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Richards v. Housing Authority of City & County of San Francisco

United States District Court, N.D. California
Jul 6, 2005
No. C 05-00136 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2005)

Opinion

No. C 05-00136 CRB.

July 6, 2005


ORDER DISMISSING CASE


Now before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Mercy Services Corporation and Mercy Housing California X (collectively "Mercy") on the grounds that plaintiff's claims are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. Also before the Court is defendant's motion for judicial notice and to declare plaintiff Larry Richards a vexatious litigant and plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and for extraordinary relief. After carefully considering all of the papers submitted by the parties, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion to dismiss and the motion for judicial notice for the reasons stated below. All other motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Mercy is the owner and operator the Rose Hotel in San Francisco. The Rose Hotel houses low-income individuals under the federal Section 8 Existing Housing Program. Richards became an occupant of Room 202 at the Rose on October 19, 2000, at a rent of $25/month. At that time he was offered a wheelchair accessible unit without a private bath. He declined it, however, in favor of Room 202 which is not wheelchair accessible but which has a private bath. On June 3, 2001, Richards made a request for accommodation. In response, he was offered a wheelchair accessible unit. He declined.

On January 10, 2003 Richards filed a complaint in the Northern District of California against Mercy alleging 14 causes of action. Richards v. Mercy, No. 03-165 (N.D. Cal. 2003), RJN Ex. A. The case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey White. In the case Richards alleged that Mercy was in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide him with disabled-accessible living accommodations (e.g. a roll-in shower, bay windows, cooking equipment, a washer/dryer in his room, a dishwasher, etc.). He also alleged harassment claims that are similar to the ones brought here.

Defendant has asked that this and several other documents in the public record be judicially noticed. The Court hereby GRANTS that motion.

Mercy filed a partial motion to dismiss the ADA claims on March 24, 2003. The motion was granted with leave to amend on the basis that Room 202 is not a public accommodation. See RJN Ex. B. Specifically, Judge White ruled that Richards had not alleged that his apartment was accessible to the public or that the common areas of the Rose Hotel were not ADA accessible. Id. Richards' retaliation and harassment claims were dismissed on the same basis. Id.

Judge White also warned Richards that his failure to file an amended complaint within 45 days would result in dismissal with prejudice. Thereafter, the court granted several extensions of the deadline to file an amended complaint. Rather than filing such a pleading, Richards instead filed two applications for temporary restraining orders and two motions for preliminary injunctions. All were denied. The case was finally dismissed with prejudice for Richards' failure to file an amended complaint on November 5, 2003.

On November 5, 2004, Mercy commenced eviction proceedings in state court against Richards for his failure to comply with conditions of his lease. In particular, Richards had failed to provide verification of his low-income status qualifying him for a housing subsidy, as required by his lease.

On January 10, 2005, Richards brought the instant action alleging 56 different claims for relief against 30 named defendants and dozens of doe defendants. Almost all of the claims in the caption of the complaint were not elaborated in the facts. Instead, the focus of the complaint was on preventing Richards' eviction.

The state eviction proceedings ultimately settled. Under the terms of the settlement, Richards was allowed to remain at the Rose Hotel and Mercy agreed that he would be offered the first wheelchair-accessible unit that becomes available. See Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exh. I. Richards, however, did not dismiss the current lawsuit.

On April 22, this Court dismissed all claims against the City and County of San Francisco, the Housing Authority, and all the employees of those entities. The day before, Richards had filed a "Clarification of Claims with Examples of Discrimination," which apparently was intended to function as an amended complaint. His claims in that filing surround the Rose Hotel's alleged failure to provide ADA-complaint disabled-accessible living accommodations (e.g. a roll-in shower and accessible windows), Mercy's harassment of him in violation of various federal laws, and their alleged fraudulent misrepresentations to the federal government that they had complied with those rules.

On March 26, 2004, Richards filed a complaint with HUD alleging that Mercy was violating various provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and the Fair Housing Act. The complaint was dismissed on August 16, 2004.

DISCUSSION

I. Res Judicata

"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised could have been raised in a prior action" and applies where there is "(1) an identity of claim, (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties." Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotations removed).

The present action is barred under res judicata because all three conditions are met. The Ninth Circuit has identified four factors to determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata:

(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action: (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
In re Imperial Corp. of America, 92 F.3d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the claims in the two cases are obviously the same. The remaining claims in Richards' suit before this Court allege violations of his rights under the ADA due to Mercy's alleged failure to provide him with accessible accommodations and their alleged retaliation against him for asserting his ADA rights. Further, although Richards alleges here several causes of action that he did not include in his prior lawsuit, all of the facts contained in his filings before this Court concern Mercy's failure to provide him with accommodations as well as their having allegedly engaged in harassment and retaliation. Richards cannot escape res judicata by recasting the same dispute under different legal theories. See Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir. 1992); McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1986).

One example of Mr. Richards' reformulation of the same claim under an ostensibly new theory is his claim that defendants defrauded the federal government by allegedly misrepresenting the accommodations available at the Rose Hotel. The Court notes that even if this claim were not barred by res judicata, it would be dismissed nonetheless because Richards has not demonstrated standing to bring such a claim and also because it is apparently a fraud claim under state law over which this Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

Second, there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit. "The phrase `final judgment on the merits' is often used interchangeably with `dismissal with prejudice.'" Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956. A dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as "an adjudication upon the merits," under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and therefore qualifies as "a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata." Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 714 (9th Cir. 2001).

Third, and finally, the parties to both lawsuits are the same. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted.

II. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

The Court need not rule on Mercy's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim since the Court has already dismissed the case on res judicata grounds.

III. Motion to Declare Richards a Vexatious Litigant

The Court does not find that Mr. Richard's litigation conduct to date merits the strong sanction of a declaration that he is a vexatious litigant. The Court notes, however, that should Mr. Richards continue to file frivolous motions, then sanctions of this sort may be in order.

IV. Richards' Motion for Reconsideration

Richards asks this Court to reconsider its prior ruling denying emergency relief and enter an order for him to be moved into an allegedly accessible room at the Rose Hotel. Richards has provided no basis for granting the relief requested and the Court finds none. See Local Rule 7-9 (setting forth procedures and justifications for a motion for reconsideration). Therefore, the motion is denied.

V. Richards' Motion for Extraordinary Relief

Richards also asks that this Court personally visit the Rose Hotel to view the accommodations there. Because the Court finds this case should be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows:

1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

2. Defendant's motion to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigant is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

4. Plaintiff's motion for extraordinary relief is DENIED.

Therefore, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Richards v. Housing Authority of City & County of San Francisco

United States District Court, N.D. California
Jul 6, 2005
No. C 05-00136 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2005)
Case details for

Richards v. Housing Authority of City & County of San Francisco

Case Details

Full title:LARRY RICHARDS, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. California

Date published: Jul 6, 2005

Citations

No. C 05-00136 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2005)