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Rodriguez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Feb 7, 2007
No. 05-06-00939-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 7, 2007)

Opinion

No. 05-06-00939-CR.

Opinion issued February 7, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 004-87400-04.

Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and MAZZANT.


OPINION


Sonia Reyes Rodriguez appeals her conviction for the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated. In her only issue, she claims the trial court erred in denying her pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Background

In the present case, Parker police officer Michael McCandless testified that at approximately 11:00 or 11:15 p.m. on the evening of March 3, 2004, he received a dispatch concerning a "possibl[y] intoxicated driver" on Highway 78 in Lavon. Another driver had called the police and reported seeing a vehicle "that was swerving as it was driving down the highway." McCandless was informed by the dispatch operator that the driver who made this complaint had activated his "hazard lights" and was "following a red passenger vehicle." When he arrived at the scene, McCandless saw two vehicles. One of them had activated its hazard lights and was slowly following the red vehicle directly in front of it, which was driven by appellant. McCandless turned his patrol car around and got between the two vehicles. After he saw appellant's vehicle cross the white shoulder line and twice cross the double yellow no-passing center line, he "made a traffic stop" of the vehicle for "failure to maintain a single lane." Taking into account the information provided by the eyewitness and his own observations of the driver's erratic behavior, McCandless considered the possibility that appellant might be talking on the phone, asleep at the wheel, or intoxicated. As he approached the driver's side window of the vehicle he "could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle," which elevated his suspicions. Appellant was ultimately arrested for driving while intoxicated.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Thus, we give almost total deference to the trial court's ruling on (1) questions of historical fact and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). However, we review de novo a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if they do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53. Where the trial court denies the motion and does not file findings of historical fact, as in this case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the ruling is based upon implicit findings of fact supported by the record. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28. Furthermore, we will uphold the trial judge's decision so long as it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855-56.

Discussion

In her sole issue, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The State claims the officer was legally justified in stopping appellant's vehicle because (1) he had reasonable suspicion she was driving while intoxicated and (2) he observed her violating traffic laws. Both the Fourth Amendment and article one, section nine of the Texas Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 9. A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer, in light of his or her experience, has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The "reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective one: there need only be an objective basis for the stop; the subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Furthermore, a court's review is not limited to the violations an officer lists in making the stop; the test is whether the articulated facts about which the officer testified would, in light of the officer's experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, warrant a reasonable person to believe a violation had occurred. See id.; Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242-43 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). If an officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting a person has committed a traffic offense, the officer may legally initiate a traffic stop. See Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Chang, 994 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). The burden is on the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the stop. See Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Chang, 994 S.W.2d at 877. The State is not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but that the officer knew sufficient facts to reasonably suspect appellant had violated a traffic law. See McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Fisher, 56 S.W.3d at 163. In the present case, the State points to two traffic law violations as justification for stopping appellant: (1) crossing the double yellow no-passing center line and (2) driving on the improved shoulder of the highway. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.051 (Vernon 1999) (stating that a vehicle operator shall drive on the right half of the roadway); § 545.058 (permitting a driver to drive on an improved shoulder to the right of the roadway if it is necessary and can be done safely and if the driver meets one of seven exceptions). Appellant relies on the traffic offense of failing to stay within a single marked lane and argues the evidence does not establish the lack-of-safety element in section 545.060. See id. § 545.060(a)(2). However, McCandless also testified that he saw appellant twice cross the double yellow, no-passing center line and that he stopped the vehicle in part because of this activity. Traveling across the yellow line is a traffic violation in itself and does not require the additional element of unsafe maneuver as does section 545.060. See Griffin v. State, 54 S.W.3d 820, 823 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd); see also Chang, 994 S.W.2d at 878. Based on his observations, McCandless had reasonable suspicion a traffic offense had been committed, and he was therefore justified in stopping appellant. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.051 (Vernon 1999); Griffin, 54 S.W.3d at 823. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the pretrial suppression motion. We overrule appellant's sole issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.


Summaries of

Rodriguez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Feb 7, 2007
No. 05-06-00939-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 7, 2007)
Case details for

Rodriguez v. State

Case Details

Full title:SONIA REYES RODRIGUEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Feb 7, 2007

Citations

No. 05-06-00939-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 7, 2007)

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TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. `545.055(b) (Vernon 1999); Rodriguez v. State, No. 05-06-00939-CR, 2007 WL 404193, at…