Opinion
Civil Action 99-0946-CB-M.
May 21, 2000.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (c)(3), Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse social security ruling which denied a claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) . The action was referred for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). Oral argument was waived in this action (Doc. 14). Upon consideration of the administrative record and the memoranda of the parties, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, that this action be dismissed, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Kenneth S. Apfel and against Plaintiff Willie L. Ruggs on all claims.
This Court is not free to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983), which must be supported by substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The substantial evidence test requires "that the decision under review be supported by evidence sufficient to justify a reasoning mind in accepting it; it is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting Jones v. Schweiker, 551 F. Supp. 205 (D. Md. 1982)
Plaintiff was born July 16, 1950. At the time of the most recent administrative hearing, Ruggs was forty-seven years old, had completed a high school education (Tr. 63), and had previous work experience as a maintenance worker and laborer (Tr. 64) . In claiming benefits, Plaintiff alleges disability due to dysthymia and headaches (Doc. 10).
testified that he had received his Graduate Equivalency Degree (Tr. 63).
The Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI on December 20, 1994 (Tr. 69-71). Benefits were denied following a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who determined that Ruggs had no severe impairments (Tr. 19-29). Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision (Tr. 14-18) by the Appeals Council which was granted; the Appeals Council then issued a new decision in which it determined that although Ruggs had a severe mental impairment, he was able to perform his past relevant work as a maintenance worker and laborer (Tr. 7-12).
Plaintiff claims that the opinion of the Appeals Council is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Ruggs alleges that: (1) The Appeals Council improperly rejected the conclusions of one of the examining physicians; and (2) he is not capable of performing his past relevant work (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff's first claim is that the ALJ did not accord proper legal weight to the opinions, diagnoses and medical evidence provided by one of his physicians. Ruggs specifically points to the report of Greg Williams, a psychologist. It should be noted that "although the opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to more weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion." Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1999).
The Eleventh' Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City off Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.
On September 15, 1997, the only time the two met on a professional basis, Williams interviewed Ruggs and gave him the Mooney Problem Checklist (Tr. 216-20). The psychologist noted that although Plaintiff's "mood was depressed and [his] affect blunted," he was fully oriented and his memory, both remote and recent, were intact; Williams found no evidence of a thought disorder (Tr. 217). The psychologist concluded that Ruggs had "some limitation in his ability to hold steady employment" and recommended that "he seek mental health treatment for depression" (Tr. 218) . Williams completed a residual functional capacity evaluation in which he indicated that Plaintiff was moderately restricted in everything he did and had been that way since being assaulted in 1994 (Tr. 219-20).
The Appeals Council rejected Williams's assessment, finding his conclusions inconsistent with his own clinical notes and the records of the Stanton Road Clinic (Tr. 7-8). The Council further noted that Ruggs had never received any mental health treatment and stated that "there is no reason to believe that his mental impairment cannot be controlled with medications and/or therapy" (Tr. 7).
Plaintiff objects to this last statement, arguing that there is no evidence to support such a finding though candidly admitting that the proposition was "certainly possible" (Doc. 10, pp. 6-7). While the Appeals Council may have reached beyond the record evidence in making this conclusion, it is, at most, harmless error as the Court finds substantial support for the Appeals Council's conclusion that Williams's determination is to be discredited. There is absolutely no evidence of record to support the moderate limitations suggested in the evaluation. While the records from the Stanton Road Clinic document Plaintiff's headaches, though noting inconsistency in his use of medications for them, they neither document nor suggest restrictions of the magnitude found by Williams (see Tr. 167; see generally Tr. 150-60, 166-74, 199-204). Plaintiff's claim that the Appeals Council did not properly evaluate the opinions of Williams is without merit.
Ruggs has also claimed that he is unable to perform his past relevant work as a maintenance worker and as a laborer. The Court notes that Plaintiff has the burden of proving that he cannot perform his past relevant work. Macia v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) ( citing Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985)). The only evidence suggesting that Ruggs could not do his past work is the evaluation form completed by Williams; the Appeals Council, however, discredited those conclusions, a finding which this Court found to be supported by substantial evidence. This claim is of no merit.
Plaintiff has raised two different claims in this Court. Both are without merit. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Magistrate Judge finds "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Therefore, it is recommended that the Secretary's decision be affirmed, see Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1980), that this action be dismissed, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant Kenneth S. Apfel and against Plaintiff Willie L. Ruggs on all claims.