Opinion
Civil No. 3:04-CV-0590-H.
January 20, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Susan Thorpe's Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 12, 2004; Plaintiff's Response, filed December 20, 2004; and Defendant's Reply, filed January 4, 2005. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
The case arises out of the termination of Plaintiff's employment as a City of Rowlett police officer on December 3, 2001. (Pl.'s Compl. at 3-7.) Plaintiff timely appealed his termination and on March 22, 2002, Susan Thorpe ("Thorpe"), the City Manager of Rowlett, conducted a hearing to consider Plaintiff's appeal. ( Id. at 5.) On March 27, 2002, Thorpe sustained Plaintiff's termination. ( Id. at 7.) On April 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the City of Rowlett, alleging that his termination violated the Texas Whistleblower Act, TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 554.001-.009 (West 2004). (Def.'s Ex. A.) On August 25, 2003, the state court entered summary judgment against Plaintiff dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. (Def.'s Ex. B.) The instant action ensued on March 19, 2004, in which Plaintiff complains of, inter alia, the subsequent, unsuccessful appeal of his termination. (Pl.'s Compl. at 10-11.)
The Court has previously granted Defendants' Rule 12(c) Motion dismissing all claims against all defendants with the exception of Plaintiff's due process claim against Thorpe. (Mem. Op. and Order, entered August 27, 2004.) In the remaining claim, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, seeks compensatory and exemplary damages for violations of his due process rights. (Pl.'s Compl. at 10-12.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Thorpe denied him his due process rights at the appeal hearing. ( Id. at 10-11.) Arguing qualified immunity and res judicata, Thorpe now moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Def.'s Br. at 1-2, 5-10.)
The Court finds Defendant's first two grounds meritorious and does not address the third ground (that Plaintiff was afforded all due process requirements of a post-termination hearing and therefore cannot prevail). (Def.s' Br. 2, 10-13.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Innovative Database Sys. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993). "The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case." Lynch Prop., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25).
The moving party may meet its initial burden by "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the movant meets its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings unsupported by specific facts presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995).
If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
In determining whether genuine issues of material fact exist, "[f]actual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that a controversy exists." Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; see also Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). However, in the absence of any proof, the Court will not assume or sift through the record to find that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. See Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). A party must do more than simply show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991).
III. Analysis
A. Qualified Immunity
The Court analyzes the qualified immunity defense under the two step approach of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See Castillo v. City of Weslaco, 369 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2004); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Dep't of Prot. and Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 2004). "Qualified immunity is appropriate if the defendant's actions were `objectively reasonable' with reference to `clearly established law' at the time of the conduct in question." Castillo, 369 F.3d at 506; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 879. The first step is to "identify the relevant clearly established law." Castillo, 369 F.3d at 506. The second step is to "determine whether the defendant's actions were objectively reasonable." Id.
"The right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 331 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). As such, the only question for the Court is whether Thorpe's actions were objectively reasonable. See Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 125 (5th Cir. 1992)) ("A defense of qualified immunity can be overcome only if an objectively reasonable officer would know that his conduct was illegal given the facts available to him at the time of his action."). The summary judgment evidence shows that: (1) Thorpe allowed Plaintiff to consult with legal counsel during the hearing (Thorpe Aff. ¶ 5); (2) after conducting the hearing for 90 minutes, Thorpe inquired whether Plaintiff "had anything else to add to his presentation" ( Id. ¶ 6); and (3) Thorpe acted with the advice of the City Attorney. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Because the Court finds Thorpe's actions objectively reasonable, she is entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's individual capacity claims. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim against Thorpe in her individual capacity.
Plaintiff's Response provides no summary judgment evidence in opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiff has directed the Court to no evidence indicating that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Malacara, 353 F.3d at 405 ("Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.") (internal citations omitted).
B. Res Judicata
Defendant argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars Plaintiff from bringing his due process claim. Res judicata bars all claims that were brought, or could have been brought, in a prior action. Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2004). The test for determining whether a claim is barred by the doctrine involves four factors: (1) the parties must be identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there must have been a prior judgment on the merits; and (4) the same cause of action must be involved in both cases. Id., 383 F.3d at 313. In the instant case, only factors (1) and (4) are contested ( see Def.'s Resp. at 5), the Court analyzes these in turn.
There is no challenge to the competency of the District Court in the 116th Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas. See Cornwell v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1977) ("State courts . . . are fully competent to resolve federal questions properly before them.") There is also no dispute that "the granting of summary judgment is a disposition on the merits." Bank One Texas v. United States, 157 F.3d 397, 403 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981).
1. Identity of the Parties
Plaintiff avers generally that "Defendant Thorpe was not named as a defendant in the previous complaint [ i.e. state court petition] and therefore could not be included in the previous legal theories and claims." (Pl.'s Resp. at 5.) Plaintiff's conclusion is in error. "[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity[.]" Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (examining Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)); Jackson v. Assoc. Credit Card Servs., Inc., No. Civ. 3:01-CV-1205-H, 2002 WL 742602, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2002). To be certain, "[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . `generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 477 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165). There is no question that Plaintiff sued the City of Carrollton in his state action (Def.'s Exs. A, B); that Plaintiff is suing Thorpe in her official capacity (Pl.'s Compl. at 1, 3, 7, 10); or that Thorpe, as the City of Carrollton's City Manager, allegedly denied Plaintiff his Due Process. ( Id.; Def.'s Ex. D.) The Court finds that the parties in both suits are identical.
2. Identity of the Causes of Action
The Fifth Circuit applies a transactional test to determine whether the same causes of action are involved in both cases; the critical issue is whether the two actions are based on the same nucleus of operative facts. Davis, 383 F.3d at 313. "Under the transactional test, a prior judgment's preclusive effect extends to all rights of the plaintiff `with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the original action arose.'" Id. (quoting Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 365 F.3d 385, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2004)). The transactional test's pragmatic approach requires the Court to group and view facts together to determine "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Id.
Plaintiff avers generally that "the previous action dealt solely with a Whistle Blower complainant [sic] and not with due process violations later committed by the city [of Carrollton] and specifically defendant Thorpe." (Pl.'s Resp. at 5.) Davis recognizes that "subsequent wrongs by a defendant constitute new causes of action." Davis, 383 F.3d at 314 (citing Blair v. City of Greenville, 649 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). The "subsequent wrongs" actions permitted by the Fifth Circuit however, "occurred either after the plaintiffs had filed their prior lawsuit or after the district court had entered judgment in the prior law suit." Id. Here, the alleged due process violations in the instant complaint occurred Plaintiff's state court petition was filed.
Plaintiff was aware of the alleged due process violation at the time he filed his state petition on April 26, 2002, and certainly before the entry of summary judgment on August 25, 2003, and therefore could have included such a claim in his state petition.
Grouping and viewing the facts together, the Court finds that the wrongs alleged in Plaintiff's state filing and the wrongs alleged in the instant complaint constitute a series of connected transactions and are the same claim. Although the factual allegations articulated in the two complaints may differ, the claim in question originates from and is so connected in time and space with the state claims that they "could have, and should have, been brought in the first action to create a single, convenient trial unit." See id. (" Res judicata `bars all claims that were or could have been advanced in support of the cause of action on the occasion of its former adjudication.'") (citing Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original)). Plaintiff thus could have brought his due process claims at the time he filed his state claims.
Plaintiff asserts without argument that "issue preclusion" does not apply because "the facts of due process violations [sic] were not litigated in the prior case[.]" (Def.'s Resp. at 5.) Because the Court holds that "claim preclusion" bars Plaintiff's action, whether the facts alleging due process violations were actually litigated, i.e. "issue preclusion," becomes immaterial.
IV. Conclusion
As to Plaintiff's claim against Thorpe in her individual capacity, the Court finds that Thorpe is protected by qualified immunity. As to Plaintiff's claim against Thorpe in her official capacity, the Court holds that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is hereby GRANTED and all Plaintiff's remaining claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Judgment will be entered in accordance with this Opinion and the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, entered August 27, 2004.
SO ORDERED.