Opinion
No. 11–P–1156.
2012-06-8
Jean J. ROWSON v. Jayne B. DENOYER.
By the Court (GRAHAM, VUONO & AGNES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge awarded damages to the plaintiff, Jean J. Rowson, on her claim of quantum meruit. Rowson filed a motion for a new trial or additur, pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 59(a), 365 Mass. 827 (1974), which was denied. This appeal followed.
We summarize the judge's findings, which are largely uncontested. Rowson and the defendant, Jayne B. Denoyer, lived together in a domestic partnership from 1984 to 2004. In 1994, Denoyer purchased a home where the couple lived until the relationship ended in 2004. The parties considered the house to be their joint property. Title was taken in Denoyer's name due to Rowson's poor credit history, but the initial deposit was made from the parties' shared checking account. In addition, Rowson paid for renovations to the property and also performed renovations herself. Rowson also contributed to household expenses, taxes, utilities, and to payment of the mortgage. During a one-year period between 1997 and 1998, while Denoyer was unemployed, Rowson covered all household expenses, including paying the mortgage.
As previously noted, the parties' relationship ended in October, 2004. In March, 2005, Denoyer informed Rowson that she planned to refinance the property and had added her sister to the deed. Denoyer also offered Rowson $60,000 ($30,000 to be paid immediately and $30,000 to be paid upon sale of the property) because “she felt bad.” Rowson responded by obtaining a real estate attachment, which thwarted Denoyer's ability to refinance, and then commenced this action seeking one-half of the value of the property under a theory of quantum meruit.
The complaint also alleged breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and destruction of property. All of these claims were dismissed and are not part of this appeal.
The judge determined the “fair value” of Rowson's services to be $32,000. He calculated that Rowson had performed 687 hours of remodeling work on the house, and valued that work at fifteen dollars per hour, for a total of $12,705. He also determined that Rowson had contributed $200 per month for one hundred months toward the mortgage, for a total of $20,000.
On appeal, Rowson contends that the judge's award is “grossly inequitable” in light of the fact that Rowson and Denoyer contributed to the purchase and maintenance of their home equally. According to Rowson, the total award of $20,000 amounts to only six percent of the value of the property.
There is no indication in the record as to the value of the property. In her brief, Rowson states that the parties stipulated to a market value of between $475,000 and $495,000, but that the property is currently valued at approximately $650,000.
As a threshold matter, we note that Rowson's failure to provide us with a transcript of the proceedings hampers our ability to assess her claim. Nevertheless, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the judge's calculation of the fair value of her services. See J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 797 (1986) (“It [is] for the judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses, including [testimony about what is] a fair and reasonable value”). See also Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692, 699 (2004), quoting from Mulhern v. Roach, 398 Mass. 18, 23 (1986) (“[T]he question of what is fair and reasonable compensation for ... services rendered is one of fact for a trial judge to decide”).
To the extent that Rowson argues she is entitled to one-half of the home's current value as a result of her relationship with Denoyer, it suffices to note that the parties were never married. Massachusetts does not recognize common law marriage and does not “permit[ ] the incidents of the marital relationship to attach to an arrangement of cohabitation without marriage.” Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 333 (1998), quoting from Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 617–618 (1994). While “unmarried cohabitants may lawfully contract concerning property, financial, and other matters relevant to their relationship,” Wilcox, supra at 332, it is undisputed that no such contract existed between the parties in this case.
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for new trial or additur affirmed.