Summary
holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to disability discrimination claim stated in EEOC charge where charge alleged that plaintiff had requested reasonable accommodation, that his requests had been denied, and that he was subsequently terminated
Summary of this case from Concey v. New York State Unified Court Sys.Opinion
06 Civ. 5055 (SAS).
April 9, 2007
Plaintiff Pro Se: Peter H. Ridgway, Queens, New York.
Counsel for Defendant: Jessica Kastin, Esq., O'MELVENY MYERS LLP, New York, New York.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Peter H. Ridgway, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the Metropolitan Museum of Art (the "Museum"), alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiff also claims that he was denied leave in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), and was retaliated against for seeking workers' compensation in violation of the New York Workers' Compensation Law ("N.Y. Workers' Comp."). The Museum moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
See N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 120 ("It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee as to his or her employment because such employee has claimed or attempted to claim compensation from such employer. . . .").
See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Metropolitan Museum of Art's Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Mem.") at 1.
II. BACKGROUND
Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, I will construe his Complaint liberally in deciding this motion to dismiss. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Because the Complaint is somewhat difficult to understand and lacking in factual detail, it is necessary to rely on plaintiff's "Summary Statement" submitted to the New York State Workers' Compensation Board ("Compensation Board"), which provides clearer factual detail. See generally Summary Statement — Peter Ridgway ("Summary Statement"), Ex. D to Def. Mem. This document is deemed "incorporated in[to the Complaint] by reference." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Complaint ("Compl.") at 1 (citing "Worker's Compensation records").
A. Procedural Background
On June 4, 2003, Ridgway filed a charge with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") alleging discrimination based on his disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the ADA. The NYSDHR dismissed Ridgway's claims on January 10, 2006. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") adopted the NYSDHR's findings, and issued a right-to-sue letter on March 6, 2006. Ridgway received this letter on March 14, 2006.
See Pro Se Complaint Form ("Compl. Form") at 4; State Division of Human Rights Complaint ("NYSDHR Complaint"), Ex. C to Def. Mem.
See Compl. at 16; Determination and Order After Investigation, Ex. E to Def. Mem. at 1-3.
See Compl. at 17; 3/6/06 Dismissal and Notice of Rights, Ex. F to Def. Mem.
See Compl. Form at 5.
While Ridgway's case was pending in the NYSDHR, he filed a claim with the Compensation Board on November 8, 2004, alleging that the Museum mishandled his workers' compensation claim, and retaliated against him and unlawfully terminated his employment because he sought workers' compensation.
See generally Compl.; Summary Statement.
On June 12, 2006, Ridgway filed this action against the Museum for discriminatory conduct in violation of the ADA on four grounds: first, for "[t]ermination of [his] employment," second, for "[f]ailure to accommodate [his] disability," third, for "[u]nequal terms and conditions of [his] employment," and fourth, for "[r]etaliation." Ridgway also alleges that he was denied leave in violation of the FMLA, and that the Museum retaliated against him for seeking and obtaining workers' compensation benefits. On January 3, 2007, the Compensation Board approved a settlement agreement between Ridgway and the Museum.
Compl. Form at 1, 3.
See Compl. at 6.
See id. at 1-2. Ridgway's Complaint also seems to allege that the Museum retaliated against him for seeking workers' compensation. See id. at 8, 14. However, in Ridgway's Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Opp. Aff." or "Affirmation in Opposition"), he states that he has "never alleged" and does not currently allege "retaliation in connection with [his] receipt of workers' compensation benefits." Opp. Aff. at 2.
See Opp. Aff. at 3; New York State Workers' Compensation Board Notice of Decision ("Board Decision"), Ex. G to Def. Mem.
B. Factual Background
Ridgway worked at the Museum from 1998 until January 31, 2003, when the Museum terminated his employment. He first worked as an intern and as ultimately as an Administrative Assistant in the Department of Greek and Roman Art. On September 20, 2002, Ridgway was "injured in a work accident." After a steam pipe burst in a storeroom containing the Museum's collection of Greek and Roman Art, Ridgway was told to "help transport a very large and very heavy table" to another floor of the Museum. Over the next few months, Ridgway experienced intense lower back pain and "muscle spasms and stiffness" that required him to rest at home, "substantially reduce [his] working hours," and "take regular breaks to lay on the floor" at work.
See Compl. at 1; 1/31/03 Letter from Richard M. Lefante, Deputy Chief Human Resources Officer, to Peter Ridgway ("1/31/03 Letter"), Ex. C to Compl.
See Compl. at 1, 3.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Summary Statement at 1.
Following the accident, Ridgway attempted to meet with one of his supervisors Dr. Carlos Picon to discuss how the Museum could accommodate his disability. On three separate occasions in October 2002, Ridgway approached Dr. Picon and each time Dr. Picon either "waved [Ridgway] away from his office" or "shouted" at him in an "unexpectedly hostile tone" that he was "too busy" to discuss any accommodations.
See Compl. at 7.
Id.
On November 14, 2002, Dr. Philip Robbins, an orthopedist, diagnosed Ridgway as having "lumbar derangement" and requested authorization for an MRI and physical therapy. In addition, Dr. Robbins ordered Ridgway to "work a maximum of 1/2 day." Ridgway gave this to the "Employee Benefits Department . . . that afternoon." In response, Ridgway's supervisor, Ms. Deborah Kuo, sent Ridgway a memorandum dated November 20, 2002 (the "11/20/02 Memorandum"), which stated that Ridgway "may not return to work at the Museum until [he] provides a note from [his] doctor that states that [he] may return to work without restrictions." In addition the 11/20/02 Memorandum stated that the Museum does not offer "part-time work to full-time staff because of a stated medical condition." According to the Complaint — and contrary to the 11/20/02 Memorandum — the Museum later claimed that it did offer Ridgway a part-time work schedule. However, Ridgway refutes this and claims that he was "never offered any part-time work schedule after [his] work injury." Ridgway further charges that the Museum's policy which "prohibits employees from working in any capacity if they have a health restriction of any kind" is facially discriminatory.
11/14/02 Letter from Dr. Philip Robbins to the Metropolitan Museum of Art ("11/14/02 Letter"), Ex. B4 to Compl. at 3.
11/14/02 Prescription from Dr. Philip Robbins for Peter Ridgway, Ex. B3 to Compl.
Compl. at 12.
11/20/02 Memorandum from Deborah Kuo to Peter Ridgway, Ex. D to Compl.
Id.
Compl. at 5.
Id. at 13.
After receipt of the 11/20/02 Memorandum, Ridgway went on "leave without pay." In December 2002, Ridgway went into the office to "check [his] email and review [his] messages." He was, however, unable to "log into the system" because his password was not recognized and his "user profile . . . had been deleted." Although the Museum communicated to Ridgway that his leave status would be maintained throughout most of January 2003, Ridgway alleges that his "termination was actively being carried out long before the museum" officially terminated his employment on January 31, 2003.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see also 1/7/03 Letter from Lefante to Ridgway, Ex. I to Compl.
Compl. at 15.
Ridgway also alleges that he was denied permission to apply for medical leave under the FMLA, that the Museum mishandled his application for workers' compensation benefits, and that the Museum retaliated against him for seeking and obtaining these benefits.
See id. at 1-2, 6. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction over Ridgway's FMLA or workers' compensation claims, as discussed infra, the factual allegations regarding these claims are omitted.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
A court may not dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) unless "'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" The task of the court is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Although "[g]enerally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to consideration of the complaint itself," "the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference." In addition, because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the factual allegations in Ridgway's Affirmation in Opposition and attached exhibits will be treated as part of his Complaint. When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts "accept all factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor." "While the pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice."
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2005)). Accord Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 920 (2007) ("A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.").
Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N. Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134.
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 152. Accord Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134 (holding that "[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion") (citing San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1996) for the proposition that it is permissible to consider the full text of documents partially quoted in the complaint, and Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991) for the proposition that it is permissible to consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and which are integral to the complaint).
See Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering pro se plaintiff's affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss in reviewing district court's dismissal of claim).
Ofori-Tenkorang v. American Int'l Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 2006).
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 2006).
B. ADA Disability Claims
1. Discrimination
The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating:
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
Under the ADA, a plaintiff raising an employment discrimination claim must establish that:
(1) his employer is subject to the ADA: (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse employment action because of his disability.
Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 747 (2d Cir. 2001). Accord Ryan v. Grae Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1998).
A plaintiff is considered disabled under the ADA if he has, or is regarded as having, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, such as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not plead "specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination." The complaint, however, must contain "at least, a short plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
Harewood v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., No. 02 Civ. 5511, 2003 WL 21373279, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2003).
A plaintiff has ninety days to file a complaint in the district court upon receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Two presumptions follow from this rule: first, that a mailed document is received three days after the date on which it is sent, and second, that a notice sent by a government agency is mailed on the date indicated on the notice. Nevertheless, this presumption may be rebutted by admissible evidence such as an affidavit or sworn testimony by the plaintiff, stating the actual date of receipt (or lack thereof). 2. Failure to Accommodate
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1996); Sousa v. NLRB, 817 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e); Sherlock, 84 F.3d at 525-26.
See Sherlock, 84 F.3d at 526.
See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Ridgway also brings claims under the ADA based upon defendant's denial of equal terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Although Ridgway checked off this box on the Pro Se Complaint Form, the allegations in his Complaint constitute part of Ridgway's failure to accommodate claim because both claims ultimately turn on Ridway's requests for accommodations. Therefore, only the failure to accommodate claim need be addressed.
A failure to accommodate claim requires plaintiff to allege facts showing: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) that an employer covered by the ADA had notice of his disability; (3) that, with reasonable accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.
See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. Retaliation
To establish a retaliation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show: "(1) he was engaged in protected activity. (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Failure to satisfy any of these prongs is fatal to a retaliation claim.
Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 2001).
C. Exhaustion of Remedies
As a precondition to filing an ADA claim in federal court, a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies and file a timely complaint with the EEOC. The Second Circuit has held, however, that "'claims that were not asserted before the EEOC may be pursued in a subsequent federal court action if they are reasonably related to those that were filed with the agency.'" "'A claim is considered 'reasonably related' if the conduct complained of would fall within the score of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made.'" The Second Circuit has characterized this exception as "essentially an allowance of loose pleading based on the recognition that EEOC charges frequently are filled out by employees without the benefit of counsel and that their primary purpose is to alert the EEOC to the discrimination that a plaintiff claims [he] is suffering."
Cf. Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Pres. Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, on other grounds as stated in Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684 (discussing the filing requirements for Title VII claim); see Santos v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 0120, 2001 WL 1568813, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2001) (finding that ADA has substantially the same subject matter jurisdiction requirements as Title VII).
Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 200-01 (quoting ' Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
D. FMLA Claims
Generally, there is a two-year statute of limitations for alleging a violation of the FMLA. Where the conduct underlying the FMLA claim is "willful," the time period is extended to three years. In both instances, the limitations period begins after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation.
Id. § 2617(c)(2).
See id. §§ 2617(c)(1)-(2).
E. Workers' Compensation Claims
"Where an employee has a remedy against his employer in proceedings under the Workers' Compensation Law, that remedy is exclusive." The exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Law is limited to claims for work-related injuries caused by an employer's negligence and to claims that an employer discriminated and/or retaliated against an employee because he or she "claimed or attempted to claim" workers' compensation benefits. "There is no cause of action for such claim[s] in the federal district court."
Williams v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 819 F. Supp. 214, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412, 416 (1984) ("[A]ll employer conduct that is regulated by the Workers' Compensation Law is subject to the protection of that law's exclusivity; if the employer violates any provision of the code, an employee's remedies cannot exceed those granted in the statutes.")).
See Patterson v. Salvation Army, 610 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43 (1st Dep't 1994) (holding that Workers' Compensation Law is an employee's exclusive remedy where the employer carried workers' compensation insurance and did not cause the injury intentionally).
N.Y. Workers' Comp. Law § 120. See also Martinelli v. Swissre Holding (N. Am.) Inc., No. 95 Civ. 10996, 1996 WL 125657, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1996).
Martinelli, 1996 WL 125657, at *3. An employee can, however, seek a remedy under the ADA based on the same disability as long as he does not allege common law negligence for work-related injuries or discrimination and/or retaliation because he sought workers' compensation benefits. See Schapiro v. New York City Dep't of Health, 179 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 4575, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2001) (Summary Order).
IV. DISCUSSION
1. Discrimination
A. ADA Claims
Ridgway has sufficiently alleged that his back injury constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA. As documented in the doctor's reports attached to his Complaint, Ridgway's back injury is a physiological condition that causes him severe pain. It can further be inferred from the pleadings that his back injury substantially limits the major life activities of working and of general mobility. Ridgway had difficulty commuting during rush hour, had to occasionally rest his back by laying on the floor at work, and his pain was aggravated by walking and using the subway steps. In addition, Ridgway has sufficiently alleged that he could "perform the essential functions of his job" if he were granted accommodations such as changes in his work schedule, the ability to attend physical therapy appointments during the day, and the ability to rest on the job.
See generally Exs. B1-10, to Compl.
See Summary Statement at 1-2.
See id.
Moreover he has alleged an adverse employment action resulting from his disability. In mid-November, Ridgway was prohibited from returning to work until he provided "adequate medical documentation" that he could "return to work without restrictions." Ridgway's doctor provided notice that he was only able to work a half day, but the Museum refused to accommodate plaintiff's request for a limited work schedule. He was repeatedly rebuffed by his supervisor in attempting to discuss his disability and reasonable accommodations that could be made. As a result, the Museum terminated Ridgway's employment while he was on leave without pay status because his injury prevented him from returning to work without restrictions.
See 11/20/02 Memorandum.
See id.; see also 11/14/02 Letter.
See Compl. at 7.
See 1/31/03 Letter. The letter also states that Ridgway was terminated because he failed to provide the Museum with the "medical certification" that was required for Ridgway to receive family medical leave. Ridgway disputes this charge and raises this issue in his Complaint. However, because this Court does not have jurisdiction over Ridgway's FMLA claims, the relevant factual allegations are omitted.
2. Failure to Accommodate
Ridgway has also pled sufficient facts to indicate that the Museum failed to accommodate his disability. The Museum clearly had notice of Ridgway's disability, and at this early stage of the proceedings the Court must accept as true plaintiff's allegation that with reasonable accommodation — such as work schedule changes — he could perform his job. Ridgway has also alleged that the Museum refused to discuss or implement these accommodations.
See Compl. at 7; 11/20/02 Memorandum.
See Compl. at 7.
3. Retaliation
Ridgway alleges that he sought reasonable accommodation of his disability, which constitutes protected activity under the ADA. Moreover, Ridgway has pled sufficient facts to indicate that the Museum was aware of his attempts to seek such accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment action when the Museum fired him. With regard to the fourth element, Ridgway has pled sufficient facts to indicate a causal connection between his requests to obtain disability accommodation and the termination of his employment. As such, Ridgway has established a cognizable claim of retaliation under the ADA.
See Weixel v. Board of Educ. of N. Y., 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Mutter v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 311 (2d Cir. 1999)). Ridgway's Complaint also seems to allege retaliation based on the fact that he sought workers' compensation benefits; however, Ridgway emphatically denies this in his Affirmation in Opposition to the instant motion. See Opp. Aff. at 2. Moreover, as discussed below, even if Ridgway is alleging that he was retaliated against for seeking workers' compensation, that claim would be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Compl. at 7, 12; 11/20/02 Memorandum.
See Compl. at 1.
See id. at 5, 15.
In addition Ridgway's allegations are sufficient to meet the "reasonably related" test and are thus properly before this Court. Although Ridgway did not mark the box labeled retaliation on the EEOC complaint form, the allegations include the fact that he engaged in protected conduct ( i.e., he requested "disability accommodations") and that these requests and subsequent denials were part of the basis for his termination. These facts could have sufficiently apprised the EEOC of the presence of retaliation and can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of disability discrimination and subsequent termination. Thus, Ridgway's EEOC charges are reasonably related to his ADA retaliation claim.
See Deravin, 335 F.3d at 200-01. Although the allegation of retaliation occurred before Ridgway filed his EEOC charge, the Second Circuit held in Francis v. City of New York that the "'reasonably related' test is not limited to plaintiffs alleging post-charge conduct" as long as the plaintiff, as in this case, can still meet the reasonably related standard. 235 F.3d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 2000).
See NYSDHR Complaint at supplemental page. See also Deravin, 335 F.3d at 201 ("In determining whether claims are reasonably related, the focus should be 'on the factual allegations made in the [EEOC] charge itself, describing the discriminatory conduct about which a plaintiff is grieving.'") (quoting Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 2002)); Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[I]t is the substance of the charge and not its label that controls.").
B. Ridgway's ADA Claim Was Timely Filed
If this Court applies the presumption that the EEOC mailed Ridgway's right-to-sue letter on the date typed on the letter (March 6, 2006), and further presumes that Ridgway received this letter three days later, on March 9, 2006, then his claim would be untimely filed by five days. However, on Ridgway's Pro Se Complaint Form, he noted that he received the right-to-sue letter on March 14, 2006, in which case his Complaint would be timely. Because Ridgway's ADA claims are sufficiently pled, and because Ridgway's sworn complaint is sufficient to rebut the presumption that he received the right-to-sue letter on March 9, 2006, the Museum's motion to dismiss Ridgway's ADA claims as untimely is denied.
Ridgway filed the instant Complaint on June 12, 2006. See Compl. Form at 1. If the limitations period began to run on March 9, 2006, he would have had until June 7, 2006 to file a timely complaint. See Toliver v. Sullivan, 841 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that in the case of a pro se litigant, the timeliness of the complaint is measured from the date of receipt by the clerk's office).
See Compl. Form at 5.
See Sherlock, 84 F.3d at 526.
C. Ridgway's FMLA Claim Is Time-Barred
Ridgway's FMLA claim is time-barred because it was not filed until June 12, 2006 — over three years and four months after the Museum terminated his employment on January 31, 2003.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). Even assuming that defendant's action amounted to a "willful violation," which would afford Ridgway the maximum three-year filing time under the statute, he is still four months outside of the limitations period. Id. § 2617(c)(2).
D. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Hear Ridgway's Workers' Compensation Claims
On January 3, 2007, the Compensation Board approved a settlement agreement between the parties based on Ridgway's allegations that the Museum mishandled his workers' compensation claim, retaliated against him, and unlawfully terminated his employment because he sought and obtained workers' compensation. The N.Y. Worker's Comp. Law provides an "exclusive remed[y]" to employees on these matters. To the extent that the instant Complaint contains allegations of retaliation because Ridgway sought workers' compensation, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear these claims.
See Opp. Aff. at 3; Board Decision.
Burlew, 63 N.Y.2d at 415.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted with respect to plaintiff's FMLA and workers' compensation claims; it is denied with respect to plaintiff's ADA claims. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [Document #12]. A conference is scheduled for April 24, 2007, at 4:30 p.m. in Courtroom 15C.
SO ORDERED: