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Riley v. Clark

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dec 21, 2020
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-325 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-325

12-21-2020

CARMEN RILEY et al., Plaintiffs v. WARDEN BRIAN CLARK, et al., Defendants


(BRANN, D.J.) () REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
The Susquehanna Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) Contents

I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 2

II. Background & Procedural History ....................................................... 5

III. Legal Standard ..................................................................................... 10

IV. Analysis ............................................................................................... 13

A. Whether Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim in Count VIII of the Amended Complaint Should be Dismissed Because Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines are Immune under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act .................................................................................... 13
B. Whether Plaintiffs' Wrongful Death and Survival Claims in Counts XIV and XV of the Amended Complaint Should be Dismissed Because Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines are Immune under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ..................... 18

V. Recommendation ................................................................................. 23

VI. Notice under Local Rule 72.3 ............................................. 24 I. INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 2019, Carmen Riley (as administrator of the estate and as Ty'rique's parent) and Thomas Matthews (as Ty'rique's parent) (collectively "Plaintiffs") initiated this civil action in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas alleging claims related to the death of their son, Ty'rique Riley ("Tyrique"). That case has since been removed to federal court, and the original complaint has been amended. In their Amended Complaint (Doc. 16), Plaintiffs name the following thirty-four Defendants:

In some portions of the Amended Complaint Defendant Thomas Matthews is referred to as Defendant Thomas Matthews-Kemrer.

(1) Brian Clark, Warden of Dauphin County Prison;

(2) Dauphin County, Pennsylvania;

(3) Susquehanna Township Police Department;

(4) Michael Darcy, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(5) Demetrius Glenn, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(6) Aaron Osman, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(7) Richard Adams, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(8) Richard Wilson, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(9) Chris Haines, Susquehanna Township Police Officer;

(10) PrimeCare Medical, Inc.;

(11) Captain Andrew Klahr, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(12) Captain Steve Smith, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;
(13) Captain Mark Neidigh, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(14) Lieutenant Richard Armermann, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(15) Lieutenant Greg Mendenhall, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(16) Sergeant Scott Rowe, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(17) Sergeant Scott Grieb, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(18) Sergeant Jason Adams, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(19) Sergeant Michael Blouch, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(20) Sergeant Scott Lewis, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(21) Sergeant Keith Biter, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(22) Officer Robert Ingersoll, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(23) Officer Cameron Weaver, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(24) Officer Taylor Glenn, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(25) Officer Martin Myers, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(26) Officer Delta Bauer, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(27) Officer Matthew Danner, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(28) Officer Steve Singleton, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(29) Officer Derek Umberger, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(30) Officer Joseph Doyle, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(31) Officer Richard Otten, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(32) Officer Keith Hoffman, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer;

(33) Officer Angela Swanson, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer; and,
(34) Officer Michael Shaeffer, Dauphin County Prison Corrections Officer.
(Doc. 16).

Plaintiffs also name 5 John Doe Susquehanna Township Police Officers, 5 John Doe Medical Employees from PrimeCare, and 10 John Doe Corrections Officers from Dauphin County Prison.

Presently pending before the Court is a Motion seeking partial dismissal of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed by seven of the thirty-four Defendants: Susquehanna Township Police Department; Michael Darcy; Demetrius Glenn; Aaron Osman; Richard Adams; Richard Wilson; and Christopher Haines, (collectively the "Susquehanna Defendants"). (Doc. 28). This Motion is fully briefed and is now ripe for decision. (Docs. 29, 35, 37).

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Susquehanna Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) Counts VIII, XIV, and XV asserted against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department should be DISMISSED upon consent of the parties. Because these are the only Counts asserted against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department in the Amended Complaint, Susquehanna Township Police Department should be terminated as a Defendant.

(2) Counts VIII, XIV, and XV asserted against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, and Wilson should be DISMISSED. Because these are the only Counts asserted against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, and Wilson, these Defendants should be terminated as Defendants.

(3) Count VIII against Defendant Haines should be DISMISSED.
(4) The Susquehanna Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED as to Counts XIV and XV against Defendant Haines.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 18, 2019, at 4:00 a.m. Plaintiff Carmen Riley woke up and saw her son, Ty'rique Riley, standing over the bed shared by Plaintiffs Carmen Riley and Thomas Matthews holding a sledgehammer and mumbling about needing to protect his parents. (Doc. 16, ¶ 63). Plaintiff Thomas Matthews woke up and a struggle ensued between Ty'rique and Plaintiff Matthews. (Doc. 16, ¶ 64). As Ty'rique and Plaintiff Matthews were grappling, Plaintiff Riley called the Susquehanna Police Department for help. (Doc. 16, ¶ 64).

Defendant Susquehanna Township Police dispatched Defendants Glenn, Darcy, Haines, Wilson, Adams, and several unidentified "John Doe" Officers to the scene. (Doc. 16, ¶ 65).

When they arrived at the scene, Defendants Darcy, Glenn, and Wilson walked around to the rear of the home to gain entry. (Doc. 16, ¶ 66). Ty'rique opened the door and the officers entered the home. (Doc. 16, ¶ 67). At that time, Ty'rique appeared "distant and uncommunicative, and he offered no struggle or fight." (Doc. 16, ¶ 68). Plaintiffs informed the officers that Ty'rique had been acting erratically, mumbling and that "something was wrong with him." (Doc. 16, ¶ 69). The officers arrested Ty'rique and placed him in a police vehicle. (Doc. 16, ¶ 70).

Defendant Haines transported Ty'rique to Dauphin County Prison. (Doc. 16, ¶ 72). During the car ride, Ty'rique spoke in long nonsensical sentences. (Doc. 16, ¶ 73). Defendant Haines inquired about Ty'rique's mental health. Id.

When they arrived at Dauphin County Prison Booking Center, Defendants Haines, Ingersoll, Weaver, Bauer, Grieb, and Mendenhall forced Ty'rique out of the police car, and into the booking center. (Doc. 16, ¶ 76). In doing so, these Defendants struck Ty'rique about the head, shoulders and torso. Id. Defendant Mendenhall sprayed Ty'rique with pepper spray and wrestled him to the ground. (Doc. 16, ¶ 77). "Other Correctional Officers" beat Ty'rique and placed him in hand and ankle restraints before taking him to cell 132. Id. At some point after this encounter, Ty'rique received medical care from unidentified PrimeCare employees. (Doc. 16, ¶ 79). The pepper spray was flushed from Ty'rique's eyes and his physical injuries were tended. Id. No mental health treatment was provided.

Ty'rique was in Dauphin County Prison from June 18, 2019 through June 26, 2019. Plaintiffs allege that during this time period, corrections officers at Dauphin County Prison used physical force on Ty'rique on several occasions. It is not clear, however, exactly when during this period of incarceration these events occurred.

At some point after his initial injuries were tended, Defendants Adams, Blouch, Taylor, Glenn and Myers caused additional physical injuries attempting to place Ty'rique in a restraint belt. (Doc. 16, ¶ 88). After this altercation, Ty'rique's physical injuries were assessed and tended by unidentified PrimeCare employees. (Doc. 16, ¶ 92).

Sometime thereafter, Ty'rique was placed in a suicide smock and moved to a suicide watch cell. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 94-95). While in the suicide watch cell, Ty'rique complained of abdominal pain. (Doc. 16, ¶ 98).

On June 26, 2019 at 9:50 a.m. Defendants Klahr, Lewis, Biter, Danner, Singleton, and several other unidentified officers attempted to change Ty'rique out of the suicide smock so that Ty'rique could be taken to the hospital. (Doc. 16, ¶ 99). Plaintiffs allege that Ty'rique was handled with "unnecessary roughness" by these officers when they placed Ty'rique in leg irons. Id. Ty'rique was then placed in a restraint chair to wait for the ambulance. (Doc. 16, ¶ 102).

As Defendants Klahr, Lewis, Biter, Danner, and Singleton forced Ty'rique into the restraint chair, Ty'rique stopped breathing. (Doc. 16, ¶ 103). PrimeCare employees were summoned, and found that Ty'rique was unresponsive, had no pulse and was apneic (not breathing). (Doc. 16, ¶ 104). Several unidentified PrimeCare employees performed chest compressions until the ambulance crew arrived at 10:10 a.m. (Doc. 16, ¶ 105). The ambulance crew attempted to resuscitate Ty'rique at the scene. Id. The Amended Complaint does not specify whether the ambulance crew was successful, but I infer that it was.

At 10:49 a.m. Ty'rique was transported the Harrisburg Hospital Emergency Room. (Doc. 16 ¶ 106). Ty'rique was admitted to the hospital, the chief complaint was listed as "cardiac arrest." (Doc. 16, ¶ 107). The inpatient encounter report documents that Ty'rique was intubated, his pupils were unequal in size, and that his eyes did not follow objects. (Doc. 16, ¶ 108). The encounter report also documented that Ty'rique had an abrasion above his left eyebrow, lacerations on his tongue, premature ventricular contractions (extra heartbeats that were disrupting his regular rhythm), sluggish capillary refill, and diminished urine production. (Doc. 16 ¶ 109). No drugs were detected in Ty'rique's urine. (Doc. 16 ¶ 110).

A second inpatient encounter report documented diffuse subcutaneous emphysema (air under the skin), pneumomediastinum (the abnormal presence of air between the lungs), pneumoperitoneum (the abnormal presence of air in the abdominal cavity), and a sternal fracture. (Doc. 16 ¶ 112).

On July 1, 2019, six days after admission to the hospital, Ty'rique died. (Doc. 16 ¶ 114). Ty'rique's final diagnoses were "cardiac arrest due to an unspecified cause, cerebral edema, acute kidney failure, acute respiratory failure with hypoxia, anoxic brain damage, traumatic pneumothorax encounter, and unspecified fracture of the sternum." (Doc. 16 ¶ 116).

On August 20, 2019, Ty'rique's parents—Plaintiffs Carmen Riley and Thomas Matthews—initiated a civil action in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of Ty'rique by filing a writ of summons. (Doc. 1-1). On February 11, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. (Doc. 1-21). On February 25, 2020, a group of Defendants removed this action to federal court. (Doc. 1).

On March 6, 2020, a telephone conference was held to discuss the issue of jurisdiction because no federal claims were alleged in Plaintiffs' original complaint. During that conference the parties agreed that Plaintiffs would either file a motion to remand or an amended complaint by March 27, 2020. (Doc. 13). On April 17, 2020, after being granted an extension of time, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend. (Doc. 14). On May 6, 2020, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was deemed unopposed and the Amended Complaint was deemed filed. (Doc. 15). A summons was issued as to newly added Defendants. (Doc. 17).

In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following claims against the Susquehanna Defendants:

Count III: 4th and 14th Amendment Use of Excessive force against Defendant Haines.

Count IV: 4th and 14th Amendment Failure to Intervene against Defendant Haines.

Count VIII: Negligence against Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines.

Count XII: Assault against Defendant Haines.

Count XIII: Battery against Defendant Haines.
Count XIV: Wrongful Death (42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8301 et seq.) against Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines.

Count XV: Survival Action (42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8302) against Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines.

As relief for each count, Plaintiffs request "all appropriate relief, including, but not limited to, compensatory damages, court costs, punitive damages, attorney's fees and all other relief as the Court deems appropriate." (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 136, 144, 181, 198, 201, 208, 212).

On May 21, 2020, the Susquehanna Defendants filed a Motion seeking Dismissal of Counts VIII, XIV, and XV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 28). Along with their Motion, the Susquehanna Defendants filed a Brief in Support. (Doc. 29).

On June 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their Brief in Opposition. (Doc. 35).

On June 16, 2020, the Susquehanna Defendants filed their Reply. (Doc. 37). III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court "must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether Plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In review of a motion to dismiss, a court must "consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents." Id. at 230.

In deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint. Jordan v. Fox Rothchild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). These allegations and inferences are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The court, however, "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, it is not proper to "assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he] has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

"A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, a complaint must recite enough factual allegations to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. Id. To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by the Supreme Court, the court must engage in a three-step analysis:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where they are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Santiago v. Warminister Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief" and instead must "'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement of relief.'" Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011). IV. ANALYSIS

A. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IN COUNT VIII OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS SUSQUEHANNA TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, DARCY, GLENN, OSMAN, ADAMS, WILSON, AND HAINES ARE IMMUNE UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT CLAIMS ACT

In Count VIII of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege:

Count VIII: Carmen Riley, Administrator of the Estate of Tyrique Riley, Deceased -v- Defendants Susquehanna Township Police Department, Susquehanna Police Officers and Susquehanna John Does (Negligence)

178. The Allegations contained in all preceding Paragraphs are here incorporated and included by reference as if fully set forth here.

179. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Susquehanna Township Police and its police officers Corporal Richard Wilson, Sergeant Richard Adams, Officer Aaron Osman, Patrolman Demetrius Glenn, Patrolman Michael Darcy and PFC Chris Haines (collectively "Susquehanna Police Officers"), and Susquehanna Township John Doe Police Officers 1-5 (collectively "Susquehanna John Does"), individually and/or jointly, were under a duty and obligation to recognize and identify that decedent Riley had serious mental health problems and then to divert him from a prison environment to a hospital or mental health facility that he might receive treatment instead of punishment.

180. At all times relevant hereto, said Defendants individually and jointly breached that duty by failing to recognize and identify that decedent Riley had serious mental health problems and failing to divert him from a prison environment to a hospital or mental health facility at which he would have received treatment instead of incarceration.

181. As a direct and proximate result of that breach, decedent Ty'rique Riley suffered deprivations of his rights, physical injuries, pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental anguish,
and eventually death on July 1, 2019 at the age of twenty one (21) years old.
(Doc. 16, ¶¶ 178-181).

In their Brief in Support, the Susquehanna Defendants argue:

Further, as a matter of law, this generic "Negligence" claim does not fall within any of the exceptions to the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act which provides immunity to "local agencies' such as Susquehanna Township and its officers unless a claim of negligence falls within one of the nine (9) narrow exceptions to immunity, none of which apply here. Namely, the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, (hereinafter referred to as the "Tort Claims Act") expressly states that - local agencies" such as Susquehanna Township Police Department and its officers, "shall [not] be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person" unless the claim falls within one of nine (9) exceptions to immunity. 42 Pa. C.S.A § 8541 and 42 Pa. C.S.A. §8541 et seq. The Tort Claims Act outlines only nine (9) exceptions to the above stated immunity that may result in the imposition of liability. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8542. Those exceptions include (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody or control of personal property; (3) real property; (4) trees, traffic controls and street lighting; (5) utility service facilities; (6) streets; (7) sidewalks; and (8) care, custody or control of animals and (9) sexual abuse. Id.

As Plaintiff's claim of negligence against the Susquehanna Defendants do not fall into any of the nine (9) exceptions Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim - Count VIII - fails as a matter of law.
(Doc. 29, pp. 8-9).

In response, Plaintiffs concede that Count VIII against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department should be dismissed, but argue that Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines are not immune from suit because the "willful misconduct" exception applies. In support of this position they cite to paragraphs 4 and 20 of their Amended Complaint:

4. This action is also brought under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Wrongful Death, Survival, Negligence and Medical Negligence actions pursuant to claims arising from Defendants' deliberate and malicious indifference and negligence in failing to train its various personnel in the recognition and treatment of medical and mental health issues in arrestees and inmates and further in depriving Ty'rique Riley of his rights to both due process and equal protection constitutionally guaranteed him, all of which eventually led to his death at the young age of twenty one (21) years old.

. . . .

20. The complained-of-acts and failures to act by the Susquehanna Township Police supervisory and non-supervisory Defendants herein were objectively unreasonable, and were malicious and sadistic and intended to cause harm.
(Doc. 16, ¶ 4, 20).

In reply the Susquehanna Defendants argue:

[I]t can hardly be said any of the Moving Defendants "desired to bring about the result that followed or were aware it was substantially certain to follow." In this case, Plaintiffs claim Moving Defendants acted "maliciously and sadistically and intended to cause harm." The facts as pled do not support this empty conclusion. Plaintiffs allege Moving Defendants responded to a call for assistance due to a struggle between Mr. Riley and his father that involved a sledgehammer. Moving Defendants arrested Mr. Riley without incident. Moving Defendants then placed an unharmed Mr. Riley in the back of a police car allowing Mr. Riley to be transported to the Booking Center. There is no indication that Mr. Riley's parents objected to him being transported to the Booking Center. Only PFC Haines transported Mr. Riley to the Booking Center. The remaining Susquehanna Officers had no further contact with Mr. Riley following their brief encounter in the early
morning hours of June 18, 2019. It is therefore impossible to conclude that it was foreseeable to Moving Defendants that by sending an unharmed Ty'rique Riley to the Booking Center it would result in any injury to Mr. Riley, let alone his unfortunate passing 14 days later on July 1, 2019.

Plaintiffs repeatedly argue the Amended Complaint alleges Moving Defendants acted maliciously, sadistically and intended to cause harm. Plaintiffs repeatedly cite to case law that references "intentional conduct." However, with the exception of PFC Haines, Plaintiffs do not include Moving Defendants in any of the Counts of the Amended Complaint that contain intentional actions. The facts as described above do not rise to the level of malicious, sadistic or an intent to cause harm. Therefore, the allegations against moving Defendants are merely conclusory, do not defeat the immunity granted Moving Defendants under the Act and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(Doc. 37, pp. 5-6).

Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PSTCA") provides legal immunity for government bodies and their employees unless their actions fall within certain enumerated categories of negligence. See 42 Pa. C. S. A. §§ 8541, 8545; 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 8542(b) (listing exceptions as: vehicle liability; care, custody or control of personal property; real property; trees, traffic controls and street lighting; utility service facilities; streets; sidewalks; care, custody or control of animals; and sexual abuse). Police departments, like Defendant Susquehanna Township Police, are "local agencies" for PSTCA purposes. See e.g. Maldet v. Johnstown Police Department, No. 19-325, 2019 WL 2435869 at * (W. D. Pa. June 11, 2019) (finding the Johnstown Police Department is a "local agency" under the PSTCA). The PSTCA also applies to the individual police officers. Id.; see also 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 8545.

As to the individual officers, however, that immunity does not extend to acts that "constitute[ ] a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct." 42 Pa. C. S. A. §8550. As explained in Sanford v. Stiles:

Willful misconduct has been defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as "conduct whereby the actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least was aware that it was substantially certain to follow, so that such desire can be implied." Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (1994) (citations omitted). Otherwise stated, "the term 'willful misconduct' is synonymous with the term 'intentional tort.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also Bright, 443 F.3d at 287; Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2001).
456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006).

In this case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs negligence claim in Count VIII of the Amended Complaint does not fall within any of the nine enumerated exceptions. The parties also agree that because the claim does not fall within one of the nine exceptions, Defendant Susquehanna Township Police is immune. However, Plaintiffs contend that the individual officers are not immune because they engaged in willful misconduct.

I agree with the Susquehanna Defendants that the PSTCA bars the negligence claim asserted in Count VIII of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines. In their negligence claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines were negligent when Ty'rique was transported to a booking center and country prison, instead of taking him to a hospital or mental health facility. Although Plaintiffs suggest that this conduct was "deliberate," "malicious," "sadistic," and "intended to cause harm," this is not enough to allow the claim to proceed. The underlying facts alleged about what each police Defendant did do not suggest that the police Defendants were aware that transferring Ty'rique to a prison would result in his death two weeks later. Further, by its very nature, a negligence claim does not speak to willful misconduct. See e.g., Kobrick v. Stevens, No. 3:1302865, 2014 WL 4914186, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2014).

Accordingly, Count VIII of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should be DISMISSED as to all of the Susquehanna Defendants.

B. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS' WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS IN COUNTS XIV AND XV OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS SUSQUEHANNA TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, DARCY, GLENN, OSMAN, ADAMS, WILSON, AND HAINES ARE IMMUNE UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT CLAIMS ACT

In Count XIV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege:

Count XIV: Plaintiffs Carmen Riley and Thomas Mathews - Kemrer -v- All Defendants (Wrongful Death)

202. The Allegations contained in all preceding Paragraphs are here incorporated and included by reference as if fully set forth here.
203. Defendant's sole survivors are his parents, Carmen Riley and Thomas Mathews-Kemrer, who together are entitled to recover damages for his death, and on whose behalf this action is brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8301 et seq.

204. Decedent's death was caused by the intentional, malicious, and/or grossly negligent conduct of Defendants, individually and/or jointly.

205. As described above, Defendants unlawfully, wantonly, unreasonably, maliciously, unnecessarily and/or with deliberate and reckless indifference to the health and welfare of Decedent and the Plaintiffs, caused the death of decedent, Ty'rique Riley, by subjecting him to excessive and unwarranted beatings and other physical force.

206. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' individual and joint actions, decedent Ty'rique Riley was unnecessarily caused extreme physical pain, mental anguish and suffering, and death, and was deprived of the enjoyment and pleasure of life.

207. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, decedent's survivors have suffered serious emotional pain and economic loss due to the wrongful death of their son, Ty'rique Riley.
(Doc. 16, ¶¶ 202-207).

In Count XV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege:

Count XV: Estate of Ty'rique Riley -v- All Defendants (Survival Action)

209. The Allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs are here incorporated and included by reference as if fully set forth here.

210. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions as described herein, Ty'rique Riley suffered grievous bodily injury, and mental and physical pain and suffering.
211. From the time of his arrest until the time of his death, and throughout his detention, decedent Riley was conscious and aware of the beatings and other harmful acts to which he was subjected by Defendants, individually and/or jointly, and felt extreme pain and suffering as a result thereof.

212. On behalf of the Estate of Ty'rique Riley, Carmen Riley, Administrator of the Decedent's Estate, brings this action under the Pennsylvania Survival Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 8302, and claims for Ty'rique Riley's Estate compensation for all damages suffered by Ty'rique Riley and recoverable under the statute by reason of the grievous bodily injury, mental and physical pain and suffering caused him by the Defendant as described above.
(Doc. 16, ¶¶ 209-212).

The Susquehanna Defendants argue:

Counts XIV, and XV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, assert claims for wrongful death, and survival. Neither of these claims fall within the exceptions to governmental immunity under 42 Pa. C.S.A § 8542(b)(1) - (9). See also, Williams v. City of Scranton, 566 F. App'x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding state law claims for wrongful death and survival action against the city and its police officers fail "[p]ursuant to the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, local agencies and municipal employees are immune to state law tort claims, subject to exceptions not applicable here."); Vicki M v. Northeastern-Educ. Intermediate Unit; 486 F. Supp. 2d 437, 460 (M.D. Pa. 2009). As such, the wrongful death and survival claims fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed.
(Doc. 35, pp. 9-10).

In response, Plaintiffs concede that Counts XIV and XV against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department should be dismissed, but argue that Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson, and Haines are not immune from suit.

In her capacity as the administrator of Ty-rique's estate, Plaintiff Carmen Riley asserts claims under Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival statutes. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8301, 8302. However, "Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival statutes do not create independent causes of action; rather, they are derivative in the sense that the substance of the claim derives from the injury to the decedent." McCracken v. Fulton Cty., No. 19-CV-1063, 2020 WL 2767577 at *10 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2020) (citing Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)); see also Sullivan v. Warminster Twp., 765 F.Supp.2d 687, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2011) ("wrongful death and survival actions are not substantive causes of action; rather they provide a vehicle through which plaintiffs can recover for unlawful conduct that results in death").

The basis for Plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival act claims against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson appears to be based on the negligence claim asserted in County VIII of the Amended Complaint. However, as explained in Section IV. A. of this Report, Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, Wilson are immune from Plaintiffs' negligence claim under the PSTCA. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims under the wrongful death and survival acts should also be dismissed because they are derivative of that negligence claim.

Although Plaintiffs also named Defendant Haines in the same negligence claim, and I recommend dismissal of that claim, the wrongful death and survival act claims should be permitted to proceed against Defendant Haines. Unlike the other police defendants, Defendant Haines was also named in Counts III (Excessive Force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), IV (Failure to Intervene under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), Count XII (Assault), and Count XIII (Battery). The Susquehanna Defendants have not moved for dismissal of these claims in their motion. One or more of these claims could form the basis for Plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival act claims against Defendant Haines. Therefore, Plaintiff's wrongful death and survival act claims against Defendant Haines should be permitted to proceed.

[The next page contains the Recommendation] V. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Susquehanna Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

(1) Counts VIII, XIV, and XV asserted against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department should be DISMISSED upon consent of the parties. Because these are the only Counts asserted against Defendant Susquehanna Township Police Department in the Amended Complaint, Susquehanna Township Police Department should be terminated as a Defendant.

(2) Counts VIII, XIV, and XV asserted against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, and Wilson should be DISMISSED. Because these are the only Counts asserted against Defendants Darcy, Glenn, Osman, Adams, and Wilson, these Defendants should be terminated as Defendants.

(3) Count VIII against Defendant Haines should be DISMISSED.

(4) The Susquehanna Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED as to Counts XIV and XV against Defendant Haines.
Date: December 21, 2020

BY THE COURT

s/William I . Arbuckle

William I. Arbuckle

U.S. Magistrate Judge

NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Date: December 21, 2020

BY THE COURT

s/William I . Arbuckle

William I. Arbuckle

U.S. Magistrate Judge


Summaries of

Riley v. Clark

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dec 21, 2020
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-325 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020)
Case details for

Riley v. Clark

Case Details

Full title:CARMEN RILEY et al., Plaintiffs v. WARDEN BRIAN CLARK, et al., Defendants

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Dec 21, 2020

Citations

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-325 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2020)