Opinion
13-23-00178-CV
06-06-2024
ANTHONY ROHLF, TDCJ NO. 2089530, Appellant, v. MARIA E. IBARRA, ET AL. Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 81ST DISTRICT COURT OF KARNES COUNTY, TEXAS
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAIME TIJERINA Justice
This is an inmate litigation case brought under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.001-.014. By a single issue, appellant Anthony Rohlf complains that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his lawsuit against appellees Maria E. Ibarra, Mike A. Valdez, and Thomas W. Hyatt, all employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), as frivolous. We affirm.
This case is before this Court on transfer from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 73.001.
Rohlf is an inmate in the TDCJ Unit in Karnes County. On May 5, 2022, Rohlf sued appellees individually for "civil assault and failure to prevent assault." Rohlf sought compensatory and punitive damages, court costs, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, as well as attorney's fees. Appellees did not answer the suit.
The Office of the Attorney General (OAG), appearing as amicus curiae, filed an advisory with the trial court stating that Rohlf alleges intentional torts which do not fall within the limited waiver of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) and requesting that the trial court dismiss the case pursuant to Chapter 14 of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See id. On February 16, 2023, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to § 14.003(a)(2). See id. § 14.003(a)(2) (providing that the trial court may dismiss a case if it finds "the claim is frivolous or malicious"). This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court's dismissal of a claim pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code under an abuse of discretion standard. Wanzer v. Garcia, 299 S.W.3d 821, 826 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied); Greer v. Reaux, No. 13-18-00433-CV, 2020 WL 948368, at *3 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg Feb. 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). "The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred." Id. at 242. "The burden of proof rests on the appellant asserting abuse of discretion to overcome the presumption that the action of the trial court was justified." Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 94 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
Trial courts have broad discretion in dismissing a case under Chapter 14 because: "(1) prisoners have a strong incentive to litigate; (2) the government bears the cost of an in forma pauperis suit; (3) sanctions are not effective; and (4) the dismissal of unmeritorious claims accrues to the benefit of state officials, courts, and meritorious claimants." Id. at 653; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.003-.006; Gross v. Carroll, 339 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). A trial court may dismiss an inmate's claim as frivolous or malicious under Chapter 14 based on the following factors: the claim's ultimate chance of success; whether the claim has an arguable basis in law or fact; whether it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the petitioner because it arises from the same operative facts. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2).
"The TTCA provides a limited waiver of governmental immunity." Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Tex. 2014); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.023. The TTCA compels "dismissal of government employees when suit should have been brought against the government." Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 790.
If a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee's employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee's official capacity only.Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann. § 101.106(f); Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 791. Application of this election-of-remedies provision requires a determination as to "'whether an employee acted independently and is thus solely liable, or acted within the general scope of his or her employment such that the governmental unit is vicariously liable.'" Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 790 (citing Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2008)). "Scope of employment" is defined as "the performance for a governmental unit of the duties of an employee's office or employment and includes being in or about the performance of a task lawfully assigned to an employee by competent authority." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(5).
The Legislature mandates this determination to reduce "the resources that the government and its employees must use in defending redundant litigation and alternative theories of recovery." Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 790. "[A] suit against an employee in his official capacity actually seeks to impose liability against the governmental unit rather than on the individual specifically named." Id. at 791. And § 101.106(f) is "the appropriate avenue for dismissal of an employee who is considered to have been sued in his official capacity." Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f). Therefore, we must determine (1) whether the alleged conduct was within the scope of the officers' employment, and (2) whether Rohlf's suit could have been brought under the TTCA against the officers' governmental employer. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 791-792; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(f).
III. Discussion
By his sole issue, Rohlf argues the trial court "abused [its] discretion by dismissing [his] claims under Chapter 14."
Rohlf alleged that appellees were liable for civil assault and the failure to prevent assault while being housed in jail. Specifically, Rohlf stated that Ibarra "intentionally and knowingly caused bodily injury to [him] by slapping the left side of [his] face," while Valdez and Hyatt "intentionally created physical contact with [him] . . . by cranking [his] arms up behind [his] back while [he] was handcuffed and at the same time standing on [his] toes." These allegations stem from the officers' allegedly improper conduct while performing their duties as employees. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 (holding that the allegations of assault in appellant's petition against the officers stemmed from their allegedly improper conduct in the course of arresting appellant). As the supreme court stated in Alexander, Rohlf "did not allege any independent course of conduct by the officers not intended to serve any purpose of [the State]." Id.; Donohue v. Dominguez, 486 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2016, pet. denied) (holding that because the appellant did not allege an independent course of conduct by the officers intended to further their own purposes only, the trial court properly dismissed the claim). "[S]uch a suit is not a suit against the employee; it is, in all but name only, a suit against the governmental unit." Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 791 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that Rohlf's suit is based on conduct within the general scope of his employment. See id. at 792.
We next consider whether Rohlf's claims could have been brought under the TTCA. Id. In Alexander, the Texas Supreme Court assessed whether an inmate's tort claims could have been brought under the TTCA, stating:
[B]arring an independent statutory waiver of immunity, tort claims against the government are brought "under this chapter [the TTCA]" for subsection (f) purposes even when the TTCA does not waive immunity for those claims. Walker's common-law tort claims against the officers therefore could have been brought under the TTCA against the government. Because Walker's suit against the officers was based on conduct within the general scope of their employment and could have been brought under the TTCA against the County, Walker's suit is considered to be against the officers in their official capacities only . . . .Id. (cleaned up). Similarly, in this case, we conclude § 101.106(f) applies to Rohlf's claims. Because Rohlf's suit against the officers was based on conduct within the general scope of their employment and could have been brought under the TTCA against the TDCJ, Rohlf's suit is against the officers in their official capacities only. Id.; Donohue, 486 S.W.3d at 55. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or without any guiding rules and principles when it dismissed Rohlf's claims as frivolous. See Alexander, 435 S.W.3d at 792 ("[B]ecause the officers were sued in their official capacities, they were entitled to dismissal pursuant to subsection (f)."); Downer, 701 S.W.3d at 241-42. We overrule his sole issue.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.