Opinion
Civil No. 3:01-CV-1205-H
April 25, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is The Individual Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss, filed November 28, 2001; Plaintiff's Response thereto, filed December 11, 2001; and the Individual Defendants' Reply, filed January 3, 2002. Pursuant to the Court's December 17, 2001 Order, this Motion supersedes a Motion to Dismiss, filed July 23, 2001, on behalf of five of the individual Defendants Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff sues his former employer, Associates Credit Card Services, Inc. ("ACCSI") and eleven individual defendants, all employees of the Defendant company, for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21 et seq. ("TCHRA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Plaintiff provides that he was employed as an Account Resolution Specialist/Collector with the Defendant company from December 1998 to October 1999, when he was promoted to Lead/Assistant Collections Supervisor. (Resp. at 4-5). Plaintiff served as Lead/Assistant Collections Supervisor until his termination on September 12, 2000. (Resp. Exh. F, Letter from Ruth Wadsworth). Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 26, 2000 and received a Right to Sue letter dated May 31, 2001. Plaintiff alleges, in his 82-page First Amended Complaint, that beginning on February 5, 2000 he was subject to random and unauthorized monitoring of his collections work and that he reported this monitoring. After a number of Supervisors and the Director of Human Resources failed to take sufficient action, Plaintiff alleges that these Supervisors and Director of Human Resources participated in a cover-up of their harassment of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that his subsequent termination was a result of discrimination based on race and that he was harassed because of his race while employed at ACCSI. Defendants assert that even if Plaintiff's claims are true, they are not sufficient to support claim under Title VII, TCHRA, or § 1981.
Plaintiff's claims against John Ditore, Joseph N. Scarpinato, Keith Hughes, and Sanford I. Weill were dismissed on August 31, 2001 by agreement of the parties. The remaining Defendants are Al Aleman, Lynda Meny, Bobie Currie, Thomas Hayes, Ken Hendrix, Stephan Malone, Steve Steverson, Steve Swening, Larry Travis, Ruth Wadsworth, and Jan Wilson.
Plaintiff also alleges state law defamation claims against the Individual Defendants. These claims are not the subject of the instant Motion.
Plaintiff asserts that he only agreed to the dismissal of the four Defendants on August 31, 2001 because Counsel to the Defendants agreed to not seek dismissal of the other Defendants. (Resp. at 3). The Parties' Joint Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed August 30, 2001, in which the Parties moved for dismissal of the four Defendants does not reflect this agreement. Plaintiffs only support is a November 30, 2001 letter from him to Defendants Counsel in which he "reminds" Defendants' Counsel of such an agreement. Because the Court may "dismiss a complaint on its own motion for failure to state a claim," it is unnecessary to delve into an analysis of whether the Defendants procured Plaintiff's agreement though fraudulent misrepresentation. Shawnee Int'l, N. V. v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, given that Plaintiff is pro se, the Court is concerned about Plaintiff's a legation that he was induced into agreeing to a dismissal, especially where Defendants do not acknowledge or refute Plaintiff's assertion in their Reply.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard
In considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true the non-movant's well-pleaded factual allegations and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff "must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will not accept as true any conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact. Generally, the Court may not look beyond the pleadings, except in instances where public officials' qualified immunity is raised. Compare Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir. 1988) with Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1994) [ and] Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) [ and] Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is not favored by the law. Mahone, 836 F.2d at 926. A Plaintiff's "complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims."); Heimann v. National Elevator Industry Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1999) (court may dismiss a claim under 12(b)(6) only if "it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.") (quoting Barrientos v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 911 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1990). However, "there are times when a court should exercise its power to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Mahone, 836 F.2d at 927 (emphasis in original).
B. Agent Liability under Title VII
Defendants assert that they cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. Plaintiff contends that the definition of "agent" within 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) provides an independent means to assert liability under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit has ruled, however, that this definition of "agent" was included solely to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., et al., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994). More conclusively, the Fifth Circuit has also found that a Plaintiff cannot proceed against both an employer and its agents under Title VII. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999). Therefore, it is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff's Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
Defendants also contend that they cannot be held liable in their official capacities. The Supreme Court has held that in respect to suits against government agents "an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). In addition, in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 context, "a Plaintiff does not have an action against both the corporation and its officer in an official capacity." Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Assoc., Inc., 778 F.2d 1068, 1081 (5th Cir. 1995). In Indest, the Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning of Sims to Title VII in holding that "a party may not maintain a suit against both an employer and its agent under Title VII." Indest, 164 F.3d at 262. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacity are also dismissed.
C. Agent Liability under TCHRA
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claims under the TCHRA should be dismissed because, in accordance with Title VII, the claims cannot proceed against the Defendants in their individual or official capacitites. Defendants are correct. "The purpose of the Human Rights Act is to execute the policies of Title VII; we note a long line of federal cases which hold that Title VII creates a cause of action against employers, but not against supervisors or public officials in their individual capacities." City of Austin v. Gifford, 824 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tex. 1992). Because the Court has found that Plaintiff's Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants should be dismissed, Plaintiff's claims under the TCHRA against the Individual Defendants are also dismissed.
D. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show any facts to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff did not suffer a tangible employment action nor can he show that Defendants actions were racially motivated. Plaintiff states in his complaint that his termination from ACCSI was "racially motivated, retaliatory in spirit and discriminatory treatment because of my race . . . BLACK." (Compl. at 79) (emphasis in the original).
"Section 1981 provides equal contract rights under the law and prevents actions to interfere with these rights on the basis of race." Zachary, et al. v. Texaco Exploration Production Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1999). A Plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under § 1981 must prove discriminatory intent. See id. at 236-37. Section 1981 claims are analyzed under the same evidentiary framework as Title VII claims. See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Plaintiff's prima facie case consists of showing that 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for his position; 3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and 4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class. See Shackleford v. Deloitte Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999).
Defendants assert that Plaintiff was not subjected to an adverse employment action. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits." Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Defendants state that Plaintiff's allegations only serve to show that the Defendants were "jealous or suspicious of his work accomplishments because of his extraordinary performance and . . . he became the subject of increased scrutiny." (Reply at 3). Although Defendant was terminated, and termination can constitute a tangible employment action, this termination does not serve to impose liability upon the Individual Defendants. "[A] tangible employment action taken by a supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. The increased scrutiny alone is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. Plaintiff cannot meet the third requirement of the prima facie case and therefore, his claim will be dismissed against the Individual Defendants.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against the Individual Defendants are DISMISSED, except for the defamation claims. Plaintiffs Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims against Defendant ACCSI remain.
SO ORDERED.