Opinion
04-22-00715-CR
02-07-2024
Justin Earl ROAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas Trial Court No. 18-04-054-CRW Honorable Lynn Ellison, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Beth Watkins, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Appellant Justin Roan pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual assault and four counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment of thirty years for each of the aggravated sexual assault counts and to fifteen years for each of the indecency counts. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11, 22.021. In two issues, Roan complains that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress audio recordings of his conversations with the complainant's parents because the conversations constituted custodial interrogations that lacked the safeguards afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) in not signing findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm.
I. Background
In the fall of 2017, the complainant told her mother that Roan, her mother's ex-boyfriend, had sexually abused her. The mother notified law enforcement, and an investigation began. Thereafter, Roan had separate conversations with the complainant's mother and father wherein he admitted to sexually abusing the complainant. Roan did not know that each parent had recorded the telephone conversation. The parents turned the recordings over to the lead investigator. Roan was indicted on a total of seven counts of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by sexual contact.
Roan moved to suppress the recordings on the grounds that the telephone conversations constituted custodial interrogations because they were recorded by "non-law enforcement actors at the direction of law enforcement." Roan further complained that his recorded statements "were made by [him] before he was given warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), or Article 38.22 § 3(a)(2)," which violated Roan's "right to due process of law and deprive[d] Defendant of his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Sections 9 and 19 of the Texas Constitution; and Articles 1.04 and 1.06, 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure."
At the hearing on Roan's motion to suppress, the trial court considered the testimony of Gary Laughlin, Jr., an investigator with the Wilson County Sheriff's Office, and the parents. Investigator Laughlin testified that each parent provided him with a recording of a conversation involving the respective parent and Roan. Investigator Laughlin denied advising the parents to record any conversation with Roan or giving the parents questions to ask Roan. Investigator Laughlin also denied being present at the time that the recorded conversations took place. He testified that he first became aware of the recordings when the parents provided them to him. Similarly, each parent denied being asked by any law enforcement officer to record conversations with Roan, being given questions to ask Roan, and having their conversation with Roan while law enforcement officers were present.
The trial court denied Roan's motion to suppress. Thereafter, Roan entered an open plea of guilty, and the trial court sentenced him as provided above. Roan timely appealed from the trial court's final judgment.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. See State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). An appellate court gives almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts. See id. Likewise, an appellate court affords almost total deference to a trial court's ruling on mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution to those questions turns on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id. at 871-72. However, an appellate court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. See id. at 872.
B. Applicable Law
A custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Paez v. State, 681 S.W.2d 34, 36-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). The procedural safeguards under Miranda apply only to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers or their agents. See Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (stating that article 38.22 does not apply to non-law enforcement personnel who are not state agents). The act of talking to an officer on the telephone does not constitute a custodial interrogation unless the defendant establishes that he was in custody during the during the telephonic questioning. See Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 294-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Wilson v. State, 195 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2006, no pet.) ("Because Wilson was not in custody while being questioned, the failure to advise him of his rights did not make the statements inadmissible under either Miranda or article 38.22.").
C. Analysis
In this case, Roan argues that the recorded statements "were recorded by non-law enforcement actors at the direction of law enforcement, and as such the denial of [his] motion to suppress was an abuse of discretion." However, even if the complainant's parents were "non-law enforcement actors" acting "at the direction of law enforcement," Roan's participation in the telephone conversations cannot be categorized as custodial interrogations. A custodial interrogation requires that the person subject to the interrogation was taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 821. Roan had not been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action when questioned by the complainant's parents; accordingly, the procedural safeguards of the Constitution and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 821; Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 294-95; see also Lacca v. State, 696 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd) (holding recorded telephone conversation with arson investigator initiated by defendant before his arrest could not be considered custodial interrogation). Therefore, we overrule Roan's first issue.
In Roan's second issue, he contends that the trial court erred by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as to its suppression ruling. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that suppression findings and conclusions are mandatory even when "neither party requested written findings at any level of the proceedings, and the issue was not considered by the lower court." Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 & n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noting article 38.22, section 6 is "mandatory in its language and . . . requires a trial court to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the voluntariness of a confession whether or not the defendant objects to the absence of such omitted filing" (internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, we abated the appeal for entry of findings and conclusions pursuant to Vasquez. Such findings and conclusions were filed with this court on October 4, 2023, and we have since reinstated this appeal. We overrule Roan's second issue as moot.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.