Opinion
E082831
06-12-2024
In re E.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.H., Defendant and Appellant. RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. DPRI2300082, Dorothy McLaughlin, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Catherine E. Rupp, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAPHAEL J.
The juvenile court terminated father's reunification services at the six-month dependency review hearing after he refused to participate meaningfully in reunification services. Father argues the court exceeded its authority by terminating his services while continuing mother's services and not setting a permanency planning hearing. He also argues the court abused its discretion by terminating his services when a permanency planning hearing was not imminent and erred by finding the department provided reasonable services. We conclude the juvenile court correctly assessed the parents' participation in services separately, appropriately exercised discretion in terminating father's services while continuing mother's, and based its finding that services were reasonable on substantial evidence.
I FACTS
A. Removal and Dependency
On March 5, 2023, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services, Children's Services Division (department) received an allegation that K.H. (then two years old) and E.H. (then six months old) were victims of emotional abuse and general neglect.
Their mother reported she had been involved in multiple domestic violence incidents with the father in front of the children. At the time, she had two black eyes, a laceration on her neck, and a hematoma on her forehead. Father had been arrested for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse.
Mother told the social worker she and father had physical fights and said she suffered from depression. She said father would isolate her, pin her down, and punch or slap her in the face. She said she had not called law enforcement to report those incidents and blamed herself for the violence. She said she did call law enforcement when father had a physical confrontation with her own father.
Mother said the day before father had head-butted her three times during an argument, and she head-butted him once. She said he "put her on the bed, got on top of her, and held her down." However, she claimed after the arrest they agreed not to fight any more and she refused to obtain a restraining order. When the department asked her to agree to a safety plan that would require one parent to leave the home, she refused. She also refused referrals for a domestic violence program, mental health services, counseling, and parenting education.
Father was combative and resistant when the social worker interviewed him. He said he had been diagnosed with multiple personality disorder as a teenager. He denied engaging in physical fights with mother. He said he and mother were having a loud argument the day before, and the maternal relatives began pounding on the door. He said he opened the door, and maternal grandfather came in and tried to fight him. He said mother suffered a cut on her head when she fell, and law enforcement arrested him because of her injury. He blamed the two year old for causing mother's black eye a week earlier. He declined any services and told the social worker "I don't need any of that."
Maternal grandmother denied seeing the parents engage in physical fights but said she saw mother with bruises that she suspected father caused. She said she called law enforcement when she suspected father was hitting mother, but mother always denied father had caused her injuries. A maternal aunt said she heard the parents arguing and had called law enforcement in the past. During the most recent incident, the aunt heard mother cry out in pain during the argument. She reported seeing mother with black eyes three times but did not know what caused the injuries.
The family lived in the converted garage of a house where the maternal grandparents and other relatives lived. Their home was dirty and unkept. Both parents used marijuana. Mother said she smoked marijuana to soothe her headaches and relax, and father smoked it to treat pain caused by gunshot injury. The social worker saw a bong on a table, accessible to the older child.
On March 8, the department obtained a protective custody warrant to remove the children from their parents and placed them in a foster home. Two days later, the department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the children came under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (unlabeled statutory references refer to this code) due to the parent's domestic violence and mother's failure to protect the children and obtain a restraining order (b-1, b-2), both parents' unresolved mental health issues (b-3, b-4), and the parents' neglect of the children's health and safety by maintaining their home in an unsafe condition (b-5).
On March 13, the juvenile court ordered the children detained from both parents. The parents were offered supervised visits twice a week and supervised phone contact. The court ordered the parents to visit separately. The court set a jurisdiction hearing for April.
Before that hearing, mother changed her story. She denied any domestic violence had occurred and said she had lied to law enforcement and a social worker. She said she hurt her head and suffered a black eye when she slipped on the wet ground and her two year old blackened her other eye by throwing a bottle at her face. She claimed she had agreed to a safety plan because she felt harassed by the social worker. She denied being depressed or smoking marijuana, though she said father used marijuana for medical purposes. She denied father's mental health interfered with his ability to parent the children.
During this period, the parents went to a supervised visit together despite the court order that they visit separately. Father recorded the visit and was rude to the foster family agency social worker.
On April 27, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing. The department amended the petition to modify the allegation about father's mental health diagnosis and struck the allegation about mother's unresolved mental health issues. Father argued against jurisdiction. He claimed there was no physical violence between the parents, denied his marijuana use posed a risk of harm to the children, and argued there was insufficient evidence he was diagnosed with multiple personality disorder.
The court sustained the allegations, declared the children dependents, removed them from their parents, and ordered the parents to participate in reunification services.
B. Father's Reunification Services
Father's visits and services went poorly. On May 19, the juvenile court suspended his visits due to inappropriate and disruptive behaviors. On June 29, the department attempted to meet with him to discuss his case plan services, but he failed to show up. The department referred him to MarSell Wellness Center for individual counseling, domestic violence, and anger management services. They also referred him to MFI Recovery Center for substance abuse services and made a referral for on-demand substance abuse testing. MFI Recovery attempted to schedule an intake appointment with father, but he declined because he did not agree with the referral. On July 13, he refused to discuss his case plan with the department. He also refused to sign a release of information form to assess his participation in substance abuse services.
On July 26, father petitioned the court to change its prior order. He asked the court to order unsupervised visits, including overnight visits, or family maintenance services. He said the change was in the children's best interest because they followed a strict diet and the family believed in limiting vaccinations. As evidence of his progress, he attached documents showing he had completed three out of 10 parenting classes and nine out of 16 counseling sessions.
Around the same time, his participation in services declined. On August 2, MarSell discharged him from their individual counseling, domestic violence, and anger management programs because he stopped making progress and "was becoming increasingly hostile towards the treatment provider." Father said he started seeing a private therapist, but he refused to provide the department with his therapist's name or contact information. He completed a parenting class but said he learned nothing because "he has been doing everything correctly." He failed to report for four random drug tests in July and August.
On September 7, the court denied father's petition, finding he had failed to satisfy either prong of the section 388 analysis.
Reunification services continued as the first six-month review hearing approached. On October 2, a social worker confirmed father had been referred to McKinley Children's Center (McKinley) for a domestic violence program. On October 27, McKinley reported their domestic violence program therapist "encountered some issues with [father's] receptivity to their services." Father had asked to be reassessed, because he felt he "may not fall under the 'perpetrator' category and questions whether he needs to receive DV treatment."
On October 30, father filed an email from a social worker at Thrive Today Psychological services indicating he had attended five therapy sessions and he was processing "his feelings of depression due to the loss of his children to child services." She said father would not be continuing with therapy as he had reported appropriate coping skills. Father also filed a letter dated October 23 from McKinley's domestic violence program which said he was enrolled in a 16-week domestic violence class. However, McKinley contacted the department to recommend father participate in individual therapy for anger management before continuing with the domestic violence group. The program therapist recommended that he continue being treated as a perpetrator of domestic violence and said he participated only minimally and "exhibited a significant lack of trust in the therapist, and was not respecting the therapist's boundaries, using threatening language towards them." Father was discharged from McKinley that day.
On October 31, the department inquired whether father discussed issues of domestic violence and his relationship with mother during individual counseling sessions. But father refused to cooperate and insisted "depression was the only problem he had, and his services are not appropriate." He accused his service providers of lying and claimed he was discharged because "his therapist reportedly stated he did not need these services." The department told father he would be referred to another program, but he declined. He said he didn't care and that "you will not refer me to any services, I don't need it." He refused to discuss the coping skills he learned in therapy and reported he and his therapist were not obligated to provide such information.
Father said MFI Recovery Center was lying about his participation in substance abuse services and said he completed intake with another provider who indicated he did not need substance abuse services. On November 2, father contacted the department and accused the social worker of lying about his discharge from McKinley. According to Father, he and the therapist from McKinley "were 'laughing and having a good time, like we were hanging out.'" Father reiterated he did not need any services and he was "doing everything right." He failed to show for four on-demand drug tests from September through October.
Mother and father continued to live together during this period and mother was pregnant. Father told the department mother acted as his caregiver, and said he had severe memory problems, muscle spasms, and nerve damage. Father also reported his therapist believed he was suffering from depression due to the dependency. He reported he treated his muscle spasms with marijuana. Mother continued to participate in visits with the children but violated court orders by video calling father to join the visits, forcing the department to make her surrender her phone at the beginning of visits.
The department filed a dependency petition as to the new child based on the open case for the older children. Among other things, the department alleged father failed to comply with his service plan in this case. We need not address father's request to strike that allegation if we rule in his favor, because we are affirming the juvenile court.
C. Termination of Father's Reunification Services
On November 8, the court held a contested six-month review hearing. Mother's counsel read a prepared statement for her. She represented she was father's caregiver, legal guardian, and spouse. She said father had been shot about two years earlier, which caused "memory problems as well as muscle spasms." She said the department was aware of his condition but refused to take it into consideration.
Father testified he was engaged in a domestic violence program at McKinley as well as individual counseling. He said he had trouble getting to his substance abuse tests because he was confined to a wheelchair and used public transportation and car services to get around. He confirmed the department gave him a bus pass but said buses often ran late, and complained the department would not come to his home to give him a saliva drug test. He said he believed his visits with the children had been suspended because he expressed his frustrations with the department, and said his therapist told him the services the department proposed were inappropriate. Father pointed out he was diagnosed with a major depressive disorder without psychotic features and had completed a parenting class.
Father asked the court to continue his services and allow him to resume visiting the children. He argued he and mother were unified and expecting another child, and it made more sense to provide services to the entire family together. He also argued the department had failed to provide services suited for his mental health diagnoses. Mother argued their awareness of the problems had improved and both parents were making progress in services. She argued father was disabled, and she acted as his caregiver, and said his disability "should not be grounds to deny reunification services." The department and the minors opposed continuing reunification services for father.
On November 16, the juvenile court terminated father's reunification services. The court noted father's lack of engagement, his aggressive behavior, and his discharge from services. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that father had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his treatment plan, and concluded there was no substantial probability of return if father were given more time. The court found the department had provided reasonable services designed to aid in overcoming the problems that led to initial removal. The court reinstated father's visits and authorized maternal grandparents to supervise them, if the department deemed it appropriate.
As to mother, the court continued her services because it found she participated regularly and had made substantive progress, showing a substantial probability the children could be returned to her care within six months.
II ANALYSIS
A. The Court Could Terminate the Reunification Services of Only One Parent
Father argues the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction by terminating father's reunification services. He argues the dependency statutes authorize termination of reunification services at the six-month review hearing only if the parents have not participated in services and the court immediately sets a section 366.26 hearing.
We review de novo issues requiring interpretation of a statute as well as the application of a statute to undisputed facts. (S.V. v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1179; Central Coast Forest Assn. v. Fish &Game Com. (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1191, 1229.)
Father is right to emphasize the importance of reunification services. "In a juvenile dependency proceeding, a parent generally has a statutory right to reunification services when his or her child is removed from the parent's custody at a disposition hearing. [Citations.] Furthermore, 'due process requires [a parent] be offered reasonable reunification services before [his or] her parental rights can be terminated.'" (In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 590, disapproved on another ground by Michael G. v. Superior Ct. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609 (Michael G.)) "The parents' right to raise their children 'is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights.' [Citation.] Thus, parents are entitled to a full complement of rights in dependency proceedings, including standing, appointment of counsel and reunification services." (In re M.S., at p. 590.)
The California dependency statutes give force to those rights by requiring the department to provide reasonable reunification services. "When a child has been removed from a parent's custody, the court ordinarily must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the reunification of the family. [Citations.] Such services may, depending on the case, include evaluations and assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.' "Reunification services,"' . . .' "implement 'the law's strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.'"' [Citations.] This is because 'services enable [parents] to demonstrate parental fitness and so regain custody of their dependent children.'" (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 624; see also § 361.5, subd. (a).)
However, the right to such services does not extend indefinitely. "To balance the interest in family preservation with the child's interest in the prompt resolution of her custody status and long-term placement, the dependency law establishes a detailed timeline for reunification. For qualifying parents, the minimum length of reunification services depends on the age of the child at the time of removal." (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625.) For children like K.H. and E.H., who were under three at removal, parents "are presumptively eligible for at least six months of reunification services." (Ibid.) The juvenile court must hold a review hearing about six months after disposition to evaluate the reunification efforts and choose the appropriate next steps. (§ 366.21.)
At a six-month review hearing for children under three years old at removal, the "court evaluates, among other things, the adequacy of the reunification services offered or provided and the extent of the parent's progress." (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 625.) If the court finds" there is a substantial probability the child may be returned to her parent within six months, or that reasonable services were not provided to the parent, the court extends reunification services for an additional six months rather than proceed to the final stage of dependency proceedings, permanency planning." (Ibid.) If, on the other hand, the court finds a parent has been provided reasonable services but failed to participate regularly and make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan, the court may terminate services and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, where the court may terminate parental rights and adopt a plan for adoption or guardianship. (§§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3) &366.26, subd. (b).)
Under this framework, the juvenile court has the authority to terminate reunification services after six months for children removed when under three years of age. Father does not question that principle. His argument is the dependency statutes authorize termination of a parent's reunification services at the six-month review hearing only to clear the way for a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. That means, he argues, where the court opts to continue services for one parent-and therefore does not set a permanency planning hearing-the court must continue reunification services for the other parent as well, even where the court finds that parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.
Father cites no case authority for his interpretation of the statutes. The case law we have located is to the contrary. In In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 57-58 (Jesse W.), a mother who had not availed herself of reunification services asserted the juvenile court lacked authority to terminate her services because the father was still receiving services. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding "a fair reading of section 366.21, subdivision (e), together with section 361.5, subdivision (a)(2) and in light of the statutory scheme as a whole, compels the conclusion that at a six-month review hearing, the juvenile court retains the discretion to terminate the offer of services to one parent even if the other parent is receiving services and no section 366.26 hearing is set." (Id. at p. 58; see also In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 878 (Katelynn Y.) ["the court retains discretion to terminate services to one parent before the applicable statutory period has expired even if it does not set a section 366.26 hearing because the other parent is still receiving services"].)
Jesse W. explained: "Nowhere in the statutory scheme is the provision of services to one parent expressly conditioned on the provision of services to the other parent. Moreover, at no time during the reunification process does the court's offer of continued services to one parent depend solely on the efforts of the other parent. [Citation.] Indeed, at each review hearing, the court must evaluate the efforts or progress toward reunification made by each parent individually by considering 'the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided.' [Citations.] Although the purpose of services is to facilitate a child's return to parental custody, reunification often involves one, but not both, parents." (Jesse W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 60.) The Court concluded, "In deciding whether to terminate the services of one parent who has failed to participate or make progress toward reunification, the court is not constrained by a consideration of the other parent's participation in services." (Ibid.)
We agree with Jesse W. and Katelyn Y. Here, the children were two years old and six months old when they were removed from parental custody. Father was offered reunification services for six months but resisted participating and at times behaved dismissively and aggressively toward providers. At the six-month review hearing, the court found he had made no substantial progress on his treatment plan or toward alleviating the cause of the removal. He was therefore not entitled to additional services. It does not matter that mother had shown greater progress, which justified an extension of her services because the children might be reunified with her.
B. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Terminating Father's Services Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating his services.
He points out he and mother continued to live together, and the termination of their parental rights was not imminent because the court continued mother's services for six months. He argues terminating his reunification services served no purpose. We disagree.
Here, the parents still living together is one barrier to reunification because they continue to deny their relationship is abusive and father refuses to seek help. That may mean mother will need to separate from father to successfully reunify with her children. As the court emphasized in Jesse W., "[E]ven when a section 366.26 hearing is not set, the termination of services previously not utilized or wanted is a step toward eliminating uncertainty in the lives of very young children and ultimately achieving the stability and permanence the Legislature sought to provide for them." (Jesse W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) The court's exercise of discretion here may clarify for either or both parents that they need to address the domestic violence in some meaningful way. The court's decision to continue mother's services preserves an opportunity for father to independently demonstrate his commitment to reforming and move the court to reinstitute services on that basis. (§ 388) We believe the court exercised its discretion wisely.
C. Substantial Evidence Supported the Court's Finding of Reasonable Services
Father argues the juvenile court erred in finding the department provided him with reasonable reunification services. We review the court's determination for substantial evidence. (In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 565-566 (J.E.).)
"To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.' [Citation.] The 'adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.' [Citation.] Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family. [Citation.] The social services agency must make a 'good faith effort' to provide reasonable services that are responsive to each family's unique needs. [Citation.] 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.'" (J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.)
Here, the department proposed a reunification plan for father that included a domestic violence program, anger management classes, parenting classes, substance abuse services, and drug testing. Father, though, responded by questioning whether the services were useful and failing to participate.
After father's first referral for a domestic violence program and an anger management class, the program discharged him due to his hostility and lack of progress. Father then said he saw a private therapist, but he refused the department's request to release information to the department. He insisted he and his therapist believed his only problem was depression, and he needed no other services.
The department made another referral to a domestic violence program, but father resisted this one as well because he believed he was not a perpetrator of domestic violence. That program discharged him, noting his threatening language and questionable behavior directed at the therapist. It recommended he receive anger management therapy before domestic violence treatment. The department made another referral, but father yet again resisted and claimed he didn't need any such services. After all these efforts, father denied any history of domestic violence with mother.
Referred to a substance abuse program, father refused to complete an intake interview and told the program he did not agree with the referral. He later claimed the program was lying about his failure to do an intake interview and asserted that another facility determined he did not need substance abuse services. He did not complete a substance abuse program.
Father explained his failure to attend any of the eight scheduled substance abuse tests by claiming it was difficult for him because he was bound to a wheelchair and reliant on public transportation and car services. The department provided him with a bus pass, but he complained buses were often late and wanted the department to come to his home to administer a test. He did not participate in any substance abuse testing.
To his credit, father completed a parenting class, but he claimed it was unnecessary because "he has been doing everything correctly."
In all, these facts constituted substantial evidence to support the court's finding that the department provided reasonable services. They show father was offered services fine-tuned to remedying the exact problems that led to the removal of his children, and father dismissed the need for the services. (J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566 ["To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents . . . and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult "'].) A parent's disagreement that he has the problems that led to the removal of his children does not show the services offered were not reasonable.
On appeal, father argues the department failed to offer reasonable services because they did not adequately accommodate his disabilities. We disagree. The only way father claimed his disability limited his engagement with services was that it made it difficult for him to make it to his drug tests. But the department made a reasonable effort to accommodate him by providing him with a bus pass. His response that buses often run late does not excuse him of failing to attend all eight drug tests. Nor does it excuse him from attending anger management, domestic violence, and substance abuse programs. Indeed, the record establishes that he could get to those sessions, but acted aggressively or dismissively while there and refused to engage because he did not believe or would not accept that he needed those services. His intransigence and denial are not a justification and do not show the department failed to provide reasonable services.
Father argues his case is like In re K.C. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 323 (K.C.), where the Court of Appeal concluded the department did not provide reasonable services because they had failed to help father overcome barriers to participation caused by his mental health problems. K.C. is distinguishable. There, a psychological evaluation identified "psychological conditions that interfered with Father's ability to address the issues preventing the children's safe return" and "recommended a further examination to determine the extent to which these conditions might be alleviated through psychotropic medication." (Id. at p. 329.) The department did nothing but refer father to a public health clinic for evaluation, and the clinic found he did not meet their criteria for treatment and did not perform the evaluation. (Ibid.) Father, predictably, failed to reunify. The court held the department had not provided reasonable services because it "appeared to delegate the burden of finding and obtaining suitable services to Father himself-despite the high likelihood that the very issues necessitating treatment would interfere with his ability to obtain it." (Id. at p. 330.)
The department did not face similar circumstances here. Father has consistently insisted since his initial interview with a department social worker that he has no mental health issues other than depression caused by the dependency. But even assuming his mental health issues were more substantial than he claims, the department made appropriate referrals to help him get individual, anger management, and domestic violence counseling. Nothing in the record indicates father's psychological condition is what prevented him from accepting that those services would help him. Unlike in K.C., there is no suggestion that father needed psychotropic medications or even an evaluation to determine whether they would help him. On the contrary, the evidence showed father was offered services reasonably attuned to his problems, but he refused to accept help. As the K.C. court noted, "Had Father refused to submit to the recommended medication evaluation, or refused to take such medications as might be recommended, his refusal would presumably have sustained a finding that reasonable services were provided." (K.C., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 330.) Under the circumstances here, father's refusal to participate does sustain the reasonableness finding.
III DISPOSITION
We affirm the order terminating father's reunification services.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P.J., MENETREZ J.