Opinion
C/A No. 6:19-cv-3564-HMH-JDA
01-08-2020
Bradley Alan Ross, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Joshua P. Campbell, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Bradley Alan Ross ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested on September 1, 2019. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant submitted false information in his warrant application to Judge Hicks to create probable cause to detain him. [Id. at 5-6.] According to Plaintiff, Defendant violated his due process rights by including false information in the warrant affidavit, violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to submit exculpatory evidence under Brady, and violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by falsely arresting and maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff. [Id. at 6.] For his injuries, Plaintiff asserts that he has suffered lost property and credit and has experienced mental anguish and stress. [Id. at 7.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks actual and punitive damages. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with the following offenses, which remain pending against him at this time: (1) possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine or cocaine base, second offense, at case number 2019A2330207839, and (2) public disorderly conduct at case number 2019A2330207840. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case numbers 2019A2330207839 and 2019A2330207840) (last visited Jan. 8, 2020); see also Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff appears to be a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant arrested and charged him without probable cause, providing false information in the warrant affidavit. [Id. at 5-6.] Despite Plaintiff's contentions, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Heck
The Complaint as a whole should be dismissed because it is legally frivolous. A finding of frivolousness can be made where the Complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Thus, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989).
The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's arrest on September 1, 2019, and his subsequent incarceration in the Greenville County Detention Center on his pending charges. For his relief, Plaintiff purports to seek money damages for the allegedly unlawful arrest and ongoing prosecution. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages based on his allegedly unlawful arrest, incarceration, and pending charges, his claim is premature because his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated and a cause of action has not accrued. As noted, Plaintiff was arrested and is being detained in the Greenville County Detention Center. The Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations that Plaintiff has been convicted and sentenced or that such a conviction or sentence has been overturned.
In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the "favorable termination" requirement, which Plaintiff has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Plaintiff seems to allege that Defendant acted improperly by unlawfully arresting him without probable cause based on fabricated evidence and holding him in the Greenville County Detention Center. [Doc. 1 at 4-6.] However, Plaintiff does not allege that he has been convicted or that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim would imply that the pending charges against him are invalid. Thus, this § 1983 claim should be dismissed because a right of action has not accrued. Abstention under Younger
The Supreme Court has recently explained that "the pragmatic considerations discussed in Heck apply generally to civil suits within the domain of habeas corpus, not only to those that challenge convictions." McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2158 (2019) (explaining Heck applied in cases of ongoing criminal prosecution). As such, "[t]he proper approach in our federal system generally is for a criminal defendant who believes that the criminal proceedings against him rest on knowingly fabricated evidence to defend himself at trial and, if necessary, then to attack any resulting conviction through collateral review proceedings." Id. at 2159.
The limitations period will not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. See Morris v. Cardillo, No. 0:10-cv-0443-JFA-PJG, 2010 WL 2722997, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2722992 (D.S.C. July 9, 2010); see also McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2158 ("There is not '"a complete and present cause of action,"' to bring a fabricated-evidence challenge to criminal proceedings while those criminal proceedings are ongoing. Only once the criminal proceeding has ended in the defendant's favor, or a resulting conviction has been invalidated within the meaning of Heck, will the statute of limitations begin to run.") (citations ommitted).
Further, Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state court criminal action are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine and are therefore subject to summary dismissal. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper, violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights. [Doc. 1 at 4-6.] Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings related to his arrest for murder and other charges, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal action; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25. Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015). In light of the allegations in the Complaint, together with the state court records, the Court finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claim for relief.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge January 8, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).