV 01-0811039 (Nov. 21, 2002) 2002 Ct.Sup. 14812, 14815, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 454, the court, citing Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 532, 542 A.2d 711 (1988), stated: "The state of mind of recklessness may . . . be inferred from conduct." Moreover, Rabis does not have the burden of proof. As the court in Welcome noted, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of demonstrating the alleged tortfeasor's state of mind at the time of the accident.
The final issue before the court is whether the purpose or object of the proceeding is rendered useless by the death of Rabis. The estate argues that the sole purpose of the penalty imposed pursuant to § 14-295 is to punish the driver who violates the statute, and that it would be illogical as well as meaningless to impose this sort of punishment on innocent beneficiaries of the decedent's estate. Plaintiff counters that the purpose of the remedy of double or treble damages pursuant to the statute is not merely to penalize a wrongdoer whose conduct violates the statute but also to promote the public policy objective of encouraging safe driving. Although both parties make reference to the relative positions of the injured plaintiff and the decedent's beneficiaries, the court finds that these concerns are not relevant to a judicial determination but rather to a legislative one.
It has been held in Connecticut that "the purpose of an award of punitive damages is not merely to deter a particular defendant from future misconduct but to deter others from committing similar wrongs." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 562-63, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989).
In addition to § 14-295, the Legislature has seen fit to enact other statutes providing for punitive damages in amounts exceeding those allowed under the common law. For example, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-240b provides for several damages: "Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant proves that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product. If the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the amount of such damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff." Section 42-110a, et seq. provides for an award of attorneys fees.
Having determined that § 14-295 is not a penal statute, and bearing in mind that the purpose of such punitive damages in Connecticut is not only to punish the tortfeasor but to deter others from engaging in the conduct addressed by the statue, the court concludes that the death of Rabis does not render the purpose or object of the proceeding useless.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed herein, the estate's motion to strike is denied.