Opinion
Case No. 5D21-677
03-04-2022
R.S., Appellant, v. C.P.T., Appellee.
Cynthia L. Hanrahan and O.H. Eaton, Jr., of Office of Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant. No Appearance for Appellee.
Cynthia L. Hanrahan and O.H. Eaton, Jr., of Office of Regional Counsel, Casselberry, for Appellant.
No Appearance for Appellee.
WALLIS, J. Appellant appeals the Order for Involuntary Treatment for Substance Abuse that required him to enroll in outpatient treatment at the Stewart Marchman Act Behavioral Healthcare Center. He contends that the trial judge abandoned his role of impartiality and assumed the role of advocate for Appellee. Appellant further argues that the trial court's actions deprived him of a fair hearing and violated his due process rights. We agree and reverse and remand for a new hearing.
This case began when Appellee filed a Petition and Affidavit Seeking Involuntary Substance Abuse Assessment and Stabilization, which requested that the trial court order the involuntary assessment of Appellant pursuant to chapter 397, Florida Statutes, also known as the "Hal S. Marchman Alcohol and Other Drug Services Act" (the Marchman Act). The trial court held a hearing on that petition, and Appellant ultimately agreed to submit to a voluntary assessment. Appellant appeared for the assessment, and the assessment found Appellant to be dependent on cocaine, opioids, and alcohol. It further found that Appellant was unaware of the severity of his addiction and that he would benefit from both a residential and an outpatient program. When Appellant did not comply with the suggested treatment, Appellee filed a Petition for Involuntary Treatment pursuant to chapter 397, alleging that Appellant had been assessed by a qualified professional and he did not attend the remainder of the treatment that had been ordered for him. The court set a hearing on the Petition and appointed an attorney to represent Appellant.
At the hearing, Appellant's attorney objected to Appellant being required to go to residential treatment. During subsequent portions of the hearing, the trial judge assisted Appellee, who appeared pro se, in the presentation of her case in numerous ways. Of relevance, the trial judge: called the clinician who evaluated Appellant to testify; questioned the clinician about her findings; and laid the evidentiary foundation for the assessment and ultimately admitted the same document into evidence. Notably, Appellee did not question the clinician during the hearing, she did not lay the foundation for the admission of the assessment into evidence, and she did not attempt to enter the assessment into evidence. Rather, only the trial judge and Appellant's attorney questioned the clinician and the trial judge entered the assessment into evidence. During the proceedings, Appellant's attorney consistently objected to the trial judge assisting Appellee in the presentation of her case.
We find that the trial judge departed from his role as a neutral arbiter by assisting Appellee in the presentation of her case and by actively participating in the hearing. It is particularly important that the trial judge laid the foundation for the admission of the assessment into evidence and questioned the clinician about her findings because that evidence was key to proving Appellee's case—i.e., that Appellant is substance abuse impaired with a history of a lack of compliance with treatment and that he is unlikely to voluntarily participate in the recommended services. The effect of the trial judge's actions was to relieve Appellee of her burden of proof and to help her prove the essential elements of the case. Therefore, the trial judge's actions deprived Appellant of a fair hearing. See R.O. v. State, 46 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that the trial court deprived appellant of a fair and impartial trial where it departed from the appearance of neutrality and actively participated in the proceedings by questioning appellant about an essential element of the prosecution's case); Sears v. State, 889 So. 2d 956, 959–60 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (concluding that the trial judge crossed the line of neutrality and impartiality by asking numerous questions of witnesses which went far beyond attempting to clear up ambiguities in their testimony, and that these actions deprived appellant of a fair and impartial hearing). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing.
During its oral ruling, the trial court stated, "[t]he report is clear that [Appellant] believes he does not have a problem .... So I do believe that there is substantially—it is substantially more likely than not that [section] 397.6957(2)(a) is—has been met." Thus, it is apparent that the trial court relied on the assessment when it concluded that Appellant was substance abuse impaired and that he is unlikely to voluntarily participate in recommended services.
REVERSED and REMANDED for New Hearing.
EDWARDS and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.