Opinion
No. CV04 041 32 44 S
September 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE
The defendant has filed a motion to strike the Second Count of the plaintiff's Revised Complaint dated August 19, 2004. The plaintiff's Second Count seeks double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, claiming that the plaintiff's alleged injuries and damages were the result of the defendant's recklessness in the operation of her automobile. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant violated General Statutes §§ 14-218a and 14-222. The defendant in filing this motion to strike argues that the plaintiff has failed to set forth facts sufficient to allege a claim for statutory recklessness.
The law regarding the consideration of a motion to strike is well-settled. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (Emphasis omitted.) Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988) A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra. 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).
The defendant claims that the plaintiff's revised complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim for recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. General Statutes § 14-295 reads as follows:
In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.
This court has addressed this issue previously in Stiber v. Adjei, CV00 0070751S, Superior Court, Ansonia/Milford Judicial District, January 3, 2001 (Arnold, J.), Henriques v. Landisi, Superior Court, Judicial District of Ansonia/Milford No. CV000072768S (Jun. 6, 2001, Arnold, J.), Chetty v. Pallay, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV02 0471200 S (August 16, 2004, Arnold, J.) and the relevant citations contained therein. The Second Count of the instant case, involves a statutory claim grounded in recklessness under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. This merely requires that a plaintiff plead that another party violated certain statutes set forth specifically in § 14-295 with reckless disregard in order for the trier of fact to consider awarding multiple damages. Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295 does not require the same specificity of pleading which is required to support a cause of action predicated on recklessness. General Statutes § 14-295 is clear and sets forth the essential components of a properly pleaded statutory recklessness claim: deliberate or reckless operation; violation of one or more of the listed statutes; and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Where a plaintiff specifically pleads each of these components, the plaintiff has fully complied with all that the statute requires. See Rocco v. Hall, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 358709 (April 7, 1999, Skolnick, J.). The plaintiff, in the Second Count, has pleaded that the defendant was operating said motor vehicle at an unreasonable, improper and excessive rate of speed with reckless disregard to the conditions then and there prevailing in violation of § 14-218a and § 14-222. The plaintiff alleges that these statutory violations were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries and damages in "reckless disregard" for the plaintiff's safety.
This court continues to adopt the position that all that is required under General Statutes § 14-295 is that the plaintiff pleads another party has operated a motor vehicle deliberately or with a reckless disregard in violation of certain statutory sections. Section 14-218a and § 14-222 are among those enumerated statutory violation set forth in General Statutes § 14-295.
The motion to strike the Second Count of the plaintiff's Revised Complaint and the prayer for relief pursuant to § 14-295 is hereby denied.
THE COURT
Arnold, J.