Opinion
Civil No. 1:02CV78
August 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's and Defendant's timely objections to The Memorandum and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. pursuant to standing orders of designation and 28 U.S.C. § 636, this Court referred Defendant's motion to dismiss to the Magistrate Judge for a recommendation as to disposition. The Magistrate Judge entered a detailed memorandum recommending that the matter be remanded to the state court or, in the alternative, that it be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted based on the Defendant's assertion of public official immunity. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court conducts a de novo review of those portions of a Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation to which specific objections are filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This Court will not address general objections to the Magistrate Judge's final Recommendation. "A general objection . . . has the same effect as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate useless." Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). In this Circuit, de novo review is unnecessary "when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Those parts of a Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation to which no specific objections are filed are given careful review. Id.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Bobby D. Robinson filed this action in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division of Buncombe County, North Carolina, alleging that he sustained damages as a result of an incident at Mountain View Correctional Facility where a guard, an employee of the Defendant Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA"), placed handcuffs on his wrists in a manner that caused him severe injury, required surgery, and has left him with permanent injury. Plaintiff's claim is based on a tort law theory of negligence, not on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint demanded "an amount in excess of $10,000." Upon request from CCA, Plaintiff filed a "Notice of Relief Sought" seeking damages in the amount of $200,000. N.C. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Based on this notice, Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 1446 based on diversity of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. After filing answer, CCA filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). After the requisite exchange of memoranda, the Magistrate Judge heard the matter on July 17, 2002, and entered his findings, conclusions, and recommendations on July 31, 2002.
In the Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge questioned the propriety of CCA's claim that it was entitled to assert immunity from suit at the same time it asserted that it was not a citizen of North Carolina for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge found that CCA was factually an entity distinct from the State of North Carolina for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, citing Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). He was concerned, however, that CCA would receive the benefit of its employee's immunity without bearing the burden. Memorandum and Recommendation, at 6. As such, he found that CCA was a citizen of North Carolina, that removal of the case based on diversity of the parties was improper, and recommended remand of the case to the state court.
Recognizing the novelty of this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge alternatively recommended that the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Magistrate Judge found that the guard employed by Defendant was entitled to public official immunity in his personal capacity from a claim of negligence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-37(g); Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 699-700, 394 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1990); Price v. Davis, 132 N.C. App. 556, 562, 512 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1999); Kephart v. Pendergraph, 131 N.C. App. 559, 507 S.E.2d 915 (1998). CCA is entitled to assert the defenses available to its employee when sued for his acts under a theory of respondeat superior. See, 27 Am. Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 459 (2002) ("Because the employer is vicariously and not separately liable in such circumstances, the employer's liability cannot be greater than the employee's liability, nor is an employer liable unless one of its employees is found liable.").
III. DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION
CCA objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that it is a citizen of North Carolina based on its assertion of the defense of immunity in this case. Section 1332 sets forth the requirements for proper subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts based on diversity of citizenship. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost, and is between (1) citizens of different states. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). That section further provides, "[f]or the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title (1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Removal of the case is proper and remand is not required if the diversity requirements of § 1332 are met. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The complaint (including the "Statement of Monetary Relief Sought") states a claim for an amount in excess of $75,000 and the first prong of the jurisdictional requirement is met.
The Court notes that CCA also objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that CCA "is a Tennessee corporation." Memorandum and Recommendation, at 1-2. The complaint alleges that CCA is incorporated in Maryland; CCA has its principle place of business in Tennessee. As such, CCA's could properly assert this defense and the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the case on these grounds as an alternative to remand.
The Magistrate Judge next turned to the issue of whether the suit was "between citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Under the terms of § 1332(c)(1) CCA is deemed to be a citizen of both Maryland and Tennessee. Because CCA raises claims of sovereign immunity, the Magistrate Judge sought to determine whether CCA was a separate entity from the state or "nothing more than an agent or mere arm of the State itself." Moor, supra. Under the analysis set forth in that case, the Magistrate Judge concluded that CCA was a separate entity from the State of North Carolina. Memorandum and Recommendation, at 6. The Magistrate Judge then concluded that since CCA asserts sovereign immunity it cannot claim diversity. Id. CCA argues that the conclusion regarding immunity has no bearing on the conclusion regarding citizenship for the purposes of immunity. CCA cites several cases in support of this proposition. See, Daughtry v. Arlington County, Va., 490 F. Supp. 307, 311 (D.D.C. 1980) ("However, immunity from suit does not affect the relationship between a state and a county."); Taylor v. Prince George's County, Md., 377 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 n. 4 (D.Md. 1974) ("While this judicially created limitation on the independence of Maryland counties expands the coverage of governmental immunity, it is insufficient to deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)."). The issue of immunity controls the available remedy, not the jurisdiction of the Court. Daughtry, supra. Determinations about citizenship are based on a different set of factors than determinations about immunity. Taylor, supra; Moor, 411 U.S. at 717; 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's alternative recommendation that the case be dismissed on the grounds of public official immunity. As stated supra, the Magistrate Judge found that CCA's employee, the guard in question, would be entitled to assert public official immunity against this suit in his personal capacity. As such, CCA is entitled to assert it in a suit against it as his employer. Memorandum and Recommendation, at 11. Plaintiff acknowledges that public prison guards are public officials entitled to personal immunity. Plaintiff's Objections, filed August 9, 2002, 1. Plaintiff does not object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that North Carolina law extends "immunity to private prison guards coterminous with the immunity enjoyed by state-employed guards, at least in the context of simple negligence claims." Memorandum and Recommendation, at 10; see also, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-37(g). Nor does Plaintiff object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that "sued under a theory of respondeat superior, [CCA] has properly asserted a defense that would have been available to its employees, had they actually been sued. . . ." Id., at 11; see, 27 Am. Jur.2d Employment Relationship § 459, supra. Plaintiff erroneously concluded that the Magistrate Judge found that CCA was entitled to assert sovereign immunity on the basis of its contractual relationship to the State of North Carolina. It is this conclusion to which the Plaintiff objects. Although the Magistrate Judge's findings do not make this distinction clear, CCA correctly observes that public official immunity is distinct from sovereign immunity. Public official immunity is immunity from suit in a personal capacity available to governmental officials for their actions in exercising discretion which has been delegated to them. See, Price v. Davis, supra; Harwood v. Johnson, 326 N.C. 231, 388 S.E.2d 439 (1990); Epps v. Duke University, Inc., 122 N.C. App. 198, 205, 468 S.E.2d 846, 852 (1996). Conversely, sovereign immunity is available to individuals in their official capacities based on the notion that a suit against an individual who is vested with authority by the state in his official capacity is the same as a suit against the state itself. Epps, 122 N.C. App. at 203, 468 S.E.2d at 850. Public official immunity, as a personal immunity, is based on the nature of the functions the individual performs, whereas an individual's assertion of sovereign immunity in an official capacity is based on that person's relationship to the state. As such, Robinson's objection is overruled.
V. ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to dismiss is ALLOWED, and this matter is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in its entirety.