Opinion
A102648.
11-26-2003
LARRY RICHARDS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN DYER, Defendant and Appellant.
On February 28, 2003, respondent Larry Richards applied for a temporary restraining order to prohibit appellant Jonathan Dyer from harassing him or Sophia Wong. The petition alleged that Dyer had assaulted Richards, that he had taken property belonging to Wong, and that he had manipulated the mentally disabled Wong. Dyer challenged the validity of the facts in this petition. On March 3, the trial court issued an order to show cause and a temporary restraining order precluding Dyer from harassing Richards. A March 21 hearing date was set. On March 7, the order to show cause and temporary restraining order were served on Dyer. On March 18, Dyer served his response, alleging that he acted in self-defense.
All subsequent dates refer to the 2003 calendar year.
On March 21, the trial court heard the application for a restraining order. Richards filed a declaration setting out additional facts in support of his petition. After hearing, the trial court issued a three-year injunction ordering Dyer to stay away from Richards and from Sophia Wong and her brother Simon Wong. Dyer appeals, contending that the underlying facts do not support issuance of the restraining order. We affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Dyer represents himself in pro. per. on appeal. In his brief, he contends that Richards obtained the restraining order by means of slander, libel, forgery and perjury. He challenges the sufficiency of evidence in support of the trial courts order. Much of his brief focuses on issues of his credibility and Richardss lack of it.
This is actually Dyers second appeal. His first—in which he purported to appeal on behalf of Sophia Wong, who is one of the people Dyer is restrained from contacting—was dismissed for failure to pay a filing fee and failure to file a docketing statement. (Appeal No. A102082.) He then filed the notice of appeal in the present appeal.
As a reviewing court, we must presume that a trial courts decision is correct. We indulge all intendments and presumptions in support of that decision on matters on which the record is silent. Dyer, as the appellant, must affirmatively show error occurred in the trial court in order to prevail on appeal. This is not simply a principle of appellate practice, but a fundamental aspect of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 440, 447; Shepherd v. Greene (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.)
On appeal, an appellant must provide an adequate record in order to demonstrate any claimed errors. (Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498, 502; see Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) In this matter, Dyer has elected not to provide us with a reporters transcript of the hearing on the petition for injunction. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.) On a partial record, we must presume that the missing aspects of the record that have not been provided to us would support the trial court in the face of Dyers claims of error. (See Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 447; Shepherd v. Greene, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 994.)
When, as here, the record on appeal consists solely of a clerks transcript, the normal presumption that the trial courts determination was correct takes on special significance. In such a case, we must conclusively presume that the evidence contained in the missing portions of the transcript would support the trial courts findings. (See Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154; see also Cosenza v. Kramer (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1102 [partial clerks transcript]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 518, pp. 562-564.) Thus, we must affirm the trial courts judgment.
Dyer also contends that the trial court was biased against him, based on comments that the judge made in court. As this claim of error is also based on the facts as they arose at the hearing on this matter, we must presume that the hearing transcript that Dyer has not provided us would support the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kay, P.J., Rivera, J.