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Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians v. Anderson

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Sep 29, 2008
No. A119362 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)

Opinion


ROBINSON RANCHERIA OF POMO INDIANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KENYA ANDERSON et al., Defendants and Respondents. A119362 California Court of Appeal, First District, Second Division September 29, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Lake County Super. Ct. No. CV404003

Kline, P.J.

Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians (plaintiff), in this action for conversion of federal TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) funds, sued Kenya Anderson and Rick Brusseau (defendants) for acts arising from their respective roles as executive director and chief financial officer of the California Tribal TANF Partnership (CTTP), a federally funded oversight entity created by a consortium of tribes. Defendants demurred on grounds that TANF funds were property “subject to a restriction against alienation” within the meaning of title 28 United States Code section 1360(b) (section 1360(b)), thus divesting the state court of subject matter jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a)), and further claimed failure to state a cause of action (id., subd. (e)).

Section 1360 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposite the name of the State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:

The trial court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction. Without reaching the alternative ground, it sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appeals, urging that the court misinterpreted federal law. We reverse the judgment of dismissal.

Background

Pleaded Facts Common to All Counts

Plaintiff is a federally recognized Indian tribe exercising jurisdiction over land in Lake County held in trust for its benefit by the federal government. Its governing body is the Robinson Rancheria Citizens Business Council (RRCBC).

Plaintiff alleges that, in 2003, the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Administration for Children and Families (ACF) granted it funding for CTTP to provide TANF, and related social services, to Indian families throughout Northern and Central California. Plaintiff, as sole grantee and, “in ACF’s view, . . . solely responsible for [the funds’] proper use,” established and structured CTTP as a consortium of about 20 Indian tribes and tribal organizations (together member tribes). The consortium formed a CTTP Advisory Board (advisory board) comprised of one representative from each member tribe, and the advisory board in turn elected an executive board comprised of five representatives, including a permanent seat for plaintiff.

Anderson, a resident of Lake County, served as CTTP’s executive director, and Brusseau, a resident of Mendocino County, served as chief financial officer. CTTP’s “principle [sic] executive office” is in Lake County.

In 2005, the RRCBC and both CTTP governing boards negotiated an operating agreement (not made part of the complaint) that increased plaintiff’s oversight of CTTP, particularly the expenditure of federal grant funds. The operating agreement provided that RRCBC “ ‘shall be provided with reasonable advance notice of: settlement of any claims in excess of $5,000; any procurement expenses in excess of $20,000.’ ”

In October 2006, having information that the executive board “was failing to comply with” the operating agreement, the RRCBC decided to “further increase its direct oversight of CTTP” and planned to announce intended changes at a quarterly meeting of the member tribes on October 25. Defendants learned of this and, on October 24, the eve of the meeting, “conspired to have selected members of the Executive Board terminate their employment and issue severance compensation checks to each of them.” They did this without informing plaintiff’s representative on the executive board.

Anderson had by then served on the executive board for 10 weeks under a written employment agreement (not attached), and his purported severance consisted of six months’ salary, totaling $53,850. Brusseau had served on CTTP for 15 months, without a written agreement, and his purported severance was $88,500, consisting of six months’ salary ($51,500), purported previously assumed additional responsibilities ($25,000), and $12,000 in claimed CTTP expenses he had charged to a personal credit card.

At the quarterly meeting the next morning, in Tehama County, RRCBC members announced their intention to increase oversight but, at a break that morning, learned for the first time that members of the executive board had purported to terminate defendants’ employment and approve issuance of severance checks to them. An RRCBC member immediately tried to stop payment by calling the issuing bank, WestAmerica Bank, 100 miles away in Lake County, but was informed that Brusseau had already converted both checks (written against CTTP’s operating account) into cashier checks. Brusseau had driven the 100 miles “presumably to avoid the customary bank ‘hold’ on checks of such large amounts.”

On November 1, 2006, CTTP payroll personnel then mistakenly issued Brusseau an electronic transfer of his weekly pay, $1,303.28, despite his termination.

Plaintiff’s demands for return of the severance and mistaken payments, plus an accounting from Brusseau (January 2007 demand letters attached to the complaint), went refused or unanswered. In February 2007, the ACF informed RRCBC that plaintiff was being assessed a misuse-of-funds penalty of $142,350, the total of the severance payments to defendants. Plaintiff filed this action that same month.

The Causes of Action

The first and second causes of action, against Anderson and Brusseau respectively, allege that defendants unlawfully converted to their own use the purported severance pay, and the post-termination funds transfer received in error by Brusseau. Plaintiff claims to be the owner of all such funds and seeks their return, plus exemplary damages for willful, wanton, malicious and oppressive conduct, plus additional damages incurred in trying to recover the funds.

The third cause of action (against Anderson) and the fourth and fifth causes of action (against Brusseau) are common counts for money had and received, for each of the same amounts, it being additionally alleged that the amounts “in equity and good conscience” belong to plaintiff.

The sixth and final cause of action is for breach of fiduciary duty, owed to plaintiff by each defendant as an officer of CTTP, to act in the interests of plaintiff and CTTP and to protect and safeguard the funds. Actual and exemplary damages are sought.

Discussion

I. Review Standards

In reviewing a demurrer, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation and treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967 (Aubry).) We also consider matters that may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) We read the complaint as a whole and all of its parts in context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) We affirm if any ground offered in support of the demurrer was well taken, but find error if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (Aubry, at p. 967.)

We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo, as a question of law. (Robbins v. Foothill Nissan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774.) Where this turns on the meaning of a federal statute, we start with the statute itself, reading it as a whole in light of its object and policy, to ascertain and give effect to the congressional intent, avoiding only absurd results. (Id. at pp. 1774-1775.) We review independently whether a cause of action is stated (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146), and review deferentially for abuse of discretion whether leave to amend should have been granted (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 970-971; Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501). It is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend if a plaintiff shows a reasonable possibility that any defect can be cured by amendment (Aubry, at p. 967), but it is the plaintiff’s burden to make that showing (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318).

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

An Indian tribe wishing to administer tribal TANF funds must submit for the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services a three-year Tribal Family Assistance Grant (TFAG) (45 C.F.R. §§ 286.65 et seq.), and the tribe is thereafter subject to use restrictions, audits and penalties for misuse (e.g., id., §§ 286.35 [proper uses], 286.200 [annual audits for grantees], 286.45 [noncompliance defined as misuse], 286.195(a)(1)-(2) [misuse results in reduced subsequent funding]).

The parties debated below the issue of whether these restrictions rendered disputes over alleged conversion of tribal TANF funds beyond state court jurisdiction as involving property “subject to a restriction against alienation” within the contemplation of section 1360(b). Defendants having prevailed on that ground, the restriction-against-alienation debate exclusively occupies each party’s initial brief filed on appeal. Neither side cites authority directly on point, but plaintiff argues that these restrictions are no different than those imposed for state TANF funds (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 603 et seq.), that congressional and regulatory restrictions do not rise to the level of restrictions against alienation unless they are akin to land transactions requiring advance federal approval, and that relegating tribes to federal court jurisdiction risks leaving them without a forum should federal courts find lack of a federal question.

Defendants argue that the restrictions and penalties here are indeed akin to those recognized for personal property like proceeds of trust lands or other resources, that the absence of need for prior federal approval is unremarkable given that tribal TANF funds are well regulated, and that treating tribal TANF funds as falling within the limitation of section 1360(b) is consistent with a tribal autonomy goal of limiting the broad grant of state jurisdiction otherwise apparent from section 1360(a). (See fn. 1, ante.)

Belatedly, in its reply brief, plaintiff raises for the first time a threshold argument that the limiting language of section 1360(b) is immaterial because, in the language of section 1360(a), no claims in this case “arise in the areas of Indian country” so as to make section 1360 applicable at all.

This is a highly irregular manner of raising the last point, but we will consider it. Ordinarily, points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered, in fairness to respondents who lack the opportunity to respond (Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11; Hibernia Sav. and Loan Soc. v. Farnham (1908) 153 Cal. 578, 584; American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453), but these respondents requested oral argument and were invited to address the issue then. Also, while the issue was not directly advanced below, the rule that on appeal a litigant may not argue theories for the first time does not apply to pure questions of law (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324), and the question of subject matter jurisdiction is a pure question of law (Robbins v. Foothill Nissan, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1774), with the interpretation of the underlying statute similarly posing a question of law calling for independent judgment (City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949; Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465). Further, while the “Indian country” issue was not raised earlier with direct reference to section 1360(a), it was raised in policy arguments about section 1360(b)’s limitation. Plaintiff’s opening brief, for example, urged that this case “has nothing to do with Indian lands, money derived from Indian lands, or any other property either held by the United States in trust for Indians . . . .” Subject matter jurisdiction may be raised any time (Boisclair v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1140, 1144, fn. 1 (Boisclair)), and our review of this issue on demurrer is confined to the face of the complaint, thus with no one disadvantaged by a lack of opportunity to present evidence below (Shaeffer v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 348, 354-355). Plaintiff also expressly declined leave to amend below, opting to stand on the original complaint’s allegations.

A. “Indian country”

The Indian-country issue is meritorious. Our state high court has explained the origin of section 1360, stressing its focal concern with Indian lands. “The predominance of the federal government in Indian affairs is nowhere more pronounced than in the field of Indian property law. Most Indian lands are owned by the United States and held in trust for the benefit of Indians. [Citation.] In addition to the normal trust relationship, there is extensive federal legislation protecting Indian property and property claims. Chief among these are statutes that forbid the alienation of Indian tribal property without approval by the federal government. [Citation.]” (Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1148.) “Federal Indian land policy has itself oscillated between the promotion of Indian tribal autonomy and the desire to assimilate Indians as ordinary citizens into American society.” (Id. at p. 1149.)

“Public Law number 280, of which section 1360 is part, was enacted by Congress in 1953 (67 Stat. 588) during an assimilationist period. It grants both civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country to six designated states, including California, and permits other states the option of assuming similar jurisdiction.” (Boisclair, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1149-1150.) “Public Law number 280, in its final form, represented ‘an attempt at compromise between wholly abandoning the Indians to the states and maintaining them as federally protected wards, subject only to federal or tribal jurisdiction.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1150.)

Section 1360(b) is central to that compromise, and ‘may be read as simply a reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government relationship in all respects save the conferral of state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action involving Indians.’ [Citation.] This ‘reaffirmation of the existing reservation Indian-Federal Government relationship’ was accomplished by excepting from the grant of jurisdiction to the states any power to legislate on, or adjudicate matters pertaining to, land held by the United States in trust for the Indians. Thus, the exclusion of the states from acts leading to the ‘alienation, encumbrance or taxation’ of Indian land has been construed to prohibit application of local zoning ordinances to such land [citation] and taxation of individual Indian reservation dwellings [citation].” (Ibid.)

The general assumption has been articulated this way: “Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State. [Citations.]” (Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973) 411 U.S. 145, 148-149.) It is no surprise, then, that section 1360(a) confers state-court jurisdiction over “civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country” (italics added). (California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202, 207, fn. omitted [“In Pub. L. 280, Congress expressly granted six States, including California, jurisdiction over specified areas of Indian country within the States’ ”]; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering (1986) 476 U.S. 877, 879 [“Public Law 280 gave federal consent to the assumption of state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country”]; Bryan v. Itasca County (1976) 426 U.S. 373, 384, fn. 11 [noting the law’s title, “ ‘A Bill to confer jurisdiction on the States . . ., with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian reservations within such States’ ”].)

The intent is thus clear from both the plain language and the history of the statute. Unless a cause of action arises in an area of Indian country, section 1360(a) cannot apply.

Indian country encompasses (a) Indian reservation lands, (b) “dependent Indian communities,” and (c) “Indian allotments.” (18 U.S.C. § 1151.) Under none of those definitions does any cause of action in this case appear, from the face of the complaint, to have arisen in Indian country. Plaintiff itself is a recognized tribe exercising jurisdiction over federal trust lands, but there are no allegations showing that any of the alleged acts or even residences of defendants, or the sites of their planning or conversion of funds, or sites of the CTTP quarterly meeting or meetings of its governing boards, were in Indian country. Defendants conceded this point at oral argument.

Accordingly, under the general principle that controversies between Indians are justiciable by state courts (Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 148-149), it would be error to sustain a special demurrer for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a)) if based solely on section 1360(a). It logically follows, as plaintiff argues, that if these causes of action did not arise from areas within Indian country, then the further jurisdictional limitation of section 1360(b), for property “subject to restriction against alienation,” similarly has no application. Defendants strongly urged at oral argument, however, that the “alienation” language reflects a broad policy that must be read as applying to any cause of action, regardless of where it arose. They cite no authority on point, but assuming purely for sake of argument that this may be true, we examine the further limitation.

B. Property “subject to a restriction against alienation”

To reiterate, while neither side cites authority on point, plaintiff argues that these restrictions are no different than those imposed for state (versus tribal) TANF funds (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 603 et seq.), that congressional and regulatory restrictions do not rise to the level of restrictions against alienation unless they are akin to land transactions requiring advance federal approval, and that relegating tribes to federal court jurisdiction risks leaving them without a forum should federal courts find lack of a federal question.

Defendants argue that the restrictions and penalties here are indeed like those recognized for personal property, such as proceeds of trust lands or other resources, that the absence of need for prior federal approval is unremarkable given that tribal TANF funds are well regulated, and that treating tribal TANF funds as falling within section 1360(b) is consistent with a tribal autonomy goal of limiting the broad grant of state jurisdiction otherwise apparent from section 1360(a). (See fn. 1, ante.)

We find defendants’ position to be untenable. Money may in a broad sense be “personal property,” but to suppose that ever-present regulatory restrictions on the use of federal funds render such funding “subject to a restriction against alienation” would be a peculiar use of the term “alienation” and would assume that federal funds become “inalienable” once they pass into tribal hands or control. The regulations on which defendants rely do not render misuses of funds void or voidable, as we would expect “inalienable” to connote (compare 25 U.S.C. § 177 [no conveyances of lands “shall be of any validity in law or equity” unless by treaty, convention or other specified authority]); rather, misuses result in adminstrative penalties that include fines and reduced future funding (45 C.F.R. § 286.195 et seq.). Defendants’ lack of case authority speaks loudly that the notion is absurd. Virtually every grant of federal funding comes with regulatory restrictions, and defendants do not cite any significant differences between the regulation of tribal TANF funds and state TANF funds.

Our own research also discloses support for plaintiff’s concern about lack of federal jurisdiction, for it has been said that “the fact that federal funds are involved is, by itself, insufficient to establish the existence of a federal question. [Citations.]” (Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma v. Cuomo (10th Cir. 1999) 193 F.3d 1162, 1167.) If state courts lack jurisdiction over causes of action about tribal TANF funds (whether or not arising from Indian country), then there might be no forum available at all, which is surely not what Congress intended.

Accordingly, the trial court’s no-jurisdiction conclusion is not supported by either subdivision of section 1360.

III. Failure to State a Cause of Action

This leaves us to examine the alternative ground urged on defendants’ demurrer, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)). In this we are totally unassisted by briefing on either side, which suggests an appalling ignorance of the rule that “[a] judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper on any grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court acted on that ground. [Citations.]” (Carman v. Alvord, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 324; Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) Our request that the parties come to oral argument prepared to discuss these issues yielded little help.

Conversion.

Defendants attacked the conversion causes of action (first and second) as not showing that plaintiff owned or possessed the TANF funds; rather, they were in “direct control” of CTTP. The principal flaw in this attack, however, is that the complaint expressly alleges that plaintiff “was, and still is, the owner” of those funds, and was, “in ACF’s view, the official grantee of the federal funds and solely responsible for their proper use.” These ultimate facts were taken as true for purposes of the demurrer. Defendants evidently meant to undermine those allegations by reference to the federal grant statutes and regulations, yet they conceded that, under the federal grant structure, plaintiff could be “the custodian, or caretaker, or trustee,” of the funds. We see no obstacle should the federal government be deemed the true owner after a grant of tribal TANF funds. “A person without legal title to property may recover from a converter if the plaintiff is responsible to the true owner, such as in the case of a bailee or pledgee of the property. [Citation.]” (Department of Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1096.) As for CTTP’s oversight role, plaintiff alleged that it and the other member tribes created CTTP for that very purpose, implying a delegation of authority through agency.

Money had and received.

The third through fifth causes of action (one for each of the misappropriated amounts) were common counts for money had and received, and common counts, given abbreviated pleading requirements, are generally immune from attack by demurrer (Pike v. Zadig (1915) 171 Cal.273, 276-277; Pleasant v. Samuels (1896) 114 Cal. 34, 37; Moya v. Northrup (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 276, 279). A demurrer does lie where the common count is nothing more than an alternative pleading of a cause of action that is itself demurrable and rests on the same facts (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394-395), but we have already found valid bases in counts one and two, based apparently on the same facts.

Contract and conspiracy.

Noting various allegations of conspiring and the severance pay being in violation of the operating agreement, defendants attacked the pleading generally as failing to show that they were parties to the operating agreement, thus capable of breaching it, and as failing to adequately plead conspiracy. Plaintiff, however, correctly observed that there was no cause of action for breach of contract or conspiracy as such. We add that allegations of “conspiring” seem to be used in the non-legal sense of planning together.

Breach of fiduciary duty.

Defendants attacked the sixth cause of action, for breach of fiduciary duty, as lacking facts showing the existence of a fiduciary relationship between themselves and plaintiff, as opposed to defendants’ employer, CTTP.

“There are two kinds of fiduciary duties—those imposed by law and those undertaken by agreement. [Citations.] Fiduciary duties are imposed by law in certain technical, legal relationships such as those between partners or joint venturers [citations], husbands and wives [citation], guardians and wards, trustees and beneficiaries, principals and agents, and attorneys and clients [citation].” (GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Services, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 409, 416 (GAB).) A fiduciary duty undertaken by agreement is “when one person enters into a confidential relationship with another,” and this poses questions of fact as to whether confidence was reposed and accepted. (Id. at p. 417.)

We conclude that a fiduciary duty between plaintiff and defendants is not adequately pleaded. Plaintiff urged below that this was a factual matter improperly resolved by demurrer, but we disagree. “Whenever the plaintiff’s theory is that some relationship or circumstance creates an affirmative duty, he must allege those facts. [Citations.]” (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 547, pp. 636-637.)

The complaint shows that defendants, at all relevant times before orchestrating their firings and severance pay, served as executive director and chief financial officer of CTTP. Their titles would seem to make them fiduciaries of CTTP as a matter of law, although the complaint does not explain their duties. “[A]n officer who participates in management of the corporation, exercising some discretionary authority, is a fiduciary of the corporation as a matter of law. Conversely, a ‘nominal’ officer with no management authority is not a fiduciary. Whether a particular officer participates in management is a question of fact.” (GAB, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 420-421.) Defendants conceded below, for sake of argument, that they might have been fiduciaries of CTTP but decried lack of factual support for the following allegation: “Both Defendants were officers of CTTP and owed a fiduciary duty to [plaintiff] as such.” (Italics added.)

We agree that no factual allegations show how fiduciary duties owed to CTTP would have extended to plaintiff. CTTP is a separate entity, according to the complaint, federally funded but “established and structured” by plaintiff as a consortium of 20 or so member tribes that in turn formed an advisory board, which in turn elected the executive board. It is alleged that plaintiff “lacked unilateral control over CTTP.” Those facts would seem to make the executive board thrice removed from plaintiff, yet the complaint confusingly goes on to allege that plaintiff (without mention of the consortium’s role, if any) “delegated responsibility for overseeing CTTP to the [advisory board],” yet that the executive board somehow had responsibility “to directly oversee CTTP’s operations, delivery of social services and its expenditure of funds.” Confusing, too, is that defendants are alleged to be officers of CTTP, but without allegations that they served on either of CTTP’s governing boards. The governing boards are the bodies with whom RRCBC (plaintiff’s own governing body) negotiated the “bilateral” operating agreement in 2005 that required advance notice of claim settlements exceeding $5,000 and procurement expenses exceeding $20,000.

Thus the complaint presents a variety of allegations, none of which show a fiduciary duty arising between plaintiff and defendants. We see no facts creating or ultimately alleging an agency or trust relationship, for example, and the agreements by which the boards were formed and authority was delegated are largely unexplained. If plaintiff can clarify the relationships of the various parties, entities and boards, it may be reasonably possible to cure the defect by amendment. Plaintiff offered below that, as the grantee of TANF funds entrusted to CTTP, plaintiff was like an investor-stockholder in a corporation (citing Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 179 [corporate officers and directors owe a fiduciary duty to stockholders]). Whatever the validity of that theory, however, there are currently insufficient facts to make out such a relationship.

In conclusion, the alternate ground of failure to state a cause of action had merit only as to the sixth cause of action, for breach of fiduciary duty. This being a general demurrer to an original complaint, with a reasonable possibility of cure by amendment (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 39), we direct leave to amend.

Disposition

The judgment of dismissal is reversed. The order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend is reversed and modified to grant the demurrer, with leave to amend, for failure to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Costs to plaintiff.

We concur: Haerle, J., Lambden, J.

State of Indian country affected

“California All Indian country within the State.

“(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest therein.”


Summaries of

Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians v. Anderson

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Sep 29, 2008
No. A119362 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)
Case details for

Robinson Rancheria of Pomo Indians v. Anderson

Case Details

Full title:ROBINSON RANCHERIA OF POMO INDIANS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. KENYA…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division

Date published: Sep 29, 2008

Citations

No. A119362 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2008)