Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. VG05244211
Kline, P.J.
Michelle M. Salazar (plaintiff) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District (defendant) in this premises liability action. On appeal, plaintiff contends that a resolution passed by defendant did not comply with the requirements of Labor Code section 3364.5 and, therefore, appellant, a school volunteer, could not be considered an “employee” for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage. We shall affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages, alleging a cause of action for premises liability. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged: “While using the stairs, located in the stage area of the band room at Granada High School of the Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District in Livermore, California, in the manner intended and reasonably anticipated and without any lack of ordinary and reasonable care by Plaintiff, Plaintiff was caused to slip, stumble and/or otherwise lose her balance proximately/legally causing her general and special damages including, but not limited to, a fractured right ankle and back injury. Upon information and believe [sic], Plaintiff alleges said stairs did not comply with local building ordinances and/or law.
“Although an unsalaried parent volunteer, Defendant Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Labor [Code] § 3364.5.”
On May 10, 2006, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied.
On November 13, 2006, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted. Notice of entry of judgment was filed on December 12, 2006.
On January 4, 2007, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal is that a resolution passed by defendant did not comply with the requirements of section 3364.5 because it did not contain a list of the specific volunteers entitled to workers’ compensation coverage. Therefore, according to plaintiff, a school volunteer such as herself could not be considered an “employee” for purposes of workers’ compensation coverage, and the trial court was incorrect when it concluded that plaintiff is limited to workers’ compensation benefits and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.
A. Rules Regarding Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If that initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850-853.)
We review a summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Marie Y. v. General Star Indemnity Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 928, 949.)
B. Trial Court Background
In its order granting defendant’s summary judgment motion, the trial court stated: “The undisputed facts establish that, at the time Plaintiff sustained her injuries, she was acting within the course and scope of her volunteer work for Defendant pursuant to Defendant’s Resolution No. 17-82/83. [Citations.] Based on these undisputed facts, Plaintiff’s claims in this action are barred by Labor Code sections 3364.5 and 3600. The Court notes that Labor Code section 3364.5 does not require that a school district resolution authorizing volunteers to receive workers compensation benefits specifically identify those volunteers by name. Even assuming arguendo that Defendant did not cause a current list of such volunteers to be filed with the Alameda County Schools Insurance Group, that would not exempt Plaintiff from the effect of Labor Code section 3364.5. [Citation.]”
C. Legal Analysis
“Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citations.] If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we ‘ “select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.)
Our Supreme Court has discussed, with respect to determining coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) (Act), the necessity of complying with “the Legislature’s command in section 3202 that the Act ‘be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending [its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.’[] This command governs all aspects of workers’ compensation; it applies to factual as well as statutory construction. [Citations.] Thus, ‘[i]f a provision in [the Act] may be reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, that construction should usually be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.’ [Citation.] The rule of liberal construction ‘is not altered because a plaintiff believes that [she] can establish negligence on the part of [her] employer and brings a civil suit for damages.’ [Citation.] It requires that we liberally construe the Act ‘in favor of awarding work[ers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.)
Section 3364.5 provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding section 3351 of the Labor Code, a volunteer, unsalaried person authorized by the governing board of a school district . . . to perform volunteer services for the school district . . . shall, upon the adoption of a resolution of the governing board of the school district . . . so declaring, be deemed an employee of the district . . . for the purposes of this division and shall be entitled to the workmen’s compensation benefits provided by this division for any injury sustained by him while engaged in the performance of any service under the direction and control of the governing board of the school district . . . .”
Section 3351 defines the term “employee.”
Section 3600, subdivision (a), provides that, for any injury sustained by an employee “arising out of and in the course of the employment,” the exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation benefits.
On October 19, 1982, defendant’s Board of Education passed Resolution No. 17-82/83, entitled “Volunteers Eligible for Workers’ Compensation Benefits.” The resolution provided: “WHEREAS, the Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District may, from time to time, have occasion to utilize the services of volunteers in the operation of its programs; and
“WHEREAS, the Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District desires to have such volunteers become eligible for Workers’ Compensation benefits;
“NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that in accordance with section 3364.5 of the Labor Code, volunteers shall be entitled to Workers’ Compensation benefits for any injury sustained by him/her while in the performance of any service under direction and control of the Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District Superintendent; and
“BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District Superintendent shall cause a current list of such volunteers to be filed with the Alameda County Schools Insurance Group.”
Plaintiff does not argue that defendant’s inclusion of this final sentence in the resolution affects the result in this case, except perhaps as indirect evidence that section 3364.5 requires that a list of volunteers’ names be included in its resolution.
We conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that section 3364.5 does not require that the resolution a school district passes to deem volunteers employees of the district for purposes of entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits contain a list of the specific volunteers entitled to such benefits. This conclusion is based, first, on the language of the statute, taking into account the Legislature’s mandate that the Act “ ‘be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending [its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.’ ” (Arriaga v. County of Alameda, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1065, quoting § 3202.)
In light of this mandate, we interpret the language in question, which provides, in relevant part, that “a volunteer, unsalaried person authorized by the governing board of a school district . . . to perform volunteer services for the school district . . . shall, upon the adoption of a resolution of the governing board of the school district . . . so declaring, be deemed an employee of the district . . . for the purposes of this division and shall be entitled to work[ers’] compensation benefits” (§ 3364.5), to require simply that a school district adopt a resolution stating that volunteers are covered by the provisions of section 3364.5. Moreover, even assuming, as plaintiff argues, that the language of the statute is ambiguous and therefore also susceptible to plaintiff’s construction—that a school district must include a volunteer’s name in its resolution before that volunteer is covered by the Act—we must reject that construction since section 3364.5 can “ ‘be reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, [and] that construction should usually be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.’ ” (Arriaga v. County of Alameda, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
This conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of section 3364.5. This history plainly shows that the purpose of its enactment was to enable school districts to provide workers’ compensation coverage for the increasing number of school volunteers. For example, a Senate staff analysis described the problem addressed by this legislation (Sen. Bill No. 336) as follows: “Increasing use is being made of volunteer assistance by numerous school districts—such as under the compensatory programs . . . and general school assistance . . . . As volunteers, they are neither compensated nor covered by insurance.” (Sen. Local Gov. Com., staff analysis of Sen. Bill No. 336 (1967 Reg. Sess.), as amended April 13, 1967.) The staff analysis further noted that the proposed legislation would “provide that a school district board may provide personal liability and workmans [sic] compensation insurance for a volunteer, the same as or comparable to that provided for its regular employees.” (Ibid.) Similarly, a letter to the Governor from the Superintendent of Public Instruction stated that the statute would “permit a school district to provide liability insurance and workman’s compensation coverage for persons authorized by the governing board to render volunteer services for the district. [¶] The many persons who offer valuable gratuitous services to our schools should be given this protection.” (Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty, letter to Governor Ronald Reagan, June 14, 1967.)
We grant plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of legislative history related to section 3364.5. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a) & (c), 459.)
The broad purpose of the legislation, reflected in the legislative history, reinforces our conclusion that section 3364.5 does not include a requirement that school districts must include the names of all volunteers in its resolution. To conclude otherwise would thwart a district’s ability to provide workers’ compensation coverage to school volunteers, given the obvious impracticability of such a requirement. (See Day v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272 [we select statutory construction that comports most closely with apparent intent of Legislature, “with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute”].)
As the trial court observed, given the informal and as-needed nature of much school volunteer assistance, it simply would not be feasible for a school district to repeatedly pass resolutions on extremely short notice naming each volunteer, as would be necessary under plaintiff’s interpretation of section 3364.5.
It is undisputed that plaintiff was a volunteer who was injured while engaged in volunteer service at one of defendant’s schools. (See § 3364.5.) In light of this fact and our conclusion that defendant’s resolution complied with the requirements of section 3364.5, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that workers’ compensation benefits are plaintiff’s exclusive remedy, and therefore, properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); see also Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-853.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendant Livermore Valley Joint Unified School District.
We concur: Haerle, J., Richman, J.